TPM2_Unseal requires TPM2_ST_SESSIONS, and tpm2_unseal_cmd() always does
set up either password or HMAC session.

Remove the branch in tpm2_unseal_cmd() conditionally setting
TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS. It is faulty but luckily it is never exercised at
run-time, and thus does not cause regressions.

Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
---
 security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c | 10 +---------
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 9 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
index d3a5c5f2b926..3666e3e48eab 100644
--- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
+++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
@@ -451,10 +451,8 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
 			   struct trusted_key_options *options,
 			   u32 blob_handle)
 {
-	struct tpm_header *head;
 	struct tpm_buf buf;
 	u16 data_len;
-	int offset;
 	u8 *data;
 	int rc;
 
@@ -495,14 +493,8 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
 		tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, options->blobauth_len);
 		tpm_buf_append(&buf, options->blobauth, options->blobauth_len);
 
-		if (tpm2_chip_auth(chip)) {
+		if (tpm2_chip_auth(chip))
 			tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, &buf, TPM2_SA_ENCRYPT, NULL, 0);
-		} else  {
-			offset = buf.handles * 4 + TPM_HEADER_SIZE;
-			head = (struct tpm_header *)buf.data;
-			if (tpm_buf_length(&buf) == offset)
-				head->tag = cpu_to_be16(TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS);
-		}
 	}
 
 	rc = tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, &buf);
-- 
2.39.5