From: Joao Moreira <joao.moreira@intel.com>
Both flow_rule_alloc and offload_action_alloc functions received an
unsigned num_actions parameters which are then operated within a loop.
The index of this loop is declared as a signed int. If it was possible
to pass a large enough num_actions to these functions, it would lead to
an out of bounds write.
After checking with maintainers, it was mentioned that front-end will
cap the num_actions value and that it is not possible to reach this
function with such a large number. Yet, for correctness, it is still
better to fix this.
This issue was observed by the commit author while reviewing a write-up
regarding a CVE within the same subsystem [1].
1 - https://nickgregory.me/post/2022/03/12/cve-2022-25636/
Signed-off-by: Joao Moreira <joao.moreira@intel.com>
---
net/core/flow_offload.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/core/flow_offload.c b/net/core/flow_offload.c
index bc5169482710..bc3f53a09d8f 100644
--- a/net/core/flow_offload.c
+++ b/net/core/flow_offload.c
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
struct flow_rule *flow_rule_alloc(unsigned int num_actions)
{
struct flow_rule *rule;
- int i;
+ unsigned int i;
rule = kzalloc(struct_size(rule, action.entries, num_actions),
GFP_KERNEL);
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(flow_rule_alloc);
struct flow_offload_action *offload_action_alloc(unsigned int num_actions)
{
struct flow_offload_action *fl_action;
- int i;
+ unsigned int i;
fl_action = kzalloc(struct_size(fl_action, action.entries, num_actions),
GFP_KERNEL);
--
2.42.0
On Wed, Sep 27, 2023 at 09:47:14AM -0700, joao@overdrivepizza.com wrote:
> From: Joao Moreira <joao.moreira@intel.com>
>
> Both flow_rule_alloc and offload_action_alloc functions received an
> unsigned num_actions parameters which are then operated within a loop.
> The index of this loop is declared as a signed int. If it was possible
> to pass a large enough num_actions to these functions, it would lead to
> an out of bounds write.
>
> After checking with maintainers, it was mentioned that front-end will
> cap the num_actions value and that it is not possible to reach this
> function with such a large number. Yet, for correctness, it is still
> better to fix this.
>
> This issue was observed by the commit author while reviewing a write-up
> regarding a CVE within the same subsystem [1].
>
> 1 - https://nickgregory.me/post/2022/03/12/cve-2022-25636/
>
> Signed-off-by: Joao Moreira <joao.moreira@intel.com>
> ---
> net/core/flow_offload.c | 4 ++--
> 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/net/core/flow_offload.c b/net/core/flow_offload.c
> index bc5169482710..bc3f53a09d8f 100644
> --- a/net/core/flow_offload.c
> +++ b/net/core/flow_offload.c
> @@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
> struct flow_rule *flow_rule_alloc(unsigned int num_actions)
> {
> struct flow_rule *rule;
> - int i;
> + unsigned int i;
With the 2^8 cap, I don't think this patch is required anymore.
>
> rule = kzalloc(struct_size(rule, action.entries, num_actions),
> GFP_KERNEL);
> @@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(flow_rule_alloc);
> struct flow_offload_action *offload_action_alloc(unsigned int num_actions)
> {
> struct flow_offload_action *fl_action;
> - int i;
> + unsigned int i;
>
> fl_action = kzalloc(struct_size(fl_action, action.entries, num_actions),
> GFP_KERNEL);
> --
> 2.42.0
>
On 2023-09-28 06:40, Pablo Neira Ayuso wrote:
> On Wed, Sep 27, 2023 at 09:47:14AM -0700, joao@overdrivepizza.com
> wrote:
>> From: Joao Moreira <joao.moreira@intel.com>
>>
>> Both flow_rule_alloc and offload_action_alloc functions received an
>> unsigned num_actions parameters which are then operated within a loop.
>> The index of this loop is declared as a signed int. If it was possible
>> to pass a large enough num_actions to these functions, it would lead
>> to
>> an out of bounds write.
