arch/riscv/kernel/patch.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
Commit 8718e5a3090b ("riscv: patch: skip fixmap mapping when kernel text
is already writable") gated the core_kernel_text() branch of patch_map()
on CONFIG_STRICT_KERNEL_RWX, and explicitly left the vmalloc branch
unchanged. That branch has a separate problem.
That branch only creates a temporary writable fixmap alias when
CONFIG_STRICT_MODULE_RWX is enabled, and otherwise assumes the target is
directly writable and returns the address unchanged. That assumption no
longer holds: bpf_prog_pack_alloc calls set_memory_rox() on every pack
unconditionally in alloc_new_pack(), independently of any
CONFIG_STRICT_*_RWX option, so BPF text in the vmalloc area is read-only
regardless of what CONFIG_STRICT_MODULE_RWX says.
With CONFIG_STRICT_MODULE_RWX=n, patch_map() returns the read-only
address directly, the subsequent copy_to_kernel_nofault() takes a
page fault and returns -EFAULT. bpf_arch_text_copy() turns that into
-EINVAL, which propagates through bpf_jit_binary_pack_finalize() to the
WARN_ON() in bpf_int_jit_compile() and leaves the program un-JITed.
Note that BPF cannot be fixed the way kprobes was in
commit bdc46e507b59 ("riscv: mm: make EXECMEM_KPROBES writable without
CONFIG_STRICT_MODULE_RWX"). EXECMEM_BPF is already PAGE_KERNEL, i.e.
writable at allocation time; the read-only mapping is established
afterwards by generic code in alloc_new_pack(), which arch code cannot
influence. The only place this can be handled is patch_map().
This is the same problem that was fixed on arm64 by commit b1480ed230ac
("arm64: patching: fix handling of execmem addresses"), and the fix is
the same: CONFIG_EXECMEM is what actually tracks whether the vmalloc
area can hold executable memory that needs a temporary alias to be
written. CONFIG_BPF_JIT, CONFIG_KPROBES and CONFIG_MODULES all select
it.
Note that this is not limited to CONFIG_MODULES=n. Unlike arm64, riscv
selects CONFIG_ARCH_OPTIONAL_KERNEL_RWX, so CONFIG_STRICT_MODULE_RWX can
be disabled with CONFIG_MODULES=y as well, and the bug is reachable in
that configuration too.
The !CONFIG_MMU build is unaffected: it has its own __patch_insn_set()
and __patch_insn_write() implementations and never calls patch_map().
Fixes: 2c9e5d4a0082 ("bpf: remove CONFIG_BPF_JIT dependency on CONFIG_MODULES of")
Signed-off-by: Wei-Jie Hung <imbigking12@gmail.com>
---
Based on riscv/fixes (b94cec5761d2).
Reproduced on qemu-system-riscv64 -M virt with CONFIG_BPF_JIT=y,
CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON=y and CONFIG_STRICT_MODULE_RWX=n.
ptp_classifier_init() builds a cBPF filter from sock_init(),
so the failure happens during boot without any userspace involved:
WARNING: arch/riscv/net/bpf_jit_core.c:156 at bpf_int_jit_compile+0x3dc/0x43e
Call Trace:
bpf_int_jit_compile+0x3dc/0x43e
__bpf_prog_select_runtime+0xec/0x186
bpf_prog_select_runtime+0x12/0x1a
bpf_prepare_filter+0x368/0x46a
bpf_prog_create+0x66/0x90
ptp_classifier_init+0x3e/0x60
sock_init+0xc4/0xe6
do_one_initcall+0x78/0x14a
kernel BUG at net/core/ptp_classifier.c:227!
Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt
The BUG_ON() is reached because CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON=y turns the
silent interpreter fallback into -ENOTSUPP. With
CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON=n the failure is silent: writing 1 to
/proc/sys/net/core/bpf_jit_enable and loading any program reproduces the
same warning, but the program simply falls back to the interpreter and
the kernel keeps running.
