Unlike with the normal stack there is no API for configuring the shadow
stack for a new thread, instead the kernel will dynamically allocate a
new shadow stack with the same size as the normal stack. This appears to
be due to the shadow stack series having been in development since
before the more extensible clone3() was added rather than anything more
deliberate.

Add a parameter to clone3() specifying a shadow stack pointer to use
for the new thread, this is inconsistent with the way we specify the
normal stack but during review concerns were expressed about having to
identify where the shadow stack pointer should be placed especially in
cases where the shadow stack has been previously active.  If no shadow
stack is specified then the existing implicit allocation behaviour is
maintained.

If a shadow stack pointer is specified then it is required to have an
architecture defined token placed on the stack, this will be consumed by
the new task, the shadow stack is specified by pointing to this token.  If
no valid token is present then this will be reported with -EINVAL.  This
token prevents new threads being created pointing at the shadow stack of
an existing running thread.  On architectures with support for userspace
pivoting of shadow stacks it is expected that the same format and placement
of tokens will be used, this is the case for arm64 and x86.

If the architecture does not support shadow stacks the shadow stack
pointer must be not be specified, architectures that do support the
feature are expected to enforce the same requirement on individual
systems that lack shadow stack support.

Update the existing arm64 and x86 implementations to pay attention to
the newly added arguments, in order to maintain compatibility we use the
existing behaviour if no shadow stack is specified. Since we are now
using more fields from the kernel_clone_args we pass that into the
shadow stack code rather than individual fields.

Portions of the x86 architecture code were written by Rick Edgecombe.

Acked-by: Yury Khrustalev <yury.khrustalev@arm.com>
Tested-by: Yury Khrustalev <yury.khrustalev@arm.com>
Tested-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
---
 arch/arm64/mm/gcs.c              | 47 +++++++++++++++++++-
 arch/x86/include/asm/shstk.h     | 11 +++--
 arch/x86/kernel/process.c        |  2 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c          | 53 ++++++++++++++++++++---
 include/asm-generic/cacheflush.h | 11 +++++
 include/linux/sched/task.h       | 17 ++++++++
 include/uapi/linux/sched.h       |  9 ++--
 kernel/fork.c                    | 93 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
 8 files changed, 217 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/mm/gcs.c b/arch/arm64/mm/gcs.c
index 3abcbf9adb5c..249ff05bca45 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/mm/gcs.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/mm/gcs.c
@@ -43,8 +43,23 @@ int gcs_alloc_thread_stack(struct task_struct *tsk,
 {
 	unsigned long addr, size;
 
-	if (!system_supports_gcs())
+	if (!system_supports_gcs()) {
+		if (args->shadow_stack_token)
+			return -EINVAL;
+
 		return 0;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * If the user specified a GCS then use it, otherwise fall
+	 * back to a default allocation strategy. Validation is done
+	 * in arch_shstk_validate_clone().
+	 */
+	if (args->shadow_stack_token) {
+		tsk->thread.gcs_base = 0;
+		tsk->thread.gcs_size = 0;
+		return 0;
+	}
 
 	if (!task_gcs_el0_enabled(tsk))
 		return 0;
@@ -68,6 +83,36 @@ int gcs_alloc_thread_stack(struct task_struct *tsk,
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static bool gcs_consume_token(struct vm_area_struct *vma, struct page *page,
+			      unsigned long user_addr)
+{
+	u64 expected = GCS_CAP(user_addr);
+	u64 *token = page_address(page) + offset_in_page(user_addr);
+
+	if (!cmpxchg_to_user_page(vma, page, user_addr, token, expected, 0))
+		return false;
+	set_page_dirty_lock(page);
+
+	return true;
+}
+
+int arch_shstk_validate_clone(struct task_struct *tsk,
+			      struct vm_area_struct *vma,
+			      struct page *page,
+			      struct kernel_clone_args *args)
+{
+	unsigned long gcspr_el0;
+	int ret = 0;
+
+	gcspr_el0 = args->shadow_stack_token;
+	if (!gcs_consume_token(vma, page, gcspr_el0))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	tsk->thread.gcspr_el0 = gcspr_el0 + sizeof(u64);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
 SYSCALL_DEFINE3(map_shadow_stack, unsigned long, addr, unsigned long, size, unsigned int, flags)
 {
 	unsigned long alloc_size;
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/shstk.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/shstk.h
index ba6f2fe43848..827e983430aa 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/shstk.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/shstk.h
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@
 #include <linux/types.h>
 
 struct task_struct;
+struct kernel_clone_args;
 struct ksignal;
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_USER_SHADOW_STACK
@@ -16,8 +17,8 @@ struct thread_shstk {
 
 long shstk_prctl(struct task_struct *task, int option, unsigned long arg2);
 void reset_thread_features(void);
-unsigned long shstk_alloc_thread_stack(struct task_struct *p, unsigned long clone_flags,
-				       unsigned long stack_size);
+unsigned long shstk_alloc_thread_stack(struct task_struct *p,
+				       const struct kernel_clone_args *args);
 void shstk_free(struct task_struct *p);
 int setup_signal_shadow_stack(struct ksignal *ksig);
 int restore_signal_shadow_stack(void);
@@ -28,8 +29,10 @@ static inline long shstk_prctl(struct task_struct *task, int option,
 			       unsigned long arg2) { return -EINVAL; }
 static inline void reset_thread_features(void) {}
 static inline unsigned long shstk_alloc_thread_stack(struct task_struct *p,
-						     unsigned long clone_flags,
-						     unsigned long stack_size) { return 0; }
+						     const struct kernel_clone_args *args)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
 static inline void shstk_free(struct task_struct *p) {}
 static inline int setup_signal_shadow_stack(struct ksignal *ksig) { return 0; }
 static inline int restore_signal_shadow_stack(void) { return 0; }
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
index 1b7960cf6eb0..0a54af6c60df 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
@@ -209,7 +209,7 @@ int copy_thread(struct task_struct *p, const struct kernel_clone_args *args)
 	 * is disabled, new_ssp will remain 0, and fpu_clone() will know not to
 	 * update it.
 	 */
-	new_ssp = shstk_alloc_thread_stack(p, clone_flags, args->stack_size);
+	new_ssp = shstk_alloc_thread_stack(p, args);
 	if (IS_ERR_VALUE(new_ssp))
 		return PTR_ERR((void *)new_ssp);
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c b/arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c
index 2ddf23387c7e..9926d58e5d41 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c
@@ -191,18 +191,61 @@ void reset_thread_features(void)
 	current->thread.features_locked = 0;
 }
 
