Tracking the lockdown at the depth granularity rather than at the
individual is somewhat inflexible as it provides an "all or nothing"
approach. Instead there are use cases where it will be useful to be
able to lockdown individual features - TDX for example wants to disable
access to just /dev/mem.
To accommodate this use case switch the internal implementation to using
a bitmap so that individual lockdown features can be turned on. At the
same time retain the existing semantic where
INTEGRITY_MAX/CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX are treated as wildcards meaning "lock
everything below me".
Signed-off-by: Nikolay Borisov <nik.borisov@suse.com>
---
security/lockdown/lockdown.c | 19 ++++++++++++-------
1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/lockdown/lockdown.c b/security/lockdown/lockdown.c
index cf83afa1d879..5014d18c423f 100644
--- a/security/lockdown/lockdown.c
+++ b/security/lockdown/lockdown.c
@@ -10,12 +10,13 @@
* 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
*/
+#include <linux/bitmap.h>
#include <linux/security.h>
#include <linux/export.h>
#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
#include <uapi/linux/lsm.h>
-static enum lockdown_reason kernel_locked_down;
+static DECLARE_BITMAP(kernel_locked_down, LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX);
static const enum lockdown_reason lockdown_levels[] = {LOCKDOWN_NONE,
LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX,
@@ -26,10 +27,15 @@ static const enum lockdown_reason lockdown_levels[] = {LOCKDOWN_NONE,
*/
static int lock_kernel_down(const char *where, enum lockdown_reason level)
{
- if (kernel_locked_down >= level)
- return -EPERM;
- kernel_locked_down = level;
+ if (level > LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (level == LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX || level == LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX)
+ bitmap_set(kernel_locked_down, 1, level);
+ else
+ bitmap_set(kernel_locked_down, level, 1);
+
pr_notice("Kernel is locked down from %s; see man kernel_lockdown.7\n",
where);
return 0;
@@ -62,13 +68,12 @@ static int lockdown_is_locked_down(enum lockdown_reason what)
"Invalid lockdown reason"))
return -EPERM;
- if (kernel_locked_down >= what) {
+ if (test_bit(what, kernel_locked_down)) {
if (lockdown_reasons[what])
pr_notice_ratelimited("Lockdown: %s: %s is restricted; see man kernel_lockdown.7\n",
current->comm, lockdown_reasons[what]);
return -EPERM;
}
-
return 0;
}
@@ -105,7 +110,7 @@ static ssize_t lockdown_read(struct file *filp, char __user *buf, size_t count,
if (lockdown_reasons[level]) {
const char *label = lockdown_reasons[level];
- if (kernel_locked_down == level)
+ if (test_bit(level, kernel_locked_down))
offset += sprintf(temp+offset, "[%s] ", label);
else
offset += sprintf(temp+offset, "%s ", label);
--
2.34.1
Nikolay Borisov wrote: > Tracking the lockdown at the depth granularity rather than at the > individual is somewhat inflexible as it provides an "all or nothing" > approach. Instead there are use cases where it will be useful to be > able to lockdown individual features - TDX for example wants to disable > access to just /dev/mem. > > To accommodate this use case switch the internal implementation to using > a bitmap so that individual lockdown features can be turned on. At the > same time retain the existing semantic where > INTEGRITY_MAX/CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX are treated as wildcards meaning "lock > everything below me". > > Signed-off-by: Nikolay Borisov <nik.borisov@suse.com> > --- > security/lockdown/lockdown.c | 19 ++++++++++++------- > 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/security/lockdown/lockdown.c b/security/lockdown/lockdown.c > index cf83afa1d879..5014d18c423f 100644 > --- a/security/lockdown/lockdown.c > +++ b/security/lockdown/lockdown.c > @@ -10,12 +10,13 @@ > * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version. > */ > > +#include <linux/bitmap.h> > #include <linux/security.h> > #include <linux/export.h> > #include <linux/lsm_hooks.h> > #include <uapi/linux/lsm.h> > > -static enum lockdown_reason kernel_locked_down; > +static DECLARE_BITMAP(kernel_locked_down, LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX); > > static const enum lockdown_reason lockdown_levels[] = {LOCKDOWN_NONE, > LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX, > @@ -26,10 +27,15 @@ static const enum lockdown_reason lockdown_levels[] = {LOCKDOWN_NONE, > */ > static int lock_kernel_down(const char *where, enum lockdown_reason level) > { > - if (kernel_locked_down >= level) > - return -EPERM; So now attempts to reduce security return "success" where previously they get permission denied? I think that is an unforunate side effect of trying to have this one function handle both levels and individual features. > - kernel_locked_down = level; > + if (level > LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX) > + return -EINVAL; > + > + if (level == LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX || level == LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX) > + bitmap_set(kernel_locked_down, 1, level); > + else > + bitmap_set(kernel_locked_down, level, 1); > + The individual case probably deserves its own interface given all current kernels expect levels and the future callers probably want to skip the pr_notice() below given only piecemeal features are being disabled. You might even special case just LOCKDOWN_DEV_MEM for now as the only once that can be indepdently set by an internal caller.
