tools/testing/selftests/x86/lam.c | 85 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 85 insertions(+)
Recent change in how get_user() handles pointers [1] has a specific case
for LAM. It assigns a different bitmask that's later used to check
whether a pointer comes from userland in get_user().
While currently commented out (until LASS [2] is merged into the kernel)
it's worth making changes to the LAM selftest ahead of time.
Add test case to LAM that utilizes a ioctl (FIOASYNC) syscall which uses
get_user() in its implementation. Execute the syscall with differently
tagged pointers to verify that valid user pointers are passing through
and invalid kernel/non-canonical pointers are not.
Code was tested on a Sierra Forest Xeon machine that's LAM capable. The
test was ran without issues with both the LAM lines from [1] untouched
and commented out. The test was also ran without issues with LAM_SUP
both enabled and disabled.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/20241024013214.129639-1-torvalds@linux-foundation.org/
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240710160655.3402786-1-alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com/
Signed-off-by: Maciej Wieczor-Retman <maciej.wieczor-retman@intel.com>
---
tools/testing/selftests/x86/lam.c | 85 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 85 insertions(+)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/x86/lam.c b/tools/testing/selftests/x86/lam.c
index 0ea4f6813930..3c53d4b7aa61 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/x86/lam.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/x86/lam.c
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <sys/syscall.h>
+#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#include <time.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <setjmp.h>
@@ -43,10 +44,19 @@
#define FUNC_INHERITE 0x20
#define FUNC_PASID 0x40
+/* get_user() pointer test cases */
+#define GET_USER_USER 0
+#define GET_USER_KERNEL_TOP 1
+#define GET_USER_KERNEL_BOT 2
+#define GET_USER_KERNEL 3
+
#define TEST_MASK 0x7f
+#define L5_SIGN_EXT_MASK (0xFFUL << 56)
+#define L4_SIGN_EXT_MASK (0x1FFFFUL << 47)
#define LOW_ADDR (0x1UL << 30)
#define HIGH_ADDR (0x3UL << 48)
+#define L5_ADDR (0x1UL << 48)
#define MALLOC_LEN 32
@@ -370,6 +380,54 @@ static int handle_syscall(struct testcases *test)
return ret;
}
+static int get_user_syscall(struct testcases *test)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ int ptr_value = 0;
+ void *ptr = &ptr_value;
+ int fd;
+
+ uint64_t bitmask = ((uint64_t)ptr & L5_ADDR) ? L5_SIGN_EXT_MASK :
+ L4_SIGN_EXT_MASK;
+
+ if (test->lam != 0)
+ if (set_lam(test->lam) != 0)
+ return 2;
+
+ fd = memfd_create("lam_ioctl", 0);
+ if (fd == -1)
+ exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
+
+ switch (test->later) {
+ case GET_USER_USER:
+ /* Control group - properly tagger user pointer */
+ ptr = (void *)set_metadata((uint64_t)ptr, test->lam);
+ break;
+ case GET_USER_KERNEL_TOP:
+ /* Kernel address with top bit cleared */
+ bitmask &= (bitmask >> 1);
+ ptr = (void *)((uint64_t)ptr | bitmask);
+ break;
+ case GET_USER_KERNEL_BOT:
+ /* Kernel address with bottom sign-extension bit cleared */
+ bitmask &= (bitmask << 1);
+ ptr = (void *)((uint64_t)ptr | bitmask);
+ break;
+ case GET_USER_KERNEL:
+ /* Try to pass a kernel address */
+ ptr = (void *)((uint64_t)ptr | bitmask);
+ break;
+ default:
+ printf("Invalid test case value passed!\n");
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (ioctl(fd, FIOASYNC, ptr) != 0)
+ ret = 1;
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
int sys_uring_setup(unsigned int entries, struct io_uring_params *p)
{
return (int)syscall(__NR_io_uring_setup, entries, p);
@@ -883,6 +941,33 @@ static struct testcases syscall_cases[] = {
