fs/ocfs2/inode.c | 9 ++++++++- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
A panic occurs in ocfs2_unlink due to WARN_ON(inode->i_nlink == 0) when
handling a corrupted inode with i_mode=0 and i_nlink=0 in memory.
This "zombie" inode is created because ocfs2_read_locked_inode proceeds
even after ocfs2_validate_inode_block successfully validates a block
that structurally looks okay (passes checksum, signature etc.) but
contains semantically invalid data (specifically i_mode=0). The current
validation function doesn't check for i_mode being zero.
This results in an in-memory inode with i_mode=0 being added to the VFS
cache, which later triggers the panic during unlink.
Prevent this by adding an explicit check for (i_mode == 0, i_nlink == 0, non-orphan)
within ocfs2_validate_inode_block. If the check is true, return -EFSCORRUPTED to signal
corruption. This causes the caller (ocfs2_read_locked_inode) to invoke
make_bad_inode(), correctly preventing the zombie inode from entering
the cache.
Reported-by: syzbot+55c40ae8a0e5f3659f2b@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=55c40ae8a0e5f3659f2b
Co-developed-by: Albin Babu Varghese <albinbabuvarghese20@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Albin Babu Varghese <albinbabuvarghese20@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ahmet Eray Karadag <eraykrdg1@gmail.com>
Previous link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20251022222752.46758-2-eraykrdg1@gmail.com/T/
---
fs/ocfs2/inode.c | 9 ++++++++-
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/inode.c b/fs/ocfs2/inode.c
index 14bf440ea4df..d966df3aa605 100644
--- a/fs/ocfs2/inode.c
+++ b/fs/ocfs2/inode.c
@@ -1455,7 +1455,14 @@ int ocfs2_validate_inode_block(struct super_block *sb,
(unsigned long long)bh->b_blocknr);
goto bail;
}
-
+ if (!le16_to_cpu(di->i_links_count) && !le16_to_cpu(di->i_mode) &&
+ !(le32_to_cpu(di->i_flags) & OCFS2_ORPHANED_FL)) {
+ mlog(ML_ERROR, "Invalid dinode #%llu: "
+ "Corrupt state (nlink=0, mode=0, !orphan) detected!\n",
+ (unsigned long long)bh->b_blocknr);
+ rc = -EFSCORRUPTED;
+ goto bail;
+ }
/*
* Errors after here are fatal.
*/
--
2.43.0On Sat, Nov 08, 2025 at 03:01:35PM +0300, Ahmet Eray Karadag wrote:
> A panic occurs in ocfs2_unlink due to WARN_ON(inode->i_nlink == 0) when
> handling a corrupted inode with i_mode=0 and i_nlink=0 in memory.
>
> This "zombie" inode is created because ocfs2_read_locked_inode proceeds
> even after ocfs2_validate_inode_block successfully validates a block
> that structurally looks okay (passes checksum, signature etc.) but
> contains semantically invalid data (specifically i_mode=0). The current
> validation function doesn't check for i_mode being zero.
>
> This results in an in-memory inode with i_mode=0 being added to the VFS
> cache, which later triggers the panic during unlink.
>
> Prevent this by adding an explicit check for (i_mode == 0, i_nlink == 0, non-orphan)
> within ocfs2_validate_inode_block. If the check is true, return -EFSCORRUPTED to signal
> corruption. This causes the caller (ocfs2_read_locked_inode) to invoke
> make_bad_inode(), correctly preventing the zombie inode from entering
> the cache.
>
> Reported-by: syzbot+55c40ae8a0e5f3659f2b@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
> Fixes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=55c40ae8a0e5f3659f2b
> Co-developed-by: Albin Babu Varghese <albinbabuvarghese20@gmail.com>
> Signed-off-by: Albin Babu Varghese <albinbabuvarghese20@gmail.com>
> Signed-off-by: Ahmet Eray Karadag <eraykrdg1@gmail.com>
> Previous link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20251022222752.46758-2-eraykrdg1@gmail.com/T/
> ---
> fs/ocfs2/inode.c | 9 ++++++++-
> 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/inode.c b/fs/ocfs2/inode.c
> index 14bf440ea4df..d966df3aa605 100644
> --- a/fs/ocfs2/inode.c
> +++ b/fs/ocfs2/inode.c
> @@ -1455,7 +1455,14 @@ int ocfs2_validate_inode_block(struct super_block *sb,
> (unsigned long long)bh->b_blocknr);
> goto bail;
> }
> -
> + if (!le16_to_cpu(di->i_links_count) && !le16_to_cpu(di->i_mode) &&
> + !(le32_to_cpu(di->i_flags) & OCFS2_ORPHANED_FL)) {
1.
di->i_links_count is the low 16 bits of i_nlink. We need to check both
di->i_link_count and di->i_link_count_hi.
2.
We are only interested the the di members' value being ZERO.
Therefore, calling le16_to_cpu() to perform the conversion is wasting CPU cycles.
3.
The ocfs2_dinode structure has dozens of members, and syzbot could potentially
corrupt any one of them. At the same time, the probability of this type of syzbot
error occurring in a real-world scenario is practically zero. My idea is to
minimize unnecessary checks.
I prefer to remove the check for OCFS2_ORPHANED_FL.
4.
It is an error/exception if either i_links_count or i_mode is zero.
The code "!di->i_links_count && !di->i_mode" need to be changed to '||'. (I
didn't test it)
Thanks,
Heming
> + mlog(ML_ERROR, "Invalid dinode #%llu: "
> + "Corrupt state (nlink=0, mode=0, !orphan) detected!\n",
> + (unsigned long long)bh->b_blocknr);
> + rc = -EFSCORRUPTED;
> + goto bail;
> + }
> /*
> * Errors after here are fatal.
> */
> --
> 2.43.0
>
>
A panic occurs in ocfs2_unlink due to WARN_ON(inode->i_nlink == 0) when
handling a corrupted inode with i_mode=0 and i_nlink=0 in memory.
