fs/ext4/xattr.c | 10 +++++++--- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
syzkaller found a path where ext4_xattr_inode_update_ref() reads an EA
inode refcount that is already <= 0 and then applies ref_change (often
-1). That lets the refcount underflow and we proceed with a bogus value,
triggering errors like:
EXT4-fs error: EA inode <n> ref underflow: ref_count=-1 ref_change=-1
EXT4-fs warning: ea_inode dec ref err=-117
Make the invariant explicit: if the current refcount is non-positive,
treat this as on-disk corruption, emit EXT4_ERROR_INODE(), and fail the
operation with -EFSCORRUPTED instead of updating the refcount. Delete the
WARN_ONCE() as negative refcounts are now impossible; keep error reporting
in ext4_error_inode().
This prevents the underflow and the follow-on orphan/cleanup churn.
Fixes: https://syzbot.org/bug?extid=0be4f339a8218d2a5bb1
Co-developed-by: Albin Babu Varghese <albinbabuvarghese20@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Albin Babu Varghese <albinbabuvarghese20@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ahmet Eray Karadag <eraykrdg1@gmail.com>
---
fs/ext4/xattr.c | 10 +++++++---
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/ext4/xattr.c b/fs/ext4/xattr.c
index 5a6fe1513fd2..a056f98579c3 100644
--- a/fs/ext4/xattr.c
+++ b/fs/ext4/xattr.c
@@ -1030,6 +1030,13 @@ static int ext4_xattr_inode_update_ref(handle_t *handle, struct inode *ea_inode,
ref_count = ext4_xattr_inode_get_ref(ea_inode);
ref_count += ref_change;
+ if (ref_count < 0) {
+ ext4_error_inode(ea_inode, __func__, __LINE__, 0,
+ "EA inode %lu ref underflow: ref_count=%lld ref_change=%d",
+ ea_inode->i_ino, ref_count, ref_change);
+ ret = -EFSCORRUPTED;
+ goto out;
+ }
ext4_xattr_inode_set_ref(ea_inode, ref_count);
if (ref_change > 0) {
@@ -1044,9 +1051,6 @@ static int ext4_xattr_inode_update_ref(handle_t *handle, struct inode *ea_inode,
ext4_orphan_del(handle, ea_inode);
}
} else {
- WARN_ONCE(ref_count < 0, "EA inode %lu ref_count=%lld",
- ea_inode->i_ino, ref_count);
-
if (ref_count == 0) {
WARN_ONCE(ea_inode->i_nlink != 1,
"EA inode %lu i_nlink=%u",
--
2.34.1
On Thu, Sep 18, 2025 at 08:55:46PM +0300, Ahmet Eray Karadag wrote:
> syzkaller found a path where ext4_xattr_inode_update_ref() reads an EA
> inode refcount that is already <= 0 and then applies ref_change (often
> -1). That lets the refcount underflow and we proceed with a bogus value,
> triggering errors like:
>
> EXT4-fs error: EA inode <n> ref underflow: ref_count=-1 ref_change=-1
> EXT4-fs warning: ea_inode dec ref err=-117
>
> Make the invariant explicit: if the current refcount is non-positive,
> treat this as on-disk corruption, emit EXT4_ERROR_INODE(), and fail the
> operation with -EFSCORRUPTED instead of updating the refcount. Delete the
> WARN_ONCE() as negative refcounts are now impossible; keep error reporting
> in ext4_error_inode().
>
> This prevents the underflow and the follow-on orphan/cleanup churn.
>
> Fixes: https://syzbot.org/bug?extid=0be4f339a8218d2a5bb1
> Co-developed-by: Albin Babu Varghese <albinbabuvarghese20@gmail.com>
> Signed-off-by: Albin Babu Varghese <albinbabuvarghese20@gmail.com>
> Signed-off-by: Ahmet Eray Karadag <eraykrdg1@gmail.com>
> ---
> fs/ext4/xattr.c | 10 +++++++---
> 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/fs/ext4/xattr.c b/fs/ext4/xattr.c
> index 5a6fe1513fd2..a056f98579c3 100644
> --- a/fs/ext4/xattr.c
> +++ b/fs/ext4/xattr.c
> @@ -1030,6 +1030,13 @@ static int ext4_xattr_inode_update_ref(handle_t *handle, struct inode *ea_inode,
>
> ref_count = ext4_xattr_inode_get_ref(ea_inode);
> ref_count += ref_change;
> + if (ref_count < 0) {
Shouldn't this check ref_count >= ref_change *before* updating it?
