security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 5 +++-- security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 3 ++- 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
ima_get_hash_algo() only recognizes version 2 signatures when the xattr
type is EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG. Since sigv3 signatures also use
EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG as the xattr type, version 3 must be accepted as
well to correctly determine the hash algorithm.
Additionally, ima_validate_rule() does not include IMA_SIGV3_REQUIRED in
the allowed flags bitmask for MODULE_CHECK, KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK, and
KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK hook functions. As a result, policy rules with
"appraise_type=sigv3" are rejected for these functions.
Add version 3 to the accepted versions in ima_get_hash_algo() for
EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG, and add IMA_SIGV3_REQUIRED to the allowed flags
for MODULE_CHECK, KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK, and KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK in
ima_validate_rule().
Signed-off-by: Kamlesh Kumar <kam@juniper.net>
---
security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 5 +++--
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 3 ++-
2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
index de963b9f3634..2dd231567710 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
@@ -195,8 +195,9 @@ enum hash_algo ima_get_hash_algo(const struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
return sig->hash_algo;
case EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG:
sig = (typeof(sig))xattr_value;
- if (sig->version != 2 || xattr_len <= sizeof(*sig)
- || sig->hash_algo >= HASH_ALGO__LAST)
+ if ((sig->version != 2 && sig->version != 3) ||
+ xattr_len <= sizeof(*sig) ||
+ sig->hash_algo >= HASH_ALGO__LAST)
return ima_hash_algo;
return sig->hash_algo;
case IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_NG:
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index f7f940a76922..b1c010e8eb13 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -1313,7 +1313,8 @@ static bool ima_validate_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
IMA_GID | IMA_EGID |
IMA_FGROUP | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED |
IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO | IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED |
- IMA_CHECK_BLACKLIST | IMA_VALIDATE_ALGOS))
+ IMA_CHECK_BLACKLIST | IMA_VALIDATE_ALGOS |
+ IMA_SIGV3_REQUIRED))
return false;
break;
base-commit: 82bbd447199ff1441031d2eaf9afe041550cf525
--
2.34.1
On 4/24/26 7:39 AM, Kamlesh Kumar wrote: > ima_get_hash_algo() only recognizes version 2 signatures when the xattr > type is EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG. Since sigv3 signatures also use > EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG as the xattr type, version 3 must be accepted as > well to correctly determine the hash algorithm. Thanks. I tested this with your patch. I can sign now with evmctl ima_sign --v3 -a sha512 ... even if sha256 is the IMA default and IMA verifies it now. Before I had to use evmctl ima_sign --v3 -a sha256 ... > > Additionally, ima_validate_rule() does not include IMA_SIGV3_REQUIRED in > the allowed flags bitmask for MODULE_CHECK, KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK, and > KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK hook functions. As a result, policy rules with > "appraise_type=sigv3" are rejected for these functions. # echo "appraise func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK appraise_type=sigv3" > /sys/kernel/security/ima/policy -bash: echo: write error: Invalid argument This rule is now accepted with your patch. > > Add version 3 to the accepted versions in ima_get_hash_algo() for > EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG, and add IMA_SIGV3_REQUIRED to the allowed flags > for MODULE_CHECK, KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK, and KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK in > ima_validate_rule(). > > Signed-off-by: Kamlesh Kumar <kam@juniper.net> Tested-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com> > --- > security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 5 +++-- > security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 3 ++- > 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c > index de963b9f3634..2dd231567710 100644 > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c > @@ -195,8 +195,9 @@ enum hash_algo ima_get_hash_algo(const struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, > return sig->hash_algo; > case EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG: > sig = (typeof(sig))xattr_value; > - if (sig->version != 2 || xattr_len <= sizeof(*sig) > - || sig->hash_algo >= HASH_ALGO__LAST) > + if ((sig->version != 2 && sig->version != 3) || > + xattr_len <= sizeof(*sig) || > + sig->hash_algo >= HASH_ALGO__LAST) > return ima_hash_algo; > return sig->hash_algo; > case IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_NG: > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c > index f7f940a76922..b1c010e8eb13 100644 > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c > @@ -1313,7 +1313,8 @@ static bool ima_validate_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry) > IMA_GID | IMA_EGID | > IMA_FGROUP | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED | > IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO | IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED | > - IMA_CHECK_BLACKLIST | IMA_VALIDATE_ALGOS)) > + IMA_CHECK_BLACKLIST | IMA_VALIDATE_ALGOS | > + IMA_SIGV3_REQUIRED)) > return false; > > break; > > base-commit: 82bbd447199ff1441031d2eaf9afe041550cf525
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