.test_func = handle_syscall,
.msg = "SYSCALL:[Negative] Disable LAM. Dereferencing pointer with metadata.\n",
},
+ {
+ .later = GET_USER_USER,
+ .lam = LAM_U57_BITS,
+ .test_func = get_user_syscall,
+ .msg = "GET_USER: get_user() and pass a properly tagged user pointer.\n",
+ },
+ {
+ .later = GET_USER_KERNEL_TOP,
+ .expected = 1,
+ .lam = LAM_U57_BITS,
+ .test_func = get_user_syscall,
+ .msg = "GET_USER:[Negative] get_user() with a kernel pointer and the top bit cleared.\n",
+ },
+ {
+ .later = GET_USER_KERNEL_BOT,
+ .expected = 1,
+ .lam = LAM_U57_BITS,
+ .test_func = get_user_syscall,
+ .msg = "GET_USER:[Negative] get_user() with a kernel pointer and the bottom sign-extension bit cleared.\n",
+ },
+ {
+ .later = GET_USER_KERNEL,
+ .expected = 1,
+ .lam = LAM_U57_BITS,
+ .test_func = get_user_syscall,
+ .msg = "GET_USER:[Negative] get_user() and pass a kernel pointer.\n",
+ },
};
static struct testcases mmap_cases[] = {
--
2.46.2
On Tue, Oct 29, 2024 at 03:14:20PM +0100, Maciej Wieczor-Retman wrote:
> Recent change in how get_user() handles pointers [1] has a specific case
> for LAM. It assigns a different bitmask that's later used to check
> whether a pointer comes from userland in get_user().
>
> While currently commented out (until LASS [2] is merged into the kernel)
> it's worth making changes to the LAM selftest ahead of time.
>
> Add test case to LAM that utilizes a ioctl (FIOASYNC) syscall which uses
> get_user() in its implementation. Execute the syscall with differently
> tagged pointers to verify that valid user pointers are passing through
> and invalid kernel/non-canonical pointers are not.
>
> Code was tested on a Sierra Forest Xeon machine that's LAM capable. The
> test was ran without issues with both the LAM lines from [1] untouched
> and commented out. The test was also ran without issues with LAM_SUP
> both enabled and disabled.
>
> [1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/20241024013214.129639-1-torvalds@linux-foundation.org/
> [2] https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240710160655.3402786-1-alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com/
>
> Signed-off-by: Maciej Wieczor-Retman <maciej.wieczor-retman@intel.com>
> ---
> tools/testing/selftests/x86/lam.c | 85 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> 1 file changed, 85 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/x86/lam.c b/tools/testing/selftests/x86/lam.c
> index 0ea4f6813930..3c53d4b7aa61 100644
> --- a/tools/testing/selftests/x86/lam.c
> +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/x86/lam.c
> @@ -4,6 +4,7 @@
> #include <stdlib.h>
> #include <string.h>
> #include <sys/syscall.h>
> +#include <sys/ioctl.h>
> #include <time.h>
> #include <signal.h>
> #include <setjmp.h>
> @@ -43,10 +44,19 @@
> #define FUNC_INHERITE 0x20
> #define FUNC_PASID 0x40
>
> +/* get_user() pointer test cases */
> +#define GET_USER_USER 0
> +#define GET_USER_KERNEL_TOP 1
> +#define GET_USER_KERNEL_BOT 2
> +#define GET_USER_KERNEL 3
> +
> #define TEST_MASK 0x7f
> +#define L5_SIGN_EXT_MASK (0xFFUL << 56)
> +#define L4_SIGN_EXT_MASK (0x1FFFFUL << 47)
>
> #define LOW_ADDR (0x1UL << 30)
> #define HIGH_ADDR (0x3UL << 48)
> +#define L5_ADDR (0x1UL << 48)
>
> #define MALLOC_LEN 32
>
> @@ -370,6 +380,54 @@ static int handle_syscall(struct testcases *test)
> return ret;
> }
>
> +static int get_user_syscall(struct testcases *test)
> +{
> + int ret = 0;
> + int ptr_value = 0;
> + void *ptr = &ptr_value;
> + int fd;
> +
> + uint64_t bitmask = ((uint64_t)ptr & L5_ADDR) ? L5_SIGN_EXT_MASK :
> + L4_SIGN_EXT_MASK;
Emm. Do you expect stack to be above at the very top of address space on
5-level paging machines? It is not true. We don't allocate any memory
above 46-bit unless asked explicitly.