This "zombie" inode is created because ocfs2_read_locked_inode proceeds
even after ocfs2_validate_inode_block successfully validates a block
that structurally looks okay (passes checksum, signature etc.) but
contains semantically invalid data (specifically i_mode=0). The current
validation function doesn't check for i_mode being zero.
This results in an in-memory inode with i_mode=0 being added to the VFS
cache, which later triggers the panic during unlink.
Prevent this by adding an explicit check for (i_mode == 0, i_nlink == 0, non-orphan)
within ocfs2_validate_inode_block. If the check is true, return -EFSCORRUPTED to signal
corruption. This causes the caller (ocfs2_read_locked_inode) to invoke
make_bad_inode(), correctly preventing the zombie inode from entering
the cache.
Reported-by: syzbot+55c40ae8a0e5f3659f2b@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=55c40ae8a0e5f3659f2b
Co-developed-by: Albin Babu Varghese <albinbabuvarghese20@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Albin Babu Varghese <albinbabuvarghese20@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ahmet Eray Karadag <eraykrdg1@gmail.com>
Previous link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20251022222752.46758-2-eraykrdg1@gmail.com/T/
---
v2:
- Only checking either i_links_count == 0 or i_mode == 0
- Not performing le16_to_cpu() anymore
- Tested with ocfs2-test
---
v3:
- Add checking both high and low bits of i_links_count
---
v4:
- Reading i_links_count hi and low bits without helper function
to save few cpu cycles
---
v5:
- Clear i_links_count check
- Log the actual i_nlink/i_mode
---
v6:
- Use `ocfs2_read_links_count` to get nlink
- Convert di->imode to cpu endian
---
fs/ocfs2/inode.c | 8 ++++++++
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/inode.c b/fs/ocfs2/inode.c
index 14bf440ea4df..f83b8e4f4d8b 100644
--- a/fs/ocfs2/inode.c
+++ b/fs/ocfs2/inode.c
@@ -1456,6 +1456,14 @@ int ocfs2_validate_inode_block(struct super_block *sb,
goto bail;
}
+ if ((!di->i_links_count && !di->i_links_count_hi) || !di->i_mode) {
+ mlog(ML_ERROR, "Invalid dinode #%llu: "
+ "Corrupt state (nlink = %u or mode = %u) detected!\n",
+ (unsigned long long)bh->b_blocknr,
+ ocfs2_read_links_count(di), le16_to_cpu(di->i_mode));
+ rc = -EFSCORRUPTED;
+ goto bail;
+ }
/*
* Errors after here are fatal.
*/
--
2.43.0
On 2025/12/3 06:45, Ahmet Eray Karadag wrote:
> A panic occurs in ocfs2_unlink due to WARN_ON(inode->i_nlink == 0) when
> handling a corrupted inode with i_mode=0 and i_nlink=0 in memory.
>
> This "zombie" inode is created because ocfs2_read_locked_inode proceeds
> even after ocfs2_validate_inode_block successfully validates a block
> that structurally looks okay (passes checksum, signature etc.) but
> contains semantically invalid data (specifically i_mode=0). The current
> validation function doesn't check for i_mode being zero.
>
> This results in an in-memory inode with i_mode=0 being added to the VFS
> cache, which later triggers the panic during unlink.
>
> Prevent this by adding an explicit check for (i_mode == 0, i_nlink == 0, non-orphan)
> within ocfs2_validate_inode_block. If the check is true, return -EFSCORRUPTED to signal
> corruption. This causes the caller (ocfs2_read_locked_inode) to invoke
> make_bad_inode(), correctly preventing the zombie inode from entering
> the cache.
>
> Reported-by: syzbot+55c40ae8a0e5f3659f2b@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
> Fixes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=55c40ae8a0e5f3659f2b
> Co-developed-by: Albin Babu Varghese <albinbabuvarghese20@gmail.com>
> Signed-off-by: Albin Babu Varghese <albinbabuvarghese20@gmail.com>
> Signed-off-by: Ahmet Eray Karadag <eraykrdg1@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
> Previous link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20251022222752.46758-2-eraykrdg1@gmail.com/T/
> ---
> v2:
> - Only checking either i_links_count == 0 or i_mode == 0
> - Not performing le16_to_cpu() anymore
> - Tested with ocfs2-test
> ---
> v3:
> - Add checking both high and low bits of i_links_count
> ---
> v4:
> - Reading i_links_count hi and low bits without helper function
> to save few cpu cycles
> ---
> v5:
> - Clear i_links_count check
> - Log the actual i_nlink/i_mode
> ---
> v6:
> - Use `ocfs2_read_links_count` to get nlink
> - Convert di->imode to cpu endian
> ---
> fs/ocfs2/inode.c | 8 ++++++++
> 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/inode.c b/fs/ocfs2/inode.c
> index 14bf440ea4df..f83b8e4f4d8b 100644
> --- a/fs/ocfs2/inode.c
> +++ b/fs/ocfs2/inode.c
> @@ -1456,6 +1456,14 @@ int ocfs2_validate_inode_block(struct super_block *sb,
> goto bail;
> }
>
> + if ((!di->i_links_count && !di->i_links_count_hi) || !di->i_mode) {
> + mlog(ML_ERROR, "Invalid dinode #%llu: "
> + "Corrupt state (nlink = %u or mode = %u) detected!\n",
> + (unsigned long long)bh->b_blocknr,
> + ocfs2_read_links_count(di), le16_to_cpu(di->i_mode));
> + rc = -EFSCORRUPTED;
> + goto bail;
> + }
> /*
> * Errors after here are fatal.
> */
A panic occurs in ocfs2_unlink due to WARN_ON(inode->i_nlink == 0) when
handling a corrupted inode with i_mode=0 and i_nlink=0 in memory.
This "zombie" inode is created because ocfs2_read_locked_inode proceeds
even after ocfs2_validate_inode_block successfully validates a block
that structurally looks okay (passes checksum, signature etc.) but
contains semantically invalid data (specifically i_mode=0). The current
validation function doesn't check for i_mode being zero.
