[PATCH 1/9] KVM: x86: SVM: Emulate reads and writes to shadow stack MSRs

John Allen posted 9 patches 2 years, 2 months ago
There is a newer version of this series
[PATCH 1/9] KVM: x86: SVM: Emulate reads and writes to shadow stack MSRs
Posted by John Allen 2 years, 2 months ago
Set up interception of shadow stack MSRs. In the event that shadow stack
is unsupported on the host or the MSRs are otherwise inaccessible, the
interception code will return an error. In certain circumstances such as
host initiated MSR reads or writes, the interception code will get or
set the requested MSR value.

Signed-off-by: John Allen <john.allen@amd.com>
---
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
index f283eb47f6ac..6a0d225311bc 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
@@ -2859,6 +2859,15 @@ static int svm_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
 		if (guest_cpuid_is_intel(vcpu))
 			msr_info->data |= (u64)svm->sysenter_esp_hi << 32;
 		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_S_CET:
+		msr_info->data = svm->vmcb->save.s_cet;
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_INT_SSP_TAB:
+		msr_info->data = svm->vmcb->save.isst_addr;
+		break;
+	case MSR_KVM_SSP:
+		msr_info->data = svm->vmcb->save.ssp;
+		break;
 	case MSR_TSC_AUX:
 		msr_info->data = svm->tsc_aux;
 		break;
@@ -3085,6 +3094,15 @@ static int svm_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr)
 		svm->vmcb01.ptr->save.sysenter_esp = (u32)data;
 		svm->sysenter_esp_hi = guest_cpuid_is_intel(vcpu) ? (data >> 32) : 0;
 		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_S_CET:
+		svm->vmcb->save.s_cet = data;
+		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_INT_SSP_TAB:
+		svm->vmcb->save.isst_addr = data;
+		break;
+	case MSR_KVM_SSP:
+		svm->vmcb->save.ssp = data;
+		break;
 	case MSR_TSC_AUX:
 		/*
 		 * TSC_AUX is usually changed only during boot and never read
-- 
2.40.1
Re: [PATCH 1/9] KVM: x86: SVM: Emulate reads and writes to shadow stack MSRs
Posted by Maxim Levitsky 2 years, 2 months ago
On Tue, 2023-10-10 at 20:02 +0000, John Allen wrote:
> Set up interception of shadow stack MSRs. In the event that shadow stack
> is unsupported on the host or the MSRs are otherwise inaccessible, the
> interception code will return an error. In certain circumstances such as
> host initiated MSR reads or writes, the interception code will get or
> set the requested MSR value.
> 
> Signed-off-by: John Allen <john.allen@amd.com>
> ---
>  arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
>  1 file changed, 18 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
> index f283eb47f6ac..6a0d225311bc 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
> @@ -2859,6 +2859,15 @@ static int svm_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
>  		if (guest_cpuid_is_intel(vcpu))
>  			msr_info->data |= (u64)svm->sysenter_esp_hi << 32;
>  		break;
> +	case MSR_IA32_S_CET:
> +		msr_info->data = svm->vmcb->save.s_cet;
> +		break;
> +	case MSR_IA32_INT_SSP_TAB:
> +		msr_info->data = svm->vmcb->save.isst_addr;
> +		break;
> +	case MSR_KVM_SSP:
> +		msr_info->data = svm->vmcb->save.ssp;
> +		break;
>  	case MSR_TSC_AUX:
>  		msr_info->data = svm->tsc_aux;
>  		break;
> @@ -3085,6 +3094,15 @@ static int svm_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr)
>  		svm->vmcb01.ptr->save.sysenter_esp = (u32)data;
>  		svm->sysenter_esp_hi = guest_cpuid_is_intel(vcpu) ? (data >> 32) : 0;
>  		break;
> +	case MSR_IA32_S_CET:
> +		svm->vmcb->save.s_cet = data;
> +		break;
> +	case MSR_IA32_INT_SSP_TAB:
> +		svm->vmcb->save.isst_addr = data;
> +		break;
> +	case MSR_KVM_SSP:
> +		svm->vmcb->save.ssp = data;
> +		break;
>  	case MSR_TSC_AUX:
>  		/*
>  		 * TSC_AUX is usually changed only during boot and never read

Looks good, except that if my complaint about turning the fake 'MSR_KVM_SSP' into
a first class register with an ioctl to load/save it is accepted, then
there will be a new vendor callback to read/write it instead of doing it in svm_get_msr/svm_set_msr.


Besides this,

Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>

Best regards,
	Maxim Levitsky