Linus,

Please pull the latest perf/urgent Git tree from:

   git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip.git perf-urgent-2025-03-22

   # HEAD: 50a53b60e141d7e31368a87e222e4dd5597bd4ae perf/amd/ibs: Prevent leaking sensitive data to userspace

[ Merge note: I'm really sorry about this late fix for a late-breaking 
  local information leak regression on AMD CPUs that was introduced in 
  the v6.14 merge window. This is the full fix, and it was booted on 
  several AMD systems and ran a few hours in the perf syscall fuzzer - 
  but it's still less than a day old and carries a risk of regression 
  in itself. ]

Fix an information leak regression in the AMD IBS PMU code.

 Thanks,

	Ingo

------------------>
Namhyung Kim (1):
      perf/amd/ibs: Prevent leaking sensitive data to userspace


 arch/x86/events/amd/ibs.c | 84 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
 1 file changed, 78 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/events/amd/ibs.c b/arch/x86/events/amd/ibs.c
index c46500592002..e36c9c63c97c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/events/amd/ibs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/events/amd/ibs.c
@@ -941,6 +941,8 @@ static void perf_ibs_get_mem_lock(union ibs_op_data3 *op_data3,
 		data_src->mem_lock = PERF_MEM_LOCK_LOCKED;
 }
 
+/* Be careful. Works only for contiguous MSRs. */
+#define ibs_fetch_msr_idx(msr)	(msr - MSR_AMD64_IBSFETCHCTL)
 #define ibs_op_msr_idx(msr)	(msr - MSR_AMD64_IBSOPCTL)
 
 static void perf_ibs_get_data_src(struct perf_ibs_data *ibs_data,
@@ -1036,6 +1038,67 @@ static int perf_ibs_get_offset_max(struct perf_ibs *perf_ibs, u64 sample_type,
 	return 1;
 }
 
+static bool perf_ibs_is_kernel_data_addr(struct perf_event *event,
+					 struct perf_ibs_data *ibs_data)
+{
+	u64 sample_type_mask = PERF_SAMPLE_ADDR | PERF_SAMPLE_RAW;
+	union ibs_op_data3 op_data3;
+	u64 dc_lin_addr;
+
+	op_data3.val = ibs_data->regs[ibs_op_msr_idx(MSR_AMD64_IBSOPDATA3)];
+	dc_lin_addr = ibs_data->regs[ibs_op_msr_idx(MSR_AMD64_IBSDCLINAD)];
+
+	return unlikely((event->attr.sample_type & sample_type_mask) &&
+			op_data3.dc_lin_addr_valid && kernel_ip(dc_lin_addr));
+}
+
+static bool perf_ibs_is_kernel_br_target(struct perf_event *event,
+					 struct perf_ibs_data *ibs_data,
+					 int br_target_idx)
+{
+	union ibs_op_data op_data;
+	u64 br_target;
+
+	op_data.val = ibs_data->regs[ibs_op_msr_idx(MSR_AMD64_IBSOPDATA)];
+	br_target = ibs_data->regs[br_target_idx];
+
+	return unlikely((event->attr.sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_RAW) &&
+			op_data.op_brn_ret && kernel_ip(br_target));
+}
+
+static bool perf_ibs_swfilt_discard(struct perf_ibs *perf_ibs, struct perf_event *event,
+				    struct pt_regs *regs, struct perf_ibs_data *ibs_data,
+				    int br_target_idx)
+{
+	if (perf_exclude_event(event, regs))
+		return true;
+
+	if (perf_ibs != &perf_ibs_op || !event->attr.exclude_kernel)
+		return false;
+
+	if (perf_ibs_is_kernel_data_addr(event, ibs_data))
+		return true;
+
+	if (br_target_idx != -1 &&
+	    perf_ibs_is_kernel_br_target(event, ibs_data, br_target_idx))
+		return true;
+
+	return false;
+}
+
+static void perf_ibs_phyaddr_clear(struct perf_ibs *perf_ibs,
+				   struct perf_ibs_data *ibs_data)
+{
+	if (perf_ibs == &perf_ibs_op) {
+		ibs_data->regs[ibs_op_msr_idx(MSR_AMD64_IBSOPDATA3)] &= ~(1ULL << 18);
+		ibs_data->regs[ibs_op_msr_idx(MSR_AMD64_IBSDCPHYSAD)] = 0;
+		return;
+	}
+
+	ibs_data->regs[ibs_fetch_msr_idx(MSR_AMD64_IBSFETCHCTL)] &= ~(1ULL << 52);
+	ibs_data->regs[ibs_fetch_msr_idx(MSR_AMD64_IBSFETCHPHYSAD)] = 0;
+}
+
 static int perf_ibs_handle_irq(struct perf_ibs *perf_ibs, struct pt_regs *iregs)
 {
 	struct cpu_perf_ibs *pcpu = this_cpu_ptr(perf_ibs->pcpu);
@@ -1048,6 +1111,7 @@ static int perf_ibs_handle_irq(struct perf_ibs *perf_ibs, struct pt_regs *iregs)
 	int offset, size, check_rip, offset_max, throttle = 0;
 	unsigned int msr;
 	u64 *buf, *config, period, new_config = 0;
+	int br_target_idx = -1;
 
