net/iucv/af_iucv.c | 10 +++++++++- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
From: Bryam Vargas <hexlabsecurity@proton.me>
A connack can land between iucv_sock_wait() returning an error and the
sever at the end of iucv_sock_connect(): iucv_callback_connack() writes
IUCV_CONNECTED from the iucv tasklet with no socket lock, and lock_sock()
does not exclude it. The sever clears iucv->path and leaves the state, so
connect() fails on a socket still claiming a connection it no longer has,
and a later sendmsg() reaches iucv->path->msglim through the NULL pointer
inside iucv_below_msglim(). The sever runs on every failed classic
connect, O_NONBLOCK included.
Reconcile only that case, so an ordinary failed connect still returns the
socket to its pre-connect state. The sever is a barrier against a later
connack: iucv_path_sever() clears the path from iucv_path_table[] under
the lock the tasklet holds across dispatch.
Fixes: 18becbc5479f ("af_iucv: avoid left over IUCV connections from failing connects")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Bryam Vargas <hexlabsecurity@proton.me>
---
net/iucv/af_iucv.c | 10 +++++++++-
1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/net/iucv/af_iucv.c b/net/iucv/af_iucv.c
index ea047bab65e7..6fb0041c4c98 100644
--- a/net/iucv/af_iucv.c
+++ b/net/iucv/af_iucv.c
@@ -778,8 +778,16 @@ static int iucv_sock_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr_unsized *addr,
if (sk->sk_state == IUCV_DISCONN || sk->sk_state == IUCV_CLOSED)
err = -ECONNREFUSED;
- if (err && iucv->transport == AF_IUCV_TRANS_IUCV)
+ if (err && iucv->transport == AF_IUCV_TRANS_IUCV) {
iucv_sever_path(sk, 0);
+ /* A connack may have landed while the wait was unwinding; the
+ * path is gone, so the socket must not still claim it.
+ */
+ if (sk->sk_state == IUCV_CONNECTED) {
+ sk->sk_state = IUCV_DISCONN;
+ sk->sk_state_change(sk);
+ }
+ }
done:
release_sock(sk);
---
base-commit: a59f57e2aa127c5354168d2ec4bac920df1be4f4
change-id: 20260815-b4-disp-e1faf4b7-feddd1575cc2
Best regards,
--
Bryam Vargas <hexlabsecurity@proton.me>
This is an AI-generated review of your patch. The human sending this
email has considered the AI review valid, or at least plausible.
---
net/iucv: reconcile the socket state when connect() severs the path
When a classic AF_IUCV connect() fails and severs the path, the socket
could be left in IUCV_CONNECTED with iucv->path already NULL. The patch
adds a state reconciliation to IUCV_DISCONN right after iucv_sever_path()
so that a later sendmsg() does not walk the NULL path pointer.
> diff --git a/net/iucv/af_iucv.c b/net/iucv/af_iucv.c
> index ea047bab65e7c..6fb0041c4c987 100644
> --- a/net/iucv/af_iucv.c
> +++ b/net/iucv/af_iucv.c
> @@ -778,8 +778,16 @@ static int iucv_sock_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr_unsized *addr,
> if (sk->sk_state == IUCV_DISCONN || sk->sk_state == IUCV_CLOSED)
> err = -ECONNREFUSED;
>
> - if (err && iucv->transport == AF_IUCV_TRANS_IUCV)
> + if (err && iucv->transport == AF_IUCV_TRANS_IUCV) {
> iucv_sever_path(sk, 0);
> + /* A connack may have landed while the wait was unwinding; the
> + * path is gone, so the socket must not still claim it.
> + */
> + if (sk->sk_state == IUCV_CONNECTED) {
> + sk->sk_state = IUCV_DISCONN;
> + sk->sk_state_change(sk);
> + }
> + }
[Severity: Critical]
This isn't a bug introduced by this patch, but it should probably be
fixed at the same time. Does the same CONNECTED-with-NULL-path state
remain reachable from the HiperSockets receive path, so that the NULL
dereference described in the changelog survives?
afiucv_hs_rcv() matches sockets on the global iucv_sk_list by name only:
net/iucv/af_iucv.c:afiucv_hs_rcv() {
...
sk_for_each(sk, &iucv_sk_list.head) {
if (trans_hdr->flags == AF_IUCV_FLAG_SYN) {
...
} else {
if ((!memcmp(&iucv_sk(sk)->src_name,
trans_hdr->destAppName, 8)) &&
...
(!memcmp(&iucv_sk(sk)->dst_user_id,
trans_hdr->srcUserID, 8))) {
iucv = iucv_sk(sk);
break;
...
}
There is no check of iucv->transport, no check of iucv->hs_dev and no
network namespace check, and iucv_packet_type is registered globally in
afiucv_init() with dev_add_pack(&iucv_packet_type) and no .dev filter.
afiucv_hs_callback_synack() then only requires IUCV_BOUND before writing
the connected state:
net/iucv/af_iucv.c:afiucv_hs_callback_synack() {
if (!iucv || sk->sk_state != IUCV_BOUND) {
kfree_skb(skb);
return NET_RX_SUCCESS;
}
bh_lock_sock(sk);
iucv->msglimit_peer = iucv_trans_hdr(skb)->window;
sk->sk_state = IUCV_CONNECTED;
sk->sk_state_change(sk);
...
}
So a classic-transport socket that has only been bound, or one whose
connect() failed with the wait timing out or being interrupted (path
severed to NULL, state left at IUCV_BOUND, which the new code does not
reconcile), can end up at IUCV_CONNECTED with iucv->path == NULL.
Once that happens, iucv_below_msglim() dereferences the NULL path:
net/iucv/af_iucv.c:iucv_below_msglim() {
if (sk->sk_state != IUCV_CONNECTED)
return 1;
if (iucv->transport == AF_IUCV_TRANS_IUCV)
return (atomic_read(&iucv->skbs_in_xmit) < iucv->path->msglim);
...
}
and it is called from iucv_sock_poll():
if (sock_writeable(sk) && iucv_below_msglim(sk))
which the sk_state_change() above has just woken, as well as from
iucv_sock_sendmsg() via iucv_sock_wait(sk, iucv_below_msglim(sk), timeo).
iucv_sock_sendmsg() also reads iucv->path->flags:
if (((iucv->path->flags & IUCV_IPRMDATA) & iucv->flags) &&
and passes iucv->path to pr_iucv->message_send().
The changelog says:
The sever is a barrier against a later connack: iucv_path_sever()
clears the path from iucv_path_table[] under the lock the tasklet
holds across dispatch.
Is that statement complete? It holds for the classic iucv tasklet, where
iucv_tasklet_fn() holds iucv_table_lock across dispatch, but the
HiperSockets callbacks run from the netdev RX softirq under
bh_lock_sock() only, and are not excluded by iucv_table_lock.
Would it make sense to also check iucv->transport (and iucv->hs_dev)
in the afiucv_hs_rcv() socket lookup or in afiucv_hs_callback_synack(),
and/or to have iucv_below_msglim() and iucv_sock_sendmsg() test
iucv->path before dereferencing it?
--
pw-bot: cr
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