[PATCH bpf v3] bpf: Fix netns reference imbalance in conntrack kfuncs

Chengfeng Ye posted 1 patch 2 months ago
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_bpf.c | 72 +++++++++++++++++++++-----------
1 file changed, 48 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
[PATCH bpf v3] bpf: Fix netns reference imbalance in conntrack kfuncs
Posted by Chengfeng Ye 2 months ago
The opts argument of the BPF conntrack kfuncs can point to a shared
map value.  __bpf_nf_ct_lookup() and __bpf_nf_ct_alloc_entry() read
opts->netns_id separately when acquiring and releasing the network
namespace reference.

The reference imbalance can occur as follows:

  CPU 0                                  CPU 1
  read opts->netns_id (-1)
  skip get_net_ns_by_id()
                                         write opts->netns_id (id)
  read opts->netns_id (id)
  put_net(net) /* no matching get */

The reverse transition leaks the reference.  Repeating the unmatched put
can destroy a live namespace and crash later users.

The kernel reported:

  Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address
  KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x00000000000000e8-0x00000000000000ef]
  RIP: 0010:bpf_prog_test_run_xdp+0x52c/0x1700
  Call Trace:
   __sys_bpf+0x1662/0x50c0
   __x64_sys_bpf+0x73/0xb0
   do_syscall_64+0xf9/0x540
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
  Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception

Snapshot every input field of opts with READ_ONCE() before validating or
using it.  The netns_id snapshot keeps the namespace get/put pair
balanced, while the other snapshots keep the remaining options from
changing partway through an invocation.  The individual reads can still
observe an inconsistent combination during a concurrent update, but each
selected field value remains stable for that invocation.

Fixes: aed8ee7feb44 ("net: netfilter: Deduplicate code in bpf_{xdp,skb}_ct_lookup")
Fixes: d7e79c97c00c ("net: netfilter: Add kfuncs to allocate and insert CT")
Signed-off-by: Chengfeng Ye <nicoyip.dev@gmail.com>
---
Changes in v3:
- Inline the one-use reserved-byte READ_ONCE() checks instead of
  copying them into a local array.
- Reorder the new local declarations in reverse-xmas-tree order.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20260730082958.2065194-1-nicoyip.dev@gmail.com/ [v2]

Changes in v2:
- Snapshot l4proto, ct_zone_id, ct_zone_dir, and the reserved bytes in
  addition to netns_id, as requested in review.
- Rebase onto bpf/master.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20260729163141.213611-1-nicoyip.dev@gmail.com/ [v1]

Please queue this fix for stable kernels.

 net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_bpf.c | 72 +++++++++++++++++++++-----------
 1 file changed, 48 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_bpf.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_bpf.c
index f98d1d4b42c3..c2df7c948281 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_bpf.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_bpf.c
@@ -122,42 +122,54 @@ __bpf_nf_ct_alloc_entry(struct net *net, struct bpf_sock_tuple *bpf_tuple,
 	struct nf_conntrack_tuple otuple, rtuple;
 	struct nf_conntrack_zone ct_zone;
 	struct nf_conn *ct;
+	u8 ct_zone_dir = 0;
+	u16 ct_zone_id;
+	s32 netns_id;
+	u8 l4proto;
 	int err;
 
 	if (!(opts_len == NF_BPF_CT_OPTS_SZ || opts_len == 12))
 		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+
+	netns_id = READ_ONCE(opts->netns_id);
+	l4proto = READ_ONCE(opts->l4proto);
+	ct_zone_id = READ_ONCE(opts->ct_zone_id);
 	if (opts_len == NF_BPF_CT_OPTS_SZ) {
-		if (opts->reserved[0] || opts->reserved[1] || opts->reserved[2])
+		ct_zone_dir = READ_ONCE(opts->ct_zone_dir);
+		if (READ_ONCE(opts->reserved[0]) ||
+		    READ_ONCE(opts->reserved[1]) ||
+		    READ_ONCE(opts->reserved[2]))
 			return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
 	} else {
-		if (opts->ct_zone_id)
+		if (ct_zone_id)
 			return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
 	}
 
-	if (unlikely(opts->netns_id < BPF_F_CURRENT_NETNS))
+	if (unlikely(netns_id < BPF_F_CURRENT_NETNS))
 		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
 