-unsigned long shstk_alloc_thread_stack(struct task_struct *tsk, unsigned long clone_flags,
-				       unsigned long stack_size)
+int arch_shstk_validate_clone(struct task_struct *t,
+			      struct vm_area_struct *vma,
+			      struct page *page,
+			      struct kernel_clone_args *args)
+{
+	void *maddr = page_address(page);
+	unsigned long token;
+	int offset;
+	u64 expected;
+
+	/*
+	 * kernel_clone_args() verification assures token address is 8
+	 * byte aligned.
+	 */
+	token = args->shadow_stack_token;
+	expected = (token + SS_FRAME_SIZE) | BIT(0);
+	offset = offset_in_page(token);
+
+	if (!cmpxchg_to_user_page(vma, page, token, (unsigned long *)(maddr + offset),
+				  expected, 0))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	set_page_dirty_lock(page);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+unsigned long shstk_alloc_thread_stack(struct task_struct *tsk,
+				       const struct kernel_clone_args *args)
 {
 	struct thread_shstk *shstk = &tsk->thread.shstk;
+	unsigned long clone_flags = args->flags;
 	unsigned long addr, size;
 
 	/*
 	 * If shadow stack is not enabled on the new thread, skip any
-	 * switch to a new shadow stack.
+	 * implicit switch to a new shadow stack and reject attempts to
+	 * explicitly specify one.
 	 */
-	if (!features_enabled(ARCH_SHSTK_SHSTK))
+	if (!features_enabled(ARCH_SHSTK_SHSTK)) {
+		if (args->shadow_stack_token)
+			return (unsigned long)ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+
 		return 0;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * If the user specified a shadow stack then use it, otherwise
+	 * fall back to a default allocation strategy. Validation is
+	 * done in arch_shstk_validate_clone().
+	 */
+	if (args->shadow_stack_token) {
+		shstk->base = 0;
+		shstk->size = 0;
+		return args->shadow_stack_token + 8;
+	}
 
 	/*
 	 * For CLONE_VFORK the child will share the parents shadow stack.
@@ -222,7 +265,7 @@ unsigned long shstk_alloc_thread_stack(struct task_struct *tsk, unsigned long cl
 	if (!(clone_flags & CLONE_VM))
 		return 0;
 
-	size = adjust_shstk_size(stack_size);
+	size = adjust_shstk_size(args->stack_size);
 	addr = alloc_shstk(0, size, 0, false);
 	if (IS_ERR_VALUE(addr))
 		return addr;
diff --git a/include/asm-generic/cacheflush.h b/include/asm-generic/cacheflush.h
index 7ee8a179d103..96cc0c7a5c90 100644
--- a/include/asm-generic/cacheflush.h
+++ b/include/asm-generic/cacheflush.h
@@ -124,4 +124,15 @@ static inline void flush_cache_vunmap(unsigned long start, unsigned long end)
 	} while (0)
 #endif
 
+#ifndef cmpxchg_to_user_page
+#define cmpxchg_to_user_page(vma, page, vaddr, ptr, old, new)  \
+({							  \
+	bool ret;						  \
+								  \
+	ret = try_cmpxchg(ptr, &old, new);			  \
+	flush_icache_user_page(vma, page, vaddr, sizeof(*ptr));	  \
+	ret;							  \
+})
+#endif
+
 #endif /* _ASM_GENERIC_CACHEFLUSH_H */
diff --git a/include/linux/sched/task.h b/include/linux/sched/task.h
index ea41795a352b..b501f752fc9a 100644
--- a/include/linux/sched/task.h
+++ b/include/linux/sched/task.h
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ struct task_struct;
 struct rusage;
 union thread_union;
 struct css_set;
+struct vm_area_struct;
 
 /* All the bits taken by the old clone syscall. */
 #define CLONE_LEGACY_FLAGS 0xffffffffULL
@@ -44,6 +45,7 @@ struct kernel_clone_args {
 	struct cgroup *cgrp;
 	struct css_set *cset;
 	unsigned int kill_seq;
+	unsigned long shadow_stack_token;
 };
 
 /*
@@ -226,4 +228,19 @@ static inline void task_unlock(struct task_struct *p)
 
 DEFINE_GUARD(task_lock, struct task_struct *, task_lock(_T), task_unlock(_T))
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_USER_SHADOW_STACK
+int arch_shstk_validate_clone(struct task_struct *p,
+			      struct vm_area_struct *vma,
+			      struct page *page,
+			      struct kernel_clone_args *args);
+#else
+static inline int arch_shstk_validate_clone(struct task_struct *p,
+					    struct vm_area_struct *vma,
+					    struct page *page,
+					    struct kernel_clone_args *args)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+#endif
+
 #endif /* _LINUX_SCHED_TASK_H */
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/sched.h b/include/uapi/linux/sched.h
index 359a14cc76a4..9cf5c419e109 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/sched.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/sched.h
@@ -84,6 +84,7 @@
  *                kernel's limit of nested PID namespaces.
  * @cgroup:       If CLONE_INTO_CGROUP is specified set this to
  *                a file descriptor for the cgroup.
+ * @shadow_stack_token: Pointer to shadow stack token at top of stack.
  *
  * The structure is versioned by size and thus extensible.
  * New struct members must go at the end of the struct and
@@ -101,12 +102,14 @@ struct clone_args {
 	__aligned_u64 set_tid;
 	__aligned_u64 set_tid_size;
 	__aligned_u64 cgroup;
+	__aligned_u64 shadow_stack_token;
 };
 #endif
 
