[PATCH v15 17/41] KVM: VMX: Set host constant supervisor states to VMCS fields

Sean Christopherson posted 41 patches 2 weeks, 5 days ago
[PATCH v15 17/41] KVM: VMX: Set host constant supervisor states to VMCS fields
Posted by Sean Christopherson 2 weeks, 5 days ago
From: Yang Weijiang <weijiang.yang@intel.com>

Save constant values to HOST_{S_CET,SSP,INTR_SSP_TABLE} field explicitly.
Kernel IBT is supported and the setting in MSR_IA32_S_CET is static after
post-boot(The exception is BIOS call case but vCPU thread never across it)
and KVM doesn't need to refresh HOST_S_CET field before every VM-Enter/
VM-Exit sequence.

Host supervisor shadow stack is not enabled now and SSP is not accessible
to kernel mode, thus it's safe to set host IA32_INT_SSP_TAB/SSP VMCS field
to 0s. When shadow stack is enabled for CPL3, SSP is reloaded from PL3_SSP
before it exits to userspace. Check SDM Vol 2A/B Chapter 3/4 for SYSCALL/
SYSRET/SYSENTER SYSEXIT/RDSSP/CALL etc.

Prevent KVM module loading if host supervisor shadow stack SHSTK_EN is set
in MSR_IA32_S_CET as KVM cannot co-exit with it correctly.

Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Suggested-by: Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Weijiang <weijiang.yang@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com>
Tested-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@grsecurity.net>
Tested-by: John Allen <john.allen@amd.com>
Tested-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com>
[sean: snapshot host S_CET if SHSTK *or* IBT is supported]
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
---
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/capabilities.h |  4 ++++
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c          | 15 +++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c              | 12 ++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kvm/x86.h              |  1 +
 4 files changed, 32 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/capabilities.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/capabilities.h
index 5316c27f6099..7d290b2cb0f4 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/capabilities.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/capabilities.h
@@ -103,6 +103,10 @@ static inline bool cpu_has_load_perf_global_ctrl(void)
 	return vmcs_config.vmentry_ctrl & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL;
 }
 
+static inline bool cpu_has_load_cet_ctrl(void)
+{
+	return (vmcs_config.vmentry_ctrl & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_CET_STATE);
+}
 static inline bool cpu_has_vmx_mpx(void)
 {
 	return vmcs_config.vmentry_ctrl & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_BNDCFGS;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
index adf5af30e537..e8155635cb42 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -4320,6 +4320,21 @@ void vmx_set_constant_host_state(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
 
 	if (cpu_has_load_ia32_efer())
 		vmcs_write64(HOST_IA32_EFER, kvm_host.efer);
+
+	/*
+	 * Supervisor shadow stack is not enabled on host side, i.e.,
+	 * host IA32_S_CET.SHSTK_EN bit is guaranteed to 0 now, per SDM
+	 * description(RDSSP instruction), SSP is not readable in CPL0,
+	 * so resetting the two registers to 0s at VM-Exit does no harm
+	 * to kernel execution. When execution flow exits to userspace,
+	 * SSP is reloaded from IA32_PL3_SSP. Check SDM Vol.2A/B Chapter
+	 * 3 and 4 for details.
+	 */
+	if (cpu_has_load_cet_ctrl()) {
+		vmcs_writel(HOST_S_CET, kvm_host.s_cet);
+		vmcs_writel(HOST_SSP, 0);
+		vmcs_writel(HOST_INTR_SSP_TABLE, 0);
+	}
 }
 
 void set_cr4_guest_host_mask(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index 0b67b1b0e361..15f208c44cbd 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -9982,6 +9982,18 @@ int kvm_x86_vendor_init(struct kvm_x86_init_ops *ops)
 		return -EIO;
 	}
 
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK) || boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBT)) {
+		rdmsrq(MSR_IA32_S_CET, kvm_host.s_cet);
+		/*
+		 * Linux doesn't yet support supervisor shadow stacks (SSS), so
+		 * KVM doesn't save/restore the associated MSRs, i.e. KVM may
+		 * clobber the host values.  Yell and refuse to load if SSS is
+		 * unexpectedly enabled, e.g. to avoid crashing the host.
+		 */
+		if (WARN_ON_ONCE(kvm_host.s_cet & CET_SHSTK_EN))
+			return -EIO;
+	}
+
 	memset(&kvm_caps, 0, sizeof(kvm_caps));
 
 	x86_emulator_cache = kvm_alloc_emulator_cache();
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
index 076eccba0f7e..65cbd454c4f1 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
@@ -50,6 +50,7 @@ struct kvm_host_values {
 	u64 efer;
 	u64 xcr0;
 	u64 xss;
+	u64 s_cet;
 	u64 arch_capabilities;
 };
 
-- 
2.51.0.384.g4c02a37b29-goog
Re: [PATCH v15 17/41] KVM: VMX: Set host constant supervisor states to VMCS fields
Posted by Xiaoyao Li 2 weeks, 1 day ago
On 9/13/2025 7:22 AM, Sean Christopherson wrote:
...
> +static inline bool cpu_has_load_cet_ctrl(void)
> +{
> +	return (vmcs_config.vmentry_ctrl & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_CET_STATE);
> +}

When looking at the patch 19, I realize that

   { VM_ENTRY_LOAD_CET_STATE,		VM_EXIT_LOAD_CET_STATE }

is added into vmcs_entry_exit_pairs[] there.

So ...

