arch/arm64/include/asm/io.h | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
From: Zeng Heng <zengheng4@huawei.com>
Mapping a stack-top page via /dev/mem with PROT_NONE and then
reading that process's /proc/<pid>/cmdline triggers a spurious WARN
in ioremap_prot() through generic_access_phys():
WARNING: ./arch/arm64/include/asm/io.h:275 at generic_access_phys
Call trace:
generic_access_phys+0x1c8/0x228 (P)
__access_remote_vm+0x2b4/0x398
access_remote_vm+0x14/0x30
get_mm_cmdline+0xf8/0x2a0
proc_pid_cmdline_read+0x68/0x120
generic_access_phys() passes the protection derived from the user PTE
to ioremap_prot(). On arm64, a PROT_NONE mapping is represented by a
present-invalid PTE, so pte_present() still returns true and the
protection reaches ioremap_prot().
A PROT_NONE mapping does not have PTE_USER, causing the existing
WARN_ON_ONCE() in ioremap_prot() to fire even though this is a valid
user mapping. Execute-only mappings have the same issue and must not
be readable through this path either.
ioremap_prot() should therefore reject protection values without
PTE_USER without warning. This makes the access fail cleanly for
PROT_NONE and execute-only mappings while retaining the existing
user-protection contract.
Fixes: 8f098037139b ("arm64: io: Extract user memory type in ioremap_prot()")
Signed-off-by: Zeng Heng <zengheng4@huawei.com>
---
arch/arm64/include/asm/io.h | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/io.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/io.h
index 21c8e400107c..31e67f6bd4a7 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/io.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/io.h
@@ -272,7 +272,8 @@ static inline void __iomem *ioremap_prot(phys_addr_t phys, size_t size,
pgprot_t prot;
ptval_t user_prot_val = pgprot_val(user_prot);
- if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!(user_prot_val & PTE_USER)))
+ /* Reject PROT_NONE and exec-only */
+ if (!(user_prot_val & PTE_USER))
return NULL;
prot = __pgprot_modify(PAGE_KERNEL, PTE_ATTRINDX_MASK,
--
2.43.0
On Fri, 11 Sep 2026 09:58:59 +0800, Zeng Heng wrote:
> Mapping a stack-top page via /dev/mem with PROT_NONE and then
> reading that process's /proc/<pid>/cmdline triggers a spurious WARN
> in ioremap_prot() through generic_access_phys():
>
> WARNING: ./arch/arm64/include/asm/io.h:275 at generic_access_phys
> Call trace:
> generic_access_phys+0x1c8/0x228 (P)
> __access_remote_vm+0x2b4/0x398
> access_remote_vm+0x14/0x30
> get_mm_cmdline+0xf8/0x2a0
> proc_pid_cmdline_read+0x68/0x120
>
> [...]
Applied to arm64 (for-next/fixes), thanks!
[1/1] arm64: io: Reject non-user protection in ioremap_prot()
https://git.kernel.org/arm64/c/bb756b11ad63
Cheers,
--
Will
https://fixes.arm64.dev
https://next.arm64.dev
https://will.arm64.dev
On Fri, Sep 11, 2026 at 09:58:59AM +0800, Zeng Heng wrote: > diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/io.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/io.h > index 21c8e400107c..31e67f6bd4a7 100644 > --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/io.h > +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/io.h > @@ -272,7 +272,8 @@ static inline void __iomem *ioremap_prot(phys_addr_t phys, size_t size, > pgprot_t prot; > ptval_t user_prot_val = pgprot_val(user_prot); > > - if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!(user_prot_val & PTE_USER))) > + /* Reject PROT_NONE and exec-only */ > + if (!(user_prot_val & PTE_USER)) > return NULL; > > prot = __pgprot_modify(PAGE_KERNEL, PTE_ATTRINDX_MASK, Looks alright to me: Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> It would be good to get Sashiko's finding sorted out as well (pre-existing issue). I reckon that should go in the core code. -- Catalin
On Wed, Sep 16, 2026 at 01:35:12PM +0100, Catalin Marinas wrote: > It would be good to get Sashiko's finding sorted out as well > (pre-existing issue). I reckon that should go in the core code. Ah, that's getting fixed already: https://lore.kernel.org/all/e06e28a46c2a176238f03b5740df0913e57c2861.1788842306.git.rakukuip@gmail.com/ -- Catalin
On Fri, Sep 11, 2026 at 09:58:59AM +0800, Zeng Heng wrote:
> From: Zeng Heng <zengheng4@huawei.com>
>
> Mapping a stack-top page via /dev/mem with PROT_NONE and then
> reading that process's /proc/<pid>/cmdline triggers a spurious WARN
> in ioremap_prot() through generic_access_phys():
>
> WARNING: ./arch/arm64/include/asm/io.h:275 at generic_access_phys
> Call trace:
> generic_access_phys+0x1c8/0x228 (P)
> __access_remote_vm+0x2b4/0x398
> access_remote_vm+0x14/0x30
> get_mm_cmdline+0xf8/0x2a0
> proc_pid_cmdline_read+0x68/0x120
>
> generic_access_phys() passes the protection derived from the user PTE
> to ioremap_prot(). On arm64, a PROT_NONE mapping is represented by a
> present-invalid PTE, so pte_present() still returns true and the
> protection reaches ioremap_prot().
>
> A PROT_NONE mapping does not have PTE_USER, causing the existing
> WARN_ON_ONCE() in ioremap_prot() to fire even though this is a valid
> user mapping. Execute-only mappings have the same issue and must not
> be readable through this path either.
>
> ioremap_prot() should therefore reject protection values without
> PTE_USER without warning. This makes the access fail cleanly for
> PROT_NONE and execute-only mappings while retaining the existing
> user-protection contract.
>
> Fixes: 8f098037139b ("arm64: io: Extract user memory type in ioremap_prot()")
> Signed-off-by: Zeng Heng <zengheng4@huawei.com>
> ---
> arch/arm64/include/asm/io.h | 3 ++-
> 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/io.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/io.h
> index 21c8e400107c..31e67f6bd4a7 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/io.h
> +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/io.h
> @@ -272,7 +272,8 @@ static inline void __iomem *ioremap_prot(phys_addr_t phys, size_t size,
> pgprot_t prot;
> ptval_t user_prot_val = pgprot_val(user_prot);
>
> - if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!(user_prot_val & PTE_USER)))
> + /* Reject PROT_NONE and exec-only */
> + if (!(user_prot_val & PTE_USER))
> return NULL;
I was initially worried about getting an invalid PTE here which happened
to have PTE_USER set (e.g. as part of a swap entry), but it looks like
follow_pfnmap_start() returns -EINVAL if the PTE isn't present.
So I think this is ok, but I'll wait to see what Catalin thinks.
Will
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