This results in an in-memory inode with i_mode=0 being added to the VFS
cache, which later triggers the panic during unlink.
Prevent this by adding an explicit check for (i_mode == 0, i_nlink == 0, non-orphan)
within ocfs2_validate_inode_block. If the check is true, return -EFSCORRUPTED to signal
corruption. This causes the caller (ocfs2_read_locked_inode) to invoke
make_bad_inode(), correctly preventing the zombie inode from entering
the cache.
Reported-by: syzbot+55c40ae8a0e5f3659f2b@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=55c40ae8a0e5f3659f2b
Co-developed-by: Albin Babu Varghese <albinbabuvarghese20@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Albin Babu Varghese <albinbabuvarghese20@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ahmet Eray Karadag <eraykrdg1@gmail.com>
Previous link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20251022222752.46758-2-eraykrdg1@gmail.com/T/
---
v2:
- Only checking either i_links_count == 0 or i_mode == 0
- Not performing le16_to_cpu() anymore
- Tested with ocfs2-test
---
v3:
- Add checking both high and low bits of i_links_count
---
v4:
- Reading i_links_count hi and low bits without helper function
to save few cpu cycles
---
v5:
- Clear i_links_count check
- Log the actual i_nlink/i_mode
---
fs/ocfs2/inode.c | 8 ++++++++
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/inode.c b/fs/ocfs2/inode.c
index 14bf440ea4df..08ce0846289c 100644
--- a/fs/ocfs2/inode.c
+++ b/fs/ocfs2/inode.c
@@ -1456,6 +1456,14 @@ int ocfs2_validate_inode_block(struct super_block *sb,
goto bail;
}
+ if ((!di->i_links_count && !di->i_links_count_hi) || !di->i_mode) {
+ mlog(ML_ERROR, "Invalid dinode #%llu: "
+ "Corrupt state (nlink = %u or mode = %u) detected!\n",
+ (unsigned long long)bh->b_blocknr,
+ (di->i_links_count_hi | di->i_links_count), di->i_mode);
+ rc = -EFSCORRUPTED;
+ goto bail;
+ }
/*
* Errors after here are fatal.
*/
--
2.43.0On Tue, Dec 02, 2025 at 06:52:14AM +0300, Ahmet Eray Karadag wrote:
> A panic occurs in ocfs2_unlink due to WARN_ON(inode->i_nlink == 0) when
> handling a corrupted inode with i_mode=0 and i_nlink=0 in memory.
>
> This "zombie" inode is created because ocfs2_read_locked_inode proceeds
> even after ocfs2_validate_inode_block successfully validates a block
> that structurally looks okay (passes checksum, signature etc.) but
> contains semantically invalid data (specifically i_mode=0). The current
> validation function doesn't check for i_mode being zero.
>
> This results in an in-memory inode with i_mode=0 being added to the VFS
> cache, which later triggers the panic during unlink.
>
> Prevent this by adding an explicit check for (i_mode == 0, i_nlink == 0, non-orphan)
> within ocfs2_validate_inode_block. If the check is true, return -EFSCORRUPTED to signal
> corruption. This causes the caller (ocfs2_read_locked_inode) to invoke
> make_bad_inode(), correctly preventing the zombie inode from entering
> the cache.
>
> Reported-by: syzbot+55c40ae8a0e5f3659f2b@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
> Fixes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=55c40ae8a0e5f3659f2b
> Co-developed-by: Albin Babu Varghese <albinbabuvarghese20@gmail.com>
> Signed-off-by: Albin Babu Varghese <albinbabuvarghese20@gmail.com>
> Signed-off-by: Ahmet Eray Karadag <eraykrdg1@gmail.com>
> Previous link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20251022222752.46758-2-eraykrdg1@gmail.com/T/
> ---
> v2:
> - Only checking either i_links_count == 0 or i_mode == 0
> - Not performing le16_to_cpu() anymore
> - Tested with ocfs2-test
> ---
> v3:
> - Add checking both high and low bits of i_links_count
> ---
> v4:
> - Reading i_links_count hi and low bits without helper function
> to save few cpu cycles
> ---
> v5:
> - Clear i_links_count check
> - Log the actual i_nlink/i_mode
> ---
> fs/ocfs2/inode.c | 8 ++++++++
> 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/inode.c b/fs/ocfs2/inode.c
> index 14bf440ea4df..08ce0846289c 100644
> --- a/fs/ocfs2/inode.c
> +++ b/fs/ocfs2/inode.c
> @@ -1456,6 +1456,14 @@ int ocfs2_validate_inode_block(struct super_block *sb,
> goto bail;
> }
>
> + if ((!di->i_links_count && !di->i_links_count_hi) || !di->i_mode) {
> + mlog(ML_ERROR, "Invalid dinode #%llu: "
> + "Corrupt state (nlink = %u or mode = %u) detected!\n",
> + (unsigned long long)bh->b_blocknr,
> + (di->i_links_count_hi | di->i_links_count), di->i_mode);
The '|' logic is meaningless here. Because the error case is rare, you can simply
call ocfs2_read_links_count(di).
- Heming
> + rc = -EFSCORRUPTED;
> + goto bail;
> + }
> /*
> * Errors after here are fatal.
> */
> --
> 2.43.0
>
>
On 2025/12/2 14:15, Heming Zhao wrote:
> On Tue, Dec 02, 2025 at 06:52:14AM +0300, Ahmet Eray Karadag wrote:
>> A panic occurs in ocfs2_unlink due to WARN_ON(inode->i_nlink == 0) when
>> handling a corrupted inode with i_mode=0 and i_nlink=0 in memory.
>>
>> This "zombie" inode is created because ocfs2_read_locked_inode proceeds
>> even after ocfs2_validate_inode_block successfully validates a block
>> that structurally looks okay (passes checksum, signature etc.) but
>> contains semantically invalid data (specifically i_mode=0). The current
>> validation function doesn't check for i_mode being zero.
>>
>> This results in an in-memory inode with i_mode=0 being added to the VFS
>> cache, which later triggers the panic during unlink.
