From: Sebastian Josue Alba Vives <sebasjosue84@gmail.com>

mpf_ops_parse_header() reads several fields from the bitstream file
and uses them as offsets and sizes without validating them against the
buffer size, leading to multiple out-of-bounds read vulnerabilities:

1. There is no check that count is large enough to read header_size
   at MPF_HEADER_SIZE_OFFSET (24). Add a minimum count check.

2. When header_size (u8 from file) is 0, the expression
   *(buf + header_size - 1) reads one byte before the buffer.
   Return -EINVAL since retrying with a larger buffer cannot fix
   a zero header_size.

3. In the block lookup loop, block_id_offset and block_start_offset
   advance by MPF_LOOKUP_TABLE_RECORD_SIZE (9) each iteration with
   blocks_num (u8) controlling the count. With a small buffer, these
   offsets exceed count, causing OOB reads via get_unaligned_le32().
   Return -EAGAIN since a larger buffer may resolve the issue.

4. components_size_start (from file) and component_size_byte_num
   (derived from components_num, u16 from file) are used as offsets
   into buf without validation, allowing arbitrary OOB reads.

Add bounds checks for all four cases.

Fixes: 5f8d4a9008307 ("fpga: microchip-spi: add Microchip MPF FPGA manager")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Alba Vives <sebasjosue84@gmail.com>
---
 drivers/fpga/microchip-spi.c | 14 ++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+)

diff --git a/drivers/fpga/microchip-spi.c b/drivers/fpga/microchip-spi.c
index 6134cea..00fa2d6 100644
--- a/drivers/fpga/microchip-spi.c
+++ b/drivers/fpga/microchip-spi.c
@@ -115,7 +115,13 @@ static int mpf_ops_parse_header(struct fpga_manager *mgr,
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
+	if (count < MPF_HEADER_SIZE_OFFSET + 1)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	header_size = *(buf + MPF_HEADER_SIZE_OFFSET);
+	if (!header_size)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	if (header_size > count) {
 		info->header_size = header_size;
 		return -EAGAIN;
@@ -139,6 +145,10 @@ static int mpf_ops_parse_header(struct fpga_manager *mgr,
 	bitstream_start = 0;
 
 	while (blocks_num--) {
+		if (block_id_offset >= count ||
+		    block_start_offset + sizeof(u32) > count)
+			return -EAGAIN;
+
 		block_id = *(buf + block_id_offset);
 		block_start = get_unaligned_le32(buf + block_start_offset);
 
@@ -183,6 +193,10 @@ static int mpf_ops_parse_header(struct fpga_manager *mgr,
 		component_size_byte_off =
 			(i * MPF_BITS_PER_COMPONENT_SIZE) % BITS_PER_BYTE;
 
+		if (components_size_start + component_size_byte_num +
+		    sizeof(u32) > count)
+			return -EINVAL;
+
 		component_size = get_unaligned_le32(buf +
 						    components_size_start +
 						    component_size_byte_num);
-- 
2.43.0

