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  3. [PATCH 0/3] KEYS: trusted_tpm1: HMAC fix and cleanup
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[PATCH 1/3] KEYS: trusted_tpm1: Compare HMAC values in constant time

Eric Biggers posted 3 patches 2 months ago
There is a newer version of this series
[PATCH 1/3] KEYS: trusted_tpm1: Compare HMAC values in constant time
Posted by Eric Biggers 2 months ago 
To prevent timing attacks, HMAC value comparison needs to be constant
time.  Replace the memcmp() with the correct function, crypto_memneq().

Fixes: d00a1c72f7f4 ("keys: add new trusted key-type")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
---
 security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c | 7 ++++---
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c
index 89c9798d18007..e73f2c6c817a0 100644
--- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c
+++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c
@@ -5,10 +5,11 @@
  *
  * See Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst
  */
 
 #include <crypto/hash_info.h>
+#include <crypto/utils.h>
 #include <linux/init.h>
 #include <linux/slab.h>
 #include <linux/parser.h>
 #include <linux/string.h>
 #include <linux/err.h>
@@ -239,11 +240,11 @@ int TSS_checkhmac1(unsigned char *buffer,
 			  TPM_NONCE_SIZE, enonce, TPM_NONCE_SIZE, ononce,
 			  1, continueflag, 0, 0);
 	if (ret < 0)
 		goto out;
 
-	if (memcmp(testhmac, authdata, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE))
+	if (crypto_memneq(testhmac, authdata, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE))
 		ret = -EINVAL;
 out:
 	kfree_sensitive(sdesc);
 	return ret;
 }
@@ -332,20 +333,20 @@ static int TSS_checkhmac2(unsigned char *buffer,
 	ret = TSS_rawhmac(testhmac1, key1, keylen1, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE,
 			  paramdigest, TPM_NONCE_SIZE, enonce1,
 			  TPM_NONCE_SIZE, ononce, 1, continueflag1, 0, 0);
 	if (ret < 0)
 		goto out;
-	if (memcmp(testhmac1, authdata1, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE)) {
+	if (crypto_memneq(testhmac1, authdata1, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE)) {
 		ret = -EINVAL;
 		goto out;
 	}
 	ret = TSS_rawhmac(testhmac2, key2, keylen2, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE,
 			  paramdigest, TPM_NONCE_SIZE, enonce2,
 			  TPM_NONCE_SIZE, ononce, 1, continueflag2, 0, 0);
 	if (ret < 0)
 		goto out;
-	if (memcmp(testhmac2, authdata2, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE))
+	if (crypto_memneq(testhmac2, authdata2, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE))
 		ret = -EINVAL;
 out:
 	kfree_sensitive(sdesc);
 	return ret;
 }

base-commit: d6084bb815c453de27af8071a23163a711586a6c
-- 
2.50.1
Re: [PATCH 1/3] KEYS: trusted_tpm1: Compare HMAC values in constant time
Posted by Jarkko Sakkinen 2 months ago 
On Thu, Jul 31, 2025 at 02:23:52PM -0700, Eric Biggers wrote:
> To prevent timing attacks, HMAC value comparison needs to be constant
> time.  Replace the memcmp() with the correct function, crypto_memneq().
> 
> Fixes: d00a1c72f7f4 ("keys: add new trusted key-type")
> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>

Was crypto_memneq() available at the time?

