[patch v4 02/27] signal: Prevent user space from setting si_sys_private

Thomas Gleixner posted 27 patches 2 months ago
There is a newer version of this series
[patch v4 02/27] signal: Prevent user space from setting si_sys_private
Posted by Thomas Gleixner 2 months ago
From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>

The si_sys_private member of siginfo is used to handle posix-timer rearming
from the signal delivery path. Prevent user space from setting it as that
creates inconsistent state.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>

---
 kernel/signal.c | 8 ++++++++
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
---
diff --git a/kernel/signal.c b/kernel/signal.c
index a83ea99f9389..7706cd304785 100644
--- a/kernel/signal.c
+++ b/kernel/signal.c
@@ -3354,6 +3354,14 @@ int copy_siginfo_to_user(siginfo_t __user *to, const kernel_siginfo_t *from)
 static int post_copy_siginfo_from_user(kernel_siginfo_t *info,
 				       const siginfo_t __user *from)
 {
+	/*
+	 * Clear the si_sys_private field for timer signals as that's the
+	 * indicator for rearming a posix timer. User space submitted
+	 * signals are not allowed to inject that.
+	 */
+	if (info->si_code == SI_TIMER)
+		info->si_sys_private = 0;
+
 	if (unlikely(!known_siginfo_layout(info->si_signo, info->si_code))) {
 		char __user *expansion = si_expansion(from);
 		char buf[SI_EXPANSION_SIZE];
Re: [patch v4 02/27] signal: Prevent user space from setting si_sys_private
Posted by Eric W. Biederman 2 months ago
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> writes:

> From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
>
> The si_sys_private member of siginfo is used to handle posix-timer rearming
> from the signal delivery path. Prevent user space from setting it as that
> creates inconsistent state.
>
> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
>
> ---
>  kernel/signal.c | 8 ++++++++
>  1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
> ---
> diff --git a/kernel/signal.c b/kernel/signal.c
> index a83ea99f9389..7706cd304785 100644
> --- a/kernel/signal.c
> +++ b/kernel/signal.c
> @@ -3354,6 +3354,14 @@ int copy_siginfo_to_user(siginfo_t __user *to, const kernel_siginfo_t *from)
>  static int post_copy_siginfo_from_user(kernel_siginfo_t *info,
>  				       const siginfo_t __user *from)
>  {
> +	/*
> +	 * Clear the si_sys_private field for timer signals as that's the
> +	 * indicator for rearming a posix timer. User space submitted
> +	 * signals are not allowed to inject that.
> +	 */
> +	if (info->si_code == SI_TIMER)
> +		info->si_sys_private = 0;
> +
>  	if (unlikely(!known_siginfo_layout(info->si_signo, info->si_code))) {
>  		char __user *expansion = si_expansion(from);
>  		char buf[SI_EXPANSION_SIZE];


Can we do this differently for maintainability?  The siginfo union sucks
to deal with.

Can we place this test after the !known_siginfo_layout test.

Can you further make the case say something like:

	if ((siginfo_layout(info->si_signo, info->si_code) == SIL_TIMER) &&
            (info->si_sys_private != 0)) {
		return -EINVAL?
        }


Using siginfo_layout is slightly more expensive but it will catch any
future oddness that comes up, and I don't think signal injection is a path
where we need to optimize every last cycle.

Unless we expect userspace to be injecting signals with
info->si_sys_private set to non-zero (and we need to maintain backwards
comparability) it is probably better to simply error.

I unfortunately overlooked this corner case when I cleaned up signal
copying.

Eric
Re: [patch v4 02/27] signal: Prevent user space from setting si_sys_private
Posted by Frederic Weisbecker 2 months ago
Le Fri, Sep 27, 2024 at 10:48:41AM +0200, Thomas Gleixner a écrit :
> From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
> 
> The si_sys_private member of siginfo is used to handle posix-timer rearming
> from the signal delivery path. Prevent user space from setting it as that
> creates inconsistent state.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>

Funny that this field is exposed to userspace.

Anyway:

Acked-by: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org>