[PATCH 3/3] PCI: Prevent overflow in proc_bus_pci_write()

Ziming Du posted 3 patches 1 month, 3 weeks ago
There is a newer version of this series
[PATCH 3/3] PCI: Prevent overflow in proc_bus_pci_write()
Posted by Ziming Du 1 month, 3 weeks ago
When the value of ppos over the INT_MAX, the pos will be
set a negtive value which will be pass to get_user() or
pci_user_write_config_dword(). And unexpected behavior
such as a softlock happens:

 watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#0 stuck for 130s! [syz.3.109:3444]
 Modules linked in:
 CPU: 0 PID: 3444 Comm: syz.3.109 Not tainted 6.6.0+ #33
 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.3-0-ga6ed6b701f0a-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
 RIP: 0010:_raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x17/0x30
 Code: cc cc cc 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 f3 0f 1e fa 0f 1f 44 00 00 e8 52 12 00 00 90 fb 65 ff 0d b1 a1 86 6d <74> 05 e9 42 52 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 c3 cc cc cc cc 0f 1f 84 00 00
 RSP: 0018:ffff88816851fb50 EFLAGS: 00000246
 RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffffff927daf9b
 RDX: 0000000000000cfc RSI: 0000000000000046 RDI: ffffffff9a7c7400
 RBP: 00000000818bb9dc R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffffed102d0a3f59
 R10: 0000000000000003 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000
 R13: ffff888102220000 R14: ffffffff926d3b10 R15: 00000000210bbb5f
 FS:  00007ff2d4e56640(0000) GS:ffff8881f5c00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
 CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
 CR2: 00000000210bbb5b CR3: 0000000147374002 CR4: 0000000000772ef0
 PKRU: 00000000
 Call Trace:
  <TASK>
  pci_user_write_config_dword+0x126/0x1f0
  ? __get_user_nocheck_8+0x20/0x20
  proc_bus_pci_write+0x273/0x470
  proc_reg_write+0x1b6/0x280
  do_iter_write+0x48e/0x790
  ? import_iovec+0x47/0x90
  vfs_writev+0x125/0x4a0
  ? futex_wake+0xed/0x500
  ? __pfx_vfs_writev+0x10/0x10
  ? userfaultfd_ioctl+0x131/0x1ae0
  ? userfaultfd_ioctl+0x131/0x1ae0
  ? do_futex+0x17e/0x220
  ? __pfx_do_futex+0x10/0x10
  ? __fget_files+0x193/0x2b0
  __x64_sys_pwritev+0x1e2/0x2a0
  ? __pfx___x64_sys_pwritev+0x10/0x10
  do_syscall_64+0x59/0x110
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x78/0xe2

Fix this by use unsigned int for the pos.

Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Yongqiang Liu <liuyongqiang13@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Ziming Du <duziming2@huawei.com>
---
 drivers/pci/proc.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/pci/proc.c b/drivers/pci/proc.c
index 9348a0fb8084..dbec1d4209c9 100644
--- a/drivers/pci/proc.c
+++ b/drivers/pci/proc.c
@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ static ssize_t proc_bus_pci_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 {
 	struct inode *ino = file_inode(file);
 	struct pci_dev *dev = pde_data(ino);
-	int pos = *ppos;
+	unsigned int pos = *ppos;
 	int size = dev->cfg_size;
 	int cnt, ret;
 
-- 
2.43.0
Re: [PATCH 3/3] PCI: Prevent overflow in proc_bus_pci_write()
Posted by Ilpo Järvinen 1 month, 3 weeks ago
On Tue, 16 Dec 2025, Ziming Du wrote:

> When the value of ppos over the INT_MAX, the pos will be

is over

> set a negtive value which will be pass to get_user() or

set to a negative value which will be passed

> pci_user_write_config_dword(). And unexpected behavior

Please start the sentence with something else than And.

Hmm, the lines look rather short too, can you please reflow the changelog 
paragraphs to 75 characters.

