drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000/e1000_main.c | 9 ++++++++- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
In e1000_tbi_should_accept() we read the last byte of the frame via
'data[length - 1]' to evaluate the TBI workaround. If the descriptor-
reported length is zero or larger than the actual RX buffer size, this
read goes out of bounds and can hit unrelated slab objects. The issue
is observed from the NAPI receive path (e1000_clean_rx_irq):
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in e1000_tbi_should_accept+0x610/0x790
Read of size 1 at addr ffff888014114e54 by task sshd/363
CPU: 0 PID: 363 Comm: sshd Not tainted 5.18.0-rc1 #1
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.12.0-59-gc9ba5276e321-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
dump_stack_lvl+0x5a/0x74
print_address_description+0x7b/0x440
print_report+0x101/0x200
kasan_report+0xc1/0xf0
e1000_tbi_should_accept+0x610/0x790
e1000_clean_rx_irq+0xa8c/0x1110
e1000_clean+0xde2/0x3c10
__napi_poll+0x98/0x380
net_rx_action+0x491/0xa20
__do_softirq+0x2c9/0x61d
do_softirq+0xd1/0x120
</IRQ>
<TASK>
__local_bh_enable_ip+0xfe/0x130
ip_finish_output2+0x7d5/0xb00
__ip_queue_xmit+0xe24/0x1ab0
__tcp_transmit_skb+0x1bcb/0x3340
tcp_write_xmit+0x175d/0x6bd0
__tcp_push_pending_frames+0x7b/0x280
tcp_sendmsg_locked+0x2e4f/0x32d0
tcp_sendmsg+0x24/0x40
sock_write_iter+0x322/0x430
vfs_write+0x56c/0xa60
ksys_write+0xd1/0x190
do_syscall_64+0x43/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
RIP: 0033:0x7f511b476b10
Code: 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 88 d3 2b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 83 3d f9 2b 2c 00 00 75 10 b8 01 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 31 c3 48 83 ec 08 e8 8e 9b 01 00 48 89 04 24
RSP: 002b:00007ffc9211d4e8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000004024 RCX: 00007f511b476b10
RDX: 0000000000004024 RSI: 0000559a9385962c RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 0000559a9383a400 R08: fffffffffffffff0 R09: 0000000000004f00
R10: 0000000000000070 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 00007ffc9211d57f R14: 0000559a9347bde7 R15: 0000000000000003
</TASK>
Allocated by task 1:
__kasan_krealloc+0x131/0x1c0
krealloc+0x90/0xc0
add_sysfs_param+0xcb/0x8a0
kernel_add_sysfs_param+0x81/0xd4
param_sysfs_builtin+0x138/0x1a6
param_sysfs_init+0x57/0x5b
do_one_initcall+0x104/0x250
do_initcall_level+0x102/0x132
do_initcalls+0x46/0x74
kernel_init_freeable+0x28f/0x393
kernel_init+0x14/0x1a0
ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888014114000
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-2k of size 2048
The buggy address is located 1620 bytes to the right of
2048-byte region [ffff888014114000, ffff888014114800]
The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
page:ffffea0000504400 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x14110
head:ffffea0000504400 order:3 compound_mapcount:0 compound_pincount:0
flags: 0x100000000010200(slab|head|node=0|zone=1)
raw: 0100000000010200 0000000000000000 dead000000000001 ffff888013442000
raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000080008 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
==================================================================
This happens because the TBI check unconditionally dereferences the last
byte without validating the reported length first:
u8 last_byte = *(data + length - 1);
Fix by rejecting the frame early if the length is zero, or if it exceeds
adapter->rx_buffer_len. This preserves the TBI workaround semantics for
valid frames and prevents touching memory beyond the RX buffer.
Fixes: 2037110c96d5 ("e1000: move tbi workaround code into helper function")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Suggested-by: Tony Nguyen <tony.nguyen@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Guangshuo Li <lgs201920130244@gmail.com>
---
changelog:
v2:
- Keep declarations at the beginning of e1000_tbi_should_accept().
- Move the last_byte assignment after the length bounds checks (suggested by Tony Nguyen)
---
drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000/e1000_main.c | 9 ++++++++-
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000/e1000_main.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000/e1000_main.c
index 3f5feb55cfba..cb49ec49f836 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000/e1000_main.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000/e1000_main.c
@@ -4091,7 +4091,14 @@ static bool e1000_tbi_should_accept(struct e1000_adapter *adapter,
u32 length, const u8 *data)
{
struct e1000_hw *hw = &adapter->hw;
- u8 last_byte = *(data + length - 1);
+ u8 last_byte;
+ /* Guard against OOB on data[length - 1] */
+ if (unlikely(!length))
+ return false;
+ /* Upper bound: length must not exceed rx_buffer_len */
+ if (unlikely(length > adapter->rx_buffer_len))
+ return false;
+ last_byte = *(data + length - 1);
if (TBI_ACCEPT(hw, status, errors, length, last_byte)) {
unsigned long irq_flags;
--
2.43.0Dear Guangshuo,
Thank you for your patch.
