fs/ntfs3/xattr.c | 13 +++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+)
NTFS3 uses $LXUID, $LXGID, $LXMOD and $LXDEV as internal WSL
permission metadata and reloads them into i_uid, i_gid and i_mode
from ntfs_get_wsl_perm().
Because the empty-prefix xattr handler also lets file owners call
setxattr() on these names directly, an unprivileged writer on a
writable ntfs3 mount can plant root ownership and S_ISUID on their own
file and gain euid 0 after inode reload.
Reject direct userspace writes to the reserved $LX* names. Internal
ntfs3 metadata updates are unchanged because ntfs_save_wsl_perm()
writes them via ntfs_set_ea() directly.
Signed-off-by: Zhen Yan <sdjasjbuaa@gmail.com>
---
Willy, thanks for the review. Replying to your points:
- Tested on v7.1-rc5: builds clean (W=1, no warnings), checkpatch
clean, and the original reproducer no longer triggers -- the
setxattr() calls now return -EPERM and uid/gid/mode survive an
inode reload. Internal WSL metadata is unaffected:
ntfs_save_wsl_perm() writes via ntfs_set_ea(), not ntfs_setxattr().
- Resent via git format-patch / git send-email so whitespace is no
longer mangled, with no PoC in the body and security@ dropped.
fs/ntfs3/xattr.c | 13 +++++++++++++
1 file changed, 13 insertions(+)
diff --git a/fs/ntfs3/xattr.c b/fs/ntfs3/xattr.c
index 9eeac0ab2..0bc633025 100644
--- a/fs/ntfs3/xattr.c
+++ b/fs/ntfs3/xattr.c
@@ -851,6 +851,14 @@ static int ntfs_getxattr(const struct xattr_handler *handler, struct dentry *de,
return err;
}
+static bool ntfs_is_reserved_lxattr(const char *name)
+{
+ return !strcmp(name, "$LXUID") ||
+ !strcmp(name, "$LXGID") ||
+ !strcmp(name, "$LXMOD") ||
+ !strcmp(name, "$LXDEV");
+}
+
/*
* ntfs_setxattr - inode_operations::setxattr
*/
@@ -955,6 +963,11 @@ static noinline int ntfs_setxattr(const struct xattr_handler *handler,
goto out;
}
+ if (ntfs_is_reserved_lxattr(name)) {
+ err = -EPERM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
/* Deal with NTFS extended attribute. */
err = ntfs_set_ea(inode, name, strlen(name), value, size, flags, 0,
NULL);
--
2.25.1
On 6/7/26 04:33, Zhen Yan wrote:
> NTFS3 uses $LXUID, $LXGID, $LXMOD and $LXDEV as internal WSL
> permission metadata and reloads them into i_uid, i_gid and i_mode
> from ntfs_get_wsl_perm().
>
> Because the empty-prefix xattr handler also lets file owners call
> setxattr() on these names directly, an unprivileged writer on a
> writable ntfs3 mount can plant root ownership and S_ISUID on their own
> file and gain euid 0 after inode reload.
>
> Reject direct userspace writes to the reserved $LX* names. Internal
> ntfs3 metadata updates are unchanged because ntfs_save_wsl_perm()
> writes them via ntfs_set_ea() directly.
>
> Signed-off-by: Zhen Yan <sdjasjbuaa@gmail.com>
> ---
> Willy, thanks for the review. Replying to your points:
>
> - Tested on v7.1-rc5: builds clean (W=1, no warnings), checkpatch
> clean, and the original reproducer no longer triggers -- the
> setxattr() calls now return -EPERM and uid/gid/mode survive an
> inode reload. Internal WSL metadata is unaffected:
> ntfs_save_wsl_perm() writes via ntfs_set_ea(), not ntfs_setxattr().
> - Resent via git format-patch / git send-email so whitespace is no
> longer mangled, with no PoC in the body and security@ dropped.
>
> fs/ntfs3/xattr.c | 13 +++++++++++++
> 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/fs/ntfs3/xattr.c b/fs/ntfs3/xattr.c
> index 9eeac0ab2..0bc633025 100644
> --- a/fs/ntfs3/xattr.c
> +++ b/fs/ntfs3/xattr.c
> @@ -851,6 +851,14 @@ static int ntfs_getxattr(const struct xattr_handler *handler, struct dentry *de,
> return err;
> }
>
> +static bool ntfs_is_reserved_lxattr(const char *name)
> +{
> + return !strcmp(name, "$LXUID") ||
> + !strcmp(name, "$LXGID") ||
> + !strcmp(name, "$LXMOD") ||
> + !strcmp(name, "$LXDEV");
> +}
> +
> /*
> * ntfs_setxattr - inode_operations::setxattr
> */
> @@ -955,6 +963,11 @@ static noinline int ntfs_setxattr(const struct xattr_handler *handler,
> goto out;
> }
>
> + if (ntfs_is_reserved_lxattr(name)) {
> + err = -EPERM;
> + goto out;
> + }
> +
> /* Deal with NTFS extended attribute. */
> err = ntfs_set_ea(inode, name, strlen(name), value, size, flags, 0,
> NULL);
> --
> 2.25.1
>
Hello,
Your patch was applied with small modifications - added a check on non
privileged users in if-statement. Thanks for the patch.
Regards,
Konstantin
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