-	err = bpf_nf_ct_tuple_parse(bpf_tuple, tuple_len, opts->l4proto,
+	err = bpf_nf_ct_tuple_parse(bpf_tuple, tuple_len, l4proto,
 				    IP_CT_DIR_ORIGINAL, &otuple);
 	if (err < 0)
 		return ERR_PTR(err);
 
-	err = bpf_nf_ct_tuple_parse(bpf_tuple, tuple_len, opts->l4proto,
+	err = bpf_nf_ct_tuple_parse(bpf_tuple, tuple_len, l4proto,
 				    IP_CT_DIR_REPLY, &rtuple);
 	if (err < 0)
 		return ERR_PTR(err);
 
-	if (opts->netns_id >= 0) {
-		net = get_net_ns_by_id(net, opts->netns_id);
+	if (netns_id >= 0) {
+		net = get_net_ns_by_id(net, netns_id);
 		if (unlikely(!net))
 			return ERR_PTR(-ENONET);
 	}
 
 	if (opts_len == NF_BPF_CT_OPTS_SZ) {
-		if (opts->ct_zone_dir == 0)
-			opts->ct_zone_dir = NF_CT_DEFAULT_ZONE_DIR;
-		nf_ct_zone_init(&ct_zone,
-				opts->ct_zone_id, opts->ct_zone_dir, 0);
+		if (ct_zone_dir == 0) {
+			ct_zone_dir = NF_CT_DEFAULT_ZONE_DIR;
+			opts->ct_zone_dir = ct_zone_dir;
+		}
+		nf_ct_zone_init(&ct_zone, ct_zone_id, ct_zone_dir, 0);
 	} else {
 		ct_zone = nf_ct_zone_dflt;
 	}
@@ -171,7 +183,7 @@ __bpf_nf_ct_alloc_entry(struct net *net, struct bpf_sock_tuple *bpf_tuple,
 	__nf_ct_set_timeout(ct, timeout * HZ);
 
 out:
-	if (opts->netns_id >= 0)
+	if (netns_id >= 0)
 		put_net(net);
 
 	return ct;
@@ -186,46 +198,58 @@ static struct nf_conn *__bpf_nf_ct_lookup(struct net *net,
 	struct nf_conntrack_tuple tuple;
 	struct nf_conntrack_zone ct_zone;
 	struct nf_conn *ct;
+	u8 ct_zone_dir = 0;
+	u16 ct_zone_id;
+	s32 netns_id;
+	u8 l4proto;
 	int err;
 
 	if (!opts || !bpf_tuple)
 		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
 	if (!(opts_len == NF_BPF_CT_OPTS_SZ || opts_len == 12))
 		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+
+	netns_id = READ_ONCE(opts->netns_id);
+	l4proto = READ_ONCE(opts->l4proto);
+	ct_zone_id = READ_ONCE(opts->ct_zone_id);
 	if (opts_len == NF_BPF_CT_OPTS_SZ) {
-		if (opts->reserved[0] || opts->reserved[1] || opts->reserved[2])
+		ct_zone_dir = READ_ONCE(opts->ct_zone_dir);
+		if (READ_ONCE(opts->reserved[0]) ||
+		    READ_ONCE(opts->reserved[1]) ||
+		    READ_ONCE(opts->reserved[2]))
 			return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
 	} else {
-		if (opts->ct_zone_id)
+		if (ct_zone_id)
 			return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
 	}
-	if (unlikely(opts->l4proto != IPPROTO_TCP && opts->l4proto != IPPROTO_UDP))
+	if (unlikely(l4proto != IPPROTO_TCP && l4proto != IPPROTO_UDP))
 		return ERR_PTR(-EPROTO);
-	if (unlikely(opts->netns_id < BPF_F_CURRENT_NETNS))
+	if (unlikely(netns_id < BPF_F_CURRENT_NETNS))
 		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
 
-	err = bpf_nf_ct_tuple_parse(bpf_tuple, tuple_len, opts->l4proto,
+	err = bpf_nf_ct_tuple_parse(bpf_tuple, tuple_len, l4proto,
 				    IP_CT_DIR_ORIGINAL, &tuple);
 	if (err < 0)
 		return ERR_PTR(err);
 
