include/linux/tpm.h | 9 +++++--- security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c | 26 ++++++----------------- 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@opinsys.com>
Using -EFAULT here was not the best idea for tpm_ret_to_err as the fallback
error code as it is no concise with trusted keys.
Change the fallback as -EPERM, process TPM_RC_HASH also in tpm_ret_to_err,
and by these changes make the helper applicable for trusted keys.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.15+
Fixes: 539fbab37881 ("tpm: Mask TPM RC in tpm2_start_auth_session()")
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@opinsys.com>
---
include/linux/tpm.h | 9 +++++---
security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c | 26 ++++++-----------------
2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/tpm.h b/include/linux/tpm.h
index dc0338a783f3..667d290789ca 100644
--- a/include/linux/tpm.h
+++ b/include/linux/tpm.h
@@ -449,13 +449,16 @@ static inline ssize_t tpm_ret_to_err(ssize_t ret)
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
- switch (tpm2_rc_value(ret)) {
- case TPM2_RC_SUCCESS:
+ if (!ret)
return 0;
+
+ switch (tpm2_rc_value(ret)) {
case TPM2_RC_SESSION_MEMORY:
return -ENOMEM;
+ case TPM2_RC_HASH:
+ return -EINVAL;
default:
- return -EFAULT;
+ return -EPERM;
}
}
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
index 024be262702f..e165b117bbca 100644
--- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
+++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
@@ -348,25 +348,19 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
}
blob_len = tpm2_key_encode(payload, options, &buf.data[offset], blob_len);
+ if (blob_len < 0)
+ rc = blob_len;
out:
tpm_buf_destroy(&sized);
tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
- if (rc > 0) {
- if (tpm2_rc_value(rc) == TPM2_RC_HASH)
- rc = -EINVAL;
- else
- rc = -EPERM;
- }
- if (blob_len < 0)
- rc = blob_len;
- else
+ if (!rc)
payload->blob_len = blob_len;
out_put:
tpm_put_ops(chip);
- return rc;
+ return tpm_ret_to_err(rc);
}
/**
@@ -468,10 +462,7 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
kfree(blob);
tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
- if (rc > 0)
- rc = -EPERM;
-
- return rc;
+ return tpm_ret_to_err(rc);
}
/**
@@ -534,8 +525,6 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, &buf);
rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 6, "unsealing");
rc = tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(chip, &buf, rc);
- if (rc > 0)
- rc = -EPERM;
if (!rc) {
data_len = be16_to_cpup(
@@ -568,7 +557,7 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
out:
tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
- return rc;
+ return tpm_ret_to_err(rc);
}
/**
@@ -600,6 +589,5 @@ int tpm2_unseal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
out:
tpm_put_ops(chip);
-
- return rc;
+ return tpm_ret_to_err(rc);
}
--
2.39.5
On Mon, Sep 22, 2025 at 10:23:32AM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote: >From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@opinsys.com> > >Using -EFAULT here was not the best idea for tpm_ret_to_err as the fallback >error code as it is no concise with trusted keys. > >Change the fallback as -EPERM, process TPM_RC_HASH also in tpm_ret_to_err, >and by these changes make the helper applicable for trusted keys. > >Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.15+ >Fixes: 539fbab37881 ("tpm: Mask TPM RC in tpm2_start_auth_session()") >Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@opinsys.com> >--- > include/linux/tpm.h | 9 +++++--- > security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c | 26 ++++++----------------- > 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-) > >diff --git a/include/linux/tpm.h b/include/linux/tpm.h >index dc0338a783f3..667d290789ca 100644 >--- a/include/linux/tpm.h >+++ b/include/linux/tpm.h >@@ -449,13 +449,16 @@ static inline ssize_t tpm_ret_to_err(ssize_t ret) > if (ret < 0) > return ret; > >- switch (tpm2_rc_value(ret)) { >- case TPM2_RC_SUCCESS: I slightly prefer the `case TPM2_RC_SUCCESS` but I don't have a strong opinion. >+ if (!ret) > return 0; If we want to remove the `case TPM2_RC_SUCCESS`, can we just merge this condition with the if on top, I mean: if (ret <= 0) return ret; >+ >+ switch (tpm2_rc_value(ret)) { > case TPM2_RC_SESSION_MEMORY: > return -ENOMEM; >+ case TPM2_RC_HASH: >+ return -EINVAL; > default: >- return -EFAULT; >+ return -EPERM; > } > } > >diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c >index 024be262702f..e165b117bbca 100644 >--- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c >+++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c >@@ -348,25 +348,19 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, > } > > blob_len = tpm2_key_encode(payload, options, &buf.data[offset], blob_len); >+ if (blob_len < 0) >+ rc = blob_len; > > out: > tpm_buf_destroy(&sized); > tpm_buf_destroy(&buf); > >- if (rc > 0) { >- if (tpm2_rc_value(rc) == TPM2_RC_HASH) >- rc = -EINVAL; >- else >- rc = -EPERM; >- } >- if (blob_len < 0) nit: since `blob_len` is