fs/ocfs2/alloc.c | 8 ++++++++ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
The l_tree_depth field is 16-bit (__le16), but the actual
maximum depth is limited to OCFS2_MAX_PATH_DEPTH.
Add a check to prevent out-of-bounds access if l_tree_depth
has an invalid value, which may occur when reading from a
corrupted mounted disk [1].
Fixes: ccd979bdbce9 ("[PATCH] OCFS2: The Second Oracle Cluster Filesystem")
Reported-by: syzbot+66c146268dc88f4341fd@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=66c146268dc88f4341fd [1]
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kovalev <kovalev@altlinux.org>
---
v2: Restricted depth to OCFS2_MAX_PATH_DEPTH and moved the check
to __ocfs2_find_path().
---
fs/ocfs2/alloc.c | 8 ++++++++
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/alloc.c b/fs/ocfs2/alloc.c
index 4414743b638e8..cec8fc5cb8e87 100644
--- a/fs/ocfs2/alloc.c
+++ b/fs/ocfs2/alloc.c
@@ -1803,6 +1803,14 @@ static int __ocfs2_find_path(struct ocfs2_caching_info *ci,
el = root_el;
while (el->l_tree_depth) {
+ if (unlikely(le16_to_cpu(el->l_tree_depth) > OCFS2_MAX_PATH_DEPTH)) {
+ ocfs2_error(ocfs2_metadata_cache_get_super(ci),
+ "Owner %llu has invalid tree depth %u in extent list\n",
+ (unsigned long long)ocfs2_metadata_cache_owner(ci),
+ le16_to_cpu(el->l_tree_depth));
+ ret = -EROFS;
+ goto out;
+ }
if (le16_to_cpu(el->l_next_free_rec) == 0) {
ocfs2_error(ocfs2_metadata_cache_get_super(ci),
"Owner %llu has empty extent list at depth %u\n",
--
2.42.2
On 2025/2/14 16:00, Vasiliy Kovalev wrote: > The l_tree_depth field is 16-bit (__le16), but the actual > maximum depth is limited to OCFS2_MAX_PATH_DEPTH. > > Add a check to prevent out-of-bounds access if l_tree_depth > has an invalid value, which may occur when reading from a > corrupted mounted disk [1]. > > Fixes: ccd979bdbce9 ("[PATCH] OCFS2: The Second Oracle Cluster Filesystem") > Reported-by: syzbot+66c146268dc88f4341fd@syzkaller.appspotmail.com > Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=66c146268dc88f4341fd [1] > Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kovalev <kovalev@altlinux.org> > --- > v2: Restricted depth to OCFS2_MAX_PATH_DEPTH and moved the check > to __ocfs2_find_path(). > --- > fs/ocfs2/alloc.c | 8 ++++++++ > 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+) > > diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/alloc.c b/fs/ocfs2/alloc.c > index 4414743b638e8..cec8fc5cb8e87 100644 > --- a/fs/ocfs2/alloc.c > +++ b/fs/ocfs2/alloc.c > @@ -1803,6 +1803,14 @@ static int __ocfs2_find_path(struct ocfs2_caching_info *ci, > > el = root_el; > while (el->l_tree_depth) { > + if (unlikely(le16_to_cpu(el->l_tree_depth) > OCFS2_MAX_PATH_DEPTH)) { More precisely, it's ">= OCFS2_MAX_PATH_DEPTH". > + ocfs2_error(ocfs2_metadata_cache_get_super(ci), > + "Owner %llu has invalid tree depth %u in extent list\n", > + (unsigned long long)ocfs2_metadata_cache_owner(ci), > + le16_to_cpu(el->l_tree_depth)); > + ret = -EROFS; > + goto out; > + } > if (le16_to_cpu(el->l_next_free_rec) == 0) { > ocfs2_error(ocfs2_metadata_cache_get_super(ci), > "Owner %llu has empty extent list at depth %u\n",
The l_tree_depth field is 16-bit (__le16), but the actual
maximum depth is limited to OCFS2_MAX_PATH_DEPTH.