On Thu, Apr 02, 2026 at 09:37:52AM -0600, Sebastian Alba Vives wrote:
> From: Sebastian Josue Alba Vives <sebasjosue84@gmail.com>
> 
> mpf_ops_parse_header() reads several fields from the bitstream file
> and uses them as offsets and sizes without validating them against the
> buffer size, leading to multiple out-of-bounds read vulnerabilities:
> 
> 1. There is no check that count is large enough to read header_size
>    at MPF_HEADER_SIZE_OFFSET (24). Add a minimum count check.
> 
> 2. When header_size (u8 from file) is 0, the expression
>    *(buf + header_size - 1) reads one byte before the buffer.
>    Return -EINVAL since retrying with a larger buffer cannot fix
>    a zero header_size.
> 
> 3. In the block lookup loop, block_id_offset and block_start_offset
>    advance by MPF_LOOKUP_TABLE_RECORD_SIZE (9) each iteration with
>    blocks_num (u8) controlling the count. With a small buffer, these
>    offsets exceed count, causing OOB reads via get_unaligned_le32().
>    Return -EAGAIN since a larger buffer may resolve the issue.
> 
> 4. components_size_start (from file) and component_size_byte_num
>    (derived from components_num, u16 from file) are used as offsets
>    into buf without validation, allowing arbitrary OOB reads.
> 
> Add bounds checks for all four cases.
> 
> Fixes: 5f8d4a9008307 ("fpga: microchip-spi: add Microchip MPF FPGA manager")
> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
> Signed-off-by: Sebastian Alba Vives <sebasjosue84@gmail.com>
> ---
>  drivers/fpga/microchip-spi.c | 14 ++++++++++++++
>  1 file changed, 14 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/drivers/fpga/microchip-spi.c b/drivers/fpga/microchip-spi.c
> index 6134cea..00fa2d6 100644
> --- a/drivers/fpga/microchip-spi.c
> +++ b/drivers/fpga/microchip-spi.c
> @@ -115,7 +115,13 @@ static int mpf_ops_parse_header(struct fpga_manager *mgr,
>  		return -EINVAL;
>  	}
>  
> +	if (count < MPF_HEADER_SIZE_OFFSET + 1)
> +		return -EINVAL;
> +
>  	header_size = *(buf + MPF_HEADER_SIZE_OFFSET);
> +	if (!header_size)
> +		return -EINVAL;
> +
>  	if (header_size > count) {
>  		info->header_size = header_size;
>  		return -EAGAIN;
> @@ -139,6 +145,10 @@ static int mpf_ops_parse_header(struct fpga_manager *mgr,
>  	bitstream_start = 0;
>  
>  	while (blocks_num--) {
> +		if (block_id_offset >= count ||
> +		    block_start_offset + sizeof(u32) > count)
> +			return -EAGAIN;
> +
>  		block_id = *(buf + block_id_offset);
>  		block_start = get_unaligned_le32(buf + block_start_offset);
>  
> @@ -183,6 +193,10 @@ static int mpf_ops_parse_header(struct fpga_manager *mgr,
>  		component_size_byte_off =
>  			(i * MPF_BITS_PER_COMPONENT_SIZE) % BITS_PER_BYTE;
>  
> +		if (components_size_start + component_size_byte_num +
> +		    sizeof(u32) > count)
> +			return -EINVAL;

I didn't mention it explicitly, but it kinda follows from the other
comment, do we not just want to ask for a bigger buffer here too?

> +
>  		component_size = get_unaligned_le32(buf +
>  						    components_size_start +
>  						    component_size_byte_num);
> -- 
> 2.43.0
> 

On Thu, Apr 02, 2026 at 09:37:52AM -0600, Sebastian Alba Vives wrote:
> From: Sebastian Josue Alba Vives <sebasjosue84@gmail.com>
> 
> mpf_ops_parse_header() reads several fields from the bitstream file
> and uses them as offsets and sizes without validating them against the
> buffer size, leading to multiple out-of-bounds read vulnerabilities:

Note, bitstream files are "trusted" so this really isn't a
"vulnerability" just a "someone with hardware permissions sent a stupid
file to the kernel" issue :)

> 1. There is no check that count is large enough to read header_size
>    at MPF_HEADER_SIZE_OFFSET (24). Add a minimum count check.
> 
> 2. When header_size (u8 from file) is 0, the expression
>    *(buf + header_size - 1) reads one byte before the buffer.
>    Return -EINVAL since retrying with a larger buffer cannot fix
>    a zero header_size.
> 
> 3. In the block lookup loop, block_id_offset and block_start_offset
>    advance by MPF_LOOKUP_TABLE_RECORD_SIZE (9) each iteration with
>    blocks_num (u8) controlling the count. With a small buffer, these
>    offsets exceed count, causing OOB reads via get_unaligned_le32().
>    Return -EAGAIN since a larger buffer may resolve the issue.
> 
> 4. components_size_start (from file) and component_size_byte_num
>    (derived from components_num, u16 from file) are used as offsets
>    into buf without validation, allowing arbitrary OOB reads.
> 
> Add bounds checks for all four cases.
> 
> Fixes: 5f8d4a9008307 ("fpga: microchip-spi: add Microchip MPF FPGA manager")
> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
> Signed-off-by: Sebastian Alba Vives <sebasjosue84@gmail.com>
> ---
>  drivers/fpga/microchip-spi.c | 14 ++++++++++++++
>  1 file changed, 14 insertions(+)