-	if (opts->netns_id >= 0) {
-		net = get_net_ns_by_id(net, opts->netns_id);
+	if (netns_id >= 0) {
+		net = get_net_ns_by_id(net, netns_id);
 		if (unlikely(!net))
 			return ERR_PTR(-ENONET);
 	}
 
 	if (opts_len == NF_BPF_CT_OPTS_SZ) {
-		if (opts->ct_zone_dir == 0)
-			opts->ct_zone_dir = NF_CT_DEFAULT_ZONE_DIR;
-		nf_ct_zone_init(&ct_zone,
-				opts->ct_zone_id, opts->ct_zone_dir, 0);
+		if (ct_zone_dir == 0) {
+			ct_zone_dir = NF_CT_DEFAULT_ZONE_DIR;
+			opts->ct_zone_dir = ct_zone_dir;
+		}
+		nf_ct_zone_init(&ct_zone, ct_zone_id, ct_zone_dir, 0);
 	} else {
 		ct_zone = nf_ct_zone_dflt;
 	}
 
 	hash = nf_conntrack_find_get(net, &ct_zone, &tuple);
-	if (opts->netns_id >= 0)
+	if (netns_id >= 0)
 		put_net(net);
 	if (!hash)
 		return ERR_PTR(-ENOENT);
-- 
2.43.0
Re: [PATCH bpf v3] bpf: Fix netns reference imbalance in conntrack kfuncs
Posted by Emil Tsalapatis 2 months ago
On Fri Jul 31, 2026 at 12:09 PM EDT, Chengfeng Ye wrote:
> The opts argument of the BPF conntrack kfuncs can point to a shared
> map value.  __bpf_nf_ct_lookup() and __bpf_nf_ct_alloc_entry() read
> opts->netns_id separately when acquiring and releasing the network
> namespace reference.
>
> The reference imbalance can occur as follows:
>
>   CPU 0                                  CPU 1
>   read opts->netns_id (-1)
>   skip get_net_ns_by_id()
>                                          write opts->netns_id (id)
>   read opts->netns_id (id)
>   put_net(net) /* no matching get */
>
> The reverse transition leaks the reference.  Repeating the unmatched put
> can destroy a live namespace and crash later users.
>
> The kernel reported:
>
>   Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address
>   KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x00000000000000e8-0x00000000000000ef]
>   RIP: 0010:bpf_prog_test_run_xdp+0x52c/0x1700
>   Call Trace:
>    __sys_bpf+0x1662/0x50c0
>    __x64_sys_bpf+0x73/0xb0
>    do_syscall_64+0xf9/0x540
>    entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
>   Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
>
> Snapshot every input field of opts with READ_ONCE() before validating or
> using it.  The netns_id snapshot keeps the namespace get/put pair
> balanced, while the other snapshots keep the remaining options from
> changing partway through an invocation.  The individual reads can still
> observe an inconsistent combination during a concurrent update, but each
> selected field value remains stable for that invocation.
>
> Fixes: aed8ee7feb44 ("net: netfilter: Deduplicate code in bpf_{xdp,skb}_ct_lookup")
> Fixes: d7e79c97c00c ("net: netfilter: Add kfuncs to allocate and insert CT")
> Signed-off-by: Chengfeng Ye <nicoyip.dev@gmail.com>