-#define CLONE_ARGS_SIZE_VER0 64 /* sizeof first published struct */
-#define CLONE_ARGS_SIZE_VER1 80 /* sizeof second published struct */
-#define CLONE_ARGS_SIZE_VER2 88 /* sizeof third published struct */
+#define CLONE_ARGS_SIZE_VER0  64 /* sizeof first published struct */
+#define CLONE_ARGS_SIZE_VER1  80 /* sizeof second published struct */
+#define CLONE_ARGS_SIZE_VER2  88 /* sizeof third published struct */
+#define CLONE_ARGS_SIZE_VER3  96 /* sizeof fourth published struct */
 
 /*
  * Scheduling policies
diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c
index af673856499d..d484ebeded33 100644
--- a/kernel/fork.c
+++ b/kernel/fork.c
@@ -1907,6 +1907,51 @@ static bool need_futex_hash_allocate_default(u64 clone_flags)
 	return true;
 }
 
+static int shstk_validate_clone(struct task_struct *p,
+				struct kernel_clone_args *args)
+{
+	struct mm_struct *mm;
+	struct vm_area_struct *vma;
+	struct page *page;
+	unsigned long addr;
+	int ret;
+
+	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_USER_SHADOW_STACK))
+		return 0;
+
+	if (!args->shadow_stack_token)
+		return 0;
+
+	mm = get_task_mm(p);
+	if (!mm)
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	mmap_read_lock(mm);
+
+	addr = untagged_addr_remote(mm, args->shadow_stack_token);
+	page = get_user_page_vma_remote(mm, addr, FOLL_FORCE | FOLL_WRITE,
+					&vma);
+	if (IS_ERR(page)) {
+		ret = -EFAULT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_SHADOW_STACK) ||
+	    !(vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE)) {
+		ret = -EFAULT;
+		goto out_page;
+	}
+
+	ret = arch_shstk_validate_clone(p, vma, page, args);
+
+out_page:
+	put_page(page);
+out:
+	mmap_read_unlock(mm);
+	mmput(mm);
+	return ret;
+}
+
 /*
  * This creates a new process as a copy of the old one,
  * but does not actually start it yet.
@@ -2182,6 +2227,9 @@ __latent_entropy struct task_struct *copy_process(
 	if (retval)
 		goto bad_fork_cleanup_namespaces;
 	retval = copy_thread(p, args);
+	if (retval)
+		goto bad_fork_cleanup_io;
+	retval = shstk_validate_clone(p, args);
 	if (retval)
 		goto bad_fork_cleanup_io;
 
@@ -2763,7 +2811,9 @@ static noinline int copy_clone_args_from_user(struct kernel_clone_args *kargs,
 		     CLONE_ARGS_SIZE_VER1);
 	BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetofend(struct clone_args, cgroup) !=
 		     CLONE_ARGS_SIZE_VER2);
-	BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct clone_args) != CLONE_ARGS_SIZE_VER2);
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetofend(struct clone_args, shadow_stack_token) !=
+		     CLONE_ARGS_SIZE_VER3);
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct clone_args) != CLONE_ARGS_SIZE_VER3);
 
 	if (unlikely(usize > PAGE_SIZE))
 		return -E2BIG;
@@ -2796,16 +2846,17 @@ static noinline int copy_clone_args_from_user(struct kernel_clone_args *kargs,
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	*kargs = (struct kernel_clone_args){
-		.flags		= args.flags,
-		.pidfd		= u64_to_user_ptr(args.pidfd),
-		.child_tid	= u64_to_user_ptr(args.child_tid),
-		.parent_tid	= u64_to_user_ptr(args.parent_tid),
-		.exit_signal	= args.exit_signal,
-		.stack		= args.stack,
-		.stack_size	= args.stack_size,
-		.tls		= args.tls,
-		.set_tid_size	= args.set_tid_size,
-		.cgroup		= args.cgroup,
+		.flags			= args.flags,
+		.pidfd			= u64_to_user_ptr(args.pidfd),
+		.child_tid		= u64_to_user_ptr(args.child_tid),
+		.parent_tid		= u64_to_user_ptr(args.parent_tid),
+		.exit_signal		= args.exit_signal,
+		.stack			= args.stack,
+		.stack_size		= args.stack_size,
+		.tls			= args.tls,
+		.set_tid_size		= args.set_tid_size,
+		.cgroup			= args.cgroup,
+		.shadow_stack_token	= args.shadow_stack_token,
 	};
 
 	if (args.set_tid &&
@@ -2846,6 +2897,24 @@ static inline bool clone3_stack_valid(struct kernel_clone_args *kargs)
 	return true;
 }
 
+/**
+ * clone3_shadow_stack_valid - check and prepare shadow stack
+ * @kargs: kernel clone args
+ *
+ * Verify that shadow stacks are only enabled if supported.
+ */
+static inline bool clone3_shadow_stack_valid(struct kernel_clone_args *kargs)
+{
+	if (!kargs->shadow_stack_token)
+		return true;
+
+	if (!IS_ALIGNED(kargs->shadow_stack_token, sizeof(void *)))
+		return false;
+
+	/* Fail if the kernel wasn't built with shadow stacks */
+	return IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_USER_SHADOW_STACK);
+}
+
 static bool clone3_args_valid(struct kernel_clone_args *kargs)
 {
 	/* Verify that no unknown flags are passed along. */
@@ -2868,7 +2937,7 @@ static bool clone3_args_valid(struct kernel_clone_args *kargs)
 	    kargs->exit_signal)
 		return false;
 
-	if (!clone3_stack_valid(kargs))
+	if (!clone3_stack_valid(kargs) || !clone3_shadow_stack_valid(kargs))
 		return false;
 
 	return true;