> such as a softlock happens:
> 
>  watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#0 stuck for 130s! [syz.3.109:3444]
>  Modules linked in:
>  CPU: 0 PID: 3444 Comm: syz.3.109 Not tainted 6.6.0+ #33
>  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.3-0-ga6ed6b701f0a-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
>  RIP: 0010:_raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x17/0x30
>  Code: cc cc cc 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 f3 0f 1e fa 0f 1f 44 00 00 e8 52 12 00 00 90 fb 65 ff 0d b1 a1 86 6d <74> 05 e9 42 52 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 c3 cc cc cc cc 0f 1f 84 00 00
>  RSP: 0018:ffff88816851fb50 EFLAGS: 00000246
>  RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffffff927daf9b
>  RDX: 0000000000000cfc RSI: 0000000000000046 RDI: ffffffff9a7c7400
>  RBP: 00000000818bb9dc R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffffed102d0a3f59
>  R10: 0000000000000003 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000
>  R13: ffff888102220000 R14: ffffffff926d3b10 R15: 00000000210bbb5f
>  FS:  00007ff2d4e56640(0000) GS:ffff8881f5c00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
>  CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
>  CR2: 00000000210bbb5b CR3: 0000000147374002 CR4: 0000000000772ef0
>  PKRU: 00000000
>  Call Trace:
>   <TASK>
>   pci_user_write_config_dword+0x126/0x1f0
>   ? __get_user_nocheck_8+0x20/0x20
>   proc_bus_pci_write+0x273/0x470
>   proc_reg_write+0x1b6/0x280
>   do_iter_write+0x48e/0x790
>   ? import_iovec+0x47/0x90
>   vfs_writev+0x125/0x4a0
>   ? futex_wake+0xed/0x500
>   ? __pfx_vfs_writev+0x10/0x10
>   ? userfaultfd_ioctl+0x131/0x1ae0
>   ? userfaultfd_ioctl+0x131/0x1ae0
>   ? do_futex+0x17e/0x220
>   ? __pfx_do_futex+0x10/0x10
>   ? __fget_files+0x193/0x2b0
>   __x64_sys_pwritev+0x1e2/0x2a0
>   ? __pfx___x64_sys_pwritev+0x10/0x10
>   do_syscall_64+0x59/0x110
>   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x78/0xe2

Could you please trim the dump so it only contains things relevant to this 
issue () (also check trimming in the other patches).

> Fix this by use unsigned int for the pos.
> 
> Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
> Signed-off-by: Yongqiang Liu <liuyongqiang13@huawei.com>
> Signed-off-by: Ziming Du <duziming2@huawei.com>
> ---
>  drivers/pci/proc.c | 2 +-
>  1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
> 
> diff --git a/drivers/pci/proc.c b/drivers/pci/proc.c
> index 9348a0fb8084..dbec1d4209c9 100644
> --- a/drivers/pci/proc.c
> +++ b/drivers/pci/proc.c
> @@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ static ssize_t proc_bus_pci_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
>  {
>  	struct inode *ino = file_inode(file);
>  	struct pci_dev *dev = pde_data(ino);
> -	int pos = *ppos;
> +	unsigned int pos = *ppos;
>  	int size = dev->cfg_size;
>  	int cnt, ret;

So this still throws away some bits compared with the original ppos ?

-- 
 i.
Re: [PATCH 3/3] PCI: Prevent overflow in proc_bus_pci_write()
Posted by duziming 1 month, 3 weeks ago
在 2025/12/16 18:57, Ilpo Järvinen 写道:
> On Tue, 16 Dec 2025, Ziming Du wrote:
>
>> When the value of ppos over the INT_MAX, the pos will be
> is over
>
>> set a negtive value which will be pass to get_user() or
> set to a negative value which will be passed
>
>> pci_user_write_config_dword(). And unexpected behavior
> Please start the sentence with something else than And.
>
> Hmm, the lines look rather short too, can you please reflow the changelog
> paragraphs to 75 characters.

Thanks for the review. I'll reflow the changelog to 75-character lines 
and avoid

starting sentences with 'And' in the next revision.

