drivers/acpi/nfit/core.c | 12 +++++++++--- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
Fix an issue detected by syzbot with KASAN:
BUG: KASAN: vmalloc-out-of-bounds in cmd_to_func drivers/acpi/nfit/
core.c:416 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: vmalloc-out-of-bounds in acpi_nfit_ctl+0x20e8/0x24a0
drivers/acpi/nfit/core.c:459
The issue occurs in `cmd_to_func` when the `call_pkg->nd_reserved2`
array is accessed without verifying that `call_pkg` points to a
buffer that is sized appropriately as a `struct nd_cmd_pkg`. This
could lead to out-of-bounds access and undefined behavior if the
buffer does not have sufficient space.
To address this issue, a check was added in `acpi_nfit_ctl()` to
ensure that `buf` is not `NULL` and `buf_len` is greater than or
equal to `sizeof(struct nd_cmd_pkg)` before casting `buf` to
`struct nd_cmd_pkg *`. This ensures safe access to the members of
`call_pkg`, including the `nd_reserved2` array.
This change preventing out-of-bounds reads.
Reported-by: syzbot+7534f060ebda6b8b51b3@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=7534f060ebda6b8b51b3
Tested-by: syzbot+7534f060ebda6b8b51b3@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: 2d5404caa8c7 ("Linux 6.12-rc7")
Signed-off-by: Suraj Sonawane <surajsonawane0215@gmail.com>
---
V1: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20241111080429.9861-1-surajsonawane0215@gmail.com/
V2: Initialized `out_obj` to `NULL` in `acpi_nfit_ctl()` to prevent
potential uninitialized variable usage if condition is true.
drivers/acpi/nfit/core.c | 12 +++++++++---
1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/acpi/nfit/core.c b/drivers/acpi/nfit/core.c
index 5429ec9ef..d0e655a9c 100644
--- a/drivers/acpi/nfit/core.c
+++ b/drivers/acpi/nfit/core.c
@@ -439,7 +439,7 @@ int acpi_nfit_ctl(struct nvdimm_bus_descriptor *nd_desc, struct nvdimm *nvdimm,
{
struct acpi_nfit_desc *acpi_desc = to_acpi_desc(nd_desc);
struct nfit_mem *nfit_mem = nvdimm_provider_data(nvdimm);
- union acpi_object in_obj, in_buf, *out_obj;
+ union acpi_object in_obj, in_buf, *out_obj = NULL;
const struct nd_cmd_desc *desc = NULL;
struct device *dev = acpi_desc->dev;
struct nd_cmd_pkg *call_pkg = NULL;
@@ -454,8 +454,14 @@ int acpi_nfit_ctl(struct nvdimm_bus_descriptor *nd_desc, struct nvdimm *nvdimm,
if (cmd_rc)
*cmd_rc = -EINVAL;
- if (cmd == ND_CMD_CALL)
- call_pkg = buf;
+ if (cmd == ND_CMD_CALL) {
+ if (buf == NULL || buf_len < sizeof(struct nd_cmd_pkg)) {
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ call_pkg = (struct nd_cmd_pkg *)buf;
+ }
+
func = cmd_to_func(nfit_mem, cmd, call_pkg, &family);
if (func < 0)
return func;
--
2.34.1
On Tue, Nov 12, 2024 at 10:50:35AM +0530, Suraj Sonawane wrote:
> Fix an issue detected by syzbot with KASAN:
>
> BUG: KASAN: vmalloc-out-of-bounds in cmd_to_func drivers/acpi/nfit/
> core.c:416 [inline]
> BUG: KASAN: vmalloc-out-of-bounds in acpi_nfit_ctl+0x20e8/0x24a0
> drivers/acpi/nfit/core.c:459
>
> The issue occurs in `cmd_to_func` when the `call_pkg->nd_reserved2`
> array is accessed without verifying that `call_pkg` points to a
> buffer that is sized appropriately as a `struct nd_cmd_pkg`. This
> could lead to out-of-bounds access and undefined behavior if the
> buffer does not have sufficient space.
>
> To address this issue, a check was added in `acpi_nfit_ctl()` to
> ensure that `buf` is not `NULL` and `buf_len` is greater than or
> equal to `sizeof(struct nd_cmd_pkg)` before casting `buf` to
> `struct nd_cmd_pkg *`. This ensures safe access to the members of
> `call_pkg`, including the `nd_reserved2` array.
>
> This change preventing out-of-bounds reads.