See tools/testing/selftests/mm/va_high_addr_switch.c
--
Kiryl Shutsemau / Kirill A. Shutemov
On 2024-10-30 at 14:31:51 +0200, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
>On Tue, Oct 29, 2024 at 03:14:20PM +0100, Maciej Wieczor-Retman wrote:
>> Recent change in how get_user() handles pointers [1] has a specific case
>> for LAM. It assigns a different bitmask that's later used to check
>> whether a pointer comes from userland in get_user().
>>
>> While currently commented out (until LASS [2] is merged into the kernel)
>> it's worth making changes to the LAM selftest ahead of time.
>>
>> Add test case to LAM that utilizes a ioctl (FIOASYNC) syscall which uses
>> get_user() in its implementation. Execute the syscall with differently
>> tagged pointers to verify that valid user pointers are passing through
>> and invalid kernel/non-canonical pointers are not.
>>
>> Code was tested on a Sierra Forest Xeon machine that's LAM capable. The
>> test was ran without issues with both the LAM lines from [1] untouched
>> and commented out. The test was also ran without issues with LAM_SUP
>> both enabled and disabled.
>>
>> [1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/20241024013214.129639-1-torvalds@linux-foundation.org/
>> [2] https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240710160655.3402786-1-alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com/
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Maciej Wieczor-Retman <maciej.wieczor-retman@intel.com>
>> ---
>> tools/testing/selftests/x86/lam.c | 85 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>> 1 file changed, 85 insertions(+)
>>
>> diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/x86/lam.c b/tools/testing/selftests/x86/lam.c
>> index 0ea4f6813930..3c53d4b7aa61 100644
>> --- a/tools/testing/selftests/x86/lam.c
>> +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/x86/lam.c
>> @@ -4,6 +4,7 @@
>> #include <stdlib.h>
>> #include <string.h>
>> #include <sys/syscall.h>
>> +#include <sys/ioctl.h>
>> #include <time.h>
>> #include <signal.h>
>> #include <setjmp.h>
>> @@ -43,10 +44,19 @@
>> #define FUNC_INHERITE 0x20
>> #define FUNC_PASID 0x40
>>
>> +/* get_user() pointer test cases */
>> +#define GET_USER_USER 0
>> +#define GET_USER_KERNEL_TOP 1
>> +#define GET_USER_KERNEL_BOT 2
>> +#define GET_USER_KERNEL 3
>> +
>> #define TEST_MASK 0x7f
>> +#define L5_SIGN_EXT_MASK (0xFFUL << 56)
>> +#define L4_SIGN_EXT_MASK (0x1FFFFUL << 47)
>>
>> #define LOW_ADDR (0x1UL << 30)
>> #define HIGH_ADDR (0x3UL << 48)
>> +#define L5_ADDR (0x1UL << 48)
>>
>> #define MALLOC_LEN 32
>>
>> @@ -370,6 +380,54 @@ static int handle_syscall(struct testcases *test)
>> return ret;
>> }
>>
>> +static int get_user_syscall(struct testcases *test)
>> +{
>> + int ret = 0;
>> + int ptr_value = 0;
>> + void *ptr = &ptr_value;
>> + int fd;
>> +
>> + uint64_t bitmask = ((uint64_t)ptr & L5_ADDR) ? L5_SIGN_EXT_MASK :
>> + L4_SIGN_EXT_MASK;
>
>Emm. Do you expect stack to be above at the very top of address space on
>5-level paging machines? It is not true. We don't allocate any memory
>above 46-bit unless asked explicitly.
Right, I'm not sure why I thought that would work here.
>See tools/testing/selftests/mm/va_high_addr_switch.c
Thanks for the tip, I'll use mmap/munmap to determine the enabled pagetable level.
>
>--
> Kiryl Shutsemau / Kirill A. Shutemov
--
Kind regards
Maciej Wieczór-Retman
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