Prepare seccomp_run_filters() function to support more than one listener
in the seccomp tree. In this patch, we only introduce a new
struct seccomp_filter_matches with kdoc and modify seccomp_run_filters()
signature correspondingly.
No functional change intended.
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Cc: Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.pizza>
Cc: Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Stéphane Graber <stgraber@stgraber.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexander Mikhalitsyn <aleksandr.mikhalitsyn@canonical.com>
---
kernel/seccomp.c | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
1 file changed, 31 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/seccomp.c b/kernel/seccomp.c
index f944ea5a2716..c9a1062a53bd 100644
--- a/kernel/seccomp.c
+++ b/kernel/seccomp.c
@@ -237,6 +237,9 @@ struct seccomp_filter {
/* Limit any path through the tree to 256KB worth of instructions. */
#define MAX_INSNS_PER_PATH ((1 << 18) / sizeof(struct sock_filter))
+/* Limit number of listeners through the tree. */
+#define MAX_LISTENERS_PER_PATH 8
+
/*
* Endianness is explicitly ignored and left for BPF program authors to manage
* as per the specific architecture.
@@ -391,18 +394,38 @@ static inline bool seccomp_cache_check_allow(const struct seccomp_filter *sfilte
}
#endif /* SECCOMP_ARCH_NATIVE */
+/**
+ * struct seccomp_filter_matches - container for seccomp filter match results
+ *
+ * @n: A number of filters matched.
+ * @filters: An array of (struct seccomp_filter) pointers.
+ * Holds pointers to filters that matched during evaluation.
+ * A first one in the array is the one with the least permissive
+ * action result.
+ *
+ * If final action result is less (or more) permissive than SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF,
+ * only the most restrictive filter is stored in the array's first element.
+ * If final action result is SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF, we need to track
+ * all filters that resulted in the same action to support multiple listeners
+ * in seccomp tree.
+ */
+struct seccomp_filter_matches {
+ unsigned char n;
+ struct seccomp_filter *filters[MAX_LISTENERS_PER_PATH];
+};
+
#define ACTION_ONLY(ret) ((s32)((ret) & (SECCOMP_RET_ACTION_FULL)))
/**
* seccomp_run_filters - evaluates all seccomp filters against @sd
* @sd: optional seccomp data to be passed to filters
- * @match: stores struct seccomp_filter that resulted in the return value,
+ * @matches: array of struct seccomp_filter pointers that resulted in the return value,
* unless filter returned SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW, in which case it will
* be unchanged.
*
* Returns valid seccomp BPF response codes.
*/
static u32 seccomp_run_filters(const struct seccomp_data *sd,
- struct seccomp_filter **match)
+ struct seccomp_filter_matches *matches)
{
u32 ret = SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW;
/* Make sure cross-thread synced filter points somewhere sane. */
@@ -425,7 +448,8 @@ static u32 seccomp_run_filters(const struct seccomp_data *sd,
if (ACTION_ONLY(cur_ret) < ACTION_ONLY(ret)) {
ret = cur_ret;
- *match = f;
+ matches->n = 1;
+ matches->filters[0] = f;
}
}
return ret;
@@ -1252,6 +1276,7 @@ static int __seccomp_filter(int this_syscall, const bool recheck_after_trace)
{
u32 filter_ret, action;
struct seccomp_data sd;
+ struct seccomp_filter_matches matches = {};
struct seccomp_filter *match = NULL;
int data;
@@ -1263,7 +1288,9 @@ static int __seccomp_filter(int this_syscall, const bool recheck_after_trace)
populate_seccomp_data(&sd);
- filter_ret = seccomp_run_filters(&sd, &match);
+ filter_ret = seccomp_run_filters(&sd, &matches);
+
+ match = matches.filters[0];
data = filter_ret & SECCOMP_RET_DATA;
action = filter_ret & SECCOMP_RET_ACTION_FULL;
--
2.43.0
On Mon, Dec 01, 2025 at 01:23:59PM +0100, Alexander Mikhalitsyn wrote:
> Prepare seccomp_run_filters() function to support more than one listener
> in the seccomp tree. In this patch, we only introduce a new
> struct seccomp_filter_matches with kdoc and modify seccomp_run_filters()
> signature correspondingly.
