arch/x86/kvm/kvm_cache_regs.h | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
There's no need to intercept changes to CR4.CET, as it's neither
included in KVM's MMU role bits, nor does KVM specifically care about
the actual value of a (nested) guest's CR4.CET value, beside for
enforcing architectural constraints, i.e. make sure that CR0.WP=1 if
CR4.CET=1.
Intercepting writes to CR4.CET is particularly bad for grsecurity
kernels with KERNEXEC or, even worse, KERNSEAL enabled. These features
heavily make use of read-only kernel objects and use a cpu-local CR0.WP
toggle to override it, when needed. Under a CET-enabled kernel, this
also requires toggling CR4.CET, hence the motivation to make it
guest-owned.
Using the old test from [1] gives the following runtime numbers (perf
stat -r 5 ssdd 10 50000):
* grsec guest on linux-6.16-rc5 + cet patches:
2.4647 +- 0.0706 seconds time elapsed ( +- 2.86% )
* grsec guest on linux-6.16-rc5 + cet patches + CR4.CET guest-owned:
1.5648 +- 0.0240 seconds time elapsed ( +- 1.53% )
Not only makes not intercepting CR4.CET the test run ~35% faster, it's
also more stable, less fluctuation due to less VMEXITs, I believe.
Therefore, make CR4.CET a guest-owned bit where possible.
This change is VMX-specific, as SVM has no such fine-grained control
register intercept control.
If KVM's assumptions regarding MMU role handling wrt. a guest's CR4.CET
value ever change, the BUILD_BUG_ON()s related to KVM_MMU_CR4_ROLE_BITS
and KVM_POSSIBLE_CR4_GUEST_BITS will catch that early.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/20230322013731.102955-1-minipli@grsecurity.net/ [1]
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@grsecurity.net>
---
v2:
- provide motivation and performance numbers
arch/x86/kvm/kvm_cache_regs.h | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/kvm_cache_regs.h b/arch/x86/kvm/kvm_cache_regs.h
index 36a8786db291..8ddb01191d6f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/kvm_cache_regs.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/kvm_cache_regs.h
@@ -7,7 +7,8 @@
#define KVM_POSSIBLE_CR0_GUEST_BITS (X86_CR0_TS | X86_CR0_WP)
#define KVM_POSSIBLE_CR4_GUEST_BITS \
(X86_CR4_PVI | X86_CR4_DE | X86_CR4_PCE | X86_CR4_OSFXSR \
- | X86_CR4_OSXMMEXCPT | X86_CR4_PGE | X86_CR4_TSD | X86_CR4_FSGSBASE)
+ | X86_CR4_OSXMMEXCPT | X86_CR4_PGE | X86_CR4_TSD | X86_CR4_FSGSBASE \
+ | X86_CR4_CET)
#define X86_CR0_PDPTR_BITS (X86_CR0_CD | X86_CR0_NW | X86_CR0_PG)
#define X86_CR4_TLBFLUSH_BITS (X86_CR4_PGE | X86_CR4_PCIDE | X86_CR4_PAE | X86_CR4_SMEP)
--
2.47.2
It is recommended to first state what a patch does before providing the background and motivation. See https://docs.kernel.org/process/maintainer-kvm-x86.html#changelog >There's no need to intercept changes to CR4.CET, as it's neither >included in KVM's MMU role bits, nor does KVM specifically care about >the actual value of a (nested) guest's CR4.CET value, beside for >enforcing architectural constraints, i.e. make sure that CR0.WP=1 if >CR4.CET=1. > >Intercepting writes to CR4.CET is particularly bad for grsecurity >kernels with KERNEXEC or, even worse, KERNSEAL enabled. These features >heavily make use of read-only kernel objects and use a cpu-local CR0.WP >toggle to override it, when needed. Under a CET-enabled kernel, this >also requires toggling CR4.CET, hence the motivation to make it >guest-owned. > >Using the old test from [1] gives the following runtime numbers (perf >stat -r 5 ssdd 10 50000): > >* grsec guest on linux-6.16-rc5 + cet patches: > 2.4647 +- 0.0706 seconds time elapsed ( +- 2.86% ) > >* grsec guest on linux-6.16-rc5 + cet patches + CR4.CET guest-owned: > 1.5648 +- 0.0240 seconds time elapsed ( +- 1.53% ) > >Not only makes not intercepting CR4.CET the test run ~35% faster, it's >also more stable, less fluctuation due to less VMEXITs, I believe. > >Therefore, make CR4.CET a guest-owned bit where possible. > >This change is VMX-specific, as SVM has no such fine-grained control >register intercept control. Ah, that's why the shortlog is "KVM: VMX". I was wondering why the shortlog specifically mentions VMX while the patch actually touches x86 common code. > >If KVM's assumptions regarding MMU role handling wrt. a guest's CR4.CET >value ever change, the BUILD_BUG_ON()s related to KVM_MMU_CR4_ROLE_BITS >and KVM_POSSIBLE_CR4_GUEST_BITS will catch that early. > >Link: https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/20230322013731.102955-1-minipli@grsecurity.net/ [1] >Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@grsecurity.net> The patch looks good. So, Reviewed-by: Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com>
© 2016 - 2025 Red Hat, Inc.