include/linux/netdevice.h | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
From: Tristan Madani <tristan@talencesecurity.com>
Virtual network devices (ipvlan, macvlan, bonding) can enter legitimate
transmit recursion when combined with packet forwarding configurations
such as IPVS NAT. The existing XMIT_RECURSION_LIMIT (8) in
__dev_queue_xmit() detects and breaks these loops, but the allowed
depth is too high for KASAN-instrumented kernels: each recursion level
consumes significantly more stack due to KASAN inline instrumentation,
and the cumulative usage overflows the kernel stack before the limit
fires.
On x86_64, CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC doubles THREAD_SIZE from 16KB to 32KB
(KASAN_STACK_ORDER=1), but KASAN per-access checks inflate individual
function frames by roughly 2-3x. For an ipvlan L3 + IPVS NAT routing
loop, objdump measurements on a non-KASAN kernel show ~1.4KB of stack
consumed per recursion level (across 17 functions from __dev_queue_xmit
through the full IP output path and back). At KASAN ~2.3x inflation
factor that becomes ~3.3KB per level. Eight levels -- the current
limit -- consume ~26KB plus the initial call chain (~8KB), which
exceeds the 32KB KASAN stack. The overflow hits the VMAP_STACK guard
page and causes a non-recoverable kernel panic (BUG: stack guard page
was hit).
On non-KASAN kernels the same loop is safely caught by the existing
limit: the "Dead loop on virtual device" message fires and the packet
is dropped without any stack overflow.
Reduce XMIT_RECURSION_LIMIT to 4 when CONFIG_KASAN is enabled.
The deepest legitimate transmit recursion observed in the kernel
selftests is 5 levels of __dev_queue_xmit nesting, in VXLAN symmetric
routing topologies with VRF (vxlan_symmetric, vxlan_asymmetric):
__dev_queue_xmit(vrf) depth 1
__dev_queue_xmit(vlan-svi) depth 2
__dev_queue_xmit(bridge) depth 3
__dev_queue_xmit(vxlan) depth 4
__dev_queue_xmit(veth) depth 5
Since the recursion check fires when the counter exceeds the limit
(strictly greater than), a limit of 4 permits 5 levels of nesting
while blocking the 6th. At ~3.3KB per level, five levels consume
~16.5KB; combined with the ~8KB initial call chain, total usage is
~24.5KB -- well within the 32KB KASAN stack with ~7.5KB of margin.
A limit of 3 (v2/v3 of this patch) allows only 4 levels, which broke
the VXLAN symmetric selftests: the 5th __dev_queue_xmit call was
incorrectly dropped, as reported by Jakub Kicinski and the kernel test
robot.
The recursion path triggering this is:
__dev_queue_xmit -> dev_hard_start_xmit -> ipvlan_start_xmit
-> ipvlan_queue_xmit -> ipvlan_process_outbound -> ip_local_out
-> nf_hook (IPVS) -> ip_vs_in_hook -> ip_vs_nat_xmit -> ip_output
-> ip_finish_output2 -> neigh_resolve_output -> __dev_queue_xmit
Tested:
- KASAN kernel (6.8.12 x86_64): panic before fix, "Dead loop"
drop after fix (at recursion level 4 instead of 8).
- Non-KASAN kernel (6.8.12 x86_64): "Dead loop" drop both before
and after fix (no behavior change for production kernels).
- Measured max __dev_queue_xmit nesting depth via bpftrace in a
VXLAN symmetric cross-VLAN topology (VRF + VLAN + bridge + VXLAN +
veth underlay): 5 levels, confirming limit=4 is sufficient.