>
> Reported-by: syzbot+7534f060ebda6b8b51b3@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
> Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=7534f060ebda6b8b51b3
> Tested-by: syzbot+7534f060ebda6b8b51b3@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
> Fixes: 2d5404caa8c7 ("Linux 6.12-rc7")
> Signed-off-by: Suraj Sonawane <surajsonawane0215@gmail.com>
Suraj,
The fixes tag needs to be where the issue originated, not
where you discovered it (which I'm guessing was using 6.12-rc7).
Here's how I find the tag:
$ git blame drivers/acpi/nfit/core.c | grep call_pkg | grep buf
ebe9f6f19d80d drivers/acpi/nfit/core.c (Dan Williams 2019-02-07 14:56:50 -0800 458) call_pkg = buf;
$ git log -1 --pretty=fixes ebe9f6f19d80d
Fixes: ebe9f6f19d80 ("acpi/nfit: Fix bus command validation")
I think ^ should be your Fixes tag.
snip
>
On 13/11/24 10:21, Alison Schofield wrote:
> On Tue, Nov 12, 2024 at 10:50:35AM +0530, Suraj Sonawane wrote:
>> Fix an issue detected by syzbot with KASAN:
>>
>> BUG: KASAN: vmalloc-out-of-bounds in cmd_to_func drivers/acpi/nfit/
>> core.c:416 [inline]
>> BUG: KASAN: vmalloc-out-of-bounds in acpi_nfit_ctl+0x20e8/0x24a0
>> drivers/acpi/nfit/core.c:459
>>
>> The issue occurs in `cmd_to_func` when the `call_pkg->nd_reserved2`
>> array is accessed without verifying that `call_pkg` points to a
>> buffer that is sized appropriately as a `struct nd_cmd_pkg`. This
>> could lead to out-of-bounds access and undefined behavior if the
>> buffer does not have sufficient space.
>>
>> To address this issue, a check was added in `acpi_nfit_ctl()` to
>> ensure that `buf` is not `NULL` and `buf_len` is greater than or
>> equal to `sizeof(struct nd_cmd_pkg)` before casting `buf` to
>> `struct nd_cmd_pkg *`. This ensures safe access to the members of
>> `call_pkg`, including the `nd_reserved2` array.
>>
>> This change preventing out-of-bounds reads.
>>
>> Reported-by: syzbot+7534f060ebda6b8b51b3@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
>> Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=7534f060ebda6b8b51b3
>> Tested-by: syzbot+7534f060ebda6b8b51b3@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
>> Fixes: 2d5404caa8c7 ("Linux 6.12-rc7")
>> Signed-off-by: Suraj Sonawane <surajsonawane0215@gmail.com>
>
> Suraj,
>
> The fixes tag needs to be where the issue originated, not
> where you discovered it (which I'm guessing was using 6.12-rc7).
>
Thank you for your feedback.
> Here's how I find the tag:
>
> $ git blame drivers/acpi/nfit/core.c | grep call_pkg | grep buf
> ebe9f6f19d80d drivers/acpi/nfit/core.c (Dan Williams 2019-02-07 14:56:50 -0800 458) call_pkg = buf;
>
> $ git log -1 --pretty=fixes ebe9f6f19d80d
Thank you for this detailed explaination.
> Fixes: ebe9f6f19d80 ("acpi/nfit: Fix bus command validation")
>
> I think ^ should be your Fixes tag.
Yes, I ran the provided steps to verify the commit ID ebe9f6f19d80d and
verified it.
>
>
> snip
>
>>
I'll update the Fixes tag in the next version of the patch.
Additionally, I will re-test with syzbot and submit the revised patch
shortly.
Thank you for your time and feedback!
Best,
Suraj Sonawane
On Tue, Nov 12, 2024 at 10:50:35AM +0530, Suraj Sonawane wrote:
> Fix an issue detected by syzbot with KASAN:
>
> BUG: KASAN: vmalloc-out-of-bounds in cmd_to_func drivers/acpi/nfit/
> core.c:416 [inline]
> BUG: KASAN: vmalloc-out-of-bounds in acpi_nfit_ctl+0x20e8/0x24a0
> drivers/acpi/nfit/core.c:459
>
> The issue occurs in `cmd_to_func` when the `call_pkg->nd_reserved2`
> array is accessed without verifying that `call_pkg` points to a
> buffer that is sized appropriately as a `struct nd_cmd_pkg`. This
> could lead to out-of-bounds access and undefined behavior if the
> buffer does not have sufficient space.