--D
> + ext4_error_inode(ea_inode, __func__, __LINE__, 0,
> + "EA inode %lu ref underflow: ref_count=%lld ref_change=%d",
> + ea_inode->i_ino, ref_count, ref_change);
> + ret = -EFSCORRUPTED;
> + goto out;
> + }
> ext4_xattr_inode_set_ref(ea_inode, ref_count);
>
> if (ref_change > 0) {
> @@ -1044,9 +1051,6 @@ static int ext4_xattr_inode_update_ref(handle_t *handle, struct inode *ea_inode,
> ext4_orphan_del(handle, ea_inode);
> }
> } else {
> - WARN_ONCE(ref_count < 0, "EA inode %lu ref_count=%lld",
> - ea_inode->i_ino, ref_count);
> -
> if (ref_count == 0) {
> WARN_ONCE(ea_inode->i_nlink != 1,
> "EA inode %lu i_nlink=%u",
> --
> 2.34.1
>
>
On Thu, Sep 18, 2025 at 11:18:01AM -0700, Darrick J. Wong wrote:
> > diff --git a/fs/ext4/xattr.c b/fs/ext4/xattr.c
> > index 5a6fe1513fd2..a056f98579c3 100644
> > --- a/fs/ext4/xattr.c
> > +++ b/fs/ext4/xattr.c
> > @@ -1030,6 +1030,13 @@ static int ext4_xattr_inode_update_ref(handle_t *handle, struct inode *ea_inode,
> >
> > ref_count = ext4_xattr_inode_get_ref(ea_inode);
> > ref_count += ref_change;
> > + if (ref_count < 0) {
>
> Shouldn't this check ref_count >= ref_change *before* updating it?
As Ahmet pointed out, so long as we don't actually update the on-disk
data structure, it's fine. The issue I'm more concerned about is that
if ref_change is +1, we could also have an overflow where we go from
an ridiculously large positive number (~0) to 0.
Your change might fix one potential syzbot-discovered issue caused by
a maliciously fuzzed file system, but we should harden it against
similar problems going in the opposite problem.
Cheers,
- Ted
syzkaller found a path where ext4_xattr_inode_update_ref() reads an EA
inode refcount that is already <= 0 and then applies ref_change (often
-1). That lets the refcount underflow and we proceed with a bogus value,
triggering errors like:
EXT4-fs error: EA inode <n> ref underflow: ref_count=-1 ref_change=-1
EXT4-fs warning: ea_inode dec ref err=-117
Make the invariant explicit: if the current refcount is non-positive,
treat this as on-disk corruption, emit ext4_error_inode(), and fail the
operation with -EFSCORRUPTED instead of updating the refcount. Delete the
WARN_ONCE() as negative refcounts are now impossible; keep error reporting
in ext4_error_inode().
This prevents the underflow and the follow-on orphan/cleanup churn.
Reported-by: syzbot+0be4f339a8218d2a5bb1@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: https://syzbot.org/bug?extid=0be4f339a8218d2a5bb1
Co-developed-by: Albin Babu Varghese <albinbabuvarghese20@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Albin Babu Varghese <albinbabuvarghese20@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ahmet Eray Karadag <eraykrdg1@gmail.com>
---
v2:
- Move underflow guard before the update
- Add overflow guard for the opposite case
- Use u64 type instead s64, since ext4_xattr_inode_update_ref() returns u64 and ext4_xattr_inode_set_ref() expects u64.
---
fs/ext4/xattr.c | 15 ++++++++-------
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/ext4/xattr.c b/fs/ext4/xattr.c
index 5a6fe1513fd2..a510693e04ac 100644
--- a/fs/ext4/xattr.c
+++ b/fs/ext4/xattr.c
@@ -1019,7 +1019,7 @@ static int ext4_xattr_inode_update_ref(handle_t *handle, struct inode *ea_inode,
int ref_change)
{
struct ext4_iloc iloc;
- s64 ref_count;
+ u64 ref_count;
int ret;
inode_lock_nested(ea_inode, I_MUTEX_XATTR);
@@ -1029,13 +1029,17 @@ static int ext4_xattr_inode_update_ref(handle_t *handle, struct inode *ea_inode,
goto out;
ref_count = ext4_xattr_inode_get_ref(ea_inode);
+ if ((ref_count == 0 && ref_change < 0) || (ref_count == U64_MAX && ref_change > 0)) {
+ ext4_error_inode(ea_inode, __func__, __LINE__, 0,
+ "EA inode %lu ref wraparound: ref_count=%lld ref_change=%d",
+ ea_inode->i_ino, ref_count, ref_change);
+ ret = -EFSCORRUPTED;
+ goto out;
+ }
ref_count += ref_change;
ext4_xattr_inode_set_ref(ea_inode, ref_count);
if (ref_change > 0) {
- WARN_ONCE(ref_count <= 0, "EA inode %lu ref_count=%lld",
- ea_inode->i_ino, ref_count);
-
if (ref_count == 1) {
WARN_ONCE(ea_inode->i_nlink, "EA inode %lu i_nlink=%u",
ea_inode->i_ino, ea_inode->i_nlink);
@@ -1044,9 +1048,6 @@ static int ext4_xattr_inode_update_ref(handle_t *handle, struct inode *ea_inode,
ext4_orphan_del(handle, ea_inode);
}
} else {
- WARN_ONCE(ref_count < 0, "EA inode %lu ref_count=%lld",
- ea_inode->i_ino, ref_count);
-
if (ref_count == 0) {
WARN_ONCE(ea_inode->i_nlink != 1,
"EA inode %lu i_nlink=%u",
--
2.34.1
On Sat, 20 Sep 2025 05:13:43 +0300, Ahmet Eray Karadag wrote:
> syzkaller found a path where ext4_xattr_inode_update_ref() reads an EA
> inode refcount that is already <= 0 and then applies ref_change (often
> -1). That lets the refcount underflow and we proceed with a bogus value,
> triggering errors like:
>
> EXT4-fs error: EA inode <n> ref underflow: ref_count=-1 ref_change=-1
> EXT4-fs warning: ea_inode dec ref err=-117
>
> [...]