Am 01.12.25 um 04:40 schrieb Guangshuo Li:
> In e1000_tbi_should_accept() we read the last byte of the frame via
> 'data[length - 1]' to evaluate the TBI workaround. If the descriptor-
> reported length is zero or larger than the actual RX buffer size, this
> read goes out of bounds and can hit unrelated slab objects. The issue
> is observed from the NAPI receive path (e1000_clean_rx_irq):
>
> ==================================================================
> BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in e1000_tbi_should_accept+0x610/0x790
> Read of size 1 at addr ffff888014114e54 by task sshd/363
>
> CPU: 0 PID: 363 Comm: sshd Not tainted 5.18.0-rc1 #1
> Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.12.0-59-gc9ba5276e321-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
> Call Trace:
> <IRQ>
> dump_stack_lvl+0x5a/0x74
> print_address_description+0x7b/0x440
> print_report+0x101/0x200
> kasan_report+0xc1/0xf0
> e1000_tbi_should_accept+0x610/0x790
> e1000_clean_rx_irq+0xa8c/0x1110
> e1000_clean+0xde2/0x3c10
> __napi_poll+0x98/0x380
> net_rx_action+0x491/0xa20
> __do_softirq+0x2c9/0x61d
> do_softirq+0xd1/0x120
> </IRQ>
> <TASK>
> __local_bh_enable_ip+0xfe/0x130
> ip_finish_output2+0x7d5/0xb00
> __ip_queue_xmit+0xe24/0x1ab0
> __tcp_transmit_skb+0x1bcb/0x3340
> tcp_write_xmit+0x175d/0x6bd0
> __tcp_push_pending_frames+0x7b/0x280
> tcp_sendmsg_locked+0x2e4f/0x32d0
> tcp_sendmsg+0x24/0x40
> sock_write_iter+0x322/0x430
> vfs_write+0x56c/0xa60
> ksys_write+0xd1/0x190
> do_syscall_64+0x43/0x90
> entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
> RIP: 0033:0x7f511b476b10
> Code: 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 88 d3 2b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 83 3d f9 2b 2c 00 00 75 10 b8 01 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 31 c3 48 83 ec 08 e8 8e 9b 01 00 48 89 04 24
> RSP: 002b:00007ffc9211d4e8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001
> RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000004024 RCX: 00007f511b476b10
> RDX: 0000000000004024 RSI: 0000559a9385962c RDI: 0000000000000003
> RBP: 0000559a9383a400 R08: fffffffffffffff0 R09: 0000000000004f00
> R10: 0000000000000070 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
> R13: 00007ffc9211d57f R14: 0000559a9347bde7 R15: 0000000000000003
> </TASK>
> Allocated by task 1:
> __kasan_krealloc+0x131/0x1c0
> krealloc+0x90/0xc0
> add_sysfs_param+0xcb/0x8a0
> kernel_add_sysfs_param+0x81/0xd4
> param_sysfs_builtin+0x138/0x1a6
> param_sysfs_init+0x57/0x5b
> do_one_initcall+0x104/0x250
> do_initcall_level+0x102/0x132
> do_initcalls+0x46/0x74
> kernel_init_freeable+0x28f/0x393
> kernel_init+0x14/0x1a0
> ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
> The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888014114000
> which belongs to the cache kmalloc-2k of size 2048
> The buggy address is located 1620 bytes to the right of
> 2048-byte region [ffff888014114000, ffff888014114800]
> The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
> page:ffffea0000504400 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x14110
> head:ffffea0000504400 order:3 compound_mapcount:0 compound_pincount:0
> flags: 0x100000000010200(slab|head|node=0|zone=1)
> raw: 0100000000010200 0000000000000000 dead000000000001 ffff888013442000
> raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000080008 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
> page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
> ==================================================================
>
> This happens because the TBI check unconditionally dereferences the last
> byte without validating the reported length first:
>
> u8 last_byte = *(data + length - 1);
>
> Fix by rejecting the frame early if the length is zero, or if it exceeds
> adapter->rx_buffer_len. This preserves the TBI workaround semantics for
> valid frames and prevents touching memory beyond the RX buffer.
