When updating an atomic-write file, f2fs_write_begin() may read the
previously written data back from the COW inode:
prepare_atomic_write_begin() locates the block in the COW inode and sets
use_cow, and the read bio is then built with the COW inode:

	f2fs_submit_page_read(use_cow ? F2FS_I(inode)->cow_inode : inode,
			      ...);

and f2fs_grab_read_bio() decides whether to schedule fs-layer decryption
(STEP_DECRYPT) for the bio based on that inode via
fscrypt_inode_uses_fs_layer_crypto().

However, the folio being filled belongs to the original inode
(folio->mapping->host == inode), and the data stored in the COW block was
encrypted (or left as plaintext) using the original inode's context, not
the COW inode's -- see f2fs_encrypt_one_page(), which keys off
fio->page->mapping->host.  fscrypt_decrypt_pagecache_blocks() likewise
operates on folio->mapping->host.

The COW inode is created as a tmpfile in the parent directory and inherits
its encryption policy from there.  With test_dummy_encryption the newly
created COW inode gets the dummy policy and becomes encrypted, while a
pre-existing regular file -- created before the policy applied, e.g.
already present in the on-disk image -- stays unencrypted.  The read
path then sets STEP_DECRYPT based on the encrypted COW inode and calls
fscrypt_decrypt_pagecache_blocks() on a folio whose host (the unencrypted
original inode) has a NULL ->i_crypt_info, dereferencing it:

  Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address ...
  KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000008-0x000000000000000f]
  RIP: 0010:fscrypt_decrypt_pagecache_blocks+0xa0/0x310
  Workqueue: f2fs_post_read_wq f2fs_post_read_work
  Call Trace:
   fscrypt_decrypt_bio+0x1eb/0x340
   f2fs_post_read_work+0xba/0x140
   process_one_work+0x91c/0x1a40
   worker_thread+0x677/0xe90
   kthread+0x2bc/0x3a0

The COW inode is only needed to locate the on-disk block, and that block
address is already resolved into @blkaddr; the data's crypto state belongs
to the original inode.  Read with the original inode so the post-read
decryption decision matches the folio's owner.  This also makes the inline
crypto path use the correct (original inode's) key.

Fixes: 591fc34e1f98 ("f2fs: use cow inode data when updating atomic write")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mikhail Lobanov <m.lobanov@rosa.ru>
---
 fs/f2fs/data.c | 14 ++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/f2fs/data.c b/fs/f2fs/data.c
index cf05014fa5e3..8f6c22537e9f 100644
--- a/fs/f2fs/data.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/data.c
@@ -3961,8 +3961,18 @@ static int f2fs_write_begin(const struct kiocb *iocb,
 			err = -EFSCORRUPTED;
 			goto put_folio;
 		}
-		f2fs_submit_page_read(use_cow ? F2FS_I(inode)->cow_inode :
-						inode,
+		/*
+		 * Although the block is stored in the COW inode, the folio
+		 * belongs to @inode and its data was encrypted (or left as
+		 * plaintext) using @inode's context, not the COW inode's; see
+		 * f2fs_encrypt_one_page(), which keys off fio->page->mapping->
+		 * host.  fscrypt_decrypt_pagecache_blocks() likewise operates
+		 * on folio->mapping->host.  Read with @inode so the post-read
+		 * decryption decision matches the folio's owner; otherwise an
+		 * unencrypted @inode whose COW inode is encrypted would hit a
+		 * NULL ->i_crypt_info during decryption.
+		 */
+		f2fs_submit_page_read(inode,
 				      NULL, /* can't write to fsverity files */
 				      folio, blkaddr, 0, true);
 
-- 
2.39.5 (Apple Git-154)