On 7/1/2025 2:58 AM, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
> From: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
>
> To prevent exploits for Spectre based on LAM as demonstrated by the
> whitepaper [1], make LAM depend on LASS, which avoids this type of
> vulnerability.
>
> [1] https://download.vusec.net/papers/slam_sp24.pdf
>
> Signed-off-by: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
> Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
> ---
> arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpuid-deps.c | 1 +
> 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
>
In terms of patch ordering, wouldn't it make more sense to introduce LAM
related changes after LASS has been fully enabled? This patch should
probably be after Patch #16 which enables LASS.
Logically, the LAM re-enabling stuff can be a separate series, but since
it's only a few changed lines having it at the end seems okay.
Patch 1-15 => Enable LASS
Patch 16-17 => Re-enable LAM
Other than that,
Reviewed-by: Sohil Mehta <sohil.mehta@intel.com>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpuid-deps.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpuid-deps.c
> index 98d0cdd82574..11bb9ed40140 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpuid-deps.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpuid-deps.c
> @@ -90,6 +90,7 @@ static const struct cpuid_dep cpuid_deps[] = {
> { X86_FEATURE_FRED, X86_FEATURE_LKGS },
> { X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL_SSBD, X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL },
> { X86_FEATURE_LASS, X86_FEATURE_SMAP },
> + { X86_FEATURE_LAM, X86_FEATURE_LASS },
> {}
> };
>