>>
>> Prevent this by adding an explicit check for (i_mode == 0, i_nlink == 0, non-orphan)
>> within ocfs2_validate_inode_block. If the check is true, return -EFSCORRUPTED to signal
>> corruption. This causes the caller (ocfs2_read_locked_inode) to invoke
>> make_bad_inode(), correctly preventing the zombie inode from entering
>> the cache.
>>
>> Reported-by: syzbot+55c40ae8a0e5f3659f2b@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
>> Fixes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=55c40ae8a0e5f3659f2b
>> Co-developed-by: Albin Babu Varghese <albinbabuvarghese20@gmail.com>
>> Signed-off-by: Albin Babu Varghese <albinbabuvarghese20@gmail.com>
>> Signed-off-by: Ahmet Eray Karadag <eraykrdg1@gmail.com>
>> Previous link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20251022222752.46758-2-eraykrdg1@gmail.com/T/
>> ---
>> v2:
>> - Only checking either i_links_count == 0 or i_mode == 0
>> - Not performing le16_to_cpu() anymore
>> - Tested with ocfs2-test
>> ---
>> v3:
>> - Add checking both high and low bits of i_links_count
>> ---
>> v4:
>> - Reading i_links_count hi and low bits without helper function
>> to save few cpu cycles
>> ---
>> v5:
>> - Clear i_links_count check
>> - Log the actual i_nlink/i_mode
>> ---
>> fs/ocfs2/inode.c | 8 ++++++++
>> 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
>>
>> diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/inode.c b/fs/ocfs2/inode.c
>> index 14bf440ea4df..08ce0846289c 100644
>> --- a/fs/ocfs2/inode.c
>> +++ b/fs/ocfs2/inode.c
>> @@ -1456,6 +1456,14 @@ int ocfs2_validate_inode_block(struct super_block *sb,
>> goto bail;
>> }
>>
>> + if ((!di->i_links_count && !di->i_links_count_hi) || !di->i_mode) {
>> + mlog(ML_ERROR, "Invalid dinode #%llu: "
>> + "Corrupt state (nlink = %u or mode = %u) detected!\n",
>> + (unsigned long long)bh->b_blocknr,
>> + (di->i_links_count_hi | di->i_links_count), di->i_mode);
>
> The '|' logic is meaningless here. Because the error case is rare, you can simply
> call ocfs2_read_links_count(di).
>
Yes, also 'di->i_mode' should be converted to cpu endian as well.
Joseph
A panic occurs in ocfs2_unlink due to WARN_ON(inode->i_nlink == 0) when
handling a corrupted inode with i_mode=0 and i_nlink=0 in memory.
This "zombie" inode is created because ocfs2_read_locked_inode proceeds
even after ocfs2_validate_inode_block successfully validates a block
that structurally looks okay (passes checksum, signature etc.) but
contains semantically invalid data (specifically i_mode=0). The current
validation function doesn't check for i_mode being zero.
This results in an in-memory inode with i_mode=0 being added to the VFS
cache, which later triggers the panic during unlink.
Prevent this by adding an explicit check for (i_mode == 0, i_nlink == 0, non-orphan)
within ocfs2_validate_inode_block. If the check is true, return -EFSCORRUPTED to signal
corruption. This causes the caller (ocfs2_read_locked_inode) to invoke
make_bad_inode(), correctly preventing the zombie inode from entering
the cache.
Reported-by: syzbot+55c40ae8a0e5f3659f2b@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=55c40ae8a0e5f3659f2b
Co-developed-by: Albin Babu Varghese <albinbabuvarghese20@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Albin Babu Varghese <albinbabuvarghese20@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ahmet Eray Karadag <eraykrdg1@gmail.com>
Previous link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20251022222752.46758-2-eraykrdg1@gmail.com/T/
---
v2:
- Only checking either i_links_count == 0 or i_mode == 0
- Not performing le16_to_cpu() anymore
- Tested with ocfs2-test
---
v3:
- Add checking both high and low bits of i_links_count
---
v4:
- Reading i_links_count hi and low bits without helper function
to save few cpu cycles
---
fs/ocfs2/inode.c | 8 +++++++-
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/inode.c b/fs/ocfs2/inode.c
index 14bf440ea4df..34c2882273ae 100644
--- a/fs/ocfs2/inode.c
+++ b/fs/ocfs2/inode.c
@@ -1455,7 +1455,13 @@ int ocfs2_validate_inode_block(struct super_block *sb,
(unsigned long long)bh->b_blocknr);
goto bail;
}
-
+ if (!(di->i_links_count | di->i_links_count_hi) || !di->i_mode) {
+ mlog(ML_ERROR, "Invalid dinode #%llu: "
+ "Corrupt state (nlink=0 or mode=0,) detected!\n",
+ (unsigned long long)bh->b_blocknr);
+ rc = -EFSCORRUPTED;
+ goto bail;
+ }
/*
* Errors after here are fatal.
*/
--
2.43.0
On 2025/12/2 08:32, Ahmet Eray Karadag wrote:
> A panic occurs in ocfs2_unlink due to WARN_ON(inode->i_nlink == 0) when
> handling a corrupted inode with i_mode=0 and i_nlink=0 in memory.
>
> This "zombie" inode is created because ocfs2_read_locked_inode proceeds
> even after ocfs2_validate_inode_block successfully validates a block
> that structurally looks okay (passes checksum, signature etc.) but
> contains semantically invalid data (specifically i_mode=0). The current
> validation function doesn't check for i_mode being zero.
>
> This results in an in-memory inode with i_mode=0 being added to the VFS
> cache, which later triggers the panic during unlink.
>
> Prevent this by adding an explicit check for (i_mode == 0, i_nlink == 0, non-orphan)
> within ocfs2_validate_inode_block. If the check is true, return -EFSCORRUPTED to signal
> corruption. This causes the caller (ocfs2_read_locked_inode) to invoke
> make_bad_inode(), correctly preventing the zombie inode from entering
> the cache.