-- 
2.39.5

On Tue, Sep 02, 2025 at 11:21:48AM +0100, Mark Brown wrote:
> Unlike with the normal stack there is no API for configuring the shadow
> stack for a new thread, instead the kernel will dynamically allocate a
> new shadow stack with the same size as the normal stack. This appears to
> be due to the shadow stack series having been in development since
> before the more extensible clone3() was added rather than anything more
> deliberate.
> 
> Add a parameter to clone3() specifying a shadow stack pointer to use
> for the new thread, this is inconsistent with the way we specify the
> normal stack but during review concerns were expressed about having to
> identify where the shadow stack pointer should be placed especially in
> cases where the shadow stack has been previously active.  If no shadow
> stack is specified then the existing implicit allocation behaviour is
> maintained.
> 
> If a shadow stack pointer is specified then it is required to have an
> architecture defined token placed on the stack, this will be consumed by
> the new task, the shadow stack is specified by pointing to this token.  If
> no valid token is present then this will be reported with -EINVAL.  This
> token prevents new threads being created pointing at the shadow stack of
> an existing running thread.  On architectures with support for userspace
> pivoting of shadow stacks it is expected that the same format and placement
> of tokens will be used, this is the case for arm64 and x86.
> 
> If the architecture does not support shadow stacks the shadow stack
> pointer must be not be specified, architectures that do support the
> feature are expected to enforce the same requirement on individual
> systems that lack shadow stack support.
> 
> Update the existing arm64 and x86 implementations to pay attention to
> the newly added arguments, in order to maintain compatibility we use the
> existing behaviour if no shadow stack is specified. Since we are now
> using more fields from the kernel_clone_args we pass that into the
> shadow stack code rather than individual fields.
> 
> Portions of the x86 architecture code were written by Rick Edgecombe.
> 
> Acked-by: Yury Khrustalev <yury.khrustalev@arm.com>
> Tested-by: Yury Khrustalev <yury.khrustalev@arm.com>
> Tested-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
> Reviewed-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
> Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
> ---
>  arch/arm64/mm/gcs.c              | 47 +++++++++++++++++++-
>  arch/x86/include/asm/shstk.h     | 11 +++--
>  arch/x86/kernel/process.c        |  2 +-
>  arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c          | 53 ++++++++++++++++++++---
>  include/asm-generic/cacheflush.h | 11 +++++
>  include/linux/sched/task.h       | 17 ++++++++
>  include/uapi/linux/sched.h       |  9 ++--
>  kernel/fork.c                    | 93 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
>  8 files changed, 217 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/mm/gcs.c b/arch/arm64/mm/gcs.c
> index 3abcbf9adb5c..249ff05bca45 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/mm/gcs.c
> +++ b/arch/arm64/mm/gcs.c
> @@ -43,8 +43,23 @@ int gcs_alloc_thread_stack(struct task_struct *tsk,
>  {
>  	unsigned long addr, size;
>  
> -	if (!system_supports_gcs())
> +	if (!system_supports_gcs()) {
> +		if (args->shadow_stack_token)
> +			return -EINVAL;
> +
>  		return 0;
> +	}
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * If the user specified a GCS then use it, otherwise fall
> +	 * back to a default allocation strategy. Validation is done
> +	 * in arch_shstk_validate_clone().
> +	 */
> +	if (args->shadow_stack_token) {
> +		tsk->thread.gcs_base = 0;
> +		tsk->thread.gcs_size = 0;
> +		return 0;
> +	}
>  
>  	if (!task_gcs_el0_enabled(tsk))
>  		return 0;
> @@ -68,6 +83,36 @@ int gcs_alloc_thread_stack(struct task_struct *tsk,
>  	return 0;
>  }
>  
> +static bool gcs_consume_token(struct vm_area_struct *vma, struct page *page,
> +			      unsigned long user_addr)
> +{
> +	u64 expected = GCS_CAP(user_addr);
> +	u64 *token = page_address(page) + offset_in_page(user_addr);
> +
> +	if (!cmpxchg_to_user_page(vma, page, user_addr, token, expected, 0))
> +		return false;
> +	set_page_dirty_lock(page);
> +
> +	return true;
> +}
> +
> +int arch_shstk_validate_clone(struct task_struct *tsk,
> +			      struct vm_area_struct *vma,
> +			      struct page *page,
> +			      struct kernel_clone_args *args)
> +{
> +	unsigned long gcspr_el0;
> +	int ret = 0;
> +
> +	gcspr_el0 = args->shadow_stack_token;
> +	if (!gcs_consume_token(vma, page, gcspr_el0))
> +		return -EINVAL;
> +
> +	tsk->thread.gcspr_el0 = gcspr_el0 + sizeof(u64);
> +
> +	return ret;
> +}
> +
>  SYSCALL_DEFINE3(map_shadow_stack, unsigned long, addr, unsigned long, size, unsigned int, flags)
>  {
>  	unsigned long alloc_size;
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/shstk.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/shstk.h
> index ba6f2fe43848..827e983430aa 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/shstk.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/shstk.h
> @@ -6,6 +6,7 @@
>  #include <linux/types.h>
>  
>  struct task_struct;
> +struct kernel_clone_args;
>  struct ksignal;
>  
>  #ifdef CONFIG_X86_USER_SHADOW_STACK
> @@ -16,8 +17,8 @@ struct thread_shstk {
>  
>  long shstk_prctl(struct task_struct *task, int option, unsigned long arg2);
>  void reset_thread_features(void);
