Restructure taa mitigation to use select/update/apply functions to
create consistent vulnerability handling.
Signed-off-by: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com>
---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 58 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------
1 file changed, 39 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 4f35dcd9dee8..c676804dfd84 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -65,6 +65,8 @@ static void __init mds_apply_mitigation(void);
static void __init md_clear_update_mitigation(void);
static void __init md_clear_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init taa_select_mitigation(void);
+static void __init taa_update_mitigation(void);
+static void __init taa_apply_mitigation(void);
static void __init mmio_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init srbds_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init l1d_flush_select_mitigation(void);
@@ -187,6 +189,7 @@ void __init cpu_select_mitigations(void)
ssb_select_mitigation();
l1tf_select_mitigation();
mds_select_mitigation();
+ taa_select_mitigation();
md_clear_select_mitigation();
srbds_select_mitigation();
l1d_flush_select_mitigation();
@@ -203,8 +206,10 @@ void __init cpu_select_mitigations(void)
* choices.
*/
mds_update_mitigation();
+ taa_update_mitigation();
mds_apply_mitigation();
+ taa_apply_mitigation();
}
/*
@@ -374,9 +379,6 @@ static int __init mds_cmdline(char *str)
}
early_param("mds", mds_cmdline);
-#undef pr_fmt
-#define pr_fmt(fmt) "TAA: " fmt
-
static bool taa_nosmt __ro_after_init;
static const char * const taa_strings[] = {
@@ -399,19 +401,19 @@ static void __init taa_select_mitigation(void)
return;
}
- if (cpu_mitigations_off()) {
+ if (cpu_mitigations_off())
taa_mitigation = TAA_MITIGATION_OFF;
- return;
- }
/*
* TAA mitigation via VERW is turned off if both
* tsx_async_abort=off and mds=off are specified.
+ *
+ * MDS mitigation will be checked in taa_update_mitigation().
*/
- if (taa_mitigation == TAA_MITIGATION_OFF &&
- mds_mitigation == MDS_MITIGATION_OFF)
+ if (taa_mitigation == TAA_MITIGATION_OFF)
return;
+ /* This handles the AUTO case. */
if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR))
taa_mitigation = TAA_MITIGATION_VERW;
else
@@ -430,17 +432,36 @@ static void __init taa_select_mitigation(void)
!(x86_arch_cap_msr & ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR))
taa_mitigation = TAA_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED;
- /*
- * TSX is enabled, select alternate mitigation for TAA which is
- * the same as MDS. Enable MDS static branch to clear CPU buffers.
- *
- * For guests that can't determine whether the correct microcode is
- * present on host, enable the mitigation for UCODE_NEEDED as well.
- */
- setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF);
+}
+
+static void __init taa_update_mitigation(void)
+{
+ if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_TAA))
+ return;
+
+ if (mitigate_any_verw())
+ taa_mitigation = TAA_MITIGATION_VERW;
+
+ pr_info("TAA: %s\n", taa_strings[taa_mitigation]);
+}
+
+static void __init taa_apply_mitigation(void)
+{
+ if (taa_mitigation == TAA_MITIGATION_VERW ||
+ taa_mitigation == TAA_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED) {
+ /*
+ * TSX is enabled, select alternate mitigation for TAA which is
+ * the same as MDS. Enable MDS static branch to clear CPU buffers.
+ *
+ * For guests that can't determine whether the correct microcode is
+ * present on host, enable the mitigation for UCODE_NEEDED as well.
+ */
+ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF);
+
+ if (taa_nosmt || cpu_mitigations_auto_nosmt())
+ cpu_smt_disable(false);
+ }
- if (taa_nosmt || cpu_mitigations_auto_nosmt())
- cpu_smt_disable(false);
}
static int __init tsx_async_abort_parse_cmdline(char *str)
@@ -649,7 +670,6 @@ static void __init md_clear_update_mitigation(void)
static void __init md_clear_select_mitigation(void)
{
- taa_select_mitigation();
mmio_select_mitigation();
rfds_select_mitigation();
--
2.34.1