fs/ocfs2/inode.c | 10 ++++++++++ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
KASAN reports a use-after-free write of 4086 bytes in
ocfs2_write_end_inline, called from ocfs2_write_end_nolock during a
copy_file_range splice fallback on a corrupted ocfs2 filesystem mounted
on a loop device. The actual bug is an out-of-bounds write past the
inode block buffer, not a true use-after-free. The write overflows into
an adjacent freed page, which KASAN reports as UAF.
The root cause is that ocfs2_try_to_write_inline_data trusts the
on-disk id_count field to determine whether a write fits in inline
data. On a corrupted filesystem, id_count can exceed the physical
maximum inline data capacity, causing writes to overflow the inode
block buffer.
Call trace (crash path):
vfs_copy_file_range (fs/read_write.c:1634)
do_splice_direct
splice_direct_to_actor
iter_file_splice_write
ocfs2_file_write_iter
generic_perform_write
ocfs2_write_end
ocfs2_write_end_nolock (fs/ocfs2/aops.c:1949)
ocfs2_write_end_inline (fs/ocfs2/aops.c:1915)
memcpy_from_folio <-- KASAN: write OOB
So add id_count upper bound check in ocfs2_validate_inode_block() to
alongside the existing i_size check to fix it.
Reported-by: syzbot+62c1793956716ea8b28a@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=62c1793956716ea8b28a
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
---
fs/ocfs2/inode.c | 10 ++++++++++
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/inode.c b/fs/ocfs2/inode.c
index 03a51662ea8e..a2ccd8011706 100644
--- a/fs/ocfs2/inode.c
+++ b/fs/ocfs2/inode.c
@@ -1505,6 +1505,16 @@ int ocfs2_validate_inode_block(struct super_block *sb,
goto bail;
}
+ if (le16_to_cpu(data->id_count) >
+ ocfs2_max_inline_data_with_xattr(sb, di)) {
+ rc = ocfs2_error(sb,
+ "Invalid dinode #%llu: inline data id_count %u exceeds max %d\n",
+ (unsigned long long)bh->b_blocknr,
+ le16_to_cpu(data->id_count),
+ ocfs2_max_inline_data_with_xattr(sb, di));
+ goto bail;
+ }
+
if (le64_to_cpu(di->i_size) > le16_to_cpu(data->id_count)) {
rc = ocfs2_error(sb,
"Invalid dinode #%llu: inline data i_size %llu exceeds id_count %u\n",
--
2.39.3
On Fri, Apr 03, 2026 at 02:38:30PM +0800, Joseph Qi wrote:
> KASAN reports a use-after-free write of 4086 bytes in
> ocfs2_write_end_inline, called from ocfs2_write_end_nolock during a
> copy_file_range splice fallback on a corrupted ocfs2 filesystem mounted
> on a loop device. The actual bug is an out-of-bounds write past the
> inode block buffer, not a true use-after-free. The write overflows into
> an adjacent freed page, which KASAN reports as UAF.
>
> The root cause is that ocfs2_try_to_write_inline_data trusts the
> on-disk id_count field to determine whether a write fits in inline
> data. On a corrupted filesystem, id_count can exceed the physical
> maximum inline data capacity, causing writes to overflow the inode
> block buffer.
>
> Call trace (crash path):
>
> vfs_copy_file_range (fs/read_write.c:1634)
> do_splice_direct
> splice_direct_to_actor
> iter_file_splice_write
> ocfs2_file_write_iter
> generic_perform_write
> ocfs2_write_end
> ocfs2_write_end_nolock (fs/ocfs2/aops.c:1949)
> ocfs2_write_end_inline (fs/ocfs2/aops.c:1915)
> memcpy_from_folio <-- KASAN: write OOB
>
> So add id_count upper bound check in ocfs2_validate_inode_block() to
> alongside the existing i_size check to fix it.
>
> Reported-by: syzbot+62c1793956716ea8b28a@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
> Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=62c1793956716ea8b28a
> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
> Signed-off-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Looks good to me.