Please look at these review comments:
	https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260402153752.3793055-1-sebasjosue84%40gmail.com
this driver is "odd", but some of those comments seem correct.

thansk,

greg k-h

On Thu, Apr 02, 2026 at 09:37:52AM -0600, Sebastian Alba Vives wrote:
> From: Sebastian Josue Alba Vives <sebasjosue84@gmail.com>
> 
> mpf_ops_parse_header() reads several fields from the bitstream file
> and uses them as offsets and sizes without validating them against the
> buffer size, leading to multiple out-of-bounds read vulnerabilities:
> 
> 1. There is no check that count is large enough to read header_size
>    at MPF_HEADER_SIZE_OFFSET (24). Add a minimum count check.
> 
> 2. When header_size (u8 from file) is 0, the expression
>    *(buf + header_size - 1) reads one byte before the buffer.
>    Return -EINVAL since retrying with a larger buffer cannot fix
>    a zero header_size.
> 
> 3. In the block lookup loop, block_id_offset and block_start_offset
>    advance by MPF_LOOKUP_TABLE_RECORD_SIZE (9) each iteration with
>    blocks_num (u8) controlling the count. With a small buffer, these
>    offsets exceed count, causing OOB reads via get_unaligned_le32().
>    Return -EAGAIN since a larger buffer may resolve the issue.
> 
> 4. components_size_start (from file) and component_size_byte_num
>    (derived from components_num, u16 from file) are used as offsets
>    into buf without validation, allowing arbitrary OOB reads.
> 
> Add bounds checks for all four cases.
> 
> Fixes: 5f8d4a9008307 ("fpga: microchip-spi: add Microchip MPF FPGA manager")
> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
> Signed-off-by: Sebastian Alba Vives <sebasjosue84@gmail.com>
> ---
>  drivers/fpga/microchip-spi.c | 14 ++++++++++++++
>  1 file changed, 14 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/drivers/fpga/microchip-spi.c b/drivers/fpga/microchip-spi.c
> index 6134cea..00fa2d6 100644
> --- a/drivers/fpga/microchip-spi.c
> +++ b/drivers/fpga/microchip-spi.c
> @@ -115,7 +115,13 @@ static int mpf_ops_parse_header(struct fpga_manager *mgr,
>  		return -EINVAL;
>  	}
>  
> +	if (count < MPF_HEADER_SIZE_OFFSET + 1)
> +		return -EINVAL;
> +
>  	header_size = *(buf + MPF_HEADER_SIZE_OFFSET);
> +	if (!header_size)
> +		return -EINVAL;
> +
>  	if (header_size > count) {
>  		info->header_size = header_size;
>  		return -EAGAIN;
> @@ -139,6 +145,10 @@ static int mpf_ops_parse_header(struct fpga_manager *mgr,
>  	bitstream_start = 0;
>  
>  	while (blocks_num--) {
> +		if (block_id_offset >= count ||
> +		    block_start_offset + sizeof(u32) > count)
> +			return -EAGAIN;
> +
>  		block_id = *(buf + block_id_offset);
>  		block_start = get_unaligned_le32(buf + block_start_offset);
>  
> @@ -183,6 +193,10 @@ static int mpf_ops_parse_header(struct fpga_manager *mgr,
>  		component_size_byte_off =
>  			(i * MPF_BITS_PER_COMPONENT_SIZE) % BITS_PER_BYTE;
>  
> +		if (components_size_start + component_size_byte_num +
> +		    sizeof(u32) > count)
> +			return -EINVAL;
> +
>  		component_size = get_unaligned_le32(buf +
>  						    components_size_start +
>  						    component_size_byte_num);
> -- 
> 2.43.0
> 
> 

Hi,

This is the friendly patch-bot of Greg Kroah-Hartman.  You have sent him
a patch that has triggered this response.  He used to manually respond
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  Please read the section entitled "The canonical patch format" in the
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  needs to be done here to properly describe this.

If you wish to discuss this problem further, or you have questions about
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thanks,

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