Reviewed-by: Emil Tsalapatis <emil@etsalapatis.com>

> ---
> Changes in v3:
> - Inline the one-use reserved-byte READ_ONCE() checks instead of
>   copying them into a local array.
> - Reorder the new local declarations in reverse-xmas-tree order.
>
> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20260730082958.2065194-1-nicoyip.dev@gmail.com/ [v2]
>
> Changes in v2:
> - Snapshot l4proto, ct_zone_id, ct_zone_dir, and the reserved bytes in
>   addition to netns_id, as requested in review.
> - Rebase onto bpf/master.
>
> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20260729163141.213611-1-nicoyip.dev@gmail.com/ [v1]
>
> Please queue this fix for stable kernels.
>
>  net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_bpf.c | 72 +++++++++++++++++++++-----------
>  1 file changed, 48 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_bpf.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_bpf.c
> index f98d1d4b42c3..c2df7c948281 100644
> --- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_bpf.c
> +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_bpf.c
> @@ -122,42 +122,54 @@ __bpf_nf_ct_alloc_entry(struct net *net, struct bpf_sock_tuple *bpf_tuple,
>  	struct nf_conntrack_tuple otuple, rtuple;
>  	struct nf_conntrack_zone ct_zone;
>  	struct nf_conn *ct;
> +	u8 ct_zone_dir = 0;
> +	u16 ct_zone_id;
> +	s32 netns_id;
> +	u8 l4proto;
>  	int err;
>  
>  	if (!(opts_len == NF_BPF_CT_OPTS_SZ || opts_len == 12))
>  		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
> +
> +	netns_id = READ_ONCE(opts->netns_id);
> +	l4proto = READ_ONCE(opts->l4proto);
> +	ct_zone_id = READ_ONCE(opts->ct_zone_id);
>  	if (opts_len == NF_BPF_CT_OPTS_SZ) {
> -		if (opts->reserved[0] || opts->reserved[1] || opts->reserved[2])
> +		ct_zone_dir = READ_ONCE(opts->ct_zone_dir);
> +		if (READ_ONCE(opts->reserved[0]) ||
> +		    READ_ONCE(opts->reserved[1]) ||
> +		    READ_ONCE(opts->reserved[2]))
>  			return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
>  	} else {
> -		if (opts->ct_zone_id)
> +		if (ct_zone_id)
>  			return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
>  	}
>  
> -	if (unlikely(opts->netns_id < BPF_F_CURRENT_NETNS))
> +	if (unlikely(netns_id < BPF_F_CURRENT_NETNS))
>  		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
>  
> -	err = bpf_nf_ct_tuple_parse(bpf_tuple, tuple_len, opts->l4proto,
> +	err = bpf_nf_ct_tuple_parse(bpf_tuple, tuple_len, l4proto,
>  				    IP_CT_DIR_ORIGINAL, &otuple);
>  	if (err < 0)
>  		return ERR_PTR(err);
>  
> -	err = bpf_nf_ct_tuple_parse(bpf_tuple, tuple_len, opts->l4proto,
> +	err = bpf_nf_ct_tuple_parse(bpf_tuple, tuple_len, l4proto,
>  				    IP_CT_DIR_REPLY, &rtuple);
>  	if (err < 0)
>  		return ERR_PTR(err);
>  
> -	if (opts->netns_id >= 0) {
> -		net = get_net_ns_by_id(net, opts->netns_id);
> +	if (netns_id >= 0) {
> +		net = get_net_ns_by_id(net, netns_id);
>  		if (unlikely(!net))
>  			return ERR_PTR(-ENONET);
>  	}
>  
>  	if (opts_len == NF_BPF_CT_OPTS_SZ) {
> -		if (opts->ct_zone_dir == 0)
> -			opts->ct_zone_dir = NF_CT_DEFAULT_ZONE_DIR;
> -		nf_ct_zone_init(&ct_zone,
> -				opts->ct_zone_id, opts->ct_zone_dir, 0);
> +		if (ct_zone_dir == 0) {
> +			ct_zone_dir = NF_CT_DEFAULT_ZONE_DIR;
> +			opts->ct_zone_dir = ct_zone_dir;
> +		}
> +		nf_ct_zone_init(&ct_zone, ct_zone_id, ct_zone_dir, 0);
>  	} else {
>  		ct_zone = nf_ct_zone_dflt;
>  	}
> @@ -171,7 +183,7 @@ __bpf_nf_ct_alloc_entry(struct net *net, struct bpf_sock_tuple *bpf_tuple,
>  	__nf_ct_set_timeout(ct, timeout * HZ);
>  
>  out:
> -	if (opts->netns_id >= 0)
> +	if (netns_id >= 0)
>  		put_net(net);
>  
>  	return ct;
> @@ -186,46 +198,58 @@ static struct nf_conn *__bpf_nf_ct_lookup(struct net *net,
>  	struct nf_conntrack_tuple tuple;
>  	struct nf_conntrack_zone ct_zone;
>  	struct nf_conn *ct;
> +	u8 ct_zone_dir = 0;