not accessed anymore in the error path, can we avoid to set it to 0 when declaring it? Thanks, Stefano >- rc = blob_len; >- else >+ if (!rc) > payload->blob_len = blob_len; > > out_put: > tpm_put_ops(chip); >- return rc; >+ return tpm_ret_to_err(rc); > } > > /** >@@ -468,10 +462,7 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, > kfree(blob); > tpm_buf_destroy(&buf); > >- if (rc > 0) >- rc = -EPERM; >- >- return rc; >+ return tpm_ret_to_err(rc); > } > > /** >@@ -534,8 +525,6 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, > tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, &buf); > rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 6, "unsealing"); > rc = tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(chip, &buf, rc); >- if (rc > 0) >- rc = -EPERM; > > if (!rc) { > data_len = be16_to_cpup( >@@ -568,7 +557,7 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, > > out: > tpm_buf_destroy(&buf); >- return rc; >+ return tpm_ret_to_err(rc); > } > > /** >@@ -600,6 +589,5 @@ int tpm2_unseal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, > > out: > tpm_put_ops(chip); >- >- return rc; >+ return tpm_ret_to_err(rc); > } >-- >2.39.5 >
On Mon, Sep 22, 2025 at 11:25:42AM +0200, Stefano Garzarella wrote: > On Mon, Sep 22, 2025 at 10:23:32AM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote: > > From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@opinsys.com> > > > > Using -EFAULT here was not the best idea for tpm_ret_to_err as the fallback > > error code as it is no concise with trusted keys. > > > > Change the fallback as -EPERM, process TPM_RC_HASH also in tpm_ret_to_err, > > and by these changes make the helper applicable for trusted keys. > > > > Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.15+ > > Fixes: 539fbab37881 ("tpm: Mask TPM RC in tpm2_start_auth_session()") > > Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@opinsys.com> > > --- > > include/linux/tpm.h | 9 +++++--- > > security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c | 26 ++++++----------------- > > 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-) > > > > diff --git a/include/linux/tpm.h b/include/linux/tpm.h > > index dc0338a783f3..667d290789ca 100644 > > --- a/include/linux/tpm.h > > +++ b/include/linux/tpm.h > > @@ -449,13 +449,16 @@ static inline ssize_t tpm_ret_to_err(ssize_t ret) > > if (ret < 0) > > return ret; > > > > - switch (tpm2_rc_value(ret)) { > > - case TPM2_RC_SUCCESS: > > I slightly prefer the `case TPM2_RC_SUCCESS` but I don't have a strong > opinion. > > > + if (!ret) > > return 0; > > If we want to remove the `case TPM2_RC_SUCCESS`, can we just merge this > condition with the if on top, I mean: > > if (ret <= 0) > return ret; I can cope with this i.e. revert back, it's not really part of the scope and was totally intentional > > > + > > + switch (tpm2_rc_value(ret)) { > > case TPM2_RC_SESSION_MEMORY: > > return -ENOMEM; > > + case TPM2_RC_HASH: > > + return -EINVAL; > > default: > > - return -EFAULT; > > + return -EPERM; > > } > > } > > > > diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c > > index 024be262702f..e165b117bbca 100644 > > --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c > > +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c > > @@ -348,25 +348,19 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, > > } > > > > blob_len = tpm2_key_encode(payload, options, &buf.data[offset], blob_len); > > + if (blob_len < 0) > > + rc = blob_len; > > > > out: > > tpm_buf_destroy(&sized); > > tpm_buf_destroy(&buf); > > > > - if (rc > 0) { > > - if (tpm2_rc_value(rc) == TPM2_RC_HASH) > > - rc = -EINVAL; > > - else > > - rc = -EPERM; > > - } > > - if (blob_len < 0) > > nit: since `blob_len` is not accessed anymore in the error path, can we > avoid to set it to 0 when declaring it? > > Thanks, > Stefano > > > - rc = blob_len; > > - else > > + if (!rc) > > payload->blob_len = blob_len; > > > > out_put: > > tpm_put_ops(chip); > > - return rc; > > + return tpm_ret_to_err(rc); > > } > > > > /** > > @@ -468,10 +462,7 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, > > kfree(blob); > > tpm_buf_destroy(&buf); > > > > - if (rc > 0) > > - rc = -EPERM; > > - > > - return rc; > > + return tpm_ret_to_err(rc); > > } > > > > /** > > @@ -534,8 +525,6 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, > > tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, &buf); > > rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 6, "unsealing"); > > rc = tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(chip, &buf, rc); > > - if (rc > 0) > > - rc = -EPERM; > > > > if (!rc) { > > data_len = be16_to_cpup( > > @@ -568,7 +557,7 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, > > > > out: > > tpm_buf_destroy(&buf); > > - return rc; > > + return tpm_ret_to_err(rc); > > } > > > > /** > > @@ -600,6 +589,5 @@ int tpm2_unseal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, > > > > out: > > tpm_put_ops(chip); > > - > > - return rc; > > + return tpm_ret_to_err(rc); > > } > > -- > > 2.39.5 > > > BR, Jarkko
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