Do you have reproducer to forth an invalid length?
> Fixes: 2037110c96d5 ("e1000: move tbi workaround code into helper function")
> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
> Suggested-by: Tony Nguyen <tony.nguyen@intel.com>
> Signed-off-by: Guangshuo Li <lgs201920130244@gmail.com>
> ---
> changelog:
> v2:
> - Keep declarations at the beginning of e1000_tbi_should_accept().
> - Move the last_byte assignment after the length bounds checks (suggested by Tony Nguyen)
> ---
> drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000/e1000_main.c | 9 ++++++++-
> 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000/e1000_main.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000/e1000_main.c
> index 3f5feb55cfba..cb49ec49f836 100644
> --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000/e1000_main.c
> +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000/e1000_main.c
> @@ -4091,7 +4091,14 @@ static bool e1000_tbi_should_accept(struct e1000_adapter *adapter,
> u32 length, const u8 *data)
> {
> struct e1000_hw *hw = &adapter->hw;
> - u8 last_byte = *(data + length - 1);
> + u8 last_byte;
> + /* Guard against OOB on data[length - 1] */
> + if (unlikely(!length))
> + return false;
> + /* Upper bound: length must not exceed rx_buffer_len */
> + if (unlikely(length > adapter->rx_buffer_len))
Should an error be logged, or is it a common scenario, that such traffic
exists?
> + return false;
> + last_byte = *(data + length - 1);
>
> if (TBI_ACCEPT(hw, status, errors, length, last_byte)) {
> unsigned long irq_flags;
Kind regards,
Paul
[Cc: Remove bouncing address of Jeffrey and update Jesse’s]
Am 01.12.25 um 14:18 schrieb Paul Menzel:
> Dear Guangshuo,
>
>
> Thank you for your patch.
>
> Am 01.12.25 um 04:40 schrieb Guangshuo Li:
>> In e1000_tbi_should_accept() we read the last byte of the frame via
>> 'data[length - 1]' to evaluate the TBI workaround. If the descriptor-
>> reported length is zero or larger than the actual RX buffer size, this
>> read goes out of bounds and can hit unrelated slab objects. The issue
>> is observed from the NAPI receive path (e1000_clean_rx_irq):
>>
>> ==================================================================
>> BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in e1000_tbi_should_accept+0x610/0x790
>> Read of size 1 at addr ffff888014114e54 by task sshd/363
>>
>> CPU: 0 PID: 363 Comm: sshd Not tainted 5.18.0-rc1 #1
>> Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS
>> rel-1.12.0-59-gc9ba5276e321-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
>> Call Trace:
>> <IRQ>
>> dump_stack_lvl+0x5a/0x74
>> print_address_description+0x7b/0x440
>> print_report+0x101/0x200
>> kasan_report+0xc1/0xf0
>> e1000_tbi_should_accept+0x610/0x790
>> e1000_clean_rx_irq+0xa8c/0x1110
>> e1000_clean+0xde2/0x3c10
>> __napi_poll+0x98/0x380
>> net_rx_action+0x491/0xa20
>> __do_softirq+0x2c9/0x61d
>> do_softirq+0xd1/0x120
>> </IRQ>
>> <TASK>
>> __local_bh_enable_ip+0xfe/0x130
>> ip_finish_output2+0x7d5/0xb00
>> __ip_queue_xmit+0xe24/0x1ab0
>> __tcp_transmit_skb+0x1bcb/0x3340
>> tcp_write_xmit+0x175d/0x6bd0
>> __tcp_push_pending_frames+0x7b/0x280
>> tcp_sendmsg_locked+0x2e4f/0x32d0
>> tcp_sendmsg+0x24/0x40
>> sock_write_iter+0x322/0x430
>> vfs_write+0x56c/0xa60
>> ksys_write+0xd1/0x190
>> do_syscall_64+0x43/0x90
>> entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
>> RIP: 0033:0x7f511b476b10
>> Code: 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 88 d3 2b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 83 3d f9 2b 2c 00 00 75 10 b8 01 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 31 c3 48 83 ec 08 e8 8e 9b 01 00 48 89 04 24
>> RSP: 002b:00007ffc9211d4e8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001
>> RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000004024 RCX: 00007f511b476b10
>> RDX: 0000000000004024 RSI: 0000559a9385962c RDI: 0000000000000003
>> RBP: 0000559a9383a400 R08: fffffffffffffff0 R09: 0000000000004f00
>> R10: 0000000000000070 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
>> R13: 00007ffc9211d57f R14: 0000559a9347bde7 R15: 0000000000000003
>> </TASK>
>> Allocated by task 1:
>> __kasan_krealloc+0x131/0x1c0
>> krealloc+0x90/0xc0
>> add_sysfs_param+0xcb/0x8a0
>> kernel_add_sysfs_param+0x81/0xd4
>> param_sysfs_builtin+0x138/0x1a6