> -unsigned long shstk_alloc_thread_stack(struct task_struct *p, unsigned long clone_flags,
> -				       unsigned long stack_size);
> +unsigned long shstk_alloc_thread_stack(struct task_struct *p,
> +				       const struct kernel_clone_args *args);
>  void shstk_free(struct task_struct *p);
>  int setup_signal_shadow_stack(struct ksignal *ksig);
>  int restore_signal_shadow_stack(void);
> @@ -28,8 +29,10 @@ static inline long shstk_prctl(struct task_struct *task, int option,
>  			       unsigned long arg2) { return -EINVAL; }
>  static inline void reset_thread_features(void) {}
>  static inline unsigned long shstk_alloc_thread_stack(struct task_struct *p,
> -						     unsigned long clone_flags,
> -						     unsigned long stack_size) { return 0; }
> +						     const struct kernel_clone_args *args)
> +{
> +	return 0;
> +}
>  static inline void shstk_free(struct task_struct *p) {}
>  static inline int setup_signal_shadow_stack(struct ksignal *ksig) { return 0; }
>  static inline int restore_signal_shadow_stack(void) { return 0; }
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
> index 1b7960cf6eb0..0a54af6c60df 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
> @@ -209,7 +209,7 @@ int copy_thread(struct task_struct *p, const struct kernel_clone_args *args)
>  	 * is disabled, new_ssp will remain 0, and fpu_clone() will know not to
>  	 * update it.
>  	 */
> -	new_ssp = shstk_alloc_thread_stack(p, clone_flags, args->stack_size);
> +	new_ssp = shstk_alloc_thread_stack(p, args);
>  	if (IS_ERR_VALUE(new_ssp))
>  		return PTR_ERR((void *)new_ssp);
>  
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c b/arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c
> index 2ddf23387c7e..9926d58e5d41 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c
> @@ -191,18 +191,61 @@ void reset_thread_features(void)
>  	current->thread.features_locked = 0;
>  }
>  
> -unsigned long shstk_alloc_thread_stack(struct task_struct *tsk, unsigned long clone_flags,
> -				       unsigned long stack_size)
> +int arch_shstk_validate_clone(struct task_struct *t,
> +			      struct vm_area_struct *vma,
> +			      struct page *page,
> +			      struct kernel_clone_args *args)
> +{
> +	void *maddr = page_address(page);
> +	unsigned long token;
> +	int offset;
> +	u64 expected;
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * kernel_clone_args() verification assures token address is 8
> +	 * byte aligned.
> +	 */
> +	token = args->shadow_stack_token;
> +	expected = (token + SS_FRAME_SIZE) | BIT(0);
> +	offset = offset_in_page(token);
> +
> +	if (!cmpxchg_to_user_page(vma, page, token, (unsigned long *)(maddr + offset),
> +				  expected, 0))
> +		return -EINVAL;
> +	set_page_dirty_lock(page);
> +
> +	return 0;
> +}
> +
> +unsigned long shstk_alloc_thread_stack(struct task_struct *tsk,
> +				       const struct kernel_clone_args *args)
>  {
>  	struct thread_shstk *shstk = &tsk->thread.shstk;
> +	unsigned long clone_flags = args->flags;
>  	unsigned long addr, size;
>  
>  	/*
>  	 * If shadow stack is not enabled on the new thread, skip any
> -	 * switch to a new shadow stack.
> +	 * implicit switch to a new shadow stack and reject attempts to
> +	 * explicitly specify one.
>  	 */
> -	if (!features_enabled(ARCH_SHSTK_SHSTK))
> +	if (!features_enabled(ARCH_SHSTK_SHSTK)) {
> +		if (args->shadow_stack_token)
> +			return (unsigned long)ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
> +
>  		return 0;
> +	}
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * If the user specified a shadow stack then use it, otherwise
> +	 * fall back to a default allocation strategy. Validation is
> +	 * done in arch_shstk_validate_clone().
> +	 */
> +	if (args->shadow_stack_token) {
> +		shstk->base = 0;
> +		shstk->size = 0;
> +		return args->shadow_stack_token + 8;
> +	}
>  
>  	/*
>  	 * For CLONE_VFORK the child will share the parents shadow stack.
> @@ -222,7 +265,7 @@ unsigned long shstk_alloc_thread_stack(struct task_struct *tsk, unsigned long cl
>  	if (!(clone_flags & CLONE_VM))
>  		return 0;
>  
> -	size = adjust_shstk_size(stack_size);
> +	size = adjust_shstk_size(args->stack_size);
>  	addr = alloc_shstk(0, size, 0, false);
>  	if (IS_ERR_VALUE(addr))
>  		return addr;
> diff --git a/include/asm-generic/cacheflush.h b/include/asm-generic/cacheflush.h
> index 7ee8a179d103..96cc0c7a5c90 100644
> --- a/include/asm-generic/cacheflush.h
> +++ b/include/asm-generic/cacheflush.h
> @@ -124,4 +124,15 @@ static inline void flush_cache_vunmap(unsigned long start, unsigned long end)
>  	} while (0)
>  #endif
>  
> +#ifndef cmpxchg_to_user_page
> +#define cmpxchg_to_user_page(vma, page, vaddr, ptr, old, new)  \
> +({							  \
> +	bool ret;						  \
> +								  \
> +	ret = try_cmpxchg(ptr, &old, new);			  \
> +	flush_icache_user_page(vma, page, vaddr, sizeof(*ptr));	  \
> +	ret;							  \
> +})
> +#endif
> +
>  #endif /* _ASM_GENERIC_CACHEFLUSH_H */
> diff --git a/include/linux/sched/task.h b/include/linux/sched/task.h
> index ea41795a352b..b501f752fc9a 100644
> --- a/include/linux/sched/task.h
> +++ b/include/linux/sched/task.h
> @@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ struct task_struct;
>  struct rusage;
>  union thread_union;
>  struct css_set;
> +struct vm_area_struct;
>  
>  /* All the bits taken by the old clone syscall. */
>  #define CLONE_LEGACY_FLAGS 0xffffffffULL
> @@ -44,6 +45,7 @@ struct kernel_clone_args {
>  	struct cgroup *cgrp;