>
> No functional change intended.
>
> Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
> Cc: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
> Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
> Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
> Cc: Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.pizza>
> Cc: Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com>
> Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
> Cc: Stéphane Graber <stgraber@stgraber.org>
> Signed-off-by: Alexander Mikhalitsyn <aleksandr.mikhalitsyn@canonical.com>
> ---
> kernel/seccomp.c | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
> 1 file changed, 31 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/kernel/seccomp.c b/kernel/seccomp.c
> index f944ea5a2716..c9a1062a53bd 100644
> --- a/kernel/seccomp.c
> +++ b/kernel/seccomp.c
> @@ -237,6 +237,9 @@ struct seccomp_filter {
> /* Limit any path through the tree to 256KB worth of instructions. */
> #define MAX_INSNS_PER_PATH ((1 << 18) / sizeof(struct sock_filter))
>
> +/* Limit number of listeners through the tree. */
> +#define MAX_LISTENERS_PER_PATH 8
> +
> /*
> * Endianness is explicitly ignored and left for BPF program authors to manage
> * as per the specific architecture.
> @@ -391,18 +394,38 @@ static inline bool seccomp_cache_check_allow(const struct seccomp_filter *sfilte
> }
> #endif /* SECCOMP_ARCH_NATIVE */
>
> +/**
> + * struct seccomp_filter_matches - container for seccomp filter match results
> + *
> + * @n: A number of filters matched.
> + * @filters: An array of (struct seccomp_filter) pointers.
> + * Holds pointers to filters that matched during evaluation.
> + * A first one in the array is the one with the least permissive
> + * action result.
> + *
> + * If final action result is less (or more) permissive than SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF,
> + * only the most restrictive filter is stored in the array's first element.
> + * If final action result is SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF, we need to track
> + * all filters that resulted in the same action to support multiple listeners
> + * in seccomp tree.
> + */
> +struct seccomp_filter_matches {
> + unsigned char n;
> + struct seccomp_filter *filters[MAX_LISTENERS_PER_PATH];
> +};
> +
> #define ACTION_ONLY(ret) ((s32)((ret) & (SECCOMP_RET_ACTION_FULL)))
> /**
> * seccomp_run_filters - evaluates all seccomp filters against @sd
> * @sd: optional seccomp data to be passed to filters
> - * @match: stores struct seccomp_filter that resulted in the return value,
> + * @matches: array of struct seccomp_filter pointers that resulted in the return value,
> * unless filter returned SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW, in which case it will
> * be unchanged.
> *
> * Returns valid seccomp BPF response codes.
> */
> static u32 seccomp_run_filters(const struct seccomp_data *sd,
> - struct seccomp_filter **match)
> + struct seccomp_filter_matches *matches)
> {
> u32 ret = SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW;
> /* Make sure cross-thread synced filter points somewhere sane. */
> @@ -425,7 +448,8 @@ static u32 seccomp_run_filters(const struct seccomp_data *sd,
>
> if (ACTION_ONLY(cur_ret) < ACTION_ONLY(ret)) {
> ret = cur_ret;
> - *match = f;
> + matches->n = 1;
> + matches->filters[0] = f;
> }
> }
> return ret;
> @@ -1252,6 +1276,7 @@ static int __seccomp_filter(int this_syscall, const bool recheck_after_trace)
> {
> u32 filter_ret, action;
> struct seccomp_data sd;
> + struct seccomp_filter_matches matches = {};
I was surprised to see this didn't induce a stack protector check (due
to the array use). It does, however, expand the work done to clear local
variables (i.e. this adds 9 unsigned long zeroings to the default case).
Regardless, I'll read this thread more closely in time for the LPC
session; I'm not exactly opposed to allowing multiple listeners, but I
do want to meditate on the safety logic (which I see you've spent time
thinking about too).
Thanks!
-Kees
--
Kees Cook
On Tue, Dec 2, 2025 at 9:26 PM Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org> wrote:
>
> On Mon, Dec 01, 2025 at 01:23:59PM +0100, Alexander Mikhalitsyn wrote:
> > Prepare seccomp_run_filters() function to support more than one listener
> > in the seccomp tree. In this patch, we only introduce a new
> > struct seccomp_filter_matches with kdoc and modify seccomp_run_filters()
> > signature correspondingly.