>> such as a softlock happens:
>>
>>   watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#0 stuck for 130s! [syz.3.109:3444]
>>   Modules linked in:
>>   CPU: 0 PID: 3444 Comm: syz.3.109 Not tainted 6.6.0+ #33
>>   Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.3-0-ga6ed6b701f0a-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
>>   RIP: 0010:_raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x17/0x30
>>   Code: cc cc cc 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 f3 0f 1e fa 0f 1f 44 00 00 e8 52 12 00 00 90 fb 65 ff 0d b1 a1 86 6d <74> 05 e9 42 52 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 c3 cc cc cc cc 0f 1f 84 00 00
>>   RSP: 0018:ffff88816851fb50 EFLAGS: 00000246
>>   RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffffff927daf9b
>>   RDX: 0000000000000cfc RSI: 0000000000000046 RDI: ffffffff9a7c7400
>>   RBP: 00000000818bb9dc R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffffed102d0a3f59
>>   R10: 0000000000000003 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000
>>   R13: ffff888102220000 R14: ffffffff926d3b10 R15: 00000000210bbb5f
>>   FS:  00007ff2d4e56640(0000) GS:ffff8881f5c00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
>>   CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
>>   CR2: 00000000210bbb5b CR3: 0000000147374002 CR4: 0000000000772ef0
>>   PKRU: 00000000
>>   Call Trace:
>>    <TASK>
>>    pci_user_write_config_dword+0x126/0x1f0
>>    ? __get_user_nocheck_8+0x20/0x20
>>    proc_bus_pci_write+0x273/0x470
>>    proc_reg_write+0x1b6/0x280
>>    do_iter_write+0x48e/0x790
>>    ? import_iovec+0x47/0x90
>>    vfs_writev+0x125/0x4a0
>>    ? futex_wake+0xed/0x500
>>    ? __pfx_vfs_writev+0x10/0x10
>>    ? userfaultfd_ioctl+0x131/0x1ae0
>>    ? userfaultfd_ioctl+0x131/0x1ae0
>>    ? do_futex+0x17e/0x220
>>    ? __pfx_do_futex+0x10/0x10
>>    ? __fget_files+0x193/0x2b0
>>    __x64_sys_pwritev+0x1e2/0x2a0
>>    ? __pfx___x64_sys_pwritev+0x10/0x10
>>    do_syscall_64+0x59/0x110
>>    entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x78/0xe2
> Could you please trim the dump so it only contains things relevant to this
> issue () (also check trimming in the other patches).
Thanks for pointing that out, we'll make sure to only keep the relevant 
stacks in future patches.
>> Fix this by use unsigned int for the pos.
>>
>> Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
>> Signed-off-by: Yongqiang Liu <liuyongqiang13@huawei.com>
>> Signed-off-by: Ziming Du <duziming2@huawei.com>
>> ---
>>   drivers/pci/proc.c | 2 +-
>>   1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/drivers/pci/proc.c b/drivers/pci/proc.c
>> index 9348a0fb8084..dbec1d4209c9 100644
>> --- a/drivers/pci/proc.c
>> +++ b/drivers/pci/proc.c
>> @@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ static ssize_t proc_bus_pci_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
>>   {
>>   	struct inode *ino = file_inode(file);
>>   	struct pci_dev *dev = pde_data(ino);
>> -	int pos = *ppos;
>> +	unsigned int pos = *ppos;
>>   	int size = dev->cfg_size;
>>   	int cnt, ret;
> So this still throws away some bits compared with the original ppos ?

The current approach may lose some precision compared to the original 
ppos, but a later check ensures  pos

remains valid—so any potential information loss is handled safely.

