tools/testing/selftests/x86/lam.c | 85 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 85 insertions(+)
Recent change in how get_user() handles pointers [1] has a specific case
for LAM. It assigns a different bitmask that's later used to check
whether a pointer comes from userland in get_user().
While currently commented out (until LASS [2] is merged into the kernel)
it's worth making changes to the LAM selftest ahead of time.
Add test case to LAM that utilizes a ioctl (FIOASYNC) syscall which uses
get_user() in its implementation. Execute the syscall with differently
tagged pointers to verify that valid user pointers are passing through
and invalid kernel/non-canonical pointers are not.
Code was tested on a Sierra Forest Xeon machine that's LAM capable. The
test was ran without issues with both the LAM lines from [1] untouched
and commented out. The test was also ran without issues with LAM_SUP
both enabled and disabled.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/20241024013214.129639-1-torvalds@linux-foundation.org/
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240710160655.3402786-1-alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com/
Signed-off-by: Maciej Wieczor-Retman <maciej.wieczor-retman@intel.com>
---
tools/testing/selftests/x86/lam.c | 85 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 85 insertions(+)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/x86/lam.c b/tools/testing/selftests/x86/lam.c
index 0ea4f6813930..3c53d4b7aa61 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/x86/lam.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/x86/lam.c
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <sys/syscall.h>
+#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#include <time.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <setjmp.h>
@@ -43,10 +44,19 @@
#define FUNC_INHERITE 0x20
#define FUNC_PASID 0x40
+/* get_user() pointer test cases */
+#define GET_USER_USER 0
+#define GET_USER_KERNEL_TOP 1
+#define GET_USER_KERNEL_BOT 2
+#define GET_USER_KERNEL 3
+
#define TEST_MASK 0x7f
+#define L5_SIGN_EXT_MASK (0xFFUL << 56)
+#define L4_SIGN_EXT_MASK (0x1FFFFUL << 47)
#define LOW_ADDR (0x1UL << 30)
#define HIGH_ADDR (0x3UL << 48)
+#define L5_ADDR (0x1UL << 48)
#define MALLOC_LEN 32
@@ -370,6 +380,54 @@ static int handle_syscall(struct testcases *test)
return ret;
}
+static int get_user_syscall(struct testcases *test)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ int ptr_value = 0;
+ void *ptr = &ptr_value;
+ int fd;
+
+ uint64_t bitmask = ((uint64_t)ptr & L5_ADDR) ? L5_SIGN_EXT_MASK :
+ L4_SIGN_EXT_MASK;
+
+ if (test->lam != 0)
+ if (set_lam(test->lam) != 0)
+ return 2;
+
+ fd = memfd_create("lam_ioctl", 0);
+ if (fd == -1)
+ exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
+
+ switch (test->later) {
+ case GET_USER_USER:
+ /* Control group - properly tagger user pointer */
+ ptr = (void *)set_metadata((uint64_t)ptr, test->lam);
+ break;
+ case GET_USER_KERNEL_TOP:
+ /* Kernel address with top bit cleared */
+ bitmask &= (bitmask >> 1);
+ ptr = (void *)((uint64_t)ptr | bitmask);
+ break;
+ case GET_USER_KERNEL_BOT:
+ /* Kernel address with bottom sign-extension bit cleared */
+ bitmask &= (bitmask << 1);
+ ptr = (void *)((uint64_t)ptr | bitmask);
+ break;
+ case GET_USER_KERNEL:
+ /* Try to pass a kernel address */
+ ptr = (void *)((uint64_t)ptr | bitmask);
+ break;
+ default:
+ printf("Invalid test case value passed!\n");
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (ioctl(fd, FIOASYNC, ptr) != 0)
+ ret = 1;
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
int sys_uring_setup(unsigned int entries, struct io_uring_params *p)
{