>
> Reported-by: syzbot+55c40ae8a0e5f3659f2b@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
> Fixes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=55c40ae8a0e5f3659f2b
> Co-developed-by: Albin Babu Varghese <albinbabuvarghese20@gmail.com>
> Signed-off-by: Albin Babu Varghese <albinbabuvarghese20@gmail.com>
> Signed-off-by: Ahmet Eray Karadag <eraykrdg1@gmail.com>
> Previous link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20251022222752.46758-2-eraykrdg1@gmail.com/T/
> ---
> v2:
> - Only checking either i_links_count == 0 or i_mode == 0
> - Not performing le16_to_cpu() anymore
> - Tested with ocfs2-test
> ---
> v3:
> - Add checking both high and low bits of i_links_count
> ---
> v4:
> - Reading i_links_count hi and low bits without helper function
> to save few cpu cycles
> ---
> fs/ocfs2/inode.c | 8 +++++++-
> 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/inode.c b/fs/ocfs2/inode.c
> index 14bf440ea4df..34c2882273ae 100644
> --- a/fs/ocfs2/inode.c
> +++ b/fs/ocfs2/inode.c
> @@ -1455,7 +1455,13 @@ int ocfs2_validate_inode_block(struct super_block *sb,
> (unsigned long long)bh->b_blocknr);
> goto bail;
> }
> -
> + if (!(di->i_links_count | di->i_links_count_hi) || !di->i_mode) {
"(di->i_links_count | di->i_links_count_hi)" looks meaningless.
So if we don't want to introduce the endian coversion here, how about:
if ((!di->i_links_count && !di->i_links_count_hi) || !di->i_mode) {
...
}
Heming, what's your opinion?
> + mlog(ML_ERROR, "Invalid dinode #%llu: "
> + "Corrupt state (nlink=0 or mode=0,) detected!\n",
Better to log the actual i_nlink/i_mode. e.g.
"corrupted i_nlink %u or i_mode %u\n"
...
Joseph
> + (unsigned long long)bh->b_blocknr);
> + rc = -EFSCORRUPTED;
> + goto bail;
> + }
> /*
> * Errors after here are fatal.
> */
On Tue, Dec 02, 2025 at 10:44:21AM +0800, Joseph Qi wrote:
>
>
> On 2025/12/2 08:32, Ahmet Eray Karadag wrote:
> > A panic occurs in ocfs2_unlink due to WARN_ON(inode->i_nlink == 0) when
> > handling a corrupted inode with i_mode=0 and i_nlink=0 in memory.
> >
> > This "zombie" inode is created because ocfs2_read_locked_inode proceeds
> > even after ocfs2_validate_inode_block successfully validates a block
> > that structurally looks okay (passes checksum, signature etc.) but
> > contains semantically invalid data (specifically i_mode=0). The current
> > validation function doesn't check for i_mode being zero.
> >
> > This results in an in-memory inode with i_mode=0 being added to the VFS
> > cache, which later triggers the panic during unlink.
> >
> > Prevent this by adding an explicit check for (i_mode == 0, i_nlink == 0, non-orphan)
> > within ocfs2_validate_inode_block. If the check is true, return -EFSCORRUPTED to signal
> > corruption. This causes the caller (ocfs2_read_locked_inode) to invoke
> > make_bad_inode(), correctly preventing the zombie inode from entering
> > the cache.
> >
> > Reported-by: syzbot+55c40ae8a0e5f3659f2b@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
> > Fixes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=55c40ae8a0e5f3659f2b
> > Co-developed-by: Albin Babu Varghese <albinbabuvarghese20@gmail.com>
> > Signed-off-by: Albin Babu Varghese <albinbabuvarghese20@gmail.com>
> > Signed-off-by: Ahmet Eray Karadag <eraykrdg1@gmail.com>
> > Previous link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20251022222752.46758-2-eraykrdg1@gmail.com/T/
> > ---
> > v2:
> > - Only checking either i_links_count == 0 or i_mode == 0
> > - Not performing le16_to_cpu() anymore
> > - Tested with ocfs2-test
> > ---
> > v3:
> > - Add checking both high and low bits of i_links_count
> > ---
> > v4:
> > - Reading i_links_count hi and low bits without helper function
> > to save few cpu cycles
> > ---
> > fs/ocfs2/inode.c | 8 +++++++-
> > 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/inode.c b/fs/ocfs2/inode.c
> > index 14bf440ea4df..34c2882273ae 100644
> > --- a/fs/ocfs2/inode.c
> > +++ b/fs/ocfs2/inode.c
> > @@ -1455,7 +1455,13 @@ int ocfs2_validate_inode_block(struct super_block *sb,
> > (unsigned long long)bh->b_blocknr);
> > goto bail;
> > }
> > -
> > + if (!(di->i_links_count | di->i_links_count_hi) || !di->i_mode) {
>
> "(di->i_links_count | di->i_links_count_hi)" looks meaningless.
> So if we don't want to introduce the endian coversion here, how about:
>
> if ((!di->i_links_count && !di->i_links_count_hi) || !di->i_mode) {
> ...
> }
>
> Heming, what's your opinion?
clearer, looks good to me.
>
> > + mlog(ML_ERROR, "Invalid dinode #%llu: "
> > + "Corrupt state (nlink=0 or mode=0,) detected!\n",
>
> Better to log the actual i_nlink/i_mode. e.g.
>
> "corrupted i_nlink %u or i_mode %u\n"
> ...
>
> Joseph
agree.
- Heming
>
> > + (unsigned long long)bh->b_blocknr);
> > + rc = -EFSCORRUPTED;
> > + goto bail;
> > + }
> > /*
> > * Errors after here are fatal.
> > */
>
A panic occurs in ocfs2_unlink due to WARN_ON(inode->i_nlink == 0) when
handling a corrupted inode with i_mode=0 and i_nlink=0 in memory.
This "zombie" inode is created because ocfs2_read_locked_inode proceeds
even after ocfs2_validate_inode_block successfully validates a block
that structurally looks okay (passes checksum, signature etc.) but
contains semantically invalid data (specifically i_mode=0). The current
validation function doesn't check for i_mode being zero.
