net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c | 8 ++++++++ net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c | 9 +++++++++ 2 files changed, 17 insertions(+)
A valid SYN that matches a TIME_WAIT socket is redirected to the
listener with a non-zero tcp_tw_isn. tcp_conn_request() deliberately
exempts those requests from normal SYN queue throttling. A peer can
therefore create victim-side TIME_WAIT entries with short connections,
replay valid reopen SYNs, and withhold the final ACK to allocate
request_sock objects outside the listener's normal SYN-flood controls.
Do not send syncookies for this path: tcp_timewait_state_process()
derives tcp_tw_isn from tw_snd_nxt so that a direct reopen uses an ISN
after the prior connection's sequence space. A syncookie ISN is a
hash-derived value and has no such ordering guarantee.
Check the selected listener's SYN queue before descheduling the
TIME_WAIT socket. If it is full, account a request-queue drop, retain
the TIME_WAIT socket, and discard the SYN. Once the queue has room,
the existing direct-reopen path and its TIME_WAIT ISN are unchanged.
Normal SYNs continue to use syncookies when the listener is full.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Yizhou Zhao <zhaoyz24@mails.tsinghua.edu.cn>
Reported-by: Yuxiang Yang <yangyx22@mails.tsinghua.edu.cn>
Reported-by: Ao Wang <wangao@seu.edu.cn>
Reported-by: Xuewei Feng <fengxw06@126.com>
Reported-by: Qi Li <qli01@tsinghua.edu.cn>
Reported-by: Ke Xu <xuke@tsinghua.edu.cn>
Assisted-by: Claude-Code:GLM-5.2-special
Signed-off-by: Yizhou Zhao <zhaoyz24@mails.tsinghua.edu.cn>
---
net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c | 8 ++++++++
net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c | 9 +++++++++
2 files changed, 17 insertions(+)
diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
index 209ef7522508fcc3974ae71d35dd66cba96b73d0..ddb5daede802d355b51b802b29b2e1ead3597bd2 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
@@ -2310,6 +2310,14 @@ int tcp_v4_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb)
inet_iif(skb),
sdif);
if (sk2) {
+ if (inet_csk_reqsk_queue_is_full(sk2)) {
+ drop_reason = SKB_DROP_REASON_TCP_LISTEN_OVERFLOW;
+ __NET_INC_STATS(net, LINUX_MIB_TCPREQQFULLDROP);
+ tcp_listendrop(sk2);
+ inet_twsk_put(inet_twsk(sk));
+ goto discard_it;
+ }
+
inet_twsk_deschedule_put(inet_twsk(sk));
sk = sk2;
tcp_v4_restore_cb(skb);
diff --git a/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c b/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c
index ebe161d72fbd07a13d92812b45b5a3ce2464a015..8d3ff7184d03f5dd81f9a9c20e3ebbf174efc43a 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c
@@ -1969,6 +1969,15 @@ INDIRECT_CALLABLE_SCOPE int tcp_v6_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb)
sdif);
if (sk2) {
struct inet_timewait_sock *tw = inet_twsk(sk);
+
+ if (inet_csk_reqsk_queue_is_full(sk2)) {
+ drop_reason = SKB_DROP_REASON_TCP_LISTEN_OVERFLOW;
+ __NET_INC_STATS(net, LINUX_MIB_TCPREQQFULLDROP);
+ tcp_listendrop(sk2);
+ inet_twsk_put(tw);
+ goto discard_it;
+ }
+
inet_twsk_deschedule_put(tw);
sk = sk2;
tcp_v6_restore_cb(skb);
--
2.47.3
On Sun, Jul 12, 2026 at 3:26 PM Yizhou Zhao <zhaoyz24@mails.tsinghua.edu.cn> wrote: > > A valid SYN that matches a TIME_WAIT socket is redirected to the > listener with a non-zero tcp_tw_isn. tcp_conn_request() deliberately > exempts those requests from normal SYN queue throttling. A peer can > therefore create victim-side TIME_WAIT entries with short connections, > replay valid reopen SYNs, and withhold the final ACK to allocate > request_sock objects outside the listener's normal SYN-flood controls. > > Do not send syncookies for this path: tcp_timewait_state_process() > derives tcp_tw_isn from tw_snd_nxt so that a direct reopen uses an ISN > after the prior connection's sequence space. A syncookie ISN is a > hash-derived value and has no such ordering guarantee. > > Check the selected listener's SYN queue before descheduling the > TIME_WAIT socket. If it is full, account a request-queue drop, retain > the TIME_WAIT socket, and discard the SYN. Once the queue has room, > the existing direct-reopen path and its TIME_WAIT ISN are unchanged. > Normal SYNs continue to use syncookies when the listener is full. I do not see it as a threat, sorry. Say no to AI hallucinations.
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