>>
>> After checking with maintainers, it was mentioned that front-end will
>> cap the num_actions value and that it is not possible to reach this
>> function with such a large number. Yet, for correctness, it is still
>> better to fix this.
>>
>> This issue was observed by the commit author while reviewing a
>> write-up
>> regarding a CVE within the same subsystem [1].
>>
>> 1 - https://nickgregory.me/post/2022/03/12/cve-2022-25636/
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Joao Moreira <joao.moreira@intel.com>
>> ---
>> net/core/flow_offload.c | 4 ++--
>> 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/net/core/flow_offload.c b/net/core/flow_offload.c
>> index bc5169482710..bc3f53a09d8f 100644
>> --- a/net/core/flow_offload.c
>> +++ b/net/core/flow_offload.c
>> @@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
>> struct flow_rule *flow_rule_alloc(unsigned int num_actions)
>> {
>> struct flow_rule *rule;
>> - int i;
>> + unsigned int i;
>
> With the 2^8 cap, I don't think this patch is required anymore.
Hm. While I understand that there is not a significant menace haunting
this... would it be good for (1) type correctness and (2) prevent that
things blow up if something changes and someone misses this spot?
>
>>
>> rule = kzalloc(struct_size(rule, action.entries, num_actions),
>> GFP_KERNEL);
>> @@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(flow_rule_alloc);
>> struct flow_offload_action *offload_action_alloc(unsigned int
>> num_actions)
>> {
>> struct flow_offload_action *fl_action;
>> - int i;
>> + unsigned int i;
>>
>> fl_action = kzalloc(struct_size(fl_action, action.entries,
>> num_actions),
>> GFP_KERNEL);
>> --
>> 2.42.0
>>
On Thu, Sep 28, 2023 at 07:53:14PM -0700, Joao Moreira wrote:
> On 2023-09-28 06:40, Pablo Neira Ayuso wrote:
> > On Wed, Sep 27, 2023 at 09:47:14AM -0700, joao@overdrivepizza.com wrote:
> > > From: Joao Moreira <joao.moreira@intel.com>
> > >
> > > Both flow_rule_alloc and offload_action_alloc functions received an
> > > unsigned num_actions parameters which are then operated within a loop.
> > > The index of this loop is declared as a signed int. If it was possible
> > > to pass a large enough num_actions to these functions, it would lead
> > > to
> > > an out of bounds write.
> > >
> > > After checking with maintainers, it was mentioned that front-end will
> > > cap the num_actions value and that it is not possible to reach this
> > > function with such a large number. Yet, for correctness, it is still
> > > better to fix this.
> > >
> > > This issue was observed by the commit author while reviewing a
> > > write-up
> > > regarding a CVE within the same subsystem [1].
> > >
> > > 1 - https://nickgregory.me/post/2022/03/12/cve-2022-25636/
> > >
> > > Signed-off-by: Joao Moreira <joao.moreira@intel.com>
> > > ---
> > > net/core/flow_offload.c | 4 ++--
> > > 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> > >
> > > diff --git a/net/core/flow_offload.c b/net/core/flow_offload.c
> > > index bc5169482710..bc3f53a09d8f 100644
> > > --- a/net/core/flow_offload.c
> > > +++ b/net/core/flow_offload.c
> > > @@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
> > > struct flow_rule *flow_rule_alloc(unsigned int num_actions)
> > > {
> > > struct flow_rule *rule;
> > > - int i;
> > > + unsigned int i;
> >
> > With the 2^8 cap, I don't think this patch is required anymore.
>
> Hm. While I understand that there is not a significant menace haunting
> this... would it be good for (1) type correctness and (2) prevent that
> things blow up if something changes and someone misses this spot?
Nothing is going to change, please remove unnecesary updates. Capping
to 2^8 for all hardware offload subsystems is sufficient by now. If
someone needs more than that, it will have to justify it.
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