>
Re: [PATCH 3/3] PCI: Prevent overflow in proc_bus_pci_write()
Posted by Ilpo Järvinen 1 month, 3 weeks ago
On Wed, 17 Dec 2025, duziming wrote:
> 在 2025/12/16 18:57, Ilpo Järvinen 写道:
> > On Tue, 16 Dec 2025, Ziming Du wrote:
> > 
> > > When the value of ppos over the INT_MAX, the pos will be
> > is over
> > 
> > > set a negtive value which will be pass to get_user() or
> > set to a negative value which will be passed
> > 
> > > pci_user_write_config_dword(). And unexpected behavior
> > Please start the sentence with something else than And.
> > 
> > Hmm, the lines look rather short too, can you please reflow the changelog
> > paragraphs to 75 characters.
> 
> Thanks for the review. I'll reflow the changelog to 75-character lines and
> avoid
> 
> starting sentences with 'And' in the next revision.
> 
> > > such as a softlock happens:
> > > 
> > >   watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#0 stuck for 130s! [syz.3.109:3444]
> > >   Modules linked in:
> > >   CPU: 0 PID: 3444 Comm: syz.3.109 Not tainted 6.6.0+ #33
> > >   Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS
> > > rel-1.16.3-0-ga6ed6b701f0a-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
> > >   RIP: 0010:_raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x17/0x30
> > >   Code: cc cc cc 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 f3 0f 1e
> > > fa 0f 1f 44 00 00 e8 52 12 00 00 90 fb 65 ff 0d b1 a1 86 6d <74> 05 e9 42
> > > 52 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 c3 cc cc cc cc 0f 1f 84 00 00
> > >   RSP: 0018:ffff88816851fb50 EFLAGS: 00000246
> > >   RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffffff927daf9b
> > >   RDX: 0000000000000cfc RSI: 0000000000000046 RDI: ffffffff9a7c7400
> > >   RBP: 00000000818bb9dc R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffffed102d0a3f59
> > >   R10: 0000000000000003 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000
> > >   R13: ffff888102220000 R14: ffffffff926d3b10 R15: 00000000210bbb5f
> > >   FS:  00007ff2d4e56640(0000) GS:ffff8881f5c00000(0000)
> > > knlGS:0000000000000000
> > >   CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
> > >   CR2: 00000000210bbb5b CR3: 0000000147374002 CR4: 0000000000772ef0
> > >   PKRU: 00000000
> > >   Call Trace:
> > >    <TASK>
> > >    pci_user_write_config_dword+0x126/0x1f0
> > >    ? __get_user_nocheck_8+0x20/0x20
> > >    proc_bus_pci_write+0x273/0x470
> > >    proc_reg_write+0x1b6/0x280
> > >    do_iter_write+0x48e/0x790
> > >    ? import_iovec+0x47/0x90
> > >    vfs_writev+0x125/0x4a0
> > >    ? futex_wake+0xed/0x500
> > >    ? __pfx_vfs_writev+0x10/0x10
> > >    ? userfaultfd_ioctl+0x131/0x1ae0
> > >    ? userfaultfd_ioctl+0x131/0x1ae0
> > >    ? do_futex+0x17e/0x220
> > >    ? __pfx_do_futex+0x10/0x10
> > >    ? __fget_files+0x193/0x2b0
> > >    __x64_sys_pwritev+0x1e2/0x2a0
> > >    ? __pfx___x64_sys_pwritev+0x10/0x10
> > >    do_syscall_64+0x59/0x110
> > >    entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x78/0xe2
> > Could you please trim the dump so it only contains things relevant to this
> > issue () (also check trimming in the other patches).
> Thanks for pointing that out, we'll make sure to only keep the relevant stacks
> in future patches.
> > > Fix this by use unsigned int for the pos.
> > > 
> > > Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
> > > Signed-off-by: Yongqiang Liu <liuyongqiang13@huawei.com>
> > > Signed-off-by: Ziming Du <duziming2@huawei.com>
> > > ---
> > >   drivers/pci/proc.c | 2 +-
> > >   1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
> > > 
> > > diff --git a/drivers/pci/proc.c b/drivers/pci/proc.c
> > > index 9348a0fb8084..dbec1d4209c9 100644
> > > --- a/drivers/pci/proc.c
> > > +++ b/drivers/pci/proc.c
> > > @@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ static ssize_t proc_bus_pci_write(struct file *file,
> > > const char __user *buf,
> > >   {
> > >   	struct inode *ino = file_inode(file);
> > >   	struct pci_dev *dev = pde_data(ino);
> > > -	int pos = *ppos;
> > > +	unsigned int pos = *ppos;
> > >   	int size = dev->cfg_size;
> > >   	int cnt, ret;
> > So this still throws away some bits compared with the original ppos ?
> 
> The current approach may lose some precision compared to the original ppos,
> but a later check ensures  pos
> 
> remains valid—so any potential information loss is handled safely.

That's somewhat odd definition of "valid" if a big ppos results in 
a smaller number after the precision loss that is smaller than size. 