Fixes: 2ad7bf363841 ("ipvlan: Initial check-in of the IPVLAN driver.")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Tristan Madani <tristan@talencesecurity.com>
---
v4: Raise the KASAN limit from 3 to 4 after investigating the recursion
depth of VXLAN symmetric forwarding selftests. Measured max nesting
depth of 5 via bpftrace (VRF + VLAN + bridge + VXLAN + underlay),
which requires limit >= 4. Limit 3 (v2/v3) incorrectly dropped the
5th call, breaking cross-VLAN tests, as reported by Jakub Kicinski
and the kernel test robot.
v3: Resend as new thread per Jakub Kicinski request (no code change
from v2).
v2: Switch from per-driver recursion guard in ipvlan_core.c to
reducing the global XMIT_RECURSION_LIMIT under CONFIG_KASAN,
as suggested by Eric Dumazet.
https://lore.kernel.org/20260711204700.1760374-1-tristmd@gmail.com
v1: https://lore.kernel.org/20260711134732.1385563-1-tristmd@gmail.com
include/linux/netdevice.h | 4 ++++
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
diff --git a/include/linux/netdevice.h b/include/linux/netdevice.h
index 87cafc932e9e6..3ccd1e65bcd9e 100644
--- a/include/linux/netdevice.h
+++ b/include/linux/netdevice.h
@@ -3669,7 +3669,11 @@ struct page_pool_bh {
};
DECLARE_PER_CPU(struct page_pool_bh, system_page_pool);
+#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN
+#define XMIT_RECURSION_LIMIT 4
+#else
#define XMIT_RECURSION_LIMIT 8
+#endif
#ifndef CONFIG_PREEMPT_RT
static inline int dev_recursion_level(void)
--
2.47.3
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 3 potential
issue(s) to consider:
Critical: 0 · High: 1 · Medium: 2 · Low: 0
- [High] The new KASAN value XMIT_RECURSION_LIMIT=4
(include/linux/netdevice.h:3673) is sized as if…
- [Medium] The reduction is gated on the umbrella symbol CONFIG_KASAN
(include/linux/netdevice.h:3672), which is also set for…
- [Medium] The patch lowers only XMIT_RECURSION_LIMIT (to 4 under
CONFIG_KASAN) and leaves IP_TUNNEL_RECURSION_LIMIT at 5…
--
net: reduce XMIT_RECURSION_LIMIT under KASAN
This halves XMIT_RECURSION_LIMIT from 8 to 4 when CONFIG_KASAN is set, on
the grounds that KASAN-inflated stack frames overflow the 32KB KASAN stack
before the existing limit of 8 fires. The changelog states that a limit of
4 still permits the 5 levels of __dev_queue_xmit nesting used by the VXLAN
symmetric selftests, while a limit of 3 (v2/v3) broke them.
> diff --git a/include/linux/netdevice.h b/include/linux/netdevice.h
> index 87cafc932e9e6..3ccd1e65bcd9e 100644
> --- a/include/linux/netdevice.h
> +++ b/include/linux/netdevice.h
> @@ -3669,7 +3669,11 @@ struct page_pool_bh {
> };
> DECLARE_PER_CPU(struct page_pool_bh, system_page_pool);
>
> +#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN
> +#define XMIT_RECURSION_LIMIT 4
> +#else
> #define XMIT_RECURSION_LIMIT 8
> +#endif
[Severity: High]
Is the new value of 4 actually enough for the topology quoted in the
changelog?
The counter compared against XMIT_RECURSION_LIMIT is not a count of
__dev_queue_xmit() nesting only. dev_xmit_recursion() reads
softnet_data.xmit.recursion, and the tunnel and BPF helpers increment that
same counter:
include/linux/netdevice.h:
static inline bool dev_xmit_recursion(void)
{
return unlikely(__this_cpu_read(softnet_data.xmit.recursion) >
XMIT_RECURSION_LIMIT);
}
net/ipv4/ip_tunnel_core.c:iptunnel_xmit() {
...
dev_xmit_recursion_inc();
...
err = ip_local_out(net, sk, skb);
...
