fs/fuse/dev.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
After a fatal signal interrupts synchronous FUSE_INIT,
request_wait_answer() aborts the channel and returns immediately. If the
request is in an FR_LOCKED reply-copy interval, fuse_chan_abort() leaves
it for the writer to finish. The synchronous caller can then free the
fuse_init_args that owns the reply destination while the writer is still
copying into it.
Wait for fuse_request_end() after aborting the channel. This keeps the
synchronous caller's reply storage alive until any locked copy has
finished, while preserving the fatal-signal abort behavior.
Fixes: 204aa22a686b ("fuse: abort on fatal signal during sync init")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Bug found and triaged by OpenAI Security Research and
validated by Trail of Bits.
Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5.6-sol gpt-5.5-cyber
Signed-off-by: Kyle Zeng <kylebot@openai.com>
---
Trail of Bits has a reproducer for this bug that triggers a
KASAN use-after-free and can share if needed.
fs/fuse/dev.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
diff --git a/fs/fuse/dev.c b/fs/fuse/dev.c
index 5763a7cd3..deee1585d 100644
--- a/fs/fuse/dev.c
+++ b/fs/fuse/dev.c
@@ -725,6 +725,8 @@ static void request_wait_answer(struct fuse_req *req)
if (req->args->abort_on_kill) {
fuse_chan_abort(fch, false);
+ wait_event(req->waitq,
+ test_bit(FR_FINISHED, &req->flags));
return;
}
--
2.53.0
On Fri, 31 Jul 2026 at 14:03, David Lee <david.lee@trailofbits.com> wrote:
>
> After a fatal signal interrupts synchronous FUSE_INIT,
> request_wait_answer() aborts the channel and returns immediately. If the
> request is in an FR_LOCKED reply-copy interval, fuse_chan_abort() leaves
> it for the writer to finish. The synchronous caller can then free the
> fuse_init_args that owns the reply destination while the writer is still
> copying into it.
>
> Wait for fuse_request_end() after aborting the channel. This keeps the
> synchronous caller's reply storage alive until any locked copy has
> finished, while preserving the fatal-signal abort behavior.
>
> Fixes: 204aa22a686b ("fuse: abort on fatal signal during sync init")
> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
> Bug found and triaged by OpenAI Security Research and
> validated by Trail of Bits.
>
> Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5.6-sol gpt-5.5-cyber
> Signed-off-by: Kyle Zeng <kylebot@openai.com>
Thanks for the report and patch.
I've committed an equivalent fix to fuse.git #for-next:
64b0b5cacbd2 ("fuse: wait for FR_FINISHED on abort_on_kill to prevent
use-after-free")
Thanks,
Miklos
On Friday, 31 July 2026 14:03:52 CEST David Lee wrote:
> Fixes: 204aa22a686b ("fuse: abort on fatal signal during sync init")
> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
> Bug found and triaged by OpenAI Security Research and
> validated by Trail of Bits.
>
> Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5.6-sol gpt-5.5-cyber
> Signed-off-by: Kyle Zeng <kylebot@openai.com>
1. weird text (advertisement) + newlines in the tags section which shouldn't be there
https://docs.kernel.org/process/submitting-patches.html#sign-your-work-the-developer-s-certificate-of-origin
(and all these tag/format related sections below)
2. author didn't sign off the patch (see below)
3. odd unrelated Signed-off-by without any obvious connection to
the patch
- I actually would guess that Kyle Zeng <kylebot@openai.com> is the author
and David Lee removed its authorship (From: ) before sending the patch.
But in its current form, David is claiming to be the author. And even
when it is the case, David must still add the the non-Author SoB at the
end.
Regards,
Sven
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