> ---
>  security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c | 7 ++++---
>  1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c
> index 89c9798d18007..e73f2c6c817a0 100644
> --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c
> +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c
> @@ -5,10 +5,11 @@
>   *
>   * See Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst
>   */
>  
>  #include <crypto/hash_info.h>
> +#include <crypto/utils.h>
>  #include <linux/init.h>
>  #include <linux/slab.h>
>  #include <linux/parser.h>
>  #include <linux/string.h>
>  #include <linux/err.h>
> @@ -239,11 +240,11 @@ int TSS_checkhmac1(unsigned char *buffer,
>  			  TPM_NONCE_SIZE, enonce, TPM_NONCE_SIZE, ononce,
>  			  1, continueflag, 0, 0);
>  	if (ret < 0)
>  		goto out;
>  
> -	if (memcmp(testhmac, authdata, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE))
> +	if (crypto_memneq(testhmac, authdata, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE))
>  		ret = -EINVAL;
>  out:
>  	kfree_sensitive(sdesc);
>  	return ret;
>  }
> @@ -332,20 +333,20 @@ static int TSS_checkhmac2(unsigned char *buffer,
>  	ret = TSS_rawhmac(testhmac1, key1, keylen1, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE,
>  			  paramdigest, TPM_NONCE_SIZE, enonce1,
>  			  TPM_NONCE_SIZE, ononce, 1, continueflag1, 0, 0);
>  	if (ret < 0)
>  		goto out;
> -	if (memcmp(testhmac1, authdata1, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE)) {
> +	if (crypto_memneq(testhmac1, authdata1, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE)) {
>  		ret = -EINVAL;
>  		goto out;
>  	}
>  	ret = TSS_rawhmac(testhmac2, key2, keylen2, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE,
>  			  paramdigest, TPM_NONCE_SIZE, enonce2,
>  			  TPM_NONCE_SIZE, ononce, 1, continueflag2, 0, 0);
>  	if (ret < 0)
>  		goto out;
> -	if (memcmp(testhmac2, authdata2, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE))
> +	if (crypto_memneq(testhmac2, authdata2, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE))
>  		ret = -EINVAL;
>  out:
>  	kfree_sensitive(sdesc);
>  	return ret;
>  }
> 
> base-commit: d6084bb815c453de27af8071a23163a711586a6c
> -- 
> 2.50.1
> 

BR, Jarkko
Re: [PATCH 1/3] KEYS: trusted_tpm1: Compare HMAC values in constant time
Posted by Eric Biggers 2 months ago 
On Tue, Aug 05, 2025 at 04:44:27PM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> On Thu, Jul 31, 2025 at 02:23:52PM -0700, Eric Biggers wrote:
> > To prevent timing attacks, HMAC value comparison needs to be constant
> > time.  Replace the memcmp() with the correct function, crypto_memneq().
> > 
> > Fixes: d00a1c72f7f4 ("keys: add new trusted key-type")
> > Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
> > Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
> 
> Was crypto_memneq() available at the time?

No.  The Fixes commit is still correct, though, as it's the commit that
introduced the memcmp().  Technically it was still a bug at that time,
even if there wasn't a helper function available yet.

- Eric
Re: [PATCH 1/3] KEYS: trusted_tpm1: Compare HMAC values in constant time
Posted by Jarkko Sakkinen 1 month, 3 weeks ago 
On Tue, Aug 05, 2025 at 10:32:27AM -0700, Eric Biggers wrote:
> On Tue, Aug 05, 2025 at 04:44:27PM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > On Thu, Jul 31, 2025 at 02:23:52PM -0700, Eric Biggers wrote:
> > > To prevent timing attacks, HMAC value comparison needs to be constant
> > > time.  Replace the memcmp() with the correct function, crypto_memneq().
> > > 
> > > Fixes: d00a1c72f7f4 ("keys: add new trusted key-type")
> > > Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
> > > Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
> > 
> > Was crypto_memneq() available at the time?
> 
> No.  The Fixes commit is still correct, though, as it's the commit that
> introduced the memcmp().  Technically it was still a bug at that time,
> even if there wasn't a helper function available yet.

Add a remark to the commit message.

> 
> - Eric

BR, Jarkko
Re: [PATCH 1/3] KEYS: trusted_tpm1: Compare HMAC values in constant time
Posted by Eric Biggers 1 month, 3 weeks ago 
On Sat, Aug 09, 2025 at 01:37:49PM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> On Tue, Aug 05, 2025 at 10:32:27AM -0700, Eric Biggers wrote:
> > On Tue, Aug 05, 2025 at 04:44:27PM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > > On Thu, Jul 31, 2025 at 02:23:52PM -0700, Eric Biggers wrote:
> > > > To prevent timing attacks, HMAC value comparison needs to be constant
> > > > time.  Replace the memcmp() with the correct function, crypto_memneq().
> > > > 
> > > > Fixes: d00a1c72f7f4 ("keys: add new trusted key-type")
> > > > Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
> > > > Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
> > > 
> > > Was crypto_memneq() available at the time?
> > 
> > No.  The Fixes commit is still correct, though, as it's the commit that
> > introduced the memcmp().  Technically it was still a bug at that time,
> > even if there wasn't a helper function available yet.
> 
> Add a remark to the commit message.

I don't know what the point is (both commits are over a decade old), but
sure I did that in v2.

- Eric

Patchew 2.1-devel-b67e4c2

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