}
In the vrf -> vlan-svi -> bridge -> vxlan -> veth chain from the changelog,
vxlan_xmit_one() -> udp_tunnel_xmit_skb() -> iptunnel_xmit() adds one
increment between the 4th and the 5th __dev_queue_xmit(). All five devices
are IFF_NO_QUEUE, so each one also takes the check-and-increment branch in
__dev_queue_xmit(). Does the counter therefore reach 5 by the time
__dev_queue_xmit(veth) runs its check, making 5 > 4 true and sending the
packet to recursion_alert:
net/core/dev.c:__dev_queue_xmit() {
...
recursion_alert:
net_crit_ratelimited("Dead loop on virtual device %s (net %llu), fix it urgently!\n", ...);
rc = -ENETDOWN;
...
}
If so, the 5th level is dropped exactly as with the limit of 3 in v2/v3 that
the changelog says broke vxlan_symmetric/vxlan_asymmetric, and the KASAN
limit would need to be 5 or higher (or a counter dedicated to
__dev_queue_xmit nesting) for the documented worst case to pass.
The same extra unit of the shared budget is consumed by ip6tunnel_xmit() for
IPv6 tunnels, by the lwtunnel output/xmit/input paths, and by
__bpf_tx_skb() -> dev_queue_xmit(), so IPv6 and BPF-redirect variants of
these topologies would lose a level too.
[Severity: Medium]
Should the reduction key on CONFIG_KASAN, or on the KASAN modes that
actually grow stack usage?
CONFIG_KASAN is also set for Hardware Tag-Based KASAN, where neither the
stack size nor the per-frame usage changes:
arch/arm64/include/asm/memory.h:
#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC) || defined(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS)
...
#define KASAN_THREAD_SHIFT 1
#else
#define KASAN_THREAD_SHIFT 0
#endif
#define MIN_THREAD_SHIFT (14 + KASAN_THREAD_SHIFT)
lib/Kconfig.kasan:
config KASAN_STACK
bool "Stack instrumentation (unsafe)" if CC_IS_CLANG && !COMPILE_TEST
depends on KASAN_GENERIC || KASAN_SW_TAGS
So an arm64 CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS=y build keeps MIN_THREAD_SHIFT at 14 (the
same 16KB stack as a non-KASAN kernel) and cannot enable stack
instrumentation, yet the transmit recursion budget drops from 8 to 4. Does
that make dev_xmit_recursion() reject nesting depths that the
identically-sized non-KASAN kernel forwards, dropping packets with
-ENETDOWN / SKB_DROP_REASON_RECURSION_LIMIT via recursion_alert in
__dev_queue_xmit()? Would gating on CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC ||
CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS (or CONFIG_KASAN_STACK) be more accurate?
[Severity: Medium]
This change also leaves the tunnel limit and its comment out of sync.
include/net/ip_tunnels.h still says:
/* Recursion limit for tunnel xmit to detect routing loops.
* Unlike XMIT_RECURSION_LIMIT (8) used in the no-qdisc path, tunnel
* recursion involves route lookups and full IP output, consuming much
* more stack per level, so a lower limit is needed.
*/
#define IP_TUNNEL_RECURSION_LIMIT 5
On CONFIG_KASAN builds the quoted value of 8 is no longer correct, and the
documented ordering is inverted since 5 > 4. Both limits are compared
against the same counter through dev_recursion_level() /
dev_xmit_recursion(). Should the comment be updated, or should
IP_TUNNEL_RECURSION_LIMIT be made KASAN-aware as well?
Related to that: the generic check is only reached in the noqueue branch of
__dev_queue_xmit():
net/core/dev.c:__dev_queue_xmit() {
...
q = rcu_dereference_bh(txq->qdisc);
trace_net_dev_queue(skb);
if (q->enqueue) {
rc = __dev_xmit_skb(skb, q, dev, txq);
goto out;
}
...
}
GRE/ipip/sit devices are not IFF_NO_QUEUE, so a routing loop through them is
bounded only by IP_TUNNEL_RECURSION_LIMIT and still gets 6 nested levels of
the heaviest frames (full route lookup plus IP output) on a KASAN kernel.
Does the new limit have any effect on those loops, given that the changelog
describes stack overflow as the problem being closed?
--
Sashiko AI review · https://netdev-ai.bots.linux.dev/sashiko/#/patchset/20260902123040.2172805-1-tristmd%40gmail.com
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