>   static inline bool cpu_has_vmx_mpx(void)
>   {
>   	return vmcs_config.vmentry_ctrl & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_BNDCFGS;
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
> index adf5af30e537..e8155635cb42 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
> @@ -4320,6 +4320,21 @@ void vmx_set_constant_host_state(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
>   
>   	if (cpu_has_load_ia32_efer())
>   		vmcs_write64(HOST_IA32_EFER, kvm_host.efer);
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * Supervisor shadow stack is not enabled on host side, i.e.,
> +	 * host IA32_S_CET.SHSTK_EN bit is guaranteed to 0 now, per SDM
> +	 * description(RDSSP instruction), SSP is not readable in CPL0,
> +	 * so resetting the two registers to 0s at VM-Exit does no harm
> +	 * to kernel execution. When execution flow exits to userspace,
> +	 * SSP is reloaded from IA32_PL3_SSP. Check SDM Vol.2A/B Chapter
> +	 * 3 and 4 for details.
> +	 */
> +	if (cpu_has_load_cet_ctrl()) {

... cpu_has_load_cet_ctrl() cannot ensure the existence of host CET 
fields, unless we change it to check vmcs_config.vmexit_ctrl or add CET 
entry_exit pair into the vmcs_entry_exit_pairs[] in this patch.

> +		vmcs_writel(HOST_S_CET, kvm_host.s_cet);
> +		vmcs_writel(HOST_SSP, 0);
> +		vmcs_writel(HOST_INTR_SSP_TABLE, 0);
> +	}
>   }
Re: [PATCH v15 17/41] KVM: VMX: Set host constant supervisor states to VMCS fields
Posted by Sean Christopherson 2 weeks ago
On Wed, Sep 17, 2025, Xiaoyao Li wrote:
> On 9/13/2025 7:22 AM, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> ...
> > +static inline bool cpu_has_load_cet_ctrl(void)
> > +{
> > +	return (vmcs_config.vmentry_ctrl & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_CET_STATE);
> > +}
> 
> When looking at the patch 19, I realize that
> 
>   { VM_ENTRY_LOAD_CET_STATE,		VM_EXIT_LOAD_CET_STATE }
> 
> is added into vmcs_entry_exit_pairs[] there.
> 
> So ...
> 
> >   static inline bool cpu_has_vmx_mpx(void)
> >   {
> >   	return vmcs_config.vmentry_ctrl & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_BNDCFGS;
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
> > index adf5af30e537..e8155635cb42 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
> > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
> > @@ -4320,6 +4320,21 @@ void vmx_set_constant_host_state(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
> >   	if (cpu_has_load_ia32_efer())
> >   		vmcs_write64(HOST_IA32_EFER, kvm_host.efer);
> > +
> > +	/*
> > +	 * Supervisor shadow stack is not enabled on host side, i.e.,
> > +	 * host IA32_S_CET.SHSTK_EN bit is guaranteed to 0 now, per SDM
> > +	 * description(RDSSP instruction), SSP is not readable in CPL0,
> > +	 * so resetting the two registers to 0s at VM-Exit does no harm
> > +	 * to kernel execution. When execution flow exits to userspace,
> > +	 * SSP is reloaded from IA32_PL3_SSP. Check SDM Vol.2A/B Chapter
> > +	 * 3 and 4 for details.
> > +	 */
> > +	if (cpu_has_load_cet_ctrl()) {
> 
> ... cpu_has_load_cet_ctrl() cannot ensure the existence of host CET fields,
> unless we change it to check vmcs_config.vmexit_ctrl or add CET entry_exit
> pair into the vmcs_entry_exit_pairs[] in this patch.

I *love* the attention to detail, but I think we're actually good, technically.

cpu_has_load_cet_ctrl() will always return %false until patch 19, because
VM_ENTRY_LOAD_CET_STATE isn't added to the set of OPTIONAL controls until then,
i.e. VM_ENTRY_LOAD_CET_STATE won't be set in vmcs_config.vmentry_ctrl until
the exit control is as well (and the sanity check is in place).

> > +		vmcs_writel(HOST_S_CET, kvm_host.s_cet);
> > +		vmcs_writel(HOST_SSP, 0);
> > +		vmcs_writel(HOST_INTR_SSP_TABLE, 0);
> > +	}
> >   }
Re: [PATCH v15 17/41] KVM: VMX: Set host constant supervisor states to VMCS fields
Posted by Xiaoyao Li 2 weeks, 2 days ago
On 9/13/2025 7:22 AM, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> From: Yang Weijiang <weijiang.yang@intel.com>
> 
> Save constant values to HOST_{S_CET,SSP,INTR_SSP_TABLE} field explicitly.
> Kernel IBT is supported and the setting in MSR_IA32_S_CET is static after
> post-boot(The exception is BIOS call case but vCPU thread never across it)
> and KVM doesn't need to refresh HOST_S_CET field before every VM-Enter/
> VM-Exit sequence.
> 
> Host supervisor shadow stack is not enabled now and SSP is not accessible
> to kernel mode, thus it's safe to set host IA32_INT_SSP_TAB/SSP VMCS field
> to 0s. When shadow stack is enabled for CPL3, SSP is reloaded from PL3_SSP
> before it exits to userspace. Check SDM Vol 2A/B Chapter 3/4 for SYSCALL/
> SYSRET/SYSENTER SYSEXIT/RDSSP/CALL etc.
> 
> Prevent KVM module loading if host supervisor shadow stack SHSTK_EN is set
> in MSR_IA32_S_CET as KVM cannot co-exit with it correctly.
> 
> Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
> Suggested-by: Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com>
> Signed-off-by: Yang Weijiang <weijiang.yang@intel.com>
> Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
> Reviewed-by: Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com>
> Tested-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@grsecurity.net>
> Tested-by: John Allen <john.allen@amd.com>
> Tested-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
> Signed-off-by: Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com>
> [sean: snapshot host S_CET if SHSTK *or* IBT is supported]
> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>

Reviewed-by: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>