Tested with CONFIG_BPF_JIT=y:
- CONFIG_MODULES=n, CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON=y:
panics before this patch, boots after
- CONFIG_MODULES=y, CONFIG_STRICT_MODULE_RWX=n,
CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON=y: same panic before this patch, boots after
- CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON=n: the warning above is emitted when a
program is loaded from userspace before this patch, and gone after
- riscv defconfig (CONFIG_STRICT_MODULE_RWX=y): unaffected, boots
before and after
- kprobes (kretprobe on __riscv_sys_openat via kprobe_events):
works before and after this patch
arch/riscv/kernel/patch.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/arch/riscv/kernel/patch.c b/arch/riscv/kernel/patch.c
index 2239c28981bc..2b5adf01c550 100644
--- a/arch/riscv/kernel/patch.c
+++ b/arch/riscv/kernel/patch.c
@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ static __always_inline void *patch_map(void *addr, const unsigned int fixmap)
if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_STRICT_KERNEL_RWX))
return addr;
phys = __pa_symbol(addr);
- } else if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_STRICT_MODULE_RWX)) {
+ } else if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EXECMEM)) {
struct page *page = vmalloc_to_page(addr);
BUG_ON(!page);
--
2.43.0
On 2026/9/14 19:56, Wei-Jie Hung wrote:
> Commit 8718e5a3090b ("riscv: patch: skip fixmap mapping when kernel text
> is already writable") gated the core_kernel_text() branch of patch_map()
> on CONFIG_STRICT_KERNEL_RWX, and explicitly left the vmalloc branch
> unchanged. That branch has a separate problem.
>
> That branch only creates a temporary writable fixmap alias when
> CONFIG_STRICT_MODULE_RWX is enabled, and otherwise assumes the target is
> directly writable and returns the address unchanged. That assumption no
> longer holds: bpf_prog_pack_alloc calls set_memory_rox() on every pack
> unconditionally in alloc_new_pack(), independently of any
> CONFIG_STRICT_*_RWX option, so BPF text in the vmalloc area is read-only
> regardless of what CONFIG_STRICT_MODULE_RWX says.
>
> With CONFIG_STRICT_MODULE_RWX=n, patch_map() returns the read-only
> address directly, the subsequent copy_to_kernel_nofault() takes a
> page fault and returns -EFAULT. bpf_arch_text_copy() turns that into
> -EINVAL, which propagates through bpf_jit_binary_pack_finalize() to the
> WARN_ON() in bpf_int_jit_compile() and leaves the program un-JITed.
>
> Note that BPF cannot be fixed the way kprobes was in
> commit bdc46e507b59 ("riscv: mm: make EXECMEM_KPROBES writable without
> CONFIG_STRICT_MODULE_RWX"). EXECMEM_BPF is already PAGE_KERNEL, i.e.
> writable at allocation time; the read-only mapping is established
> afterwards by generic code in alloc_new_pack(), which arch code cannot
> influence. The only place this can be handled is patch_map().
>
> This is the same problem that was fixed on arm64 by commit b1480ed230ac
> ("arm64: patching: fix handling of execmem addresses"), and the fix is
> the same: CONFIG_EXECMEM is what actually tracks whether the vmalloc
> area can hold executable memory that needs a temporary alias to be
> written. CONFIG_BPF_JIT, CONFIG_KPROBES and CONFIG_MODULES all select
> it.
>
> Note that this is not limited to CONFIG_MODULES=n. Unlike arm64, riscv
> selects CONFIG_ARCH_OPTIONAL_KERNEL_RWX, so CONFIG_STRICT_MODULE_RWX can
> be disabled with CONFIG_MODULES=y as well, and the bug is reachable in
> that configuration too.
>
> The !CONFIG_MMU build is unaffected: it has its own __patch_insn_set()
> and __patch_insn_write() implementations and never calls patch_map().
>
> Fixes: 2c9e5d4a0082 ("bpf: remove CONFIG_BPF_JIT dependency on CONFIG_MODULES of")
> Signed-off-by: Wei-Jie Hung <imbigking12@gmail.com>
> ---
> Based on riscv/fixes (b94cec5761d2).
>
> Reproduced on qemu-system-riscv64 -M virt with CONFIG_BPF_JIT=y,
> CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON=y and CONFIG_STRICT_MODULE_RWX=n.
> ptp_classifier_init() builds a cBPF filter from sock_init(),
> so the failure happens during boot without any userspace involved:
>
> WARNING: arch/riscv/net/bpf_jit_core.c:156 at bpf_int_jit_compile+0x3dc/0x43e
> Call Trace:
> bpf_int_jit_compile+0x3dc/0x43e
> __bpf_prog_select_runtime+0xec/0x186
> bpf_prog_select_runtime+0x12/0x1a
> bpf_prepare_filter+0x368/0x46a
> bpf_prog_create+0x66/0x90
> ptp_classifier_init+0x3e/0x60
> sock_init+0xc4/0xe6
> do_one_initcall+0x78/0x14a
>
> kernel BUG at net/core/ptp_classifier.c:227!
> Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt
>
> The BUG_ON() is reached because CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON=y turns the
> silent interpreter fallback into -ENOTSUPP. With
> CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON=n the failure is silent: writing 1 to
> /proc/sys/net/core/bpf_jit_enable and loading any program reproduces the
> same warning, but the program simply falls back to the interpreter and
> the kernel keeps running.