> >
> > No functional change intended.
> >
> > Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
> > Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
> > Cc: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
> > Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
> > Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
> > Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
> > Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
> > Cc: Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.pizza>
> > Cc: Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com>
> > Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
> > Cc: Stéphane Graber <stgraber@stgraber.org>
> > Signed-off-by: Alexander Mikhalitsyn <aleksandr.mikhalitsyn@canonical.com>
> > ---
> > kernel/seccomp.c | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
> > 1 file changed, 31 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/kernel/seccomp.c b/kernel/seccomp.c
> > index f944ea5a2716..c9a1062a53bd 100644
> > --- a/kernel/seccomp.c
> > +++ b/kernel/seccomp.c
> > @@ -237,6 +237,9 @@ struct seccomp_filter {
> > /* Limit any path through the tree to 256KB worth of instructions. */
> > #define MAX_INSNS_PER_PATH ((1 << 18) / sizeof(struct sock_filter))
> >
> > +/* Limit number of listeners through the tree. */
> > +#define MAX_LISTENERS_PER_PATH 8
> > +
> > /*
> > * Endianness is explicitly ignored and left for BPF program authors to manage
> > * as per the specific architecture.
> > @@ -391,18 +394,38 @@ static inline bool seccomp_cache_check_allow(const struct seccomp_filter *sfilte
> > }
> > #endif /* SECCOMP_ARCH_NATIVE */
> >
> > +/**
> > + * struct seccomp_filter_matches - container for seccomp filter match results
> > + *
> > + * @n: A number of filters matched.
> > + * @filters: An array of (struct seccomp_filter) pointers.
> > + * Holds pointers to filters that matched during evaluation.
> > + * A first one in the array is the one with the least permissive
> > + * action result.
> > + *
> > + * If final action result is less (or more) permissive than SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF,
> > + * only the most restrictive filter is stored in the array's first element.
> > + * If final action result is SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF, we need to track
> > + * all filters that resulted in the same action to support multiple listeners
> > + * in seccomp tree.
> > + */
> > +struct seccomp_filter_matches {
> > + unsigned char n;
> > + struct seccomp_filter *filters[MAX_LISTENERS_PER_PATH];
> > +};
> > +
> > #define ACTION_ONLY(ret) ((s32)((ret) & (SECCOMP_RET_ACTION_FULL)))
> > /**
> > * seccomp_run_filters - evaluates all seccomp filters against @sd
> > * @sd: optional seccomp data to be passed to filters
> > - * @match: stores struct seccomp_filter that resulted in the return value,
> > + * @matches: array of struct seccomp_filter pointers that resulted in the return value,
> > * unless filter returned SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW, in which case it will
> > * be unchanged.
> > *
> > * Returns valid seccomp BPF response codes.
> > */
> > static u32 seccomp_run_filters(const struct seccomp_data *sd,
> > - struct seccomp_filter **match)
> > + struct seccomp_filter_matches *matches)
> > {
> > u32 ret = SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW;
> > /* Make sure cross-thread synced filter points somewhere sane. */
> > @@ -425,7 +448,8 @@ static u32 seccomp_run_filters(const struct seccomp_data *sd,
> >
> > if (ACTION_ONLY(cur_ret) < ACTION_ONLY(ret)) {
> > ret = cur_ret;
> > - *match = f;
> > + matches->n = 1;
> > + matches->filters[0] = f;
> > }
> > }
> > return ret;
> > @@ -1252,6 +1276,7 @@ static int __seccomp_filter(int this_syscall, const bool recheck_after_trace)
> > {
> > u32 filter_ret, action;
> > struct seccomp_data sd;
> > + struct seccomp_filter_matches matches = {};
>
Hi Kees,
Thanks for looking into this stuff! ;)
> I was surprised to see this didn't induce a stack protector check (due
> to the array use). It does, however, expand the work done to clear local
> variables (i.e. this adds 9 unsigned long zeroings to the default case).