>  	struct css_set *cset;
>  	unsigned int kill_seq;
> +	unsigned long shadow_stack_token;
>  };
>  
>  /*
> @@ -226,4 +228,19 @@ static inline void task_unlock(struct task_struct *p)
>  
>  DEFINE_GUARD(task_lock, struct task_struct *, task_lock(_T), task_unlock(_T))
>  
> +#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_USER_SHADOW_STACK
> +int arch_shstk_validate_clone(struct task_struct *p,
> +			      struct vm_area_struct *vma,
> +			      struct page *page,
> +			      struct kernel_clone_args *args);
> +#else
> +static inline int arch_shstk_validate_clone(struct task_struct *p,
> +					    struct vm_area_struct *vma,
> +					    struct page *page,
> +					    struct kernel_clone_args *args)
> +{
> +	return 0;
> +}
> +#endif
> +
>  #endif /* _LINUX_SCHED_TASK_H */
> diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/sched.h b/include/uapi/linux/sched.h
> index 359a14cc76a4..9cf5c419e109 100644
> --- a/include/uapi/linux/sched.h
> +++ b/include/uapi/linux/sched.h
> @@ -84,6 +84,7 @@
>   *                kernel's limit of nested PID namespaces.
>   * @cgroup:       If CLONE_INTO_CGROUP is specified set this to
>   *                a file descriptor for the cgroup.
> + * @shadow_stack_token: Pointer to shadow stack token at top of stack.
>   *
>   * The structure is versioned by size and thus extensible.
>   * New struct members must go at the end of the struct and
> @@ -101,12 +102,14 @@ struct clone_args {
>  	__aligned_u64 set_tid;
>  	__aligned_u64 set_tid_size;
>  	__aligned_u64 cgroup;
> +	__aligned_u64 shadow_stack_token;
>  };
>  #endif
>  
> -#define CLONE_ARGS_SIZE_VER0 64 /* sizeof first published struct */
> -#define CLONE_ARGS_SIZE_VER1 80 /* sizeof second published struct */
> -#define CLONE_ARGS_SIZE_VER2 88 /* sizeof third published struct */
> +#define CLONE_ARGS_SIZE_VER0  64 /* sizeof first published struct */
> +#define CLONE_ARGS_SIZE_VER1  80 /* sizeof second published struct */
> +#define CLONE_ARGS_SIZE_VER2  88 /* sizeof third published struct */
> +#define CLONE_ARGS_SIZE_VER3  96 /* sizeof fourth published struct */
>  
>  /*
>   * Scheduling policies
> diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c
> index af673856499d..d484ebeded33 100644
> --- a/kernel/fork.c
> +++ b/kernel/fork.c
> @@ -1907,6 +1907,51 @@ static bool need_futex_hash_allocate_default(u64 clone_flags)
>  	return true;
>  }
>  
> +static int shstk_validate_clone(struct task_struct *p,
> +				struct kernel_clone_args *args)
> +{
> +	struct mm_struct *mm;
> +	struct vm_area_struct *vma;
> +	struct page *page;
> +	unsigned long addr;
> +	int ret;
> +
> +	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_USER_SHADOW_STACK))
> +		return 0;
> +
> +	if (!args->shadow_stack_token)
> +		return 0;
> +
> +	mm = get_task_mm(p);
> +	if (!mm)
> +		return -EFAULT;
> +
> +	mmap_read_lock(mm);
> +
> +	addr = untagged_addr_remote(mm, args->shadow_stack_token);
> +	page = get_user_page_vma_remote(mm, addr, FOLL_FORCE | FOLL_WRITE,
> +					&vma);
> +	if (IS_ERR(page)) {
> +		ret = -EFAULT;
> +		goto out;
> +	}
> +
> +	if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_SHADOW_STACK) ||
> +	    !(vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE)) {
> +		ret = -EFAULT;
> +		goto out_page;
> +	}
> +
> +	ret = arch_shstk_validate_clone(p, vma, page, args);
> +
> +out_page:
> +	put_page(page);
> +out:
> +	mmap_read_unlock(mm);
> +	mmput(mm);
> +	return ret;
> +}
> +
>  /*
>   * This creates a new process as a copy of the old one,
>   * but does not actually start it yet.
> @@ -2182,6 +2227,9 @@ __latent_entropy struct task_struct *copy_process(
>  	if (retval)
>  		goto bad_fork_cleanup_namespaces;
>  	retval = copy_thread(p, args);
> +	if (retval)
> +		goto bad_fork_cleanup_io;
> +	retval = shstk_validate_clone(p, args);
>  	if (retval)
>  		goto bad_fork_cleanup_io;
>  
> @@ -2763,7 +2811,9 @@ static noinline int copy_clone_args_from_user(struct kernel_clone_args *kargs,
>  		     CLONE_ARGS_SIZE_VER1);
>  	BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetofend(struct clone_args, cgroup) !=
>  		     CLONE_ARGS_SIZE_VER2);
> -	BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct clone_args) != CLONE_ARGS_SIZE_VER2);
> +	BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetofend(struct clone_args, shadow_stack_token) !=
> +		     CLONE_ARGS_SIZE_VER3);
> +	BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct clone_args) != CLONE_ARGS_SIZE_VER3);
>  
>  	if (unlikely(usize > PAGE_SIZE))
>  		return -E2BIG;
> @@ -2796,16 +2846,17 @@ static noinline int copy_clone_args_from_user(struct kernel_clone_args *kargs,
>  		return -EINVAL;
>  
>  	*kargs = (struct kernel_clone_args){
> -		.flags		= args.flags,
> -		.pidfd		= u64_to_user_ptr(args.pidfd),
> -		.child_tid	= u64_to_user_ptr(args.child_tid),
> -		.parent_tid	= u64_to_user_ptr(args.parent_tid),
> -		.exit_signal	= args.exit_signal,
> -		.stack		= args.stack,
> -		.stack_size	= args.stack_size,
> -		.tls		= args.tls,
> -		.set_tid_size	= args.set_tid_size,
> -		.cgroup		= args.cgroup,
> +		.flags			= args.flags,
> +		.pidfd			= u64_to_user_ptr(args.pidfd),
> +		.child_tid		= u64_to_user_ptr(args.child_tid),
> +		.parent_tid		= u64_to_user_ptr(args.parent_tid),
> +		.exit_signal		= args.exit_signal,
> +		.stack			= args.stack,
> +		.stack_size		= args.stack_size,
> +		.tls			= args.tls,
> +		.set_tid_size		= args.set_tid_size,
> +		.cgroup			= args.cgroup,
> +		.shadow_stack_token	= args.shadow_stack_token,