return (int)syscall(__NR_io_uring_setup, entries, p);
@@ -883,6 +941,33 @@ static struct testcases syscall_cases[] = {
.test_func = handle_syscall,
.msg = "SYSCALL:[Negative] Disable LAM. Dereferencing pointer with metadata.\n",
},
+ {
+ .later = GET_USER_USER,
+ .lam = LAM_U57_BITS,
+ .test_func = get_user_syscall,
+ .msg = "GET_USER: get_user() and pass a properly tagged user pointer.\n",
+ },
+ {
+ .later = GET_USER_KERNEL_TOP,
+ .expected = 1,
+ .lam = LAM_U57_BITS,
+ .test_func = get_user_syscall,
+ .msg = "GET_USER:[Negative] get_user() with a kernel pointer and the top bit cleared.\n",
+ },
+ {
+ .later = GET_USER_KERNEL_BOT,
+ .expected = 1,
+ .lam = LAM_U57_BITS,
+ .test_func = get_user_syscall,
+ .msg = "GET_USER:[Negative] get_user() with a kernel pointer and the bottom sign-extension bit cleared.\n",
+ },
+ {
+ .later = GET_USER_KERNEL,
+ .expected = 1,
+ .lam = LAM_U57_BITS,
+ .test_func = get_user_syscall,
+ .msg = "GET_USER:[Negative] get_user() and pass a kernel pointer.\n",
+ },
};
static struct testcases mmap_cases[] = {
--
2.46.2
On Tue, Oct 29, 2024 at 03:14:20PM +0100, Maciej Wieczor-Retman wrote: > Recent change in how get_user() handles pointers [1] has a specific case > for LAM. It assigns a different bitmask that's later used to check > whether a pointer comes from userland in get_user(). > > While currently commented out (until LASS [2] is merged into the kernel) > it's worth making changes to the LAM selftest ahead of time. > > Add test case to LAM that utilizes a ioctl (FIOASYNC) syscall which uses > get_user() in its implementation. Execute the syscall with differently > tagged pointers to verify that valid user pointers are passing through > and invalid kernel/non-canonical pointers are not. > > Code was tested on a Sierra Forest Xeon machine that's LAM capable. The > test was ran without issues with both the LAM lines from [1] untouched > and commented out. The test was also ran without issues with LAM_SUP > both enabled and disabled. > > [1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/20241024013214.129639-1-torvalds@linux-foundation.org/ > [2] https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240710160655.3402786-1-alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com/ > > Signed-off-by: Maciej Wieczor-Retman <maciej.wieczor-retman@intel.com> > --- > tools/testing/selftests/x86/lam.c | 85 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ > 1 file changed, 85 insertions(+) > > diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/x86/lam.c b/tools/testing/selftests/x86/lam.c > index 0ea4f6813930..3c53d4b7aa61 100644 > --- a/tools/testing/selftests/x86/lam.c > +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/x86/lam.c > @@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ > #include <stdlib.h> > #include <string.h> > #include <sys/syscall.h> > +#include <sys/ioctl.h> > #include <time.h> > #include <signal.h> > #include <setjmp.h> > @@ -43,10 +44,19 @@ > #define FUNC_INHERITE 0x20 > #define FUNC_PASID 0x40 > > +/* get_user() pointer test cases */ > +#define GET_USER_USER 0 > +#define GET_USER_KERNEL_TOP 1 > +#define GET_USER_KERNEL_BOT 2 > +#define GET_USER_KERNEL 3 > + > #define TEST_MASK 0x7f > +#define L5_SIGN_EXT_MASK (0xFFUL << 56) > +#define L4_SIGN_EXT_MASK (0x1FFFFUL << 47) > > #define LOW_ADDR (0x1UL << 30) > #define HIGH_ADDR (0x3UL << 48) > +#define L5_ADDR (0x1UL << 48) > > #define MALLOC_LEN 32 > > @@ -370,6 +380,54 @@ static int handle_syscall(struct testcases *test) > return ret; > } > > +static int get_user_syscall(struct testcases *test) > +{ > + int ret = 0; > + int ptr_value = 0; > + void *ptr = &ptr_value; > + int fd; > + > + uint64_t bitmask = ((uint64_t)ptr & L5_ADDR) ? L5_SIGN_EXT_MASK : > + L4_SIGN_EXT_MASK; Emm. Do you expect stack to be above at the very top of address space on 5-level paging machines? It is not true. We don't allocate any memory above 46-bit unless asked explicitly. See tools/testing/selftests/mm/va_high_addr_switch.c -- Kiryl Shutsemau / Kirill A. Shutemov
