From: Yan Zhao <yan.y.zhao@intel.com>
Always honor guest PAT in KVM-managed EPTs on TDX enabled guests by
making self-snoop feature a hard dependency for TDX and making quirk
KVM_X86_QUIRK_EPT_IGNORE_GUEST_PAT not a valid quirk once TDX is enabled.
The quirk KVM_X86_QUIRK_EPT_IGNORE_GUEST_PAT only affects memory type of
KVM-managed EPTs. For the TDX-module-managed private EPT, memory type is
always forced to WB now.
Honoring guest PAT in KVM-managed EPTs ensures KVM does not invoke
kvm_zap_gfn_range() when attaching/detaching non-coherent DMA devices,
which would cause mirrored EPTs for TDs to be zapped, leading to the
TDX-module-managed private EPT being incorrectly zapped.
As a new feature, TDX always comes with support for self-snoop, and does
not have to worry about unmodifiable but buggy guests. So, simply ignore
KVM_X86_QUIRK_IGNORE_GUEST_PAT on TDX guests just like kvm-amd.ko already
does.
Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Yan Zhao <yan.y.zhao@intel.com>
Message-ID: <20250224071039.31511-1-yan.y.zhao@intel.com>
[Only apply to TDX guests. - Paolo]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
---
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c | 6 ++++++
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
index b6f6f6e2f02e..89a0e90b7aef 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
@@ -624,6 +624,7 @@ int tdx_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm)
kvm->arch.has_protected_state = true;
kvm->arch.has_private_mem = true;
+ kvm->arch.disabled_quirks |= KVM_X86_QUIRK_IGNORE_GUEST_PAT;
/*
* Because guest TD is protected, VMM can't parse the instruction in TD.
@@ -3470,6 +3471,11 @@ int __init tdx_bringup(void)
goto success_disable_tdx;
}
+ if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SELFSNOOP)) {
+ pr_err("Self-snoop is required for TDX\n");
+ goto success_disable_tdx;
+ }
+
if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_TDX_HOST_PLATFORM)) {
pr_err("tdx: no TDX private KeyIDs available\n");
goto success_disable_tdx;
--
2.43.5