Applied, thanks!
[1/1] Fix: ext4: guard against EA inode refcount underflow in xattr update
commit: 57295e835408d8d425bef58da5253465db3d6888
Best regards,
--
Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
On Sat, Sep 20, 2025 at 05:13:43AM +0300, Ahmet Eray Karadag wrote:
> syzkaller found a path where ext4_xattr_inode_update_ref() reads an EA
> inode refcount that is already <= 0 and then applies ref_change (often
> -1). That lets the refcount underflow and we proceed with a bogus value,
> triggering errors like:
>
> EXT4-fs error: EA inode <n> ref underflow: ref_count=-1 ref_change=-1
> EXT4-fs warning: ea_inode dec ref err=-117
>
> Make the invariant explicit: if the current refcount is non-positive,
> treat this as on-disk corruption, emit ext4_error_inode(), and fail the
> operation with -EFSCORRUPTED instead of updating the refcount. Delete the
> WARN_ONCE() as negative refcounts are now impossible; keep error reporting
> in ext4_error_inode().
>
> This prevents the underflow and the follow-on orphan/cleanup churn.
>
> Reported-by: syzbot+0be4f339a8218d2a5bb1@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
> Fixes: https://syzbot.org/bug?extid=0be4f339a8218d2a5bb1
> Co-developed-by: Albin Babu Varghese <albinbabuvarghese20@gmail.com>
> Signed-off-by: Albin Babu Varghese <albinbabuvarghese20@gmail.com>
> Signed-off-by: Ahmet Eray Karadag <eraykrdg1@gmail.com>
> ---
> v2:
> - Move underflow guard before the update
> - Add overflow guard for the opposite case
> - Use u64 type instead s64, since ext4_xattr_inode_update_ref() returns u64 and ext4_xattr_inode_set_ref() expects u64.
>
> ---
> fs/ext4/xattr.c | 15 ++++++++-------
> 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/fs/ext4/xattr.c b/fs/ext4/xattr.c
> index 5a6fe1513fd2..a510693e04ac 100644
> --- a/fs/ext4/xattr.c
> +++ b/fs/ext4/xattr.c
> @@ -1019,7 +1019,7 @@ static int ext4_xattr_inode_update_ref(handle_t *handle, struct inode *ea_inode,
> int ref_change)
> {
> struct ext4_iloc iloc;
> - s64 ref_count;
> + u64 ref_count;
> int ret;
>
> inode_lock_nested(ea_inode, I_MUTEX_XATTR);
> @@ -1029,13 +1029,17 @@ static int ext4_xattr_inode_update_ref(handle_t *handle, struct inode *ea_inode,
> goto out;
>
> ref_count = ext4_xattr_inode_get_ref(ea_inode);
> + if ((ref_count == 0 && ref_change < 0) || (ref_count == U64_MAX && ref_change > 0)) {
/me wonders if you could use check_add_overflow for this, but otherwise
everthing looks fine to me...
> + ext4_error_inode(ea_inode, __func__, __LINE__, 0,
> + "EA inode %lu ref wraparound: ref_count=%lld ref_change=%d",
Nit: %llu since ref_count is now unsigned.
> + ea_inode->i_ino, ref_count, ref_change);
> + ret = -EFSCORRUPTED;
> + goto out;
> + }
> ref_count += ref_change;
> ext4_xattr_inode_set_ref(ea_inode, ref_count);
>
> if (ref_change > 0) {
> - WARN_ONCE(ref_count <= 0, "EA inode %lu ref_count=%lld",
> - ea_inode->i_ino, ref_count);
> -
> if (ref_count == 1) {
> WARN_ONCE(ea_inode->i_nlink, "EA inode %lu i_nlink=%u",
> ea_inode->i_ino, ea_inode->i_nlink);
...though while you're modifying the precondition checking here, I think
these i_nlink preconditions should also be hoisted to the top and cause
an EFSCORRUPTED return on bad inputs.
--D
> @@ -1044,9 +1048,6 @@ static int ext4_xattr_inode_update_ref(handle_t *handle, struct inode *ea_inode,
> ext4_orphan_del(handle, ea_inode);
> }
> } else {
> - WARN_ONCE(ref_count < 0, "EA inode %lu ref_count=%lld",
> - ea_inode->i_ino, ref_count);
> -
> if (ref_count == 0) {
> WARN_ONCE(ea_inode->i_nlink != 1,
> "EA inode %lu i_nlink=%u",
> --
> 2.34.1
>
>
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