On IMA policy update, if a measure rule exists in the policy,
IMA_MEASURE is set for ima_policy_flags which makes the violation_check
variable always true. Coupled with a no-action on MAY_READ for a
FILE_CHECK call, we're always taking the inode_lock().

This becomes a performance problem for extremely heavy read-only workloads.
Therefore, prevent this only in the case there's no action to be taken.

Signed-off-by: Frederick Lawler <fred@cloudflare.com>
---
Changes since v2:
- s/mask & MAY_WRITE/file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE/

Changes since v1:
- Add MAY_WRITE && action check to violation_check to avoid MAY_READ
  only situations
---
 security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index 9b87556b03a7..bc453f5a7531 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -237,7 +237,9 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
 				&allowed_algos);
 	violation_check = ((func == FILE_CHECK || func == MMAP_CHECK ||
 			    func == MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT) &&
-			   (ima_policy_flag & IMA_MEASURE));
+			   (ima_policy_flag & IMA_MEASURE) &&
+			   ((action & IMA_MEASURE) ||
+			    (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE)));
 	if (!action && !violation_check)
 		return 0;
 
-- 
2.43.0

On Thu, 2025-03-27 at 11:09 -0500, Frederick Lawler wrote:
> On IMA policy update, if a measure rule exists in the policy,
> IMA_MEASURE is set for ima_policy_flags which makes the violation_check
> variable always true. Coupled with a no-action on MAY_READ for a
> FILE_CHECK call, we're always taking the inode_lock().
> 
> This becomes a performance problem for extremely heavy read-only workloads.
> Therefore, prevent this only in the case there's no action to be taken.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Frederick Lawler <fred@cloudflare.com>

Thanks Frederick!

Acked-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>

Roberto

> ---
> Changes since v2:
> - s/mask & MAY_WRITE/file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE/
> 
> Changes since v1:
> - Add MAY_WRITE && action check to violation_check to avoid MAY_READ
>   only situations
> ---
>  security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 4 +++-
>  1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> 
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> index 9b87556b03a7..bc453f5a7531 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> @@ -237,7 +237,9 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
>  				&allowed_algos);
>  	violation_check = ((func == FILE_CHECK || func == MMAP_CHECK ||
>  			    func == MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT) &&
> -			   (ima_policy_flag & IMA_MEASURE));
> +			   (ima_policy_flag & IMA_MEASURE) &&
> +			   ((action & IMA_MEASURE) ||
> +			    (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE)));
>  	if (!action && !violation_check)
>  		return 0;
>