>> param_sysfs_init+0x57/0x5b
>> do_one_initcall+0x104/0x250
>> do_initcall_level+0x102/0x132
>> do_initcalls+0x46/0x74
>> kernel_init_freeable+0x28f/0x393
>> kernel_init+0x14/0x1a0
>> ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
>> The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888014114000
>> which belongs to the cache kmalloc-2k of size 2048
>> The buggy address is located 1620 bytes to the right of
>> 2048-byte region [ffff888014114000, ffff888014114800]
>> The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
>> page:ffffea0000504400 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x14110
>> head:ffffea0000504400 order:3 compound_mapcount:0 compound_pincount:0
>> flags: 0x100000000010200(slab|head|node=0|zone=1)
>> raw: 0100000000010200 0000000000000000 dead000000000001 ffff888013442000
>> raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000080008 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
>> page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
>> ==================================================================
>>
>> This happens because the TBI check unconditionally dereferences the last
>> byte without validating the reported length first:
>>
>> u8 last_byte = *(data + length - 1);
>>
>> Fix by rejecting the frame early if the length is zero, or if it exceeds
>> adapter->rx_buffer_len. This preserves the TBI workaround semantics for
>> valid frames and prevents touching memory beyond the RX buffer.
>
> Do you have reproducer to forth an invalid length?
>
>> Fixes: 2037110c96d5 ("e1000: move tbi workaround code into helper function")
>> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
>> Suggested-by: Tony Nguyen <tony.nguyen@intel.com>
>> Signed-off-by: Guangshuo Li <lgs201920130244@gmail.com>
>> ---
>> changelog:
>> v2:
>> - Keep declarations at the beginning of e1000_tbi_should_accept().
>> - Move the last_byte assignment after the length bounds checks
>> (suggested by Tony Nguyen)
>> ---
>> drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000/e1000_main.c | 9 ++++++++-
>> 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000/e1000_main.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000/e1000_main.c
>> index 3f5feb55cfba..cb49ec49f836 100644
>> --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000/e1000_main.c
>> +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000/e1000_main.c
>> @@ -4091,7 +4091,14 @@ static bool e1000_tbi_should_accept(struct
>> e1000_adapter *adapter,
>> u32 length, const u8 *data)
>> {
>> struct e1000_hw *hw = &adapter->hw;
>> - u8 last_byte = *(data + length - 1);
>> + u8 last_byte;
>> + /* Guard against OOB on data[length - 1] */
>> + if (unlikely(!length))
>> + return false;
>> + /* Upper bound: length must not exceed rx_buffer_len */
>> + if (unlikely(length > adapter->rx_buffer_len))
>
> Should an error be logged, or is it a common scenario, that such traffic
> exists?
>
>> + return false;
>> + last_byte = *(data + length - 1);
>> if (TBI_ACCEPT(hw, status, errors, length, last_byte)) {
>> unsigned long irq_flags;
>
>
> Kind regards,
>
> Paul
+ Aleksandr
On Mon, Dec 01, 2025 at 11:40:58AM +0800, Guangshuo Li wrote:
> In e1000_tbi_should_accept() we read the last byte of the frame via
> 'data[length - 1]' to evaluate the TBI workaround. If the descriptor-
> reported length is zero or larger than the actual RX buffer size, this
> read goes out of bounds and can hit unrelated slab objects. The issue
> is observed from the NAPI receive path (e1000_clean_rx_irq):
...
> Fixes: 2037110c96d5 ("e1000: move tbi workaround code into helper function")
> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
> Suggested-by: Tony Nguyen <tony.nguyen@intel.com>
> Signed-off-by: Guangshuo Li <lgs201920130244@gmail.com>
> ---
> changelog:
> v2:
> - Keep declarations at the beginning of e1000_tbi_should_accept().
> - Move the last_byte assignment after the length bounds checks (suggested by Tony Nguyen)
I'm not sure that Tony's suggestions warrant a Suggested-by tag.
And perhaps Aleksandr's Reviewed-by tag should have been carried
over from v1: IMHO, I don't think the changes between v1 and v2
materially effect the review. But overall this looks good to me.
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
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