This results in an in-memory inode with i_mode=0 being added to the VFS
cache, which later triggers the panic during unlink.
Prevent this by adding an explicit check for (i_mode == 0, i_nlink == 0, non-orphan)
within ocfs2_validate_inode_block. If the check is true, return -EFSCORRUPTED to signal
corruption. This causes the caller (ocfs2_read_locked_inode) to invoke
make_bad_inode(), correctly preventing the zombie inode from entering
the cache.
Reported-by: syzbot+55c40ae8a0e5f3659f2b@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=55c40ae8a0e5f3659f2b
Co-developed-by: Albin Babu Varghese <albinbabuvarghese20@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Albin Babu Varghese <albinbabuvarghese20@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ahmet Eray Karadag <eraykrdg1@gmail.com>
Previous link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20251022222752.46758-2-eraykrdg1@gmail.com/T/
---
v2:
- Only checking either i_links_count == 0 or i_mode == 0
- Not performing le16_to_cpu() anymore
- Tested with ocfs2-test
---
v3:
- Add checking both high and low bits of i_links_count
---
fs/ocfs2/inode.c | 7 +++++++
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/inode.c b/fs/ocfs2/inode.c
index 14bf440ea4df..c8b129db756e 100644
--- a/fs/ocfs2/inode.c
+++ b/fs/ocfs2/inode.c
@@ -1456,6 +1456,13 @@ int ocfs2_validate_inode_block(struct super_block *sb,
goto bail;
}
+ if (!ocfs2_read_links_count(di) || !di->i_mode) {
+ mlog(ML_ERROR, "Invalid dinode #%llu: "
+ "Corrupt state (nlink=0 or mode=0,) detected!\n",
+ (unsigned long long)bh->b_blocknr);
+ rc = -EFSCORRUPTED;
+ goto bail;
+ }
/*
* Errors after here are fatal.
*/
--
2.43.0On Thu, Nov 20, 2025 at 01:17:24AM +0300, Ahmet Eray Karadag wrote:
> A panic occurs in ocfs2_unlink due to WARN_ON(inode->i_nlink == 0) when
> handling a corrupted inode with i_mode=0 and i_nlink=0 in memory.
>
> This "zombie" inode is created because ocfs2_read_locked_inode proceeds
> even after ocfs2_validate_inode_block successfully validates a block
> that structurally looks okay (passes checksum, signature etc.) but
> contains semantically invalid data (specifically i_mode=0). The current
> validation function doesn't check for i_mode being zero.
>
> This results in an in-memory inode with i_mode=0 being added to the VFS
> cache, which later triggers the panic during unlink.
>
> Prevent this by adding an explicit check for (i_mode == 0, i_nlink == 0, non-orphan)
> within ocfs2_validate_inode_block. If the check is true, return -EFSCORRUPTED to signal
> corruption. This causes the caller (ocfs2_read_locked_inode) to invoke
> make_bad_inode(), correctly preventing the zombie inode from entering
> the cache.
>
> Reported-by: syzbot+55c40ae8a0e5f3659f2b@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
> Fixes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=55c40ae8a0e5f3659f2b
> Co-developed-by: Albin Babu Varghese <albinbabuvarghese20@gmail.com>
> Signed-off-by: Albin Babu Varghese <albinbabuvarghese20@gmail.com>
> Signed-off-by: Ahmet Eray Karadag <eraykrdg1@gmail.com>
> Previous link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20251022222752.46758-2-eraykrdg1@gmail.com/T/
> ---
> v2:
> - Only checking either i_links_count == 0 or i_mode == 0
> - Not performing le16_to_cpu() anymore
> - Tested with ocfs2-test
> ---
> v3:
> - Add checking both high and low bits of i_links_count
> ---
> fs/ocfs2/inode.c | 7 +++++++
> 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/inode.c b/fs/ocfs2/inode.c
> index 14bf440ea4df..c8b129db756e 100644
> --- a/fs/ocfs2/inode.c
> +++ b/fs/ocfs2/inode.c
> @@ -1456,6 +1456,13 @@ int ocfs2_validate_inode_block(struct super_block *sb,
> goto bail;
> }
>
> + if (!ocfs2_read_links_count(di) || !di->i_mode) {
the code logic looks good to me, but I prefer the following code to save a few
cpu cycles.
```
/* only check if the "link count" or i_mode is ZERO */
if (!(di->i_links_count | di->i_links_count_hi) || !di->i_mode)
```
@Joseph
which do you like?
- Heming
> + mlog(ML_ERROR, "Invalid dinode #%llu: "
> + "Corrupt state (nlink=0 or mode=0,) detected!\n",
> + (unsigned long long)bh->b_blocknr);
> + rc = -EFSCORRUPTED;
> + goto bail;
> + }
> /*
> * Errors after here are fatal.
> */
> --
> 2.43.0
>
>
On 2025/11/20 10:32, Heming Zhao wrote:
> On Thu, Nov 20, 2025 at 01:17:24AM +0300, Ahmet Eray Karadag wrote:
>> A panic occurs in ocfs2_unlink due to WARN_ON(inode->i_nlink == 0) when
>> handling a corrupted inode with i_mode=0 and i_nlink=0 in memory.
>>
>> This "zombie" inode is created because ocfs2_read_locked_inode proceeds
>> even after ocfs2_validate_inode_block successfully validates a block
>> that structurally looks okay (passes checksum, signature etc.) but
>> contains semantically invalid data (specifically i_mode=0). The current
>> validation function doesn't check for i_mode being zero.
>>
>> This results in an in-memory inode with i_mode=0 being added to the VFS
>> cache, which later triggers the panic during unlink.
>>
>> Prevent this by adding an explicit check for (i_mode == 0, i_nlink == 0, non-orphan)
>> within ocfs2_validate_inode_block. If the check is true, return -EFSCORRUPTED to signal
>> corruption. This causes the caller (ocfs2_read_locked_inode) to invoke
>> make_bad_inode(), correctly preventing the zombie inode from entering
>> the cache.