> +	u16 ct_zone_id;
> +	s32 netns_id;
> +	u8 l4proto;
>  	int err;
>  
>  	if (!opts || !bpf_tuple)
>  		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
>  	if (!(opts_len == NF_BPF_CT_OPTS_SZ || opts_len == 12))
>  		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
> +
> +	netns_id = READ_ONCE(opts->netns_id);
> +	l4proto = READ_ONCE(opts->l4proto);
> +	ct_zone_id = READ_ONCE(opts->ct_zone_id);
>  	if (opts_len == NF_BPF_CT_OPTS_SZ) {
> -		if (opts->reserved[0] || opts->reserved[1] || opts->reserved[2])
> +		ct_zone_dir = READ_ONCE(opts->ct_zone_dir);
> +		if (READ_ONCE(opts->reserved[0]) ||
> +		    READ_ONCE(opts->reserved[1]) ||
> +		    READ_ONCE(opts->reserved[2]))
>  			return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
>  	} else {
> -		if (opts->ct_zone_id)
> +		if (ct_zone_id)
>  			return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
>  	}
> -	if (unlikely(opts->l4proto != IPPROTO_TCP && opts->l4proto != IPPROTO_UDP))
> +	if (unlikely(l4proto != IPPROTO_TCP && l4proto != IPPROTO_UDP))
>  		return ERR_PTR(-EPROTO);
> -	if (unlikely(opts->netns_id < BPF_F_CURRENT_NETNS))
> +	if (unlikely(netns_id < BPF_F_CURRENT_NETNS))
>  		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
>  
> -	err = bpf_nf_ct_tuple_parse(bpf_tuple, tuple_len, opts->l4proto,
> +	err = bpf_nf_ct_tuple_parse(bpf_tuple, tuple_len, l4proto,
>  				    IP_CT_DIR_ORIGINAL, &tuple);
>  	if (err < 0)
>  		return ERR_PTR(err);
>  
> -	if (opts->netns_id >= 0) {
> -		net = get_net_ns_by_id(net, opts->netns_id);
> +	if (netns_id >= 0) {
> +		net = get_net_ns_by_id(net, netns_id);
>  		if (unlikely(!net))
>  			return ERR_PTR(-ENONET);
>  	}
>  
>  	if (opts_len == NF_BPF_CT_OPTS_SZ) {
> -		if (opts->ct_zone_dir == 0)
> -			opts->ct_zone_dir = NF_CT_DEFAULT_ZONE_DIR;
> -		nf_ct_zone_init(&ct_zone,
> -				opts->ct_zone_id, opts->ct_zone_dir, 0);
> +		if (ct_zone_dir == 0) {
> +			ct_zone_dir = NF_CT_DEFAULT_ZONE_DIR;
> +			opts->ct_zone_dir = ct_zone_dir;
> +		}
> +		nf_ct_zone_init(&ct_zone, ct_zone_id, ct_zone_dir, 0);
>  	} else {
>  		ct_zone = nf_ct_zone_dflt;
>  	}
>  
>  	hash = nf_conntrack_find_get(net, &ct_zone, &tuple);
> -	if (opts->netns_id >= 0)
> +	if (netns_id >= 0)
>  		put_net(net);
>  	if (!hash)
>  		return ERR_PTR(-ENOENT);
Re: [PATCH bpf v3] bpf: Fix netns reference imbalance in conntrack kfuncs
Posted by bot+bpf-ci@kernel.org 2 months ago
> diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_bpf.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_bpf.c
> --- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_bpf.c
> +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_bpf.c
> @@ -122,42 +122,54 @@ __bpf_nf_ct_alloc_entry(struct net *net, struct bpf_sock_tuple *bpf_tuple,
>  	struct nf_conntrack_tuple otuple, rtuple;
>  	struct nf_conntrack_zone ct_zone;
>  	struct nf_conn *ct;
> +	u8 ct_zone_dir = 0;
> +	u16 ct_zone_id;
> +	s32 netns_id;
> +	u8 l4proto;
>  	int err;
>
>  	if (!(opts_len == NF_BPF_CT_OPTS_SZ || opts_len == 12))
>  		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
> +
> +	netns_id = READ_ONCE(opts->netns_id);
> +	l4proto = READ_ONCE(opts->l4proto);
> +	ct_zone_id = READ_ONCE(opts->ct_zone_id);
>  	if (opts_len == NF_BPF_CT_OPTS_SZ) {
> -		if (opts->reserved[0] || opts->reserved[1] || opts->reserved[2])
> +		ct_zone_dir = READ_ONCE(opts->ct_zone_dir);
> +		if (READ_ONCE(opts->reserved[0]) ||
> +		    READ_ONCE(opts->reserved[1]) ||
> +		    READ_ONCE(opts->reserved[2]))
>  			return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
>  	} else {
> -		if (opts->ct_zone_id)
> +		if (ct_zone_id)
>  			return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
>  	}
>
> -	if (unlikely(opts->netns_id < BPF_F_CURRENT_NETNS))
> +	if (unlikely(netns_id < BPF_F_CURRENT_NETNS))
>  		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);