>
> Tested with CONFIG_BPF_JIT=y:
> - CONFIG_MODULES=n, CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON=y:
> panics before this patch, boots after
> - CONFIG_MODULES=y, CONFIG_STRICT_MODULE_RWX=n,
> CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON=y: same panic before this patch, boots after
> - CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON=n: the warning above is emitted when a
> program is loaded from userspace before this patch, and gone after
> - riscv defconfig (CONFIG_STRICT_MODULE_RWX=y): unaffected, boots
> before and after
> - kprobes (kretprobe on __riscv_sys_openat via kprobe_events):
> works before and after this patch
>
> arch/riscv/kernel/patch.c | 2 +-
> 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/riscv/kernel/patch.c b/arch/riscv/kernel/patch.c
> index 2239c28981bc..2b5adf01c550 100644
> --- a/arch/riscv/kernel/patch.c
> +++ b/arch/riscv/kernel/patch.c
> @@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ static __always_inline void *patch_map(void *addr, const unsigned int fixmap)
> if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_STRICT_KERNEL_RWX))
> return addr;
> phys = __pa_symbol(addr);
> - } else if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_STRICT_MODULE_RWX)) {
> + } else if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EXECMEM)) {
> struct page *page = vmalloc_to_page(addr);
>
> BUG_ON(!page);
Reviewed-by: Pu Lehui <pulehui@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Pu Lehui <pulehui@huawei.com>
On Thu, Sep 17, 2026 at 6:32 PM Pu Lehui <pulehui@huawei.com> wrote:
>
>
> On 2026/9/14 19:56, Wei-Jie Hung wrote:
> > Commit 8718e5a3090b ("riscv: patch: skip fixmap mapping when kernel text
> > is already writable") gated the core_kernel_text() branch of patch_map()
> > on CONFIG_STRICT_KERNEL_RWX, and explicitly left the vmalloc branch
> > unchanged. That branch has a separate problem.
> >
> > That branch only creates a temporary writable fixmap alias when
> > CONFIG_STRICT_MODULE_RWX is enabled, and otherwise assumes the target is
> > directly writable and returns the address unchanged. That assumption no
> > longer holds: bpf_prog_pack_alloc calls set_memory_rox() on every pack
> > unconditionally in alloc_new_pack(), independently of any
> > CONFIG_STRICT_*_RWX option, so BPF text in the vmalloc area is read-only
> > regardless of what CONFIG_STRICT_MODULE_RWX says.
> >
> > With CONFIG_STRICT_MODULE_RWX=n, patch_map() returns the read-only
> > address directly, the subsequent copy_to_kernel_nofault() takes a
> > page fault and returns -EFAULT. bpf_arch_text_copy() turns that into
> > -EINVAL, which propagates through bpf_jit_binary_pack_finalize() to the
> > WARN_ON() in bpf_int_jit_compile() and leaves the program un-JITed.
> >
> > Note that BPF cannot be fixed the way kprobes was in
> > commit bdc46e507b59 ("riscv: mm: make EXECMEM_KPROBES writable without
> > CONFIG_STRICT_MODULE_RWX"). EXECMEM_BPF is already PAGE_KERNEL, i.e.
> > writable at allocation time; the read-only mapping is established
> > afterwards by generic code in alloc_new_pack(), which arch code cannot
> > influence. The only place this can be handled is patch_map().
> >
> > This is the same problem that was fixed on arm64 by commit b1480ed230ac
> > ("arm64: patching: fix handling of execmem addresses"), and the fix is
> > the same: CONFIG_EXECMEM is what actually tracks whether the vmalloc
> > area can hold executable memory that needs a temporary alias to be
> > written. CONFIG_BPF_JIT, CONFIG_KPROBES and CONFIG_MODULES all select
> > it.
> >
> > Note that this is not limited to CONFIG_MODULES=n. Unlike arm64, riscv
> > selects CONFIG_ARCH_OPTIONAL_KERNEL_RWX, so CONFIG_STRICT_MODULE_RWX can
> > be disabled with CONFIG_MODULES=y as well, and the bug is reachable in
> > that configuration too.
> >
> > The !CONFIG_MMU build is unaffected: it has its own __patch_insn_set()
> > and __patch_insn_write() implementations and never calls patch_map().
> >
> > Fixes: 2c9e5d4a0082 ("bpf: remove CONFIG_BPF_JIT dependency on CONFIG_MODULES of")
> > Signed-off-by: Wei-Jie Hung <imbigking12@gmail.com>
> > ---
> > Based on riscv/fixes (b94cec5761d2).
Not clear what tree this patch suppose to go to.
If it's bpf-next then pls respin with correct subj,
pw-bot: cr
>
> Reviewed-by: Pu Lehui <pulehui@huawei.com>
> Tested-by: Pu Lehui <pulehui@huawei.com>
and keep tags.
Thanks everyone.
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