Add a check to prevent out-of-bounds access if l_tree_depth
has an invalid value, which may occur when reading from a
corrupted mounted disk [1].
Fixes: ccd979bdbce9 ("[PATCH] OCFS2: The Second Oracle Cluster Filesystem")
Reported-by: syzbot+66c146268dc88f4341fd@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=66c146268dc88f4341fd [1]
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kovalev <kovalev@altlinux.org>
---
v3: Change the condition "> OCFS2_MAX_PATH_DEPTH" to ">= OCFS2_MAX_PATH_DEPTH"
v2: Restricted depth to OCFS2_MAX_PATH_DEPTH and moved the check
to __ocfs2_find_path().
---
fs/ocfs2/alloc.c | 8 ++++++++
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/alloc.c b/fs/ocfs2/alloc.c
index 4414743b638e8..cec8fc5cb8e87 100644
--- a/fs/ocfs2/alloc.c
+++ b/fs/ocfs2/alloc.c
@@ -1803,6 +1803,14 @@ static int __ocfs2_find_path(struct ocfs2_caching_info *ci,
el = root_el;
while (el->l_tree_depth) {
+ if (unlikely(le16_to_cpu(el->l_tree_depth) >= OCFS2_MAX_PATH_DEPTH)) {
+ ocfs2_error(ocfs2_metadata_cache_get_super(ci),
+ "Owner %llu has invalid tree depth %u in extent list\n",
+ (unsigned long long)ocfs2_metadata_cache_owner(ci),
+ le16_to_cpu(el->l_tree_depth));
+ ret = -EROFS;
+ goto out;
+ }
if (le16_to_cpu(el->l_next_free_rec) == 0) {
ocfs2_error(ocfs2_metadata_cache_get_super(ci),
"Owner %llu has empty extent list at depth %u\n",
--
2.42.2
On 2025/2/14 16:49, Vasiliy Kovalev wrote: > The l_tree_depth field is 16-bit (__le16), but the actual > maximum depth is limited to OCFS2_MAX_PATH_DEPTH. > > Add a check to prevent out-of-bounds access if l_tree_depth > has an invalid value, which may occur when reading from a > corrupted mounted disk [1]. > > Fixes: ccd979bdbce9 ("[PATCH] OCFS2: The Second Oracle Cluster Filesystem") > Reported-by: syzbot+66c146268dc88f4341fd@syzkaller.appspotmail.com > Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=66c146268dc88f4341fd [1] > Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kovalev <kovalev@altlinux.org> Looks fine. Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com> > --- > v3: Change the condition "> OCFS2_MAX_PATH_DEPTH" to ">= OCFS2_MAX_PATH_DEPTH" > v2: Restricted depth to OCFS2_MAX_PATH_DEPTH and moved the check > to __ocfs2_find_path(). > --- > fs/ocfs2/alloc.c | 8 ++++++++ > 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+) > > diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/alloc.c b/fs/ocfs2/alloc.c > index 4414743b638e8..cec8fc5cb8e87 100644 > --- a/fs/ocfs2/alloc.c > +++ b/fs/ocfs2/alloc.c > @@ -1803,6 +1803,14 @@ static int __ocfs2_find_path(struct ocfs2_caching_info *ci, > > el = root_el; > while (el->l_tree_depth) { > + if (unlikely(le16_to_cpu(el->l_tree_depth) >= OCFS2_MAX_PATH_DEPTH)) { > + ocfs2_error(ocfs2_metadata_cache_get_super(ci), > + "Owner %llu has invalid tree depth %u in extent list\n", > + (unsigned long long)ocfs2_metadata_cache_owner(ci), > + le16_to_cpu(el->l_tree_depth)); > + ret = -EROFS; > + goto out; > + } > if (le16_to_cpu(el->l_next_free_rec) == 0) { > ocfs2_error(ocfs2_metadata_cache_get_super(ci), > "Owner %llu has empty extent list at depth %u\n",
© 2016 - 2025 Red Hat, Inc.