io_uring/loop.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
Submitting SQEs through an io_uring BPF loop can trigger a NULL pointer
dereference in io_submit_sqes(), as shown by the following arm64 report:
[ 2049.380301] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000000
[ 2049.388788] pc : io_submit_sqes+0x48/0x6c4
[ 2049.389153] lr : bpf_io_uring_submit_sqes+0x10/0x1c
[ 2049.396310] Call trace:
[ 2049.396531] io_submit_sqes+0x48/0x6c4 (P)
[ 2049.396893] bpf_io_uring_submit_sqes+0x10/0x1c
[ 2049.397293] bpf_prog_1a2a95cb199202b5+0x3c/0x68
[ 2049.397699] bpf__io_uring_bpf_ops_loop_step+0x5c/0x94
[ 2049.398149] io_run_loop+0x70/0x2e4
[ 2049.398461] __arm64_sys_io_uring_enter+0xf0/0x710
[ 2049.398882] invoke_syscall+0x54/0x10c
[ 2049.399414] el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x40/0xe0
[ 2049.399829] do_el0_svc+0x1c/0x28
[ 2049.400125] el0_svc+0x38/0x1d0
[ 2049.400409] el0t_64_sync_handler+0xa0/0xe4
[ 2049.400779] el0t_64_sync+0x198/0x19c
io_uring_enter() dispatches to io_run_loop() before reaching the normal
submission path's io_uring_add_tctx_node() call. The loop only checks
whether the caller is allowed to run task work; it does not initialize
current->io_uring or associate the task with the ring. A BPF call to
bpf_io_uring_submit_sqes() then reaches io_get_task_refs(), which assumes
that current->io_uring is valid.
A ring created with IORING_SETUP_R_DISABLED, IORING_SETUP_SINGLE_ISSUER
and IORING_SETUP_DEFER_TASKRUN can be enabled by a different task that
has never used io_uring. Enabling the ring makes that task the submitter
without allocating its io_uring task context. Its first BPF-driven
submission of a pending SQE can therefore cause a kernel Oops.
Call io_uring_add_tctx_node() in io_run_loop() before invoking the loop
and propagate any initialization error. Do this before acquiring
uring_lock, since task context setup may acquire the same mutex. This
also establishes the task-to-ring association used for cancellation.
Fixes: 033af2b3eb19 ("io_uring: introduce callback driven main loop")
Signed-off-by: Yao Kai <yaokai34@huawei.com>
---
io_uring/loop.c | 5 +++++
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
diff --git a/io_uring/loop.c b/io_uring/loop.c
index bbbb6ef14e6a..c923cae6dfc7 100644
--- a/io_uring/loop.c
+++ b/io_uring/loop.c
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
#include "io_uring.h"
#include "wait.h"
#include "loop.h"
+#include "tctx.h"
static inline int io_loop_nr_cqes(const struct io_ring_ctx *ctx,
const struct iou_loop_params *lp)
@@ -84,6 +85,10 @@ int io_run_loop(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx)
if (!io_allowed_run_tw(ctx))
return -EEXIST;
+ ret = io_uring_add_tctx_node(ctx);
+ if (unlikely(ret))
+ return ret;
+
mutex_lock(&ctx->uring_lock);
ret = __io_run_loop(ctx);
mutex_unlock(&ctx->uring_lock);
--
2.54.0
On 9/22/26 07:54, Yao Kai wrote: ...> --- > io_uring/loop.c | 5 +++++ > 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) > > diff --git a/io_uring/loop.c b/io_uring/loop.c > index bbbb6ef14e6a..c923cae6dfc7 100644 > --- a/io_uring/loop.c > +++ b/io_uring/loop.c > @@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ > #include "io_uring.h" > #include "wait.h" > #include "loop.h" > +#include "tctx.h" > > static inline int io_loop_nr_cqes(const struct io_ring_ctx *ctx, > const struct iou_loop_params *lp) > @@ -84,6 +85,10 @@ int io_run_loop(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx) > if (!io_allowed_run_tw(ctx)) > return -EEXIST; > > + ret = io_uring_add_tctx_node(ctx); > + if (unlikely(ret)) > + return ret; > + Looks good in general, but can you move it a couple of lines up before io_allowed_run_tw()? Thanks > mutex_lock(&ctx->uring_lock); > ret = __io_run_loop(ctx); > mutex_unlock(&ctx->uring_lock); -- Pavel Begunkov
Submitting SQEs through an io_uring BPF loop can trigger a NULL pointer