>>
>> Reported-by: syzbot+55c40ae8a0e5f3659f2b@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
>> Fixes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=55c40ae8a0e5f3659f2b
>> Co-developed-by: Albin Babu Varghese <albinbabuvarghese20@gmail.com>
>> Signed-off-by: Albin Babu Varghese <albinbabuvarghese20@gmail.com>
>> Signed-off-by: Ahmet Eray Karadag <eraykrdg1@gmail.com>
>> Previous link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20251022222752.46758-2-eraykrdg1@gmail.com/T/
>> ---
>> v2:
>> - Only checking either i_links_count == 0 or i_mode == 0
>> - Not performing le16_to_cpu() anymore
>> - Tested with ocfs2-test
>> ---
>> v3:
>> - Add checking both high and low bits of i_links_count
>> ---
>> fs/ocfs2/inode.c | 7 +++++++
>> 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
>>
>> diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/inode.c b/fs/ocfs2/inode.c
>> index 14bf440ea4df..c8b129db756e 100644
>> --- a/fs/ocfs2/inode.c
>> +++ b/fs/ocfs2/inode.c
>> @@ -1456,6 +1456,13 @@ int ocfs2_validate_inode_block(struct super_block *sb,
>> goto bail;
>> }
>>
>> + if (!ocfs2_read_links_count(di) || !di->i_mode) {
>
> the code logic looks good to me, but I prefer the following code to save a few
> cpu cycles.
>
> ```
> /* only check if the "link count" or i_mode is ZERO */
> if (!(di->i_links_count | di->i_links_count_hi) || !di->i_mode)
> ```
>
> @Joseph
> which do you like?
>
Sorry to miss this thread discuss.
The above check looks wried since "(di->i_links_count|di->i_links_count_hi)"
is meaningless, though it may work well...
So I'd prefer the code readability first.
BTW, from the syzbot report, I haven't seen where to show i_mode=0 or
i_nlink=0. Am I missing something?
Thanks,
Joseph
On Tue, Dec 02, 2025 at 09:25:14AM +0800, Joseph Qi wrote:
>
>
> On 2025/11/20 10:32, Heming Zhao wrote:
> > On Thu, Nov 20, 2025 at 01:17:24AM +0300, Ahmet Eray Karadag wrote:
> >> A panic occurs in ocfs2_unlink due to WARN_ON(inode->i_nlink == 0) when
> >> handling a corrupted inode with i_mode=0 and i_nlink=0 in memory.
> >>
> >> This "zombie" inode is created because ocfs2_read_locked_inode proceeds
> >> even after ocfs2_validate_inode_block successfully validates a block
> >> that structurally looks okay (passes checksum, signature etc.) but
> >> contains semantically invalid data (specifically i_mode=0). The current
> >> validation function doesn't check for i_mode being zero.
> >>
> >> This results in an in-memory inode with i_mode=0 being added to the VFS
> >> cache, which later triggers the panic during unlink.
> >>
> >> Prevent this by adding an explicit check for (i_mode == 0, i_nlink == 0, non-orphan)
> >> within ocfs2_validate_inode_block. If the check is true, return -EFSCORRUPTED to signal
> >> corruption. This causes the caller (ocfs2_read_locked_inode) to invoke
> >> make_bad_inode(), correctly preventing the zombie inode from entering
> >> the cache.
> >>
> >> Reported-by: syzbot+55c40ae8a0e5f3659f2b@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
> >> Fixes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=55c40ae8a0e5f3659f2b
> >> Co-developed-by: Albin Babu Varghese <albinbabuvarghese20@gmail.com>
> >> Signed-off-by: Albin Babu Varghese <albinbabuvarghese20@gmail.com>
> >> Signed-off-by: Ahmet Eray Karadag <eraykrdg1@gmail.com>
> >> Previous link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20251022222752.46758-2-eraykrdg1@gmail.com/T/
> >> ---
> >> v2:
> >> - Only checking either i_links_count == 0 or i_mode == 0
> >> - Not performing le16_to_cpu() anymore
> >> - Tested with ocfs2-test
> >> ---
> >> v3:
> >> - Add checking both high and low bits of i_links_count
> >> ---
> >> fs/ocfs2/inode.c | 7 +++++++
> >> 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
> >>
> >> diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/inode.c b/fs/ocfs2/inode.c
> >> index 14bf440ea4df..c8b129db756e 100644
> >> --- a/fs/ocfs2/inode.c
> >> +++ b/fs/ocfs2/inode.c
> >> @@ -1456,6 +1456,13 @@ int ocfs2_validate_inode_block(struct super_block *sb,
> >> goto bail;
> >> }
> >>
> >> + if (!ocfs2_read_links_count(di) || !di->i_mode) {
> >
> > the code logic looks good to me, but I prefer the following code to save a few
> > cpu cycles.
> >
> > ```
> > /* only check if the "link count" or i_mode is ZERO */
> > if (!(di->i_links_count | di->i_links_count_hi) || !di->i_mode)
> > ```
> >
> > @Joseph
> > which do you like?
> >
> Sorry to miss this thread discuss.
> The above check looks wried since "(di->i_links_count|di->i_links_count_hi)"
> is meaningless, though it may work well...
> So I'd prefer the code readability first.
>
> BTW, from the syzbot report, I haven't seen where to show i_mode=0 or
> i_nlink=0. Am I missing something?
You are right, the syzbot report itself doesn't explicitly dump the inode
values. I reproduced the issue locally and debugged ocfs2_unlink() to
inspect the inode attributes just before the crash.
The debug output confirmed that the inode had:
i_ino = 17057
i_nlink = 0
i_mode = 0
It appears the inode block read succeeds (physically), but due to corruption,
validation was insufficient, allowing a zeroed/corrupted inode struct to be
initialized in the VFS cache.
