arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
SYNTHESIZED_F() generally is used together with setup_force_cpu_cap(),
i.e. when it makes sense to present the feature even if cpuid does not
have it *and* the VM is not able to see the difference. For example,
it can be used when mitigations on the host automatically protect
the guest as well.
The "SYNTHESIZED_F(SRSO_USER_KERNEL_NO)" line came in as a conflict
resolution between the CPUID overhaul from the KVM tree and support
for the feature in the x86 tree. Using it right now does not hurt,
or make a difference for that matter, because there is no
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SRSO_USER_KERNEL_NO). However, it
is a little less future proof in case such a setup_force_cpu_cap()
appears later, for a case where the kernel somehow is not vulnerable
but the guest would have to apply the mitigation.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
---
arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
index 2cbb3874ad39..8eb3a88707f2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
@@ -1180,7 +1180,7 @@ void kvm_set_cpu_caps(void)
SYNTHESIZED_F(SBPB),
SYNTHESIZED_F(IBPB_BRTYPE),
SYNTHESIZED_F(SRSO_NO),
- SYNTHESIZED_F(SRSO_USER_KERNEL_NO),
+ F(SRSO_USER_KERNEL_NO),
);
kvm_cpu_cap_init(CPUID_8000_0022_EAX,
--
2.43.5
On Tue, Feb 04, 2025, Paolo Bonzini wrote: > SYNTHESIZED_F() generally is used together with setup_force_cpu_cap(), > i.e. when it makes sense to present the feature even if cpuid does not > have it *and* the VM is not able to see the difference. For example, > it can be used when mitigations on the host automatically protect > the guest as well. > > The "SYNTHESIZED_F(SRSO_USER_KERNEL_NO)" line came in as a conflict > resolution between the CPUID overhaul from the KVM tree and support > for the feature in the x86 tree. Using it right now does not hurt, > or make a difference for that matter, because there is no > setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SRSO_USER_KERNEL_NO). However, it > is a little less future proof in case such a setup_force_cpu_cap() > appears later, for a case where the kernel somehow is not vulnerable > but the guest would have to apply the mitigation. > > Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> > --- Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
© 2016 - 2025 Red Hat, Inc.