Reviewed-by: Heming Zhao <heming.zhao@suse.com>
> ---
> fs/ocfs2/inode.c | 10 ++++++++++
> 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/inode.c b/fs/ocfs2/inode.c
> index 03a51662ea8e..a2ccd8011706 100644
> --- a/fs/ocfs2/inode.c
> +++ b/fs/ocfs2/inode.c
> @@ -1505,6 +1505,16 @@ int ocfs2_validate_inode_block(struct super_block *sb,
> goto bail;
> }
>
> + if (le16_to_cpu(data->id_count) >
> + ocfs2_max_inline_data_with_xattr(sb, di)) {
> + rc = ocfs2_error(sb,
> + "Invalid dinode #%llu: inline data id_count %u exceeds max %d\n",
> + (unsigned long long)bh->b_blocknr,
> + le16_to_cpu(data->id_count),
> + ocfs2_max_inline_data_with_xattr(sb, di));
> + goto bail;
> + }
> +
> if (le64_to_cpu(di->i_size) > le16_to_cpu(data->id_count)) {
> rc = ocfs2_error(sb,
> "Invalid dinode #%llu: inline data i_size %llu exceeds id_count %u\n",
> --
> 2.39.3
>
On Fri, 3 Apr 2026 14:38:30 +0800 Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com> wrote: > KASAN reports a use-after-free write of 4086 bytes in > ocfs2_write_end_inline, called from ocfs2_write_end_nolock during a > copy_file_range splice fallback on a corrupted ocfs2 filesystem mounted > on a loop device. The actual bug is an out-of-bounds write past the > inode block buffer, not a true use-after-free. The write overflows into > an adjacent freed page, which KASAN reports as UAF. > > The root cause is that ocfs2_try_to_write_inline_data trusts the > on-disk id_count field to determine whether a write fits in inline > data. On a corrupted filesystem, id_count can exceed the physical > maximum inline data capacity, causing writes to overflow the inode > block buffer. > > Call trace (crash path): > > vfs_copy_file_range (fs/read_write.c:1634) > do_splice_direct > splice_direct_to_actor > iter_file_splice_write > ocfs2_file_write_iter > generic_perform_write > ocfs2_write_end > ocfs2_write_end_nolock (fs/ocfs2/aops.c:1949) > ocfs2_write_end_inline (fs/ocfs2/aops.c:1915) > memcpy_from_folio <-- KASAN: write OOB > > So add id_count upper bound check in ocfs2_validate_inode_block() to > alongside the existing i_size check to fix it. AI review had a question: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260403063830.3662739-1-joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com
On 4/4/26 3:28 AM, Andrew Morton wrote: > On Fri, 3 Apr 2026 14:38:30 +0800 Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com> wrote: > >> KASAN reports a use-after-free write of 4086 bytes in >> ocfs2_write_end_inline, called from ocfs2_write_end_nolock during a >> copy_file_range splice fallback on a corrupted ocfs2 filesystem mounted >> on a loop device. The actual bug is an out-of-bounds write past the >> inode block buffer, not a true use-after-free. The write overflows into >> an adjacent freed page, which KASAN reports as UAF. >> >> The root cause is that ocfs2_try_to_write_inline_data trusts the >> on-disk id_count field to determine whether a write fits in inline >> data. On a corrupted filesystem, id_count can exceed the physical >> maximum inline data capacity, causing writes to overflow the inode >> block buffer. >> >> Call trace (crash path): >> >> vfs_copy_file_range (fs/read_write.c:1634) >> do_splice_direct >> splice_direct_to_actor >> iter_file_splice_write >> ocfs2_file_write_iter >> generic_perform_write >> ocfs2_write_end >> ocfs2_write_end_nolock (fs/ocfs2/aops.c:1949) >> ocfs2_write_end_inline (fs/ocfs2/aops.c:1915) >> memcpy_from_folio <-- KASAN: write OOB >> >> So add id_count upper bound check in ocfs2_validate_inode_block() to >> alongside the existing i_size check to fix it. > > AI review had a question: > https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260403063830.3662739-1-joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com Sashiko worries about it can't handle the case OCFS2_INLINE_DATA_FL not set. I think it is a seprated case. Thanks, Joseph
On Fri, 3 Apr 2026 14:38:30 +0800 Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com> wrote:
> KASAN reports a use-after-free write of 4086 bytes in
> ocfs2_write_end_inline, called from ocfs2_write_end_nolock during a
> copy_file_range splice fallback on a corrupted ocfs2 filesystem mounted
> on a loop device. The actual bug is an out-of-bounds write past the
> inode block buffer, not a true use-after-free. The write overflows into
> an adjacent freed page, which KASAN reports as UAF.
>
> The root cause is that ocfs2_try_to_write_inline_data trusts the
> on-disk id_count field to determine whether a write fits in inline
> data. On a corrupted filesystem, id_count can exceed the physical
> maximum inline data capacity, causing writes to overflow the inode
> block buffer.