>
> Thanks,
> Joseph
>
Regarding the patch logic: We had previously discussed and seemed to agree
on an approach in the thread linked below, but since I didn't get a
final response there, I refreshed the patch here.
https://lore.kernel.org/all/20251022222752.46758-2-eraykrdg1@gmail.com/T/
Thanks,
Eray
Hi all, Just a kind reminder regarding this patch. Since We are participating in the Linux Kernel Mentorship Program and have a nearing deadline, your feedback would be incredibly helpful for us to move forward. Thanks, Ahmet Eray
On Fri, Nov 28, 2025 at 05:36:06PM +0300, Ahmet Eray Karadag wrote: > Hi all, > > Just a kind reminder regarding this patch. > > Since We are participating in the Linux Kernel Mentorship Program and have > a nearing deadline, your feedback would be incredibly helpful for us to > move forward. > > Thanks, > Ahmet Eray I have provided my comment on the v3 patch. The sanity check is expensive, costing about six lines of asm code for ocfs2_read_links_count() on a big-endian architecture. Also, since I'm not the maintainer, if Joseph agrees with your patch, he can provide his Reviewed-by tag. PS: Kindly note that the kernel mailing list generally discourages separate emails for patch review threads.
A panic occurs in ocfs2_unlink due to WARN_ON(inode->i_nlink == 0) when
handling a corrupted inode with i_mode=0 and i_nlink=0 in memory.
This "zombie" inode is created because ocfs2_read_locked_inode proceeds
even after ocfs2_validate_inode_block successfully validates a block
that structurally looks okay (passes checksum, signature etc.) but
contains semantically invalid data (specifically i_mode=0). The current
validation function doesn't check for i_mode being zero.
This results in an in-memory inode with i_mode=0 being added to the VFS
cache, which later triggers the panic during unlink.
Prevent this by adding an explicit check for (i_mode == 0, i_nlink == 0, non-orphan)
within ocfs2_validate_inode_block. If the check is true, return -EFSCORRUPTED to signal
corruption. This causes the caller (ocfs2_read_locked_inode) to invoke
make_bad_inode(), correctly preventing the zombie inode from entering
the cache.
Reported-by: syzbot+55c40ae8a0e5f3659f2b@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=55c40ae8a0e5f3659f2b
Co-developed-by: Albin Babu Varghese <albinbabuvarghese20@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Albin Babu Varghese <albinbabuvarghese20@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ahmet Eray Karadag <eraykrdg1@gmail.com>
Previous link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20251022222752.46758-2-eraykrdg1@gmail.com/T/
---
v2:
- Only checking either i_links_count == 0 or i_mode == 0
- Not performing le16_to_cpu() anymore
- Tested with ocfs2-test
---
fs/ocfs2/inode.c | 7 +++++++
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/inode.c b/fs/ocfs2/inode.c
index 14bf440ea4df..6641caa45292 100644
--- a/fs/ocfs2/inode.c
+++ b/fs/ocfs2/inode.c
@@ -1456,6 +1456,13 @@ int ocfs2_validate_inode_block(struct super_block *sb,
goto bail;
}
+ if (!di->i_links_count || !di->i_mode) {
+ mlog(ML_ERROR, "Invalid dinode #%llu: "
+ "Corrupt state (nlink=0 or mode=0,) detected!\n",
+ (unsigned long long)bh->b_blocknr);
+ rc = -EFSCORRUPTED;
+ goto bail;
+ }
/*
* Errors after here are fatal.
*/
--
2.43.0On Tue, Nov 18, 2025 at 01:35:07AM +0300, Ahmet Eray Karadag wrote:
> A panic occurs in ocfs2_unlink due to WARN_ON(inode->i_nlink == 0) when
> handling a corrupted inode with i_mode=0 and i_nlink=0 in memory.
>
> This "zombie" inode is created because ocfs2_read_locked_inode proceeds
> even after ocfs2_validate_inode_block successfully validates a block
> that structurally looks okay (passes checksum, signature etc.) but
> contains semantically invalid data (specifically i_mode=0). The current
> validation function doesn't check for i_mode being zero.
>
> This results in an in-memory inode with i_mode=0 being added to the VFS
> cache, which later triggers the panic during unlink.
>
> Prevent this by adding an explicit check for (i_mode == 0, i_nlink == 0, non-orphan)
> within ocfs2_validate_inode_block. If the check is true, return -EFSCORRUPTED to signal
> corruption. This causes the caller (ocfs2_read_locked_inode) to invoke
> make_bad_inode(), correctly preventing the zombie inode from entering
> the cache.
>
> Reported-by: syzbot+55c40ae8a0e5f3659f2b@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
> Fixes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=55c40ae8a0e5f3659f2b
> Co-developed-by: Albin Babu Varghese <albinbabuvarghese20@gmail.com>
> Signed-off-by: Albin Babu Varghese <albinbabuvarghese20@gmail.com>
> Signed-off-by: Ahmet Eray Karadag <eraykrdg1@gmail.com>
> Previous link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20251022222752.46758-2-eraykrdg1@gmail.com/T/
> ---
> v2:
> - Only checking either i_links_count == 0 or i_mode == 0
> - Not performing le16_to_cpu() anymore
> - Tested with ocfs2-test
> ---
> fs/ocfs2/inode.c | 7 +++++++
> 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/inode.c b/fs/ocfs2/inode.c
> index 14bf440ea4df..6641caa45292 100644
> --- a/fs/ocfs2/inode.c
> +++ b/fs/ocfs2/inode.c
> @@ -1456,6 +1456,13 @@ int ocfs2_validate_inode_block(struct super_block *sb,
> goto bail;
> }
>
> + if (!di->i_links_count || !di->i_mode) {
question:
Why does this code not check both di->i_link_count and di->i_links_count_hi here?
- Heming
> + mlog(ML_ERROR, "Invalid dinode #%llu: "
> + "Corrupt state (nlink=0 or mode=0,) detected!\n",
> + (unsigned long long)bh->b_blocknr);
> + rc = -EFSCORRUPTED;
> + goto bail;
> + }
> /*
> * Errors after here are fatal.
> */
> --
> 2.43.0
>
>
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