[PATCH 01/10] mm/kasan: implement kasan_poison_range

Ethan Graham posted 10 patches 1 week, 2 days ago
[PATCH 01/10] mm/kasan: implement kasan_poison_range
Posted by Ethan Graham 1 week, 2 days ago
From: Ethan Graham <ethangraham@google.com>

Introduce a new helper function, kasan_poison_range(), to encapsulate
the logic for poisoning an arbitrary memory range of a given size, and
expose it publically in <include/linux/kasan.h>.

This is a preparatory change for the upcoming KFuzzTest patches, which
requires the ability to poison the inter-region padding in its input
buffers.

No functional change to any other subsystem is intended by this commit.

Signed-off-by: Ethan Graham <ethangraham@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Ethan Graham <ethan.w.s.graham@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>

---
PR v3:
- Move kasan_poison_range into mm/kasan/common.c so that it is built
  with HW_TAGS mode enabled.
- Add a runtime check for kasan_enabled() in kasan_poison_range.
- Add two WARN_ON()s in kasan_poison_range when the input is invalid.
PR v1:
- Enforce KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE alignment for the end of the range in
  kasan_poison_range(), and return -EINVAL when this isn't respected.
---
---
 include/linux/kasan.h | 11 +++++++++++
 mm/kasan/common.c     | 37 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 48 insertions(+)

diff --git a/include/linux/kasan.h b/include/linux/kasan.h
index 890011071f2b..cd6cdf732378 100644
--- a/include/linux/kasan.h
+++ b/include/linux/kasan.h
@@ -102,6 +102,16 @@ static inline bool kasan_has_integrated_init(void)
 }
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_KASAN
+
+/**
+ * kasan_poison_range - poison the memory range [@addr, @addr + @size)
+ *
+ * The exact behavior is subject to alignment with KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE, defined
+ * in <mm/kasan/kasan.h>: if @start is unaligned, the initial partial granule
+ * at the beginning of the range is only poisoned if CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC=y.
+ */
+int kasan_poison_range(const void *addr, size_t size);
+
 void __kasan_unpoison_range(const void *addr, size_t size);
 static __always_inline void kasan_unpoison_range(const void *addr, size_t size)
 {
@@ -402,6 +412,7 @@ static __always_inline bool kasan_check_byte(const void *addr)
 
 #else /* CONFIG_KASAN */
 
+static inline int kasan_poison_range(const void *start, size_t size) { return 0; }
 static inline void kasan_unpoison_range(const void *address, size_t size) {}
 static inline void kasan_poison_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order,
 				      bool init) {}
diff --git a/mm/kasan/common.c b/mm/kasan/common.c
index 9142964ab9c9..c83579ef37c6 100644
--- a/mm/kasan/common.c
+++ b/mm/kasan/common.c
@@ -570,3 +570,40 @@ bool __kasan_check_byte(const void *address, unsigned long ip)
 	}
 	return true;
 }
+
+int kasan_poison_range(const void *addr, size_t size)
+{
+	uintptr_t start_addr = (uintptr_t)addr;
+	uintptr_t head_granule_start;
+	uintptr_t poison_body_start;
+	uintptr_t poison_body_end;
+	size_t head_prefix_size;
+	uintptr_t end_addr;
+
+	if (!kasan_enabled())
+		return 0;
+
+	end_addr = start_addr + size;
+	if (WARN_ON(end_addr % KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (WARN_ON(start_addr >= end_addr))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	head_granule_start = ALIGN_DOWN(start_addr, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE);
+	head_prefix_size = start_addr - head_granule_start;
+
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC) && head_prefix_size > 0)
+		kasan_poison_last_granule((void *)head_granule_start,
+					  head_prefix_size);
+
+	poison_body_start = ALIGN(start_addr, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE);
+	poison_body_end = end_addr;
+
+	if (poison_body_start < poison_body_end)
+		kasan_poison((void *)poison_body_start,
+			     poison_body_end - poison_body_start,
+			     KASAN_SLAB_REDZONE, false);
+	return 0;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(kasan_poison_range);
-- 
2.51.0
Re: [PATCH 01/10] mm/kasan: implement kasan_poison_range
Posted by Andrey Konovalov 1 week, 2 days ago
On Thu, Dec 4, 2025 at 3:13 PM Ethan Graham <ethan.w.s.graham@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> From: Ethan Graham <ethangraham@google.com>
>
> Introduce a new helper function, kasan_poison_range(), to encapsulate
> the logic for poisoning an arbitrary memory range of a given size, and
> expose it publically in <include/linux/kasan.h>.
>
> This is a preparatory change for the upcoming KFuzzTest patches, which
> requires the ability to poison the inter-region padding in its input
> buffers.
>
> No functional change to any other subsystem is intended by this commit.
>
> Signed-off-by: Ethan Graham <ethangraham@google.com>
> Signed-off-by: Ethan Graham <ethan.w.s.graham@gmail.com>
> Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
>
> ---
> PR v3:
> - Move kasan_poison_range into mm/kasan/common.c so that it is built
>   with HW_TAGS mode enabled.
> - Add a runtime check for kasan_enabled() in kasan_poison_range.
> - Add two WARN_ON()s in kasan_poison_range when the input is invalid.
> PR v1:
> - Enforce KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE alignment for the end of the range in
>   kasan_poison_range(), and return -EINVAL when this isn't respected.
> ---
> ---
>  include/linux/kasan.h | 11 +++++++++++
>  mm/kasan/common.c     | 37 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  2 files changed, 48 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/kasan.h b/include/linux/kasan.h
> index 890011071f2b..cd6cdf732378 100644
> --- a/include/linux/kasan.h
> +++ b/include/linux/kasan.h
> @@ -102,6 +102,16 @@ static inline bool kasan_has_integrated_init(void)
>  }
>
>  #ifdef CONFIG_KASAN
> +
> +/**
> + * kasan_poison_range - poison the memory range [@addr, @addr + @size)
> + *
> + * The exact behavior is subject to alignment with KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE, defined
> + * in <mm/kasan/kasan.h>: if @start is unaligned, the initial partial granule
> + * at the beginning of the range is only poisoned if CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC=y.

