drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon.c | 11 +++++++++-- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
Fix integer overflow vulnerabilities in fbcon_do_set_font() where font
size calculations could overflow when handling user-controlled font
parameters.
The vulnerabilities occur when:
1. CALC_FONTSZ(h, pitch, charcount) performs h * pith * charcount
multiplication with user-controlled values that can overflow.
2. FONT_EXTRA_WORDS * sizeof(int) + size addition can also overflow
3. This results in smaller allocations than expected, leading to buffer
overflows during font data copying.
Add explicit overflow checking using check_mul_overflow() and
check_add_overflow() kernel helpers to safety validate all size
calculations before allocation.
Signed-off-by: Samasth Norway Ananda <samasth.norway.ananda@oracle.com>
---
drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon.c | 11 +++++++++--
1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon.c b/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon.c
index 55f5731e94c3..a507d05f8fea 100644
--- a/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon.c
+++ b/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon.c
@@ -2531,9 +2531,16 @@ static int fbcon_set_font(struct vc_data *vc, const struct console_font *font,
if (fbcon_invalid_charcount(info, charcount))
return -EINVAL;
- size = CALC_FONTSZ(h, pitch, charcount);
+ /* Check for integer overflow in font size calculation */
+ if (check_mul_overflow(h, pitch, &size) ||
+ check_mul_overflow(size, charcount, &size))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /* Check for overflow in allocation size calculation */
+ if (check_add_overflow(FONT_EXTRA_WORDS * sizeof(int), size, &size))
+ return -EINVAL;
- new_data = kmalloc(FONT_EXTRA_WORDS * sizeof(int) + size, GFP_USER);
+ new_data = kmalloc(size, GFP_USER);
if (!new_data)
return -ENOMEM;
--
2.50.1
On Fri, 12 Sep 2025, Samasth Norway Ananda <samasth.norway.ananda@oracle.com> wrote: > Fix integer overflow vulnerabilities in fbcon_do_set_font() where font > size calculations could overflow when handling user-controlled font > parameters. > > The vulnerabilities occur when: > 1. CALC_FONTSZ(h, pitch, charcount) performs h * pith * charcount > multiplication with user-controlled values that can overflow. > 2. FONT_EXTRA_WORDS * sizeof(int) + size addition can also overflow > 3. This results in smaller allocations than expected, leading to buffer > overflows during font data copying. > > Add explicit overflow checking using check_mul_overflow() and > check_add_overflow() kernel helpers to safety validate all size > calculations before allocation. > > Signed-off-by: Samasth Norway Ananda <samasth.norway.ananda@oracle.com> > --- > drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon.c | 11 +++++++++-- > 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon.c b/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon.c > index 55f5731e94c3..a507d05f8fea 100644 > --- a/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon.c > +++ b/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon.c > @@ -2531,9 +2531,16 @@ static int fbcon_set_font(struct vc_data *vc, const struct console_font *font, > if (fbcon_invalid_charcount(info, charcount)) > return -EINVAL; > > - size = CALC_FONTSZ(h, pitch, charcount); > + /* Check for integer overflow in font size calculation */ > + if (check_mul_overflow(h, pitch, &size) || > + check_mul_overflow(size, charcount, &size)) > + return -EINVAL; > + > + /* Check for overflow in allocation size calculation */ > + if (check_add_overflow(FONT_EXTRA_WORDS * sizeof(int), size, &size)) This change stores the intermediate value into size, but fails to take into account that size is used just a bit later in the function, expecting the original size: new_data += FONT_EXTRA_WORDS * sizeof(int); FNTSIZE(new_data) = size; REFCOUNT(new_data) = 0; /* usage counter */ for (i=0; i< charcount; i++) { memcpy(new_data + i*h*pitch, data + i*vpitch*pitch, h*pitch); } /* Since linux has a nice crc32 function use it for counting font * checksums. */ csum = crc32(0, new_data, size); What was supposed to address an unlikely integer overflow seems to have caused a real buffer overflow [1]. BR, Jani. [1] https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/i915/kernel/-/issues/15020 > + return -EINVAL; > > - new_data = kmalloc(FONT_EXTRA_WORDS * sizeof(int) + size, GFP_USER); > + new_data = kmalloc(size, GFP_USER); > > if (!new_data) > return -ENOMEM; -- Jani Nikula, Intel
