In case X86_FEATURE_PSE isn't available (e.g. when running as a Xen
PV guest), execmem_arch_setup() will fall back to use PAGE_KERNEL
protection for the EXECMEM_MODULE_TEXT range.
This will result in attempts to execute code with the NX bit set in
case of ITS mitigation being applied.
Avoid this problem by using PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC protection instead,
which will not set the NX bit.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reported-by: Xin Li <xin@zytor.com>
Fixes: 5185e7f9f3bd ("x86/module: enable ROX caches for module text on 64 bit")
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
---
arch/x86/mm/init.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/init.c b/arch/x86/mm/init.c
index 7456df985d96..f5012ae31d8b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/init.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/init.c
@@ -1089,7 +1089,7 @@ struct execmem_info __init *execmem_arch_setup(void)
pgprot = PAGE_KERNEL_ROX;
flags = EXECMEM_KASAN_SHADOW | EXECMEM_ROX_CACHE;
} else {
- pgprot = PAGE_KERNEL;
+ pgprot = PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC;
flags = EXECMEM_KASAN_SHADOW;
}
--
2.43.0
On Wed, May 28, 2025 at 02:35:55PM +0200, Juergen Gross wrote:
> In case X86_FEATURE_PSE isn't available (e.g. when running as a Xen
> PV guest), execmem_arch_setup() will fall back to use PAGE_KERNEL
> protection for the EXECMEM_MODULE_TEXT range.
>
> This will result in attempts to execute code with the NX bit set in
> case of ITS mitigation being applied.
>
> Avoid this problem by using PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC protection instead,
> which will not set the NX bit.
>
> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
> Reported-by: Xin Li <xin@zytor.com>
> Fixes: 5185e7f9f3bd ("x86/module: enable ROX caches for module text on 64 bit")
> Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
> ---
> arch/x86/mm/init.c | 2 +-
> 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/init.c b/arch/x86/mm/init.c
> index 7456df985d96..f5012ae31d8b 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/mm/init.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/mm/init.c
> @@ -1089,7 +1089,7 @@ struct execmem_info __init *execmem_arch_setup(void)
> pgprot = PAGE_KERNEL_ROX;
> flags = EXECMEM_KASAN_SHADOW | EXECMEM_ROX_CACHE;
> } else {
> - pgprot = PAGE_KERNEL;
> + pgprot = PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC;
Please don't. Everything except ITS can work with PAGE_KENREL so the fix
should be on ITS side.
> flags = EXECMEM_KASAN_SHADOW;
> }
>
> --
> 2.43.0
>
--
Sincerely yours,
Mike.
On Wed, May 28, 2025 at 08:27:19PM +0300, Mike Rapoport wrote:
> On Wed, May 28, 2025 at 02:35:55PM +0200, Juergen Gross wrote:
> > In case X86_FEATURE_PSE isn't available (e.g. when running as a Xen
> > PV guest), execmem_arch_setup() will fall back to use PAGE_KERNEL
> > protection for the EXECMEM_MODULE_TEXT range.
> >
> > This will result in attempts to execute code with the NX bit set in
> > case of ITS mitigation being applied.
> >
> > Avoid this problem by using PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC protection instead,
> > which will not set the NX bit.
> >
> > Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
> > Reported-by: Xin Li <xin@zytor.com>
> > Fixes: 5185e7f9f3bd ("x86/module: enable ROX caches for module text on 64 bit")
> > Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
> > ---
> > arch/x86/mm/init.c | 2 +-
> > 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/init.c b/arch/x86/mm/init.c
> > index 7456df985d96..f5012ae31d8b 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/mm/init.c
> > +++ b/arch/x86/mm/init.c
> > @@ -1089,7 +1089,7 @@ struct execmem_info __init *execmem_arch_setup(void)
> > pgprot = PAGE_KERNEL_ROX;
> > flags = EXECMEM_KASAN_SHADOW | EXECMEM_ROX_CACHE;
> > } else {
> > - pgprot = PAGE_KERNEL;
> > + pgprot = PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC;
>
> Please don't. Everything except ITS can work with PAGE_KENREL so the fix
> should be on ITS side.
Well, this is early vs post make_ro again.
Does something like so work for you?
---
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/init.c b/arch/x86/mm/init.c
index 7456df985d96..f5012ae31d8b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/init.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/init.c
@@ -1089,7 +1089,7 @@ struct execmem_info __init *execmem_arch_setup(void)
pgprot = PAGE_KERNEL_ROX;
flags = EXECMEM_KASAN_SHADOW | EXECMEM_ROX_CACHE;
} else {
- pgprot = PAGE_KERNEL;
+ pgprot = PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC;
flags = EXECMEM_KASAN_SHADOW;
}
diff --git a/mm/execmem.c b/mm/execmem.c
index 6f7a2653b280..dbe2eedea0e6 100644
--- a/mm/execmem.c
+++ b/mm/execmem.c
@@ -258,6 +258,7 @@ static bool execmem_cache_rox = false;
void execmem_cache_make_ro(void)
{
+ struct execmem_range *module_text = &execmem_info->ranges[EXECMEM_MODULE_TEXT];
struct maple_tree *free_areas = &execmem_cache.free_areas;
struct maple_tree *busy_areas = &execmem_cache.busy_areas;
MA_STATE(mas_free, free_areas, 0, ULONG_MAX);
@@ -269,6 +270,9 @@ void execmem_cache_make_ro(void)
mutex_lock(mutex);
+ if (!(module_text->flags & EXECMEM_ROX_CACHE))
+ module_text->pgprot = PAGE_KERNEL;
+
mas_for_each(&mas_free, area, ULONG_MAX) {
unsigned long pages = mas_range_len(&mas_free) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
set_memory_ro(mas_free.index, pages);
On 28.05.25 19:27, Mike Rapoport wrote:
> On Wed, May 28, 2025 at 02:35:55PM +0200, Juergen Gross wrote:
>> In case X86_FEATURE_PSE isn't available (e.g. when running as a Xen
>> PV guest), execmem_arch_setup() will fall back to use PAGE_KERNEL
>> protection for the EXECMEM_MODULE_TEXT range.
>>
>> This will result in attempts to execute code with the NX bit set in
>> case of ITS mitigation being applied.
>>
>> Avoid this problem by using PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC protection instead,
>> which will not set the NX bit.
>>
>> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
>> Reported-by: Xin Li <xin@zytor.com>
>> Fixes: 5185e7f9f3bd ("x86/module: enable ROX caches for module text on 64 bit")
>> Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
>> ---
>> arch/x86/mm/init.c | 2 +-
>> 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/init.c b/arch/x86/mm/init.c
>> index 7456df985d96..f5012ae31d8b 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/mm/init.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/mm/init.c
>> @@ -1089,7 +1089,7 @@ struct execmem_info __init *execmem_arch_setup(void)
>> pgprot = PAGE_KERNEL_ROX;
>> flags = EXECMEM_KASAN_SHADOW | EXECMEM_ROX_CACHE;
>> } else {
>> - pgprot = PAGE_KERNEL;
>> + pgprot = PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC;
>
> Please don't. Everything except ITS can work with PAGE_KENREL so the fix
> should be on ITS side.
Hmm, maybe adding another element to execmem_info[] with the new
type EXECMEM_KERNEL_TEXT, specifying PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC if !PSE?
Juergen
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