Rename ->digest and ->digest_len to ->m and ->m_size to represent the input
to the signature verification algorithm, reflecting that ->digest may no
longer actually *be* a digest.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
cc: Ignat Korchagin <ignat@cloudflare.com>
cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
cc: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
---
crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c | 4 ++--
crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c | 28 ++++++++++++------------
crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c | 3 +--
crypto/asymmetric_keys/signature.c | 2 +-
crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c | 10 ++++-----
include/crypto/public_key.h | 4 ++--
security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c | 4 ++--
7 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c
index 348966ea2175..2326743310b1 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c
@@ -593,10 +593,10 @@ static int asymmetric_key_verify_signature(struct kernel_pkey_params *params,
{
struct public_key_signature sig = {
.s_size = params->in2_len,
- .digest_size = params->in_len,
+ .m_size = params->in_len,
.encoding = params->encoding,
.hash_algo = params->hash_algo,
- .digest = (void *)in,
+ .m = (void *)in,
.s = (void *)in2,
};
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c
index 6d6475e3a9bf..aa085ec6fb1c 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ static int pkcs7_digest(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
kenter(",%u,%s", sinfo->index, sinfo->sig->hash_algo);
/* The digest was calculated already. */
- if (sig->digest)
+ if (sig->m)
return 0;
if (!sinfo->sig->hash_algo)
@@ -45,11 +45,11 @@ static int pkcs7_digest(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
return (PTR_ERR(tfm) == -ENOENT) ? -ENOPKG : PTR_ERR(tfm);
desc_size = crypto_shash_descsize(tfm) + sizeof(*desc);
- sig->digest_size = crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm);
+ sig->m_size = crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm);
ret = -ENOMEM;
- sig->digest = kmalloc(sig->digest_size, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!sig->digest)
+ sig->m = kmalloc(sig->m_size, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!sig->m)
goto error_no_desc;
desc = kzalloc(desc_size, GFP_KERNEL);
@@ -59,11 +59,10 @@ static int pkcs7_digest(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
desc->tfm = tfm;
/* Digest the message [RFC2315 9.3] */
- ret = crypto_shash_digest(desc, pkcs7->data, pkcs7->data_len,
- sig->digest);
+ ret = crypto_shash_digest(desc, pkcs7->data, pkcs7->data_len, sig->m);
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
- pr_devel("MsgDigest = [%*ph]\n", 8, sig->digest);
+ pr_devel("MsgDigest = [%*ph]\n", 8, sig->m);
/* However, if there are authenticated attributes, there must be a
* message digest attribute amongst them which corresponds to the
@@ -78,14 +77,14 @@ static int pkcs7_digest(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
goto error;
}
- if (sinfo->msgdigest_len != sig->digest_size) {
+ if (sinfo->msgdigest_len != sig->m_size) {
pr_warn("Sig %u: Invalid digest size (%u)\n",
sinfo->index, sinfo->msgdigest_len);
ret = -EBADMSG;
goto error;
}
- if (memcmp(sig->digest, sinfo->msgdigest,
+ if (memcmp(sig->m, sinfo->msgdigest,
sinfo->msgdigest_len) != 0) {
pr_warn("Sig %u: Message digest doesn't match\n",
sinfo->index);
@@ -98,7 +97,8 @@ static int pkcs7_digest(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
* convert the attributes from a CONT.0 into a SET before we
* hash it.
*/
- memset(sig->digest, 0, sig->digest_size);
+ memset(sig->m, 0, sig->m_size);
+
ret = crypto_shash_init(desc);
if (ret < 0)
@@ -108,10 +108,10 @@ static int pkcs7_digest(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
ret = crypto_shash_finup(desc, sinfo->authattrs,
- sinfo->authattrs_len, sig->digest);
+ sinfo->authattrs_len, sig->m);
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
- pr_devel("AADigest = [%*ph]\n", 8, sig->digest);
+ pr_devel("AADigest = [%*ph]\n", 8, sig->m);
}
error:
@@ -138,8 +138,8 @@ int pkcs7_get_digest(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, const u8 **buf, u32 *len,
if (ret)
return ret;
- *buf = sinfo->sig->digest;
- *len = sinfo->sig->digest_size;
+ *buf = sinfo->sig->m;
+ *len = sinfo->sig->m_size;
i = match_string(hash_algo_name, HASH_ALGO__LAST,
sinfo->sig->hash_algo);
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
index e5b177c8e842..a46356e0c08b 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
@@ -425,8 +425,7 @@ int public_key_verify_signature(const struct public_key *pkey,
if (ret)
goto error_free_key;
- ret = crypto_sig_verify(tfm, sig->s, sig->s_size,
- sig->digest, sig->digest_size);
+ ret = crypto_sig_verify(tfm, sig->s, sig->s_size, sig->m, sig->m_size);
error_free_key:
kfree_sensitive(key);
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/signature.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/signature.c
index 041d04b5c953..f4ec126121b3 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/signature.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/signature.c
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ void public_key_signature_free(struct public_key_signature *sig)
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(sig->auth_ids); i++)
kfree(sig->auth_ids[i]);
kfree(sig->s);
- kfree(sig->digest);
+ kfree(sig->m);
kfree(sig);
}
}
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
index 79cc7b7a0630..3854f7ae4ed0 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
@@ -63,11 +63,11 @@ int x509_get_sig_params(struct x509_certificate *cert)
}
desc_size = crypto_shash_descsize(tfm) + sizeof(*desc);
- sig->digest_size = crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm);
+ sig->m_size = crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm);
ret = -ENOMEM;
- sig->digest = kmalloc(sig->digest_size, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!sig->digest)
+ sig->m = kmalloc(sig->m_size, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!sig->m)
goto error;
desc = kzalloc(desc_size, GFP_KERNEL);
@@ -76,9 +76,7 @@ int x509_get_sig_params(struct x509_certificate *cert)
desc->tfm = tfm;
- ret = crypto_shash_digest(desc, cert->tbs, cert->tbs_size,
- sig->digest);
-
+ ret = crypto_shash_digest(desc, cert->tbs, cert->tbs_size, sig->m);
if (ret < 0)
goto error_2;
diff --git a/include/crypto/public_key.h b/include/crypto/public_key.h
index 81098e00c08f..bd38ba4d217d 100644
--- a/include/crypto/public_key.h
+++ b/include/crypto/public_key.h
@@ -43,9 +43,9 @@ extern void public_key_free(struct public_key *key);
struct public_key_signature {
struct asymmetric_key_id *auth_ids[3];
u8 *s; /* Signature */
- u8 *digest;
+ u8 *m; /* Message data to pass to verifier */
u32 s_size; /* Number of bytes in signature */
- u32 digest_size; /* Number of bytes in digest */
+ u32 m_size; /* Number of bytes in ->m */
const char *pkey_algo;
const char *hash_algo;
const char *encoding;
diff --git a/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c b/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c
index 457c0a396caf..87be85f477d1 100644
--- a/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c
+++ b/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c
@@ -121,8 +121,8 @@ int asymmetric_verify(struct key *keyring, const char *sig,
goto out;
}
- pks.digest = (u8 *)data;
- pks.digest_size = datalen;
+ pks.m = (u8 *)data;
+ pks.m_size = datalen;
pks.s = hdr->sig;
pks.s_size = siglen;
ret = verify_signature(key, &pks);© 2016 - 2026 Red Hat, Inc.