On Mon, 22 Sep 2025, Jani Nikula <jani.nikula@linux.intel.com> wrote: > On Fri, 12 Sep 2025, Samasth Norway Ananda <samasth.norway.ananda@oracle.com> wrote: >> Fix integer overflow vulnerabilities in fbcon_do_set_font() where font >> size calculations could overflow when handling user-controlled font >> parameters. >> >> The vulnerabilities occur when: >> 1. CALC_FONTSZ(h, pitch, charcount) performs h * pith * charcount >> multiplication with user-controlled values that can overflow. >> 2. FONT_EXTRA_WORDS * sizeof(int) + size addition can also overflow >> 3. This results in smaller allocations than expected, leading to buffer >> overflows during font data copying. >> >> Add explicit overflow checking using check_mul_overflow() and >> check_add_overflow() kernel helpers to safety validate all size >> calculations before allocation. >> >> Signed-off-by: Samasth Norway Ananda <samasth.norway.ananda@oracle.com> >> --- >> drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon.c | 11 +++++++++-- >> 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) >> >> diff --git a/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon.c b/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon.c >> index 55f5731e94c3..a507d05f8fea 100644 >> --- a/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon.c >> +++ b/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon.c >> @@ -2531,9 +2531,16 @@ static int fbcon_set_font(struct vc_data *vc, const struct console_font *font, >> if (fbcon_invalid_charcount(info, charcount)) >> return -EINVAL; >> >> - size = CALC_FONTSZ(h, pitch, charcount); >> + /* Check for integer overflow in font size calculation */ >> + if (check_mul_overflow(h, pitch, &size) || >> + check_mul_overflow(size, charcount, &size)) >> + return -EINVAL; >> + >> + /* Check for overflow in allocation size calculation */ >> + if (check_add_overflow(FONT_EXTRA_WORDS * sizeof(int), size, &size)) > > This change stores the intermediate value into size, but fails to take > into account that size is used just a bit later in the function, > expecting the original size: > > new_data += FONT_EXTRA_WORDS * sizeof(int); > FNTSIZE(new_data) = size; > REFCOUNT(new_data) = 0; /* usage counter */ > for (i=0; i< charcount; i++) { > memcpy(new_data + i*h*pitch, data + i*vpitch*pitch, h*pitch); > } > > /* Since linux has a nice crc32 function use it for counting font > * checksums. */ > csum = crc32(0, new_data, size); > > What was supposed to address an unlikely integer overflow seems to have > caused a real buffer overflow [1]. The overflow of 16 bytes matches FONT_EXTRA_WORDS * sizeof(int): memcmp: detected buffer overflow: 8208 byte read of buffer size 8192 > BR, > Jani. > > > [1] https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/i915/kernel/-/issues/15020 > >> + return -EINVAL; >> >> - new_data = kmalloc(FONT_EXTRA_WORDS * sizeof(int) + size, GFP_USER); >> + new_data = kmalloc(size, GFP_USER); >> >> if (!new_data) >> return -ENOMEM; -- Jani Nikula, Intel
Am 12.09.25 um 19:00 schrieb Samasth Norway Ananda: > Fix integer overflow vulnerabilities in fbcon_do_set_font() where font > size calculations could overflow when handling user-controlled font > parameters. > > The vulnerabilities occur when: > 1. CALC_FONTSZ(h, pitch, charcount) performs h * pith * charcount > multiplication with user-controlled values that can overflow. > 2. FONT_EXTRA_WORDS * sizeof(int) + size addition can also overflow > 3. This results in smaller allocations than expected, leading to buffer > overflows during font data copying. > > Add explicit overflow checking using check_mul_overflow() and > check_add_overflow() kernel helpers to safety validate all size > calculations before allocation. > > Signed-off-by: Samasth Norway Ananda <samasth.norway.ananda@oracle.com> Fixes: 39b3cffb8cf3 ("fbcon: