In af9035_i2c_master_xfer, msg is controlled by user. When msg[i].buf
is null and msg[i].len is zero, former checks on msg[i].buf would be
passed. Malicious data finally reach af9035_i2c_master_xfer. If accessing
msg[i].buf[0] without sanity check, null ptr deref would happen.
We add check on msg[i].len to prevent crash.
Similar commit:
commit 0ed554fd769a
("media: dvb-usb: az6027: fix null-ptr-deref in az6027_i2c_xfer()")
Signed-off-by: Zhang Shurong <zhang_shurong@foxmail.com>
---
drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb-v2/af9035.c | 9 +++++----
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb-v2/af9035.c b/drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb-v2/af9035.c
index 1e9c8d01523b..33a2aa8907e6 100644
--- a/drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb-v2/af9035.c
+++ b/drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb-v2/af9035.c
@@ -322,6 +322,8 @@ static int af9035_i2c_master_xfer(struct i2c_adapter *adap,
ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
} else if ((msg[0].addr == state->af9033_i2c_addr[0]) ||
(msg[0].addr == state->af9033_i2c_addr[1])) {
+ if (msg[0].len < 3 || msg[1].len < 1)
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
/* demod access via firmware interface */
u32 reg = msg[0].buf[0] << 16 | msg[0].buf[1] << 8 |
msg[0].buf[2];
@@ -381,6 +383,8 @@ static int af9035_i2c_master_xfer(struct i2c_adapter *adap,
ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
} else if ((msg[0].addr == state->af9033_i2c_addr[0]) ||
(msg[0].addr == state->af9033_i2c_addr[1])) {
+ if (msg[0].len < 3)
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
/* demod access via firmware interface */
u32 reg = msg[0].buf[0] << 16 | msg[0].buf[1] << 8 |
msg[0].buf[2];
@@ -388,10 +392,7 @@ static int af9035_i2c_master_xfer(struct i2c_adapter *adap,
if (msg[0].addr == state->af9033_i2c_addr[1])
reg |= 0x100000;
- ret = (msg[0].len >= 3) ? af9035_wr_regs(d, reg,
- &msg[0].buf[3],
- msg[0].len - 3)
- : -EOPNOTSUPP;
+ ret = af9035_wr_regs(d, reg, &msg[0].buf[3], msg[0].len - 3);
} else {
/* I2C write */
u8 buf[MAX_XFER_SIZE];
--
2.30.2