I'm not sure why this has to be named "shadow_stack_token" I think
that's just confusing and we should just call it "shadow_stack" and be
done with it. It's also a bit long of a field name imho.

I have a kernel-6.18.clone3 branch
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/vfs.git/log/?h=kernel-6.18.clone3
because there's another cross-arch cleanup that cleans up copy_thread(),
copy_sighand(), and copy_process() and - surprisingly - also adds
clone3() support for nios2...

Anyway, if you just want me to slap it on top of that branch then I can
simply rename while applying so no need to resend in that case.

>  	};
>  
>  	if (args.set_tid &&
> @@ -2846,6 +2897,24 @@ static inline bool clone3_stack_valid(struct kernel_clone_args *kargs)
>  	return true;
>  }
>  
> +/**
> + * clone3_shadow_stack_valid - check and prepare shadow stack
> + * @kargs: kernel clone args
> + *
> + * Verify that shadow stacks are only enabled if supported.
> + */
> +static inline bool clone3_shadow_stack_valid(struct kernel_clone_args *kargs)
> +{
> +	if (!kargs->shadow_stack_token)
> +		return true;
> +
> +	if (!IS_ALIGNED(kargs->shadow_stack_token, sizeof(void *)))
> +		return false;
> +
> +	/* Fail if the kernel wasn't built with shadow stacks */
> +	return IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_USER_SHADOW_STACK);
> +}
> +
>  static bool clone3_args_valid(struct kernel_clone_args *kargs)
>  {
>  	/* Verify that no unknown flags are passed along. */
> @@ -2868,7 +2937,7 @@ static bool clone3_args_valid(struct kernel_clone_args *kargs)
>  	    kargs->exit_signal)
>  		return false;
>  
> -	if (!clone3_stack_valid(kargs))
> +	if (!clone3_stack_valid(kargs) || !clone3_shadow_stack_valid(kargs))
>  		return false;
>  
>  	return true;
> 
> -- 
> 2.39.5
>

On Fri, Sep 05, 2025 at 05:21:59PM +0200, Christian Brauner wrote:
> On Tue, Sep 02, 2025 at 11:21:48AM +0100, Mark Brown wrote:

> > +		.shadow_stack_token	= args.shadow_stack_token,

> I'm not sure why this has to be named "shadow_stack_token" I think
> that's just confusing and we should just call it "shadow_stack" and be
> done with it. It's also a bit long of a field name imho.

I'm not hugely attached to the name, if you want to rename that's
perfectly fine by me.  My thinking was that there's a potential
confusion with it being a pointer to the base of the shadow stack by
comparison with the existing "stack" but I do agree that the resulting
name is quite long and if someone does actually get confused they should
discover the problem fairly rapidly in testing.  ss_token would shorter
but the abbreviation is less clear, whatever name you prefer is fine by
me.

> I have a kernel-6.18.clone3 branch
> https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/vfs.git/log/?h=kernel-6.18.clone3
> because there's another cross-arch cleanup that cleans up copy_thread(),
> copy_sighand(), and copy_process() and - surprisingly - also adds
> clone3() support for nios2...

> Anyway, if you just want me to slap it on top of that branch then I can
> simply rename while applying so no need to resend in that case.

That would be amazing, I'm totally happy with you doing that.  If I do
need to rebase and resend let me know.

It's probably worth mentioning that the RISC-V shadow stack support was
getting near to being merged, if that ends up being OK for this release
(it's not been posted yet though) there might be some cross tree merge
needed or something.

On Fri, Sep 05, 2025 at 04:43:22PM +0100, Mark Brown wrote:
> On Fri, Sep 05, 2025 at 05:21:59PM +0200, Christian Brauner wrote:
> > On Tue, Sep 02, 2025 at 11:21:48AM +0100, Mark Brown wrote:
> 
> > > +		.shadow_stack_token	= args.shadow_stack_token,
> 
> > I'm not sure why this has to be named "shadow_stack_token" I think
> > that's just confusing and we should just call it "shadow_stack" and be
> > done with it. It's also a bit long of a field name imho.
> 
> I'm not hugely attached to the name, if you want to rename that's
> perfectly fine by me.  My thinking was that there's a potential
> confusion with it being a pointer to the base of the shadow stack by
> comparison with the existing "stack" but I do agree that the resulting
> name is quite long and if someone does actually get confused they should
> discover the problem fairly rapidly in testing.  ss_token would shorter
> but the abbreviation is less clear, whatever name you prefer is fine by
> me.

Bike shed: shstk_token?


-- 
Kees Cook

On Fri, Sep 05, 2025 at 09:00:51AM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Fri, Sep 05, 2025 at 04:43:22PM +0100, Mark Brown wrote:

> > discover the problem fairly rapidly in testing.  ss_token would shorter
> > but the abbreviation is less clear, whatever name you prefer is fine by
> > me.

> Bike shed: shstk_token?

That also works and is fine by me, probably better than my idea.

On Fri, Sep 05, 2025 at 05:02:33PM +0100, Mark Brown wrote:
> On Fri, Sep 05, 2025 at 09:00:51AM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> > On Fri, Sep 05, 2025 at 04:43:22PM +0100, Mark Brown wrote:
> 
> > > discover the problem fairly rapidly in testing.  ss_token would shorter
> > > but the abbreviation is less clear, whatever name you prefer is fine by
> > > me.
> 
> > Bike shed: shstk_token?
> 
> That also works and is fine by me, probably better than my idea.

Can you do a quick resend based on kernel-6.18.clone3?
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/vfs.git/log/?h=kernel-6.18.clone3

On Mon, Sep 15, 2025 at 04:29:41PM +0200, Christian Brauner wrote:
> On Fri, Sep 05, 2025 at 05:02:33PM +0100, Mark Brown wrote:
> > On Fri, Sep 05, 2025 at 09:00:51AM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:

> > > Bike shed: shstk_token?

> > That also works and is fine by me, probably better than my idea.

> Can you do a quick resend based on kernel-6.18.clone3?
> https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/vfs.git/log/?h=kernel-6.18.clone3

No problem, should be something later today.