-- 
 i.
Re: [PATCH 3/3] PCI: Prevent overflow in proc_bus_pci_write()
Posted by duziming 1 month, 3 weeks ago
在 2025/12/17 18:19, Ilpo Järvinen 写道:
> On Wed, 17 Dec 2025, duziming wrote:
>> 在 2025/12/16 18:57, Ilpo Järvinen 写道:
>>> On Tue, 16 Dec 2025, Ziming Du wrote:
>>>
>>>> When the value of ppos over the INT_MAX, the pos will be
>>> is over
>>>
>>>> set a negtive value which will be pass to get_user() or
>>> set to a negative value which will be passed
>>>
>>>> pci_user_write_config_dword(). And unexpected behavior
>>> Please start the sentence with something else than And.
>>>
>>> Hmm, the lines look rather short too, can you please reflow the changelog
>>> paragraphs to 75 characters.
>> Thanks for the review. I'll reflow the changelog to 75-character lines and
>> avoid
>>
>> starting sentences with 'And' in the next revision.
>>
>>>> such as a softlock happens:
>>>>
>>>>    watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#0 stuck for 130s! [syz.3.109:3444]
>>>>    Modules linked in:
>>>>    CPU: 0 PID: 3444 Comm: syz.3.109 Not tainted 6.6.0+ #33
>>>>    Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS
>>>> rel-1.16.3-0-ga6ed6b701f0a-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
>>>>    RIP: 0010:_raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x17/0x30
>>>>    Code: cc cc cc 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 f3 0f 1e
>>>> fa 0f 1f 44 00 00 e8 52 12 00 00 90 fb 65 ff 0d b1 a1 86 6d <74> 05 e9 42
>>>> 52 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 c3 cc cc cc cc 0f 1f 84 00 00
>>>>    RSP: 0018:ffff88816851fb50 EFLAGS: 00000246
>>>>    RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffffff927daf9b
>>>>    RDX: 0000000000000cfc RSI: 0000000000000046 RDI: ffffffff9a7c7400
>>>>    RBP: 00000000818bb9dc R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffffed102d0a3f59
>>>>    R10: 0000000000000003 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000
>>>>    R13: ffff888102220000 R14: ffffffff926d3b10 R15: 00000000210bbb5f
>>>>    FS:  00007ff2d4e56640(0000) GS:ffff8881f5c00000(0000)
>>>> knlGS:0000000000000000
>>>>    CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
>>>>    CR2: 00000000210bbb5b CR3: 0000000147374002 CR4: 0000000000772ef0
>>>>    PKRU: 00000000
>>>>    Call Trace:
>>>>     <TASK>
>>>>     pci_user_write_config_dword+0x126/0x1f0
>>>>     ? __get_user_nocheck_8+0x20/0x20
>>>>     proc_bus_pci_write+0x273/0x470
>>>>     proc_reg_write+0x1b6/0x280
>>>>     do_iter_write+0x48e/0x790
>>>>     ? import_iovec+0x47/0x90
>>>>     vfs_writev+0x125/0x4a0
>>>>     ? futex_wake+0xed/0x500
>>>>     ? __pfx_vfs_writev+0x10/0x10
>>>>     ? userfaultfd_ioctl+0x131/0x1ae0
>>>>     ? userfaultfd_ioctl+0x131/0x1ae0
>>>>     ? do_futex+0x17e/0x220
>>>>     ? __pfx_do_futex+0x10/0x10
>>>>     ? __fget_files+0x193/0x2b0
>>>>     __x64_sys_pwritev+0x1e2/0x2a0
>>>>     ? __pfx___x64_sys_pwritev+0x10/0x10
>>>>     do_syscall_64+0x59/0x110
>>>>     entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x78/0xe2
>>> Could you please trim the dump so it only contains things relevant to this
>>> issue () (also check trimming in the other patches).
>> Thanks for pointing that out, we'll make sure to only keep the relevant stacks
>> in future patches.
>>>> Fix this by use unsigned int for the pos.
>>>>
>>>> Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
>>>> Signed-off-by: Yongqiang Liu <liuyongqiang13@huawei.com>
>>>> Signed-off-by: Ziming Du <duziming2@huawei.com>
>>>> ---
>>>>    drivers/pci/proc.c | 2 +-
>>>>    1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
>>>>
>>>> diff --git a/drivers/pci/proc.c b/drivers/pci/proc.c
>>>> index 9348a0fb8084..dbec1d4209c9 100644
>>>> --- a/drivers/pci/proc.c
>>>> +++ b/drivers/pci/proc.c
>>>> @@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ static ssize_t proc_bus_pci_write(struct file *file,
>>>> const char __user *buf,
>>>>    {
>>>>    	struct inode *ino = file_inode(file);
>>>>    	struct pci_dev *dev = pde_data(ino);
>>>> -	int pos = *ppos;
>>>> +	unsigned int pos = *ppos;
>>>>    	int size = dev->cfg_size;
>>>>    	int cnt, ret;
>>> So this still throws away some bits compared with the original ppos ?
>> The current approach may lose some precision compared to the original ppos,
>> but a later check ensures  pos
>>
>> remains valid—so any potential information loss is handled safely.
> That's somewhat odd definition of "valid" if a big ppos results in
> a smaller number after the precision loss that is smaller than size.

Oh, I get your concern now. In fact, in previous version, we fixed it 
like this :

diff --git a/drivers/pci/proc.c b/drivers/pci/proc.c
index dbec1d4209c9..200d42feafd8 100644
--- a/drivers/pci/proc.c
+++ b/drivers/pci/proc.c
@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ static ssize_t proc_bus_pci_write(struct file *file, 
const char __user *buf,
  {
         struct inode *ino = file_inode(file);
         struct pci_dev *dev = pde_data(ino);
-       unsigned int pos = *ppos;
+       int pos = *ppos;
         int size = dev->cfg_size;
         int cnt, ret;

@@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ static ssize_t proc_bus_pci_write(struct file *file, 
const char __user *buf,
         if (ret)
                 return ret;

-       if (pos >= size)
+       if (pos >= size || pos < 0)
                 return 0;
         if (nbytes >= size)
                 nbytes = size;

In addition, we notice that in proc_bus_pci_read(), "unsigned int pos = 
*ppos" might also cause some issues.

>