prevent user font height or width change from causing potential out-of-bounds access") Cc: George Kennedy <george.kennedy@oracle.com> Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> Cc: syzbot+38a3699c7eaf165b97a6@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Simona Vetter <simona@ffwll.ch> Cc: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de> Cc: Thomas Zimmermann <tzimmermann@suse.de> Cc: "Ville Syrjälä" <ville.syrjala@linux.intel.com> Cc: Sam Ravnborg <sam@ravnborg.org> Cc: Qianqiang Liu <qianqiang.liu@163.com> Cc: Shixiong Ou <oushixiong@kylinos.cn> Cc: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v5.9+ > --- > drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon.c | 11 +++++++++-- > 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon.c b/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon.c > index 55f5731e94c3..a507d05f8fea 100644 > --- a/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon.c > +++ b/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon.c > @@ -2531,9 +2531,16 @@ static int fbcon_set_font(struct vc_data *vc, const struct console_font *font, > if (fbcon_invalid_charcount(info, charcount)) > return -EINVAL; > > - size = CALC_FONTSZ(h, pitch, charcount); > + /* Check for integer overflow in font size calculation */ > + if (check_mul_overflow(h, pitch, &size) || > + check_mul_overflow(size, charcount, &size)) > + return -EINVAL; > + > + /* Check for overflow in allocation size calculation */ > + if (check_add_overflow(FONT_EXTRA_WORDS * sizeof(int), size, &size)) > + return -EINVAL; > > - new_data = kmalloc(FONT_EXTRA_WORDS * sizeof(int) + size, GFP_USER); > + new_data = kmalloc(size, GFP_USER); > > if (!new_data) > return -ENOMEM; -- -- Thomas Zimmermann Graphics Driver Developer SUSE Software Solutions Germany GmbH Frankenstrasse 146, 90461 Nuernberg, Germany GF: Ivo Totev, Andrew Myers, Andrew McDonald, Boudien Moerman HRB 36809 (AG Nuernberg)
Am 12.09.25 um 19:00 schrieb Samasth Norway Ananda: > Fix integer overflow vulnerabilities in fbcon_do_set_font() where font > size calculations could overflow when handling user-controlled font > parameters. > > The vulnerabilities occur when: > 1. CALC_FONTSZ(h, pitch, charcount) performs h * pith * charcount > multiplication with user-controlled values that can overflow. > 2. FONT_EXTRA_WORDS * sizeof(int) + size addition can also overflow > 3. This results in smaller allocations than expected, leading to buffer > overflows during font data copying. > > Add explicit overflow checking using check_mul_overflow() and > check_add_overflow() kernel helpers to safety validate all size > calculations before allocation. > > Signed-off-by: Samasth Norway Ananda <samasth.norway.ananda@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Zimmermann <tzimmermann@suse.de> Thanks a lot for the patch. > --- > drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon.c | 11 +++++++++-- > 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon.c b/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon.c > index 55f5731e94c3..a507d05f8fea 100644 > --- a/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon.c > +++ b/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon.c > @@ -2531,9 +2531,16 @@ static int fbcon_set_font(struct vc_data *vc, const struct console_font *font, > if (fbcon_invalid_charcount(info, charcount)) > return -EINVAL; > > - size = CALC_FONTSZ(h, pitch, charcount); > + /* Check for integer overflow in font size calculation */ > + if (check_mul_overflow(h, pitch, &size) || > + check_mul_overflow(size, charcount, &size)) > + return -EINVAL; > + > + /* Check for overflow in allocation size calculation */ > + if (check_add_overflow(FONT_EXTRA_WORDS * sizeof(int), size, &size)) > + return -EINVAL; > > - new_data = kmalloc(FONT_EXTRA_WORDS * sizeof(int) + size, GFP_USER); > + new_data = kmalloc(size, GFP_USER); > > if (!new_data) > return -ENOMEM; -- -- Thomas Zimmermann Graphics Driver Developer SUSE Software Solutions Germany GmbH Frankenstrasse 146, 90461 Nuernberg, Germany GF: Ivo Totev, Andrew Myers, Andrew McDonald, Boudien Moerman HRB 36809 (AG Nuernberg)
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