>
> Call trace (crash path):
>
> vfs_copy_file_range (fs/read_write.c:1634)
> do_splice_direct
> splice_direct_to_actor
> iter_file_splice_write
> ocfs2_file_write_iter
> generic_perform_write
> ocfs2_write_end
> ocfs2_write_end_nolock (fs/ocfs2/aops.c:1949)
> ocfs2_write_end_inline (fs/ocfs2/aops.c:1915)
> memcpy_from_folio <-- KASAN: write OOB
>
> So add id_count upper bound check in ocfs2_validate_inode_block() to
> alongside the existing i_size check to fix it.
Thanks.
> --- a/fs/ocfs2/inode.c
> +++ b/fs/ocfs2/inode.c
> @@ -1505,6 +1505,16 @@ int ocfs2_validate_inode_block(struct super_block *sb,
> goto bail;
> }
>
> + if (le16_to_cpu(data->id_count) >
> + ocfs2_max_inline_data_with_xattr(sb, di)) {
> + rc = ocfs2_error(sb,
> + "Invalid dinode #%llu: inline data id_count %u exceeds max %d\n",
> + (unsigned long long)bh->b_blocknr,
> + le16_to_cpu(data->id_count),
> + ocfs2_max_inline_data_with_xattr(sb, di));
> + goto bail;
> + }
> +
> if (le64_to_cpu(di->i_size) > le16_to_cpu(data->id_count)) {
> rc = ocfs2_error(sb,
> "Invalid dinode #%llu: inline data i_size %llu exceeds id_count %u\n",
Even though the surrounding code is from 2025 (1524af3685b35), I think
this bug predates 1524af3685b35?
If so, I expect the -stable people will have trouble backporting this.
If so, they'll report it and shall ask for a reworked version.
On 4/3/26 2:48 PM, Andrew Morton wrote:
> On Fri, 3 Apr 2026 14:38:30 +0800 Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com> wrote:
>
>> KASAN reports a use-after-free write of 4086 bytes in
>> ocfs2_write_end_inline, called from ocfs2_write_end_nolock during a
>> copy_file_range splice fallback on a corrupted ocfs2 filesystem mounted
>> on a loop device. The actual bug is an out-of-bounds write past the
>> inode block buffer, not a true use-after-free. The write overflows into
>> an adjacent freed page, which KASAN reports as UAF.
>>
>> The root cause is that ocfs2_try_to_write_inline_data trusts the
>> on-disk id_count field to determine whether a write fits in inline
>> data. On a corrupted filesystem, id_count can exceed the physical
>> maximum inline data capacity, causing writes to overflow the inode
>> block buffer.
>>
>> Call trace (crash path):
>>
>> vfs_copy_file_range (fs/read_write.c:1634)
>> do_splice_direct
>> splice_direct_to_actor
>> iter_file_splice_write
>> ocfs2_file_write_iter
>> generic_perform_write
>> ocfs2_write_end
>> ocfs2_write_end_nolock (fs/ocfs2/aops.c:1949)
>> ocfs2_write_end_inline (fs/ocfs2/aops.c:1915)
>> memcpy_from_folio <-- KASAN: write OOB
>>
>> So add id_count upper bound check in ocfs2_validate_inode_block() to
>> alongside the existing i_size check to fix it.
>
> Thanks.
>
>> --- a/fs/ocfs2/inode.c
>> +++ b/fs/ocfs2/inode.c
>> @@ -1505,6 +1505,16 @@ int ocfs2_validate_inode_block(struct super_block *sb,
>> goto bail;
>> }
>>
>> + if (le16_to_cpu(data->id_count) >
>> + ocfs2_max_inline_data_with_xattr(sb, di)) {
>> + rc = ocfs2_error(sb,
>> + "Invalid dinode #%llu: inline data id_count %u exceeds max %d\n",
>> + (unsigned long long)bh->b_blocknr,
>> + le16_to_cpu(data->id_count),
>> + ocfs2_max_inline_data_with_xattr(sb, di));
>> + goto bail;
>> + }
>> +
>> if (le64_to_cpu(di->i_size) > le16_to_cpu(data->id_count)) {
>> rc = ocfs2_error(sb,
>> "Invalid dinode #%llu: inline data i_size %llu exceeds id_count %u\n",
>
> Even though the surrounding code is from 2025 (1524af3685b35), I think
> this bug predates 1524af3685b35?
>
> If so, I expect the -stable people will have trouble backporting this.
> If so, they'll report it and shall ask for a reworked version.
This seems blame to a very old commit (perhaps 1afc32b95233?), since it
was designed to trust the on-disk block.
So I don't add a fixes tag for it.
Thanks,
Joseph
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