aesbs_setkey() and aesbs_cbc_ctr_setkey() allocate struct crypto_aes_ctx
on the stack. On arm64, the kernel-mode NEON context is also stored on
the stack, causing the combined frame size to exceed 1024 bytes and
triggering -Wframe-larger-than= warnings.

Allocate struct crypto_aes_ctx on the heap instead and use
kfree_sensitive() to ensure the key material is zeroed on free.
Use a goto-based cleanup path to ensure kfree_sensitive() is always
called.

Signed-off-by: Cheng-Yang Chou <yphbchou0911@gmail.com>
---
Changes in v1:
- Replace memzero_explicit() + kfree() with kfree_sensitive()
  (Eric Biggers)
- Link to v1: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260305183229.150599-1-yphbchou0911@gmail.com/

 arch/arm64/crypto/aes-neonbs-glue.c | 37 ++++++++++++++++++-----------
 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-neonbs-glue.c b/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-neonbs-glue.c
index cb87c8fc66b3..00530b291010 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-neonbs-glue.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-neonbs-glue.c
@@ -76,19 +76,24 @@ static int aesbs_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *in_key,
 			unsigned int key_len)
 {
 	struct aesbs_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
-	struct crypto_aes_ctx rk;
+	struct crypto_aes_ctx *rk;
 	int err;
 
-	err = aes_expandkey(&rk, in_key, key_len);
+	rk = kmalloc(sizeof(*rk), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!rk)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	err = aes_expandkey(rk, in_key, key_len);
 	if (err)
-		return err;
+		goto out;
 
 	ctx->rounds = 6 + key_len / 4;
 
 	scoped_ksimd()
-		aesbs_convert_key(ctx->rk, rk.key_enc, ctx->rounds);
-
-	return 0;
+		aesbs_convert_key(ctx->rk, rk->key_enc, ctx->rounds);
+out:
+	kfree_sensitive(rk);
+	return err;
 }
 
 static int __ecb_crypt(struct skcipher_request *req,
@@ -133,22 +138,26 @@ static int aesbs_cbc_ctr_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *in_key,
 			    unsigned int key_len)
 {
 	struct aesbs_cbc_ctr_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
-	struct crypto_aes_ctx rk;
+	struct crypto_aes_ctx *rk;
 	int err;
 
-	err = aes_expandkey(&rk, in_key, key_len);
+	rk = kmalloc(sizeof(*rk), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!rk)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	err = aes_expandkey(rk, in_key, key_len);
 	if (err)
-		return err;
+		goto out;
 
 	ctx->key.rounds = 6 + key_len / 4;
 
-	memcpy(ctx->enc, rk.key_enc, sizeof(ctx->enc));
+	memcpy(ctx->enc, rk->key_enc, sizeof(ctx->enc));
 
 	scoped_ksimd()
-		aesbs_convert_key(ctx->key.rk, rk.key_enc, ctx->key.rounds);
-	memzero_explicit(&rk, sizeof(rk));
-
-	return 0;
+		aesbs_convert_key(ctx->key.rk, rk->key_enc, ctx->key.rounds);
+out:
+	kfree_sensitive(rk);
+	return err;
 }
 
 static int cbc_encrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
-- 
2.48.1

On Fri, Mar 06, 2026 at 02:42:54PM +0800, Cheng-Yang Chou wrote:
> aesbs_setkey() and aesbs_cbc_ctr_setkey() allocate struct crypto_aes_ctx
> on the stack. On arm64, the kernel-mode NEON context is also stored on
> the stack, causing the combined frame size to exceed 1024 bytes and
> triggering -Wframe-larger-than= warnings.
> 
> Allocate struct crypto_aes_ctx on the heap instead and use
> kfree_sensitive() to ensure the key material is zeroed on free.
> Use a goto-based cleanup path to ensure kfree_sensitive() is always
> called.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Cheng-Yang Chou <yphbchou0911@gmail.com>
> ---
> Changes in v1:
> - Replace memzero_explicit() + kfree() with kfree_sensitive()
>   (Eric Biggers)
> - Link to v1: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260305183229.150599-1-yphbchou0911@gmail.com/
> 
>  arch/arm64/crypto/aes-neonbs-glue.c | 37 ++++++++++++++++++-----------
>  1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)

Looks okay for now, though as I mentioned I'd like to eventually
refactor this code to not need so much temporary space.

I'll plan to take this through the libcrypto-fixes tree.  Herbert, let
me know if you prefer to take it instead.

I'll plan to add:

    Fixes: 4fa617cc6851 ("arm64/fpsimd: Allocate kernel mode FP/SIMD buffers on the stack")

... since that is the change that put the stack usage over the "limit".

- Eric

On Fri, Mar 06, 2026 at 01:35:02PM -0800, Eric Biggers wrote:
> On Fri, Mar 06, 2026 at 02:42:54PM +0800, Cheng-Yang Chou wrote:
> > aesbs_setkey() and aesbs_cbc_ctr_setkey() allocate struct crypto_aes_ctx
> > on the stack. On arm64, the kernel-mode NEON context is also stored on
> > the stack, causing the combined frame size to exceed 1024 bytes and
> > triggering -Wframe-larger-than= warnings.
> > 
> > Allocate struct crypto_aes_ctx on the heap instead and use
> > kfree_sensitive() to ensure the key material is zeroed on free.
> > Use a goto-based cleanup path to ensure kfree_sensitive() is always
> > called.
> > 
> > Signed-off-by: Cheng-Yang Chou <yphbchou0911@gmail.com>
> > ---
> > Changes in v1:
> > - Replace memzero_explicit() + kfree() with kfree_sensitive()
> >   (Eric Biggers)
> > - Link to v1: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260305183229.150599-1-yphbchou0911@gmail.com/
> > 
> >  arch/arm64/crypto/aes-neonbs-glue.c | 37 ++++++++++++++++++-----------
> >  1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
> 
> Looks okay for now, though as I mentioned I'd like to eventually
> refactor this code to not need so much temporary space.
> 
> I'll plan to take this through the libcrypto-fixes tree.  Herbert, let
> me know if you prefer to take it instead.
> 
> I'll plan to add:
> 
>     Fixes: 4fa617cc6851 ("arm64/fpsimd: Allocate kernel mode FP/SIMD buffers on the stack")
> 
> ... since that is the change that put the stack usage over the "limit".

Applied to https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiggers/linux.git/log/?h=libcrypto-fixes

- Eric

On Fri, Mar 06, 2026 at 01:35:02PM -0800, Eric Biggers wrote:
>
> I'll plan to take this through the libcrypto-fixes tree.  Herbert, let
> me know if you prefer to take it instead.

No objections from my end.

Thanks,
-- 
Email: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Home Page: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/
PGP Key: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/pubkey.txt