mm/slub.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
When CONFIG_SLUB_TINY is enabled, kfree_nolock() calls kasan_slab_free()
before defer_free(). On ARM64 with MTE (Memory Tagging Extension),
kasan_slab_free() poisons the memory and changes the tag from the
original (e.g., 0xf3) to a poison tag (0xfe).
When defer_free() then tries to write to the freed object to build the
deferred free list via llist_add(), the pointer still has the old tag,
causing a tag mismatch and triggering a KASAN use-after-free report:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in defer_free+0x3c/0xbc mm/slub.c:6537
Write at addr f3f000000854f020 by task kworker/u8:6/983
Pointer tag: [f3], memory tag: [fe]
Fix this by calling kasan_reset_tag() before accessing the freed memory.
This is safe because defer_free() is part of the allocator itself and is
expected to manipulate freed memory for bookkeeping purposes.
Fixes: af92793e52c3 ("slab: Introduce kmalloc_nolock() and kfree_nolock().")
Reported-by: syzbot+7a25305a76d872abcfa1@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=7a25305a76d872abcfa1
Tested-by: syzbot+7a25305a76d872abcfa1@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Deepanshu Kartikey <kartikey406@gmail.com>
---
mm/slub.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
diff --git a/mm/slub.c b/mm/slub.c
index e6a330e24145..46959c6da2cf 100644
--- a/mm/slub.c
+++ b/mm/slub.c
@@ -6534,6 +6534,8 @@ static void defer_free(struct kmem_cache *s, void *head)
guard(preempt)();
+ head = kasan_reset_tag(head);
+
df = this_cpu_ptr(&defer_free_objects);
if (llist_add(head + s->offset, &df->objects))
irq_work_queue(&df->work);
--
2.43.0
On 12/10/25 03:20, Deepanshu Kartikey wrote:
> When CONFIG_SLUB_TINY is enabled, kfree_nolock() calls kasan_slab_free()
> before defer_free(). On ARM64 with MTE (Memory Tagging Extension),
> kasan_slab_free() poisons the memory and changes the tag from the
> original (e.g., 0xf3) to a poison tag (0xfe).
>
> When defer_free() then tries to write to the freed object to build the
> deferred free list via llist_add(), the pointer still has the old tag,
> causing a tag mismatch and triggering a KASAN use-after-free report:
>
> BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in defer_free+0x3c/0xbc mm/slub.c:6537
> Write at addr f3f000000854f020 by task kworker/u8:6/983
> Pointer tag: [f3], memory tag: [fe]
>
> Fix this by calling kasan_reset_tag() before accessing the freed memory.
> This is safe because defer_free() is part of the allocator itself and is
> expected to manipulate freed memory for bookkeeping purposes.
>
> Fixes: af92793e52c3 ("slab: Introduce kmalloc_nolock() and kfree_nolock().")
> Reported-by: syzbot+7a25305a76d872abcfa1@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
> Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=7a25305a76d872abcfa1
> Tested-by: syzbot+7a25305a76d872abcfa1@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
> Signed-off-by: Deepanshu Kartikey <kartikey406@gmail.com>
Thanks, added cc: stable and pushed to slab/for-next-fixes
> ---
> mm/slub.c | 2 ++
> 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/mm/slub.c b/mm/slub.c
> index e6a330e24145..46959c6da2cf 100644
> --- a/mm/slub.c
> +++ b/mm/slub.c
> @@ -6534,6 +6534,8 @@ static void defer_free(struct kmem_cache *s, void *head)
>
> guard(preempt)();
>
> + head = kasan_reset_tag(head);
> +
> df = this_cpu_ptr(&defer_free_objects);
> if (llist_add(head + s->offset, &df->objects))
> irq_work_queue(&df->work);
On Wed, Dec 10, 2025 at 11:20 AM Deepanshu Kartikey
<kartikey406@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> When CONFIG_SLUB_TINY is enabled, kfree_nolock() calls kasan_slab_free()
> before defer_free(). On ARM64 with MTE (Memory Tagging Extension),
> kasan_slab_free() poisons the memory and changes the tag from the
> original (e.g., 0xf3) to a poison tag (0xfe).
>
> When defer_free() then tries to write to the freed object to build the
> deferred free list via llist_add(), the pointer still has the old tag,
> causing a tag mismatch and triggering a KASAN use-after-free report:
>
> BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in defer_free+0x3c/0xbc mm/slub.c:6537
> Write at addr f3f000000854f020 by task kworker/u8:6/983
> Pointer tag: [f3], memory tag: [fe]
>
> Fix this by calling kasan_reset_tag() before accessing the freed memory.
> This is safe because defer_free() is part of the allocator itself and is
> expected to manipulate freed memory for bookkeeping purposes.
>
> Fixes: af92793e52c3 ("slab: Introduce kmalloc_nolock() and kfree_nolock().")
> Reported-by: syzbot+7a25305a76d872abcfa1@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
> Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=7a25305a76d872abcfa1
> Tested-by: syzbot+7a25305a76d872abcfa1@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
> Signed-off-by: Deepanshu Kartikey <kartikey406@gmail.com>
> ---
> mm/slub.c | 2 ++
> 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/mm/slub.c b/mm/slub.c
> index e6a330e24145..46959c6da2cf 100644
> --- a/mm/slub.c
> +++ b/mm/slub.c
> @@ -6534,6 +6534,8 @@ static void defer_free(struct kmem_cache *s, void *head)
>
> guard(preempt)();
>
> + head = kasan_reset_tag(head);
> +
> df = this_cpu_ptr(&defer_free_objects);
> if (llist_add(head + s->offset, &df->objects))
> irq_work_queue(&df->work);
makes sense to me.
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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