On Mon, Jul 28, 2025 at 02:15:15PM +0300, Nikolay Borisov wrote: > Tracking the lockdown at the depth granularity rather than at the > individual is somewhat inflexible as it provides an "all or nothing" > approach. Instead there are use cases where it will be useful to be > able to lockdown individual features - TDX for example wants to disable > access to just /dev/mem. > > To accommodate this use case switch the internal implementation to using > a bitmap so that individual lockdown features can be turned on. At the > same time retain the existing semantic where > INTEGRITY_MAX/CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX are treated as wildcards meaning "lock > everything below me". > > Signed-off-by: Nikolay Borisov <nik.borisov@suse.com> Would still like to see the comment, but, with or without it, looks good, thank you. Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> > --- > security/lockdown/lockdown.c | 19 ++++++++++++------- > 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/security/lockdown/lockdown.c b/security/lockdown/lockdown.c > index cf83afa1d879..5014d18c423f 100644 > --- a/security/lockdown/lockdown.c > +++ b/security/lockdown/lockdown.c > @@ -10,12 +10,13 @@ > * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version. > */ > > +#include <linux/bitmap.h> > #include <linux/security.h> > #include <linux/export.h> > #include <linux/lsm_hooks.h> > #include <uapi/linux/lsm.h> > > -static enum lockdown_reason kernel_locked_down; > +static DECLARE_BITMAP(kernel_locked_down, LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX); > > static const enum lockdown_reason lockdown_levels[] = {LOCKDOWN_NONE, > LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX, > @@ -26,10 +27,15 @@ static const enum lockdown_reason lockdown_levels[] = {LOCKDOWN_NONE, > */ > static int lock_kernel_down(const char *where, enum lockdown_reason level) > { > - if (kernel_locked_down >= level) > - return -EPERM; > > - kernel_locked_down = level; > + if (level > LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX) > + return -EINVAL; > + > + if (level == LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX || level == LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX) > + bitmap_set(kernel_locked_down, 1, level); > + else > + bitmap_set(kernel_locked_down, level, 1); > + > pr_notice("Kernel is locked down from %s; see man kernel_lockdown.7\n", > where); > return 0; > @@ -62,13 +68,12 @@ static int lockdown_is_locked_down(enum lockdown_reason what) > "Invalid lockdown reason")) > return -EPERM; > > - if (kernel_locked_down >= what) { > + if (test_bit(what, kernel_locked_down)) { > if (lockdown_reasons[what]) > pr_notice_ratelimited("Lockdown: %s: %s is restricted; see man kernel_lockdown.7\n", > current->comm, lockdown_reasons[what]); > return -EPERM; > } > - > return 0; > } > > @@ -105,7 +110,7 @@ static ssize_t lockdown_read(struct file *filp, char __user *buf, size_t count, > if (lockdown_reasons[level]) { > const char *label = lockdown_reasons[level]; > > - if (kernel_locked_down == level) > + if (test_bit(level, kernel_locked_down)) > offset += sprintf(temp+offset, "[%s] ", label); > else > offset += sprintf(temp+offset, "%s ", label); > -- > 2.34.1 >
On Mon, Jul 28, 2025 at 02:15:15PM +0300, Nikolay Borisov wrote: > Tracking the lockdown at the depth granularity rather than at the > individual is somewhat inflexible as it provides an "all or nothing" > approach. Instead there are use cases where it will be useful to be > able to lockdown individual features - TDX for example wants to disable > access to just /dev/mem. > > To accommodate this use case switch the internal implementation to using > a bitmap so that individual lockdown features can be turned on. At the > same time retain the existing semantic where > INTEGRITY_MAX/CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX are treated as wildcards meaning "lock > everything below me". > > Signed-off-by: Nikolay Borisov <nik.borisov@suse.com> > --- > security/lockdown/lockdown.c | 19 ++++++++++++------- > 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/security/lockdown/lockdown.c b/security/lockdown/lockdown.c > index cf83afa1d879..5014d18c423f 100644 > --- a/security/lockdown/lockdown.c > +++ b/security/lockdown/lockdown.c > @@ -10,12 +10,13 @@ > * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version. > */ > > +#include <linux/bitmap.h> > #include <linux/security.h> > #include <linux/export.h> > #include <linux/lsm_hooks.h> > #include <uapi/linux/lsm.h> > > -static enum lockdown_reason kernel_locked_down; > +static DECLARE_BITMAP(kernel_locked_down, LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX); > > static const enum lockdown_reason lockdown_levels[] = {LOCKDOWN_NONE, > LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX, > @@ -26,10 +27,15 @@ static const enum lockdown_reason lockdown_levels[] = {LOCKDOWN_NONE, > */ > static int lock_kernel_down(const char *where, enum lockdown_reason level) > { > - if (kernel_locked_down >= level) > - return -EPERM; > > - kernel_locked_down = level; > + if (level > LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX) > + return -EINVAL; > + > + if (level == LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX || level == LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX) For the reviewer (including me), it would be good to have a comment here or at top of fn to ease our minds that this is really what's meant: So if we lock down with reason LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX, we want to set all bits up to LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX, which is not the whole array, and if setting LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX, then we want to set *all* bits, right? So LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX is a supserset of LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX? And for anything else, set the single bit. > + bitmap_set(kernel_locked_down, 1, level); > + else > + bitmap_set(kernel_locked_down, level, 1); > + > pr_notice("Kernel is locked down from %s; see man kernel_lockdown.7\n", > where); > return 0; > @@ -62,13 +68,12 @@ static int lockdown_is_locked_down(enum lockdown_reason what) > "Invalid lockdown reason")) > return -EPERM; > > - if (kernel_locked_down >= what) { > + if (test_bit(what, kernel_locked_down)) { > if (lockdown_reasons[what]) > pr_notice_ratelimited("Lockdown: %s: %s is restricted; see man kernel_lockdown.7\n", > current->comm, lockdown_reasons[what]); > return -EPERM; > } > - > return 0; > } > > @@ -105,7 +110,7 @@ static ssize_t lockdown_read(struct file *filp, char __user *buf, size_t count, > if (lockdown_reasons[level]) { > const char *label = lockdown_reasons[level]; > > - if (kernel_locked_down == level) > + if (test_bit(level, kernel_locked_down)) > offset += sprintf(temp+offset, "[%s] ", label); > else > offset += sprintf(temp+offset, "%s ", label); > -- > 2.34.1 >
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