drivers/usb/fotg210/fotg210-udc.c | 17 +++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
fotg210_set_feature(), fotg210_clear_feature() and fotg210_get_status()
use wIndex from the USB setup packet to index the fotg210->ep[] array
without verifying that the endpoint number falls below
FOTG210_MAX_NUM_EP (5). USB_ENDPOINT_NUMBER_MASK is 0x0f, so a
malicious host can issue a setup packet with wIndex 5..15, resulting in
an out-of-bounds array read. The resulting wild pointer is then
dereferenced in fotg210_set_epnstall() or fotg210_is_epnstall(), which
compute an MMIO register offset from ep->epnum and perform iowrite32
through it.
fotg210_clear_feature() is especially problematic: the out-of-bounds
access occurs at function entry (source-level) regardless of which
USB_RECIP_* case is taken, because the ep pointer is computed before the
switch statement.
Add upper-bound checks on the endpoint number derived from wIndex in
all three functions. Invalid endpoint numbers in clear_feature now
trigger fotg210_request_error() (STALL) instead of silently falling
through to fotg210_set_cxdone(). Also add the missing le16_to_cpu()
conversion for ctrl->wIndex in fotg210_get_status() to fix a sparse
endianness warning.
Fixes: b84a8dee23fd ("usb: gadget: add Faraday fotg210_udc driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Liu Chao <liuc63@xiaopeng.com>
---
drivers/usb/fotg210/fotg210-udc.c | 17 +++++++++++------
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/usb/fotg210/fotg210-udc.c b/drivers/usb/fotg210/fotg210-udc.c
index d9e024873..127a259c8 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/fotg210/fotg210-udc.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/fotg210/fotg210-udc.c
@@ -661,7 +661,7 @@ static void fotg210_set_feature(struct fotg210_udc *fotg210,
case USB_RECIP_ENDPOINT: {
u8 epnum;
epnum = le16_to_cpu(ctrl->wIndex) & USB_ENDPOINT_NUMBER_MASK;
- if (epnum)
+ if (epnum && epnum < FOTG210_MAX_NUM_EP)
fotg210_set_epnstall(fotg210->ep[epnum]);
else
fotg210_set_cxstall(fotg210);
@@ -677,8 +677,8 @@ static void fotg210_set_feature(struct fotg210_udc *fotg210,
static void fotg210_clear_feature(struct fotg210_udc *fotg210,
struct usb_ctrlrequest *ctrl)
{
- struct fotg210_ep *ep =
- fotg210->ep[ctrl->wIndex & USB_ENDPOINT_NUMBER_MASK];
+ u8 epnum = le16_to_cpu(ctrl->wIndex) & USB_ENDPOINT_NUMBER_MASK;
+ struct fotg210_ep *ep;
switch (ctrl->bRequestType & USB_RECIP_MASK) {
case USB_RECIP_DEVICE:
@@ -688,7 +688,12 @@ static void fotg210_clear_feature(struct fotg210_udc *fotg210,
fotg210_set_cxdone(fotg210);
break;
case USB_RECIP_ENDPOINT:
- if (ctrl->wIndex & USB_ENDPOINT_NUMBER_MASK) {
+ if (epnum >= FOTG210_MAX_NUM_EP) {
+ fotg210_request_error(fotg210);
+ break;
+ }
+ if (epnum) {
+ ep = fotg210->ep[epnum];
if (ep->wedged) {
fotg210_set_cxdone(fotg210);
break;
@@ -744,8 +749,8 @@ static void fotg210_get_status(struct fotg210_udc *fotg210,
fotg210->ep0_data = cpu_to_le16(0);
break;
case USB_RECIP_ENDPOINT:
- epnum = ctrl->wIndex & USB_ENDPOINT_NUMBER_MASK;
- if (epnum)
+ epnum = le16_to_cpu(ctrl->wIndex) & USB_ENDPOINT_NUMBER_MASK;
+ if (epnum && epnum < FOTG210_MAX_NUM_EP)
fotg210->ep0_data =
cpu_to_le16(fotg210_is_epnstall(fotg210->ep[epnum])
<< USB_ENDPOINT_HALT);
base-commit: 2f0c1cf72f4682178506f513bbf015e591b1aa4a
--
2.50.1
On Sun, Sep 13, 2026 at 2:05 PM Liu Chao <liuc63@xiaopeng.com> wrote:
> fotg210_set_feature(), fotg210_clear_feature() and fotg210_get_status()
> use wIndex from the USB setup packet to index the fotg210->ep[] array
> without verifying that the endpoint number falls below
> FOTG210_MAX_NUM_EP (5). USB_ENDPOINT_NUMBER_MASK is 0x0f, so a
> malicious host can issue a setup packet with wIndex 5..15, resulting in
> an out-of-bounds array read. The resulting wild pointer is then
> dereferenced in fotg210_set_epnstall() or fotg210_is_epnstall(), which
> compute an MMIO register offset from ep->epnum and perform iowrite32
> through it.
>
> fotg210_clear_feature() is especially problematic: the out-of-bounds
> access occurs at function entry (source-level) regardless of which
> USB_RECIP_* case is taken, because the ep pointer is computed before the
> switch statement.
>
> Add upper-bound checks on the endpoint number derived from wIndex in
> all three functions. Invalid endpoint numbers in clear_feature now
> trigger fotg210_request_error() (STALL) instead of silently falling
> through to fotg210_set_cxdone(). Also add the missing le16_to_cpu()
> conversion for ctrl->wIndex in fotg210_get_status() to fix a sparse
> endianness warning.
>
> Fixes: b84a8dee23fd ("usb: gadget: add Faraday fotg210_udc driver")
> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
> Signed-off-by: Liu Chao <liuc63@xiaopeng.com>
That's a good catch.
Reviewed-by: Linus Walleij <linusw@kernel.org>
Yours,
Linus Walleij
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