Provide run-time validation of the __counted_by_ptr() annotation via
newly added PTR_BOUNDS LKDTM test.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
---
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/misc/lkdtm/bugs.c | 90 ++++++++++++++++++++++---
tools/testing/selftests/lkdtm/tests.txt | 2 +
2 files changed, 84 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/misc/lkdtm/bugs.c b/drivers/misc/lkdtm/bugs.c
index 376047beea3d..a069a7d686fc 100644
--- a/drivers/misc/lkdtm/bugs.c
+++ b/drivers/misc/lkdtm/bugs.c
@@ -414,32 +414,32 @@ static void lkdtm_ARRAY_BOUNDS(void)
pr_expected_config(CONFIG_UBSAN_BOUNDS);
}
-struct lkdtm_annotated {
+struct lkdtm_cb_fam {
unsigned long flags;
int count;
int array[] __counted_by(count);
};
-static volatile int fam_count = 4;
+static volatile int element_count = 4;
static void lkdtm_FAM_BOUNDS(void)
{
- struct lkdtm_annotated *inst;
+ struct lkdtm_cb_fam *inst;
- inst = kzalloc(struct_size(inst, array, fam_count + 1), GFP_KERNEL);
+ inst = kzalloc(struct_size(inst, array, element_count + 1), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!inst) {
pr_err("FAIL: could not allocate test struct!\n");
return;
}
- inst->count = fam_count;
+ inst->count = element_count;
pr_info("Array access within bounds ...\n");
- inst->array[1] = fam_count;
+ inst->array[1] = element_count;
ignored = inst->array[1];
pr_info("Array access beyond bounds ...\n");
- inst->array[fam_count] = fam_count;
- ignored = inst->array[fam_count];
+ inst->array[element_count] = element_count;
+ ignored = inst->array[element_count];
kfree(inst);
@@ -454,6 +454,79 @@ static void lkdtm_FAM_BOUNDS(void)
pr_expected_config(CONFIG_UBSAN_BOUNDS);
}
+struct lkdtm_extra {
+ short a, b;
+ u16 sixteen;
+ u32 bigger;
+ u64 biggest;
+};
+
+struct lkdtm_cb_ptr {
+ int a, b, c;
+ int nr_extra;
+ char *buf __counted_by_ptr(len);
+ size_t len;
+ struct lkdtm_extra *extra __counted_by_ptr(nr_extra);
+};
+
+static noinline void check_ptr_len(struct lkdtm_cb_ptr *p, size_t len)
+{
+ if (__member_size(p->buf) != len)
+ pr_err("FAIL: could not determine size of inst->buf: %zu\n",
+ __member_size(p->buf));
+ else
+ pr_info("good: inst->buf length is %zu\n", len);
+}
+
+static void lkdtm_PTR_BOUNDS(void)
+{
+ struct lkdtm_cb_ptr *inst;
+
+ inst = kzalloc(sizeof(*inst), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!inst) {
+ pr_err("FAIL: could not allocate struct lkdtm_cb_ptr!\n");
+ return;
+ }
+
+ inst->buf = kzalloc(element_count, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!inst->buf) {
+ pr_err("FAIL: could not allocate inst->buf!\n");
+ return;
+ }
+ inst->len = element_count;
+
+ /* Double element_count */
+ inst->extra = kcalloc(element_count * 2, sizeof(*inst->extra), GFP_KERNEL);
+ inst->nr_extra = element_count * 2;
+
+ pr_info("Pointer access within bounds ...\n");
+ check_ptr_len(inst, 4);
+ /* All 4 bytes */
+ inst->buf[0] = 'A';
+ inst->buf[1] = 'B';
+ inst->buf[2] = 'C';
+ inst->buf[3] = 'D';
+ /* Halfway into the array */
+ inst->extra[element_count].biggest = 0x1000;
+
+ pr_info("Pointer access beyond bounds ...\n");
+ ignored = inst->extra[inst->nr_extra].b;
+
+ kfree(inst->extra);
+ kfree(inst->buf);
+ kfree(inst);
+
+ pr_err("FAIL: survived access of invalid pointer member offset!\n");
+
+ if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CC_HAS_COUNTED_BY_PTR))
+ pr_warn("This is expected since this %s was built with a compiler that does not support __counted_by_ptr\n",
+ lkdtm_kernel_info);
+ else if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_UBSAN_BOUNDS))
+ pr_expected_config(CONFIG_UBSAN_TRAP);
+ else
+ pr_expected_config(CONFIG_UBSAN_BOUNDS);
+}
+
static void lkdtm_CORRUPT_LIST_ADD(void)
{
/*
@@ -716,6 +789,7 @@ static struct crashtype crashtypes[] = {
CRASHTYPE(OVERFLOW_UNSIGNED),
CRASHTYPE(ARRAY_BOUNDS),
CRASHTYPE(FAM_BOUNDS),
+ CRASHTYPE(PTR_BOUNDS),
CRASHTYPE(CORRUPT_LIST_ADD),
CRASHTYPE(CORRUPT_LIST_DEL),
CRASHTYPE(STACK_GUARD_PAGE_LEADING),
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/lkdtm/tests.txt b/tools/testing/selftests/lkdtm/tests.txt
index cff124c1eddd..204d4a669632 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/lkdtm/tests.txt
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/lkdtm/tests.txt
@@ -9,6 +9,8 @@ EXCEPTION
#CORRUPT_STACK Crashes entire system on success
#CORRUPT_STACK_STRONG Crashes entire system on success
ARRAY_BOUNDS call trace:|UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds
+FAM_BOUNDS call trace:|UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds
+PTR_BOUNDS call trace:|UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds
CORRUPT_LIST_ADD list_add corruption
CORRUPT_LIST_DEL list_del corruption
STACK_GUARD_PAGE_LEADING
--
2.34.1
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