 	if (!test_bit(IBS_STARTED, pcpu->state)) {
 fail:
@@ -1102,6 +1166,7 @@ static int perf_ibs_handle_irq(struct perf_ibs *perf_ibs, struct pt_regs *iregs)
 		if (perf_ibs == &perf_ibs_op) {
 			if (ibs_caps & IBS_CAPS_BRNTRGT) {
 				rdmsrl(MSR_AMD64_IBSBRTARGET, *buf++);
+				br_target_idx = size;
 				size++;
 			}
 			if (ibs_caps & IBS_CAPS_OPDATA4) {
@@ -1128,16 +1193,20 @@ static int perf_ibs_handle_irq(struct perf_ibs *perf_ibs, struct pt_regs *iregs)
 		regs.flags |= PERF_EFLAGS_EXACT;
 	}
 
-	if (perf_ibs == &perf_ibs_op)
-		perf_ibs_parse_ld_st_data(event->attr.sample_type, &ibs_data, &data);
-
 	if ((event->attr.config2 & IBS_SW_FILTER_MASK) &&
-	    (perf_exclude_event(event, &regs) ||
-	     ((data.sample_flags & PERF_SAMPLE_ADDR) &&
-	      event->attr.exclude_kernel && kernel_ip(data.addr)))) {
+	    perf_ibs_swfilt_discard(perf_ibs, event, &regs, &ibs_data, br_target_idx)) {
 		throttle = perf_event_account_interrupt(event);
 		goto out;
 	}
+	/*
+	 * Prevent leaking physical addresses to unprivileged users. Skip
+	 * PERF_SAMPLE_PHYS_ADDR check since generic code prevents it for
+	 * unprivileged users.
+	 */
+	if ((event->attr.sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_RAW) &&
+	    perf_allow_kernel(&event->attr)) {
+		perf_ibs_phyaddr_clear(perf_ibs, &ibs_data);
+	}
 
 	if (event->attr.sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_RAW) {
 		raw = (struct perf_raw_record){
@@ -1149,6 +1218,9 @@ static int perf_ibs_handle_irq(struct perf_ibs *perf_ibs, struct pt_regs *iregs)
 		perf_sample_save_raw_data(&data, event, &raw);
 	}
 
+	if (perf_ibs == &perf_ibs_op)
+		perf_ibs_parse_ld_st_data(event->attr.sample_type, &ibs_data, &data);
+
 	/*
 	 * rip recorded by IbsOpRip will not be consistent with rsp and rbp
 	 * recorded as part of interrupt regs. Thus we need to use rip from

The pull request you sent on Sat, 22 Mar 2025 21:56:22 +0100:

> git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip.git perf-urgent-2025-03-22

has been merged into torvalds/linux.git:
https://git.kernel.org/torvalds/c/183601b78a9b1c3da2b59f2bee915f97ba745c0b

Thank you!

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