You can also mention that @addr + @size must be aligned.

> + */
> +int kasan_poison_range(const void *addr, size_t size);
> +
>  void __kasan_unpoison_range(const void *addr, size_t size);
>  static __always_inline void kasan_unpoison_range(const void *addr, size_t size)
>  {
> @@ -402,6 +412,7 @@ static __always_inline bool kasan_check_byte(const void *addr)
>
>  #else /* CONFIG_KASAN */
>
> +static inline int kasan_poison_range(const void *start, size_t size) { return 0; }
>  static inline void kasan_unpoison_range(const void *address, size_t size) {}
>  static inline void kasan_poison_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order,
>                                       bool init) {}
> diff --git a/mm/kasan/common.c b/mm/kasan/common.c
> index 9142964ab9c9..c83579ef37c6 100644
> --- a/mm/kasan/common.c
> +++ b/mm/kasan/common.c
> @@ -570,3 +570,40 @@ bool __kasan_check_byte(const void *address, unsigned long ip)
>         }
>         return true;
>  }
> +
> +int kasan_poison_range(const void *addr, size_t size)
> +{
> +       uintptr_t start_addr = (uintptr_t)addr;
> +       uintptr_t head_granule_start;
> +       uintptr_t poison_body_start;
> +       uintptr_t poison_body_end;
> +       size_t head_prefix_size;
> +       uintptr_t end_addr;
> +
> +       if (!kasan_enabled())
> +               return 0;

Please move this check to include/linux/kasan.h; see how
kasan_unpoison_range() is implemented. Otherwise eventually these
checks start creeping into lower level functions and the logic of
checking when and whether KASAN is enabled becomes a mess.

> +
> +       end_addr = start_addr + size;
> +       if (WARN_ON(end_addr % KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE))
> +               return -EINVAL;
> +
> +       if (WARN_ON(start_addr >= end_addr))
> +               return -EINVAL;
> +
> +       head_granule_start = ALIGN_DOWN(start_addr, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE);
> +       head_prefix_size = start_addr - head_granule_start;
> +
> +       if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC) && head_prefix_size > 0)
> +               kasan_poison_last_granule((void *)head_granule_start,
> +                                         head_prefix_size);

As I mentioned before, please rename kasan_poison_last_granule() to
kasan_poison_granule() (or maybe even kasan_poison_partial_granule?).
Here the granule being poisoned is not the last one.


> +
> +       poison_body_start = ALIGN(start_addr, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE);
> +       poison_body_end = end_addr;
> +
> +       if (poison_body_start < poison_body_end)
> +               kasan_poison((void *)poison_body_start,
> +                            poison_body_end - poison_body_start,
> +                            KASAN_SLAB_REDZONE, false);
> +       return 0;
> +}
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL(kasan_poison_range);
> --
> 2.51.0
>
Re: [PATCH 01/10] mm/kasan: implement kasan_poison_range
Posted by Andy Shevchenko 1 week, 2 days ago
On Thu, Dec 4, 2025 at 5:17 PM Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Thu, Dec 4, 2025 at 3:13 PM Ethan Graham <ethan.w.s.graham@gmail.com> wrote:

> > Introduce a new helper function, kasan_poison_range(), to encapsulate
> > the logic for poisoning an arbitrary memory range of a given size, and
> > expose it publically in <include/linux/kasan.h>.

publicly

> > This is a preparatory change for the upcoming KFuzzTest patches, which
> > requires the ability to poison the inter-region padding in its input
> > buffers.
> >
> > No functional change to any other subsystem is intended by this commit.

...

> > +/**
> > + * kasan_poison_range - poison the memory range [@addr, @addr + @size)
> > + *
> > + * The exact behavior is subject to alignment with KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE, defined
> > + * in <mm/kasan/kasan.h>: if @start is unaligned, the initial partial granule
> > + * at the beginning of the range is only poisoned if CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC=y.
>
> You can also mention that @addr + @size must be aligned.
>
> > + */
> > +int kasan_poison_range(const void *addr, size_t size);

And also run a kernel-doc with all warnings enabled and fix the
descriptions respectively.

-- 
With Best Regards,
Andy Shevchenko