On Fri, 2025-09-05 at 16:43 +0100, Mark Brown wrote:
> On Fri, Sep 05, 2025 at 05:21:59PM +0200, Christian Brauner wrote:
> > On Tue, Sep 02, 2025 at 11:21:48AM +0100, Mark Brown wrote:
> 
> > > +		.shadow_stack_token	= args.shadow_stack_token,
> 
> > I'm not sure why this has to be named "shadow_stack_token" I think
> > that's just confusing and we should just call it "shadow_stack" and be
> > done with it. It's also a bit long of a field name imho.
> 
> I'm not hugely attached to the name, if you want to rename that's
> perfectly fine by me.  My thinking was that there's a potential
> confusion with it being a pointer to the base of the shadow stack by
> comparison with the existing "stack" but I do agree that the resulting
> name is quite long and if someone does actually get confused they should
> discover the problem fairly rapidly in testing.  ss_token would shorter
> but the abbreviation is less clear, whatever name you prefer is fine by
> me.

Yea the token point here is kind of important. That said, we could probably make
up for it with documentation.

On Tue, Sep 02, 2025 at 11:21:48AM +0100, Mark Brown wrote:
> diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c
> index af673856499d..d484ebeded33 100644
> --- a/kernel/fork.c
> +++ b/kernel/fork.c
> @@ -1907,6 +1907,51 @@ static bool need_futex_hash_allocate_default(u64 clone_flags)
>  	return true;
>  }
>  
> +static int shstk_validate_clone(struct task_struct *p,
> +				struct kernel_clone_args *args)
> +{
> +	struct mm_struct *mm;
> +	struct vm_area_struct *vma;
> +	struct page *page;
> +	unsigned long addr;
> +	int ret;
> +
> +	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_USER_SHADOW_STACK))
> +		return 0;
> +
> +	if (!args->shadow_stack_token)
> +		return 0;
> +
> +	mm = get_task_mm(p);
> +	if (!mm)
> +		return -EFAULT;

In theory, I don't think we need the get_task_mm() -> mmget() since
copy_mm() early on already did this and the task can't disappear from
underneath while we are creating it.

> +
> +	mmap_read_lock(mm);
> +
> +	addr = untagged_addr_remote(mm, args->shadow_stack_token);
> +	page = get_user_page_vma_remote(mm, addr, FOLL_FORCE | FOLL_WRITE,
> +					&vma);

However, I wonder whether it makes sense to use the remote mm access
here at all. Does this code ever run without CLONE_VM? If not, this is
all done within the current mm context.

I can see the x86 shstk_alloc_thread_stack() returns early if !CLONE_VM.
Similarly on arm64. I think the behaviour is preserved with this series
but I'm not entirely sure from the contextual diff (I need to apply the
patches locally).

Otherwise the patch looks fine (well, even the above wouldn't fail, I
just find it strange that we pretend it's a remote mm but on the default
allocation path like alloc_gcs() we go for current->mm).


BTW, if you repost, it might be worth cross-posting to linux-arm-kernel
for wider exposure as not everyone reads LKML (and you can drop
Szabolcs, his arm address is no longer valid).

-- 
Catalin

On Tue, Sep 02, 2025 at 10:02:07PM +0100, Catalin Marinas wrote:
> On Tue, Sep 02, 2025 at 11:21:48AM +0100, Mark Brown wrote:

> > +	mm = get_task_mm(p);
> > +	if (!mm)
> > +		return -EFAULT;

> In theory, I don't think we need the get_task_mm() -> mmget() since
> copy_mm() early on already did this and the task can't disappear from
> underneath while we are creating it.

mmget() will only have been done in the CLONE_VM case, if we're in the
!CLONE_VM case we do a dup_mm() but that also returns with a reference.
I didn't know if people would be happier with the reference clearly
taken by the code using things or not, the general pattern is that
whenever we're doing anything with remote VMs we take a reference.

> > +	mmap_read_lock(mm);
> > +
> > +	addr = untagged_addr_remote(mm, args->shadow_stack_token);
> > +	page = get_user_page_vma_remote(mm, addr, FOLL_FORCE | FOLL_WRITE,
> > +					&vma);

> However, I wonder whether it makes sense to use the remote mm access
> here at all. Does this code ever run without CLONE_VM? If not, this is
> all done within the current mm context.

Yes, userspace can select if it wants CLONE_VM or not so we should
handle that case.  We discussed this on prior versions and we felt that
while we couldn't immediately see the use case for !CLONE_VM there
wasn't a good reason to restrict the creativity of userspace developers,
and given that you can specify the regular stack in these cases it seems
logical that you'd also be able to specify the shadow stack.

> I can see the x86 shstk_alloc_thread_stack() returns early if !CLONE_VM.
> Similarly on arm64. I think the behaviour is preserved with this series
> but I'm not entirely sure from the contextual diff (I need to apply the
> patches locally).

That is all for the case where the kernel allocates and manages the
shadow stack, it's the behaviour that this series allows userspace to
override.

On Wed, Sep 03, 2025 at 11:01:05AM +0100, Mark Brown wrote:
> On Tue, Sep 02, 2025 at 10:02:07PM +0100, Catalin Marinas wrote:
> > On Tue, Sep 02, 2025 at 11:21:48AM +0100, Mark Brown wrote:
> > > +	mmap_read_lock(mm);
> > > +
> > > +	addr = untagged_addr_remote(mm, args->shadow_stack_token);
> > > +	page = get_user_page_vma_remote(mm, addr, FOLL_FORCE | FOLL_WRITE,
> > > +					&vma);
> 
> > However, I wonder whether it makes sense to use the remote mm access
> > here at all. Does this code ever run without CLONE_VM? If not, this is
> > all done within the current mm context.
> 
> Yes, userspace can select if it wants CLONE_VM or not so we should
> handle that case.  We discussed this on prior versions and we felt that
> while we couldn't immediately see the use case for !CLONE_VM there
> wasn't a good reason to restrict the creativity of userspace developers,
> and given that you can specify the regular stack in these cases it seems
> logical that you'd also be able to specify the shadow stack.

Yeah. Not sure it makes much sense in practice but if we allow a new
stack without CLONE_VM, we should also allow a shadow stack. Thanks for
the clarification.

Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>