>
> To address this issue, a check was added in `acpi_nfit_ctl()` to
> ensure that `buf` is not `NULL` and `buf_len` is greater than or
> equal to `sizeof(struct nd_cmd_pkg)` before casting `buf` to
> `struct nd_cmd_pkg *`. This ensures safe access to the members of
> `call_pkg`, including the `nd_reserved2` array.
That all sounds good! A couple of coding conventions fixups suggested
below -
snip
> @@ -439,7 +439,7 @@ int acpi_nfit_ctl(struct nvdimm_bus_descriptor *nd_desc, struct nvdimm *nvdimm,
> {
> struct acpi_nfit_desc *acpi_desc = to_acpi_desc(nd_desc);
> struct nfit_mem *nfit_mem = nvdimm_provider_data(nvdimm);
> - union acpi_object in_obj, in_buf, *out_obj;
> + union acpi_object in_obj, in_buf, *out_obj = NULL;
> const struct nd_cmd_desc *desc = NULL;
> struct device *dev = acpi_desc->dev;
> struct nd_cmd_pkg *call_pkg = NULL;
> @@ -454,8 +454,14 @@ int acpi_nfit_ctl(struct nvdimm_bus_descriptor *nd_desc, struct nvdimm *nvdimm,
> if (cmd_rc)
> *cmd_rc = -EINVAL;
>
> - if (cmd == ND_CMD_CALL)
> - call_pkg = buf;
> + if (cmd == ND_CMD_CALL) {
> + if (buf == NULL || buf_len < sizeof(struct nd_cmd_pkg)) {
Comparison to NULL and sizeof() usage preferred like this:
if (!buf || buf_len < sizeof(*call_pkg))
-snip
>
>
On 13/11/24 10:08, Alison Schofield wrote:
> On Tue, Nov 12, 2024 at 10:50:35AM +0530, Suraj Sonawane wrote:
>> Fix an issue detected by syzbot with KASAN:
>>
>> BUG: KASAN: vmalloc-out-of-bounds in cmd_to_func drivers/acpi/nfit/
>> core.c:416 [inline]
>> BUG: KASAN: vmalloc-out-of-bounds in acpi_nfit_ctl+0x20e8/0x24a0
>> drivers/acpi/nfit/core.c:459
>>
>> The issue occurs in `cmd_to_func` when the `call_pkg->nd_reserved2`
>> array is accessed without verifying that `call_pkg` points to a
>> buffer that is sized appropriately as a `struct nd_cmd_pkg`. This
>> could lead to out-of-bounds access and undefined behavior if the
>> buffer does not have sufficient space.
>>
>> To address this issue, a check was added in `acpi_nfit_ctl()` to
>> ensure that `buf` is not `NULL` and `buf_len` is greater than or
>> equal to `sizeof(struct nd_cmd_pkg)` before casting `buf` to
>> `struct nd_cmd_pkg *`. This ensures safe access to the members of
>> `call_pkg`, including the `nd_reserved2` array.
>
> That all sounds good! A couple of coding conventions fixups suggested
> below -
>
> snip
>
>> @@ -439,7 +439,7 @@ int acpi_nfit_ctl(struct nvdimm_bus_descriptor *nd_desc, struct nvdimm *nvdimm,
>> {
>> struct acpi_nfit_desc *acpi_desc = to_acpi_desc(nd_desc);
>> struct nfit_mem *nfit_mem = nvdimm_provider_data(nvdimm);
>> - union acpi_object in_obj, in_buf, *out_obj;
>> + union acpi_object in_obj, in_buf, *out_obj = NULL;
>> const struct nd_cmd_desc *desc = NULL;
>> struct device *dev = acpi_desc->dev;
>> struct nd_cmd_pkg *call_pkg = NULL;
>> @@ -454,8 +454,14 @@ int acpi_nfit_ctl(struct nvdimm_bus_descriptor *nd_desc, struct nvdimm *nvdimm,
>> if (cmd_rc)
>> *cmd_rc = -EINVAL;
>>
>> - if (cmd == ND_CMD_CALL)
>> - call_pkg = buf;
>> + if (cmd == ND_CMD_CALL) {
>> + if (buf == NULL || buf_len < sizeof(struct nd_cmd_pkg)) {
>
> Comparison to NULL and sizeof() usage preferred like this:
> if (!buf || buf_len < sizeof(*call_pkg))
>
>
> -snip
>>
>>
Thank you for the feedback and your time.
I appreciate your review and coding convention insights. I have studied
the suggested change and updated the patch.
I will test the updated patch with syzbot and submit a new version very
shortly.
Best regards,
Suraj Sonawane
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