Restructure spectre_v1 to use select/apply functions to create
consistent vulnerability handling.
Signed-off-by: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com>
---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 10 ++++++++--
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 37056bdd3a9b..ea50c77ccb70 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -54,6 +54,7 @@
*/
static void __init spectre_v1_select_mitigation(void);
+static void __init spectre_v1_apply_mitigation(void);
static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init retbleed_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(void);
@@ -216,6 +217,7 @@ void __init cpu_select_mitigations(void)
mmio_update_mitigation();
rfds_update_mitigation();
+ spectre_v1_apply_mitigation();
mds_apply_mitigation();
taa_apply_mitigation();
mmio_apply_mitigation();
@@ -989,10 +991,14 @@ static bool smap_works_speculatively(void)
static void __init spectre_v1_select_mitigation(void)
{
- if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1) || cpu_mitigations_off()) {
+ if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1) || cpu_mitigations_off())
spectre_v1_mitigation = SPECTRE_V1_MITIGATION_NONE;
+}
+
+static void __init spectre_v1_apply_mitigation(void)
+{
+ if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1) || cpu_mitigations_off())
return;
- }
if (spectre_v1_mitigation == SPECTRE_V1_MITIGATION_AUTO) {
/*
--
2.34.1