[ ... ]

>  	if (opts_len == NF_BPF_CT_OPTS_SZ) {
> -		if (opts->ct_zone_dir == 0)
> -			opts->ct_zone_dir = NF_CT_DEFAULT_ZONE_DIR;
> -		nf_ct_zone_init(&ct_zone,
> -				opts->ct_zone_id, opts->ct_zone_dir, 0);
> +		if (ct_zone_dir == 0) {
> +			ct_zone_dir = NF_CT_DEFAULT_ZONE_DIR;
> +			opts->ct_zone_dir = ct_zone_dir;
> +		}
> +		nf_ct_zone_init(&ct_zone, ct_zone_id, ct_zone_dir, 0);
>  	} else {
>  		ct_zone = nf_ct_zone_dflt;
>  	}

[ ... ]

> @@ -186,46 +198,58 @@ static struct nf_conn *__bpf_nf_ct_lookup(struct net *net,
>  	struct nf_conntrack_tuple tuple;
>  	struct nf_conntrack_zone ct_zone;
>  	struct nf_conn *ct;
> +	u8 ct_zone_dir = 0;
> +	u16 ct_zone_id;
> +	s32 netns_id;
> +	u8 l4proto;
>  	int err;
>
>  	if (!opts || !bpf_tuple)
>  		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
>  	if (!(opts_len == NF_BPF_CT_OPTS_SZ || opts_len == 12))
>  		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
> +
> +	netns_id = READ_ONCE(opts->netns_id);
> +	l4proto = READ_ONCE(opts->l4proto);
> +	ct_zone_id = READ_ONCE(opts->ct_zone_id);
>  	if (opts_len == NF_BPF_CT_OPTS_SZ) {
> -		if (opts->reserved[0] || opts->reserved[1] || opts->reserved[2])
> +		ct_zone_dir = READ_ONCE(opts->ct_zone_dir);
> +		if (READ_ONCE(opts->reserved[0]) ||
> +		    READ_ONCE(opts->reserved[1]) ||
> +		    READ_ONCE(opts->reserved[2]))
>  			return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
>  	} else {
> -		if (opts->ct_zone_id)
> +		if (ct_zone_id)
>  			return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
>  	}
> -	if (unlikely(opts->l4proto != IPPROTO_TCP && opts->l4proto != IPPROTO_UDP))
> +	if (unlikely(l4proto != IPPROTO_TCP && l4proto != IPPROTO_UDP))
>  		return ERR_PTR(-EPROTO);
> -	if (unlikely(opts->netns_id < BPF_F_CURRENT_NETNS))
> +	if (unlikely(netns_id < BPF_F_CURRENT_NETNS))
>  		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);

[ ... ]

>  	if (opts_len == NF_BPF_CT_OPTS_SZ) {
> -		if (opts->ct_zone_dir == 0)
> -			opts->ct_zone_dir = NF_CT_DEFAULT_ZONE_DIR;
> -		nf_ct_zone_init(&ct_zone,
> -				opts->ct_zone_id, opts->ct_zone_dir, 0);
> +		if (ct_zone_dir == 0) {
> +			ct_zone_dir = NF_CT_DEFAULT_ZONE_DIR;
> +			opts->ct_zone_dir = ct_zone_dir;
> +		}
> +		nf_ct_zone_init(&ct_zone, ct_zone_id, ct_zone_dir, 0);
>  	} else {
>  		ct_zone = nf_ct_zone_dflt;
>  	}

This isn't a bug, but both __bpf_nf_ct_alloc_entry() and
__bpf_nf_ct_lookup() now snapshot and validate the same five opts fields
in the same order with the same declarations (u8 ct_zone_dir = 0; u16
ct_zone_id; s32 netns_id; u8 l4proto;), and both carry the identical
zone-init block. The two functions now share about 25 lines of duplicated
code, and the patch grows each copy from roughly 8 lines to roughly 14.

Would it be worth factoring the snapshot and validation into a shared
helper so a future opts field only has to be handled once?  One of the
Fixes targets, aed8ee7feb44, was itself a de-duplication of similar code
in this file, so the direction of travel here has been toward sharing
rather than copying.


---
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