Actually, by saying this you've inspired me to look at this stuff with
a fresh mind again
and I have a feeling that I can probably make it work with just one additional
struct seccomp_filter pointer on the stack, instead of adding extra 8
pointers... :)
Let me make another iteration on this and send a -v3 then.
>I was surprised to see this didn't induce a stack protector check (due
> to the array use).
Also, sorry if my question is stupid, but what do you mean by stack
protector check in
this case? Just a check for an array index before writing to it? Or
something more generic?
>
> Regardless, I'll read this thread more closely in time for the LPC
> session; I'm not exactly opposed to allowing multiple listeners, but I
> do want to meditate on the safety logic (which I see you've spent time
> thinking about too).
Thanks, Kees!
>
> Thanks!
Kind regards,
Alex
>
> -Kees
>
> --
> Kees Cook
On Mon, Dec 01, 2025 at 01:23:59PM +0100, Alexander Mikhalitsyn wrote:
> +/**
> + * struct seccomp_filter_matches - container for seccomp filter match results
> + *
> + * @n: A number of filters matched.
> + * @filters: An array of (struct seccomp_filter) pointers.
> + * Holds pointers to filters that matched during evaluation.
> + * A first one in the array is the one with the least permissive
> + * action result.
> + *
> + * If final action result is less (or more) permissive than SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF,
> + * only the most restrictive filter is stored in the array's first element.
> + * If final action result is SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF, we need to track
> + * all filters that resulted in the same action to support multiple listeners
> + * in seccomp tree.
> + */
> +struct seccomp_filter_matches {
> + unsigned char n;
> + struct seccomp_filter *filters[MAX_LISTENERS_PER_PATH];
Maybe a __counted_by() for this?
Tycho
On Mon, Dec 1, 2025 at 3:24 PM Tycho Andersen <tycho@kernel.org> wrote:
>
> On Mon, Dec 01, 2025 at 01:23:59PM +0100, Alexander Mikhalitsyn wrote:
> > +/**
> > + * struct seccomp_filter_matches - container for seccomp filter match results
> > + *
> > + * @n: A number of filters matched.
> > + * @filters: An array of (struct seccomp_filter) pointers.
> > + * Holds pointers to filters that matched during evaluation.
> > + * A first one in the array is the one with the least permissive
> > + * action result.
> > + *
> > + * If final action result is less (or more) permissive than SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF,
> > + * only the most restrictive filter is stored in the array's first element.
> > + * If final action result is SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF, we need to track
> > + * all filters that resulted in the same action to support multiple listeners
> > + * in seccomp tree.
> > + */
> > +struct seccomp_filter_matches {
> > + unsigned char n;
> > + struct seccomp_filter *filters[MAX_LISTENERS_PER_PATH];
>
> Maybe a __counted_by() for this?
I thought that __counted_by() only makes sense for flex arrays, while
in this case we have a static array.
Kind regards,
Alex
>
> Tycho
On Tue, Dec 02, 2025 at 12:58:14PM +0100, Aleksandr Mikhalitsyn wrote:
> On Mon, Dec 1, 2025 at 3:24 PM Tycho Andersen <tycho@kernel.org> wrote:
> >
> > On Mon, Dec 01, 2025 at 01:23:59PM +0100, Alexander Mikhalitsyn wrote:
> > > +/**
> > > + * struct seccomp_filter_matches - container for seccomp filter match results
> > > + *
> > > + * @n: A number of filters matched.
> > > + * @filters: An array of (struct seccomp_filter) pointers.
> > > + * Holds pointers to filters that matched during evaluation.
> > > + * A first one in the array is the one with the least permissive
> > > + * action result.
> > > + *
> > > + * If final action result is less (or more) permissive than SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF,
> > > + * only the most restrictive filter is stored in the array's first element.
> > > + * If final action result is SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF, we need to track
> > > + * all filters that resulted in the same action to support multiple listeners
> > > + * in seccomp tree.
> > > + */
> > > +struct seccomp_filter_matches {
> > > + unsigned char n;
> > > + struct seccomp_filter *filters[MAX_LISTENERS_PER_PATH];
> >
> > Maybe a __counted_by() for this?
>
> I thought that __counted_by() only makes sense for flex arrays, while
> in this case we have a static array.
Oh, duh, you're right of course.
Tycho
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