On 2024-10-30 at 14:31:51 +0200, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote: >On Tue, Oct 29, 2024 at 03:14:20PM +0100, Maciej Wieczor-Retman wrote: >> Recent change in how get_user() handles pointers [1] has a specific case >> for LAM. It assigns a different bitmask that's later used to check >> whether a pointer comes from userland in get_user(). >> >> While currently commented out (until LASS [2] is merged into the kernel) >> it's worth making changes to the LAM selftest ahead of time. >> >> Add test case to LAM that utilizes a ioctl (FIOASYNC) syscall which uses >> get_user() in its implementation. Execute the syscall with differently >> tagged pointers to verify that valid user pointers are passing through >> and invalid kernel/non-canonical pointers are not. >> >> Code was tested on a Sierra Forest Xeon machine that's LAM capable. The >> test was ran without issues with both the LAM lines from [1] untouched >> and commented out. The test was also ran without issues with LAM_SUP >> both enabled and disabled. >> >> [1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/20241024013214.129639-1-torvalds@linux-foundation.org/ >> [2] https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240710160655.3402786-1-alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com/ >> >> Signed-off-by: Maciej Wieczor-Retman <maciej.wieczor-retman@intel.com> >> --- >> tools/testing/selftests/x86/lam.c | 85 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ >> 1 file changed, 85 insertions(+) >> >> diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/x86/lam.c b/tools/testing/selftests/x86/lam.c >> index 0ea4f6813930..3c53d4b7aa61 100644 >> --- a/tools/testing/selftests/x86/lam.c >> +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/x86/lam.c >> @@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ >> #include <stdlib.h> >> #include <string.h> >> #include <sys/syscall.h> >> +#include <sys/ioctl.h> >> #include <time.h> >> #include <signal.h> >> #include <setjmp.h> >> @@ -43,10 +44,19 @@ >> #define FUNC_INHERITE 0x20 >> #define FUNC_PASID 0x40 >> >> +/* get_user() pointer test cases */ >> +#define GET_USER_USER 0 >> +#define GET_USER_KERNEL_TOP 1 >> +#define GET_USER_KERNEL_BOT 2 >> +#define GET_USER_KERNEL 3 >> + >> #define TEST_MASK 0x7f >> +#define L5_SIGN_EXT_MASK (0xFFUL << 56) >> +#define L4_SIGN_EXT_MASK (0x1FFFFUL << 47) >> >> #define LOW_ADDR (0x1UL << 30) >> #define HIGH_ADDR (0x3UL << 48) >> +#define L5_ADDR (0x1UL << 48) >> >> #define MALLOC_LEN 32 >> >> @@ -370,6 +380,54 @@ static int handle_syscall(struct testcases *test) >> return ret; >> } >> >> +static int get_user_syscall(struct testcases *test) >> +{ >> + int ret = 0; >> + int ptr_value = 0; >> + void *ptr = &ptr_value; >> + int fd; >> + >> + uint64_t bitmask = ((uint64_t)ptr & L5_ADDR) ? L5_SIGN_EXT_MASK : >> + L4_SIGN_EXT_MASK; > >Emm. Do you expect stack to be above at the very top of address space on >5-level paging machines? It is not true. We don't allocate any memory >above 46-bit unless asked explicitly. Right, I'm not sure why I thought that would work here. >See tools/testing/selftests/mm/va_high_addr_switch.c Thanks for the tip, I'll use mmap/munmap to determine the enabled pagetable level. > >-- > Kiryl Shutsemau / Kirill A. Shutemov -- Kind regards Maciej Wieczór-Retman
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