dereference in io_submit_sqes(), as shown by the following arm64 report:
[ 2049.380301] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000000
[ 2049.388788] pc : io_submit_sqes+0x48/0x6c4
[ 2049.389153] lr : bpf_io_uring_submit_sqes+0x10/0x1c
[ 2049.396310] Call trace:
[ 2049.396531] io_submit_sqes+0x48/0x6c4 (P)
[ 2049.396893] bpf_io_uring_submit_sqes+0x10/0x1c
[ 2049.397293] bpf_prog_1a2a95cb199202b5+0x3c/0x68
[ 2049.397699] bpf__io_uring_bpf_ops_loop_step+0x5c/0x94
[ 2049.398149] io_run_loop+0x70/0x2e4
[ 2049.398461] __arm64_sys_io_uring_enter+0xf0/0x710
[ 2049.398882] invoke_syscall+0x54/0x10c
[ 2049.399414] el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x40/0xe0
[ 2049.399829] do_el0_svc+0x1c/0x28
[ 2049.400125] el0_svc+0x38/0x1d0
[ 2049.400409] el0t_64_sync_handler+0xa0/0xe4
[ 2049.400779] el0t_64_sync+0x198/0x19c
io_uring_enter() dispatches to io_run_loop() before reaching the normal
submission path's io_uring_add_tctx_node() call. The loop only checks
whether the caller is allowed to run task work; it does not initialize
current->io_uring or associate the task with the ring. A BPF call to
bpf_io_uring_submit_sqes() then reaches io_get_task_refs(), which assumes
that current->io_uring is valid.
A ring created with IORING_SETUP_R_DISABLED, IORING_SETUP_SINGLE_ISSUER
and IORING_SETUP_DEFER_TASKRUN can be enabled by a different task that
has never used io_uring. Enabling the ring makes that task the submitter
without allocating its io_uring task context. Its first BPF-driven
submission of a pending SQE can therefore cause a kernel Oops.
Call io_uring_add_tctx_node() in io_run_loop() before invoking the loop
and propagate any initialization error. Do this before acquiring
uring_lock, since task context setup may acquire the same mutex. This
also establishes the task-to-ring association used for cancellation.
Fixes: 033af2b3eb19 ("io_uring: introduce callback driven main loop")
Signed-off-by: Yao Kai <yaokai34@huawei.com>
---
io_uring/loop.c | 5 +++++
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
diff --git a/io_uring/loop.c b/io_uring/loop.c
index bbbb6ef14e6a..3d472b7827fa 100644
--- a/io_uring/loop.c
+++ b/io_uring/loop.c
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
#include "io_uring.h"
#include "wait.h"
#include "loop.h"
+#include "tctx.h"
static inline int io_loop_nr_cqes(const struct io_ring_ctx *ctx,
const struct iou_loop_params *lp)
@@ -81,6 +82,10 @@ int io_run_loop(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx)
{
int ret;
+ ret = io_uring_add_tctx_node(ctx);
+ if (unlikely(ret))
+ return ret;
+
if (!io_allowed_run_tw(ctx))
return -EEXIST;
--
2.43.0
On Wed, 23 Sep 2026 09:43:10 +0800, Yao Kai wrote:
> Submitting SQEs through an io_uring BPF loop can trigger a NULL pointer
> dereference in io_submit_sqes(), as shown by the following arm64 report:
>
> [ 2049.380301] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000000
> [ 2049.388788] pc : io_submit_sqes+0x48/0x6c4
> [ 2049.389153] lr : bpf_io_uring_submit_sqes+0x10/0x1c
> [ 2049.396310] Call trace:
> [ 2049.396531] io_submit_sqes+0x48/0x6c4 (P)
> [ 2049.396893] bpf_io_uring_submit_sqes+0x10/0x1c
> [ 2049.397293] bpf_prog_1a2a95cb199202b5+0x3c/0x68
> [ 2049.397699] bpf__io_uring_bpf_ops_loop_step+0x5c/0x94
> [ 2049.398149] io_run_loop+0x70/0x2e4
> [ 2049.398461] __arm64_sys_io_uring_enter+0xf0/0x710
> [ 2049.398882] invoke_syscall+0x54/0x10c
> [ 2049.399414] el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x40/0xe0
> [ 2049.399829] do_el0_svc+0x1c/0x28
> [ 2049.400125] el0_svc+0x38/0x1d0
> [ 2049.400409] el0t_64_sync_handler+0xa0/0xe4
> [ 2049.400779] el0t_64_sync+0x198/0x19c
>
> [...]
Applied, thanks!
[1/1] io_uring: initialize task context before running the BPF loop
commit: a3bdf68feecc57af5c11fb599f860ac9790ffad9
Best regards,
--
Jens Axboe
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