kernel/trace/trace.c | 10 +++++++++- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
From d6ef949d29b884dd77fe5e628dc71318de08868c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Mateusz Stachyra <m.stachyra@samsung.com>
Date: Mon, 3 Jul 2023 17:48:40 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] trace: fix null pointer dereference in tracing_err_log_open()
Fix an issue in function 'tracing_err_log_open'.
The function doesn't call 'seq_open' if file is opened only with
write permissions, which results in 'file->private_data' being left at null.
If we then use 'lseek' on that opened file, 'seq_lseek' dereferences
'file->private_data' in 'mutex_lock(&m->lock)', resulting in a Kernel panic.
Writing to this node requires root privilages, therefore this bug
has very little security impact.
Tracefs node: /sys/kernel/tracing/error_log
Example Kernel panic:
Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000038
Call trace:
mutex_lock+0x30/0x110
seq_lseek+0x34/0xb8
__arm64_sys_lseek+0x6c/0xb8
invoke_syscall+0x58/0x13c
el0_svc_common+0xc4/0x10c
do_el0_svc+0x24/0x98
el0_svc+0x24/0x88
el0t_64_sync_handler+0x84/0xe4
el0t_64_sync+0x1b4/0x1b8
Code: d503201f aa0803e0 aa1f03e1 aa0103e9 (c8e97d02)
---[ end trace 561d1b49c12cf8a5 ]---
Kernel panic - not syncing: Oops: Fatal exception
Signed-off-by: Mateusz Stachyra <m.stachyra@samsung.com>
---
kernel/trace/trace.c | 10 +++++++++-
1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/kernel/trace/trace.c b/kernel/trace/trace.c
index 5d2c5678b..bfa8e2d01 100644
--- a/kernel/trace/trace.c
+++ b/kernel/trace/trace.c
@@ -8097,8 +8097,16 @@ static int tracing_err_log_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
return ret;
/* If this file was opened for write, then erase contents */
- if ((file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) && (file->f_flags & O_TRUNC))
+ if ((file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) && (file->f_flags & O_TRUNC)) {
clear_tracing_err_log(tr);
+ ret = seq_open(file, &tracing_err_log_seq_ops);
+ if (!ret) {
+ struct seq_file *m = file->private_data;
+ m->private = tr;
+ } else {
+ trace_array_put(tr);
+ }
+ }
if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ) {
ret = seq_open(file, &tracing_err_log_seq_ops);
base-commit: 1ef6663a587ba3e57dc5065a477db1c64481eedd
--
2.25.1
On Mon, 03 Jul 2023 17:52:37 +0200
Mateusz Stachyra <m.stachyra@samsung.com> wrote:
> >From d6ef949d29b884dd77fe5e628dc71318de08868c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
> From: Mateusz Stachyra <m.stachyra@samsung.com>
> Date: Mon, 3 Jul 2023 17:48:40 +0200
> Subject: [PATCH] trace: fix null pointer dereference in tracing_err_log_open()
>
> Fix an issue in function 'tracing_err_log_open'.
> The function doesn't call 'seq_open' if file is opened only with
> write permissions, which results in 'file->private_data' being left at null.
> If we then use 'lseek' on that opened file, 'seq_lseek' dereferences
> 'file->private_data' in 'mutex_lock(&m->lock)', resulting in a Kernel panic.
> Writing to this node requires root privilages, therefore this bug
> has very little security impact.
>
> Tracefs node: /sys/kernel/tracing/error_log
>
Nice catch, but I recommend a different solution.
> Example Kernel panic:
>
> Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000038
> Call trace:
> mutex_lock+0x30/0x110
> seq_lseek+0x34/0xb8
> __arm64_sys_lseek+0x6c/0xb8
> invoke_syscall+0x58/0x13c
> el0_svc_common+0xc4/0x10c
> do_el0_svc+0x24/0x98
> el0_svc+0x24/0x88
> el0t_64_sync_handler+0x84/0xe4
> el0t_64_sync+0x1b4/0x1b8
> Code: d503201f aa0803e0 aa1f03e1 aa0103e9 (c8e97d02)
> ---[ end trace 561d1b49c12cf8a5 ]---
> Kernel panic - not syncing: Oops: Fatal exception
>
> Signed-off-by: Mateusz Stachyra <m.stachyra@samsung.com>
> ---
> kernel/trace/trace.c | 10 +++++++++-
> 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/kernel/trace/trace.c b/kernel/trace/trace.c
> index 5d2c5678b..bfa8e2d01 100644
> --- a/kernel/trace/trace.c
> +++ b/kernel/trace/trace.c
> @@ -8097,8 +8097,16 @@ static int tracing_err_log_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
> return ret;
>
> /* If this file was opened for write, then erase contents */
> - if ((file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) && (file->f_flags & O_TRUNC))
> + if ((file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) && (file->f_flags & O_TRUNC)) {
> clear_tracing_err_log(tr);
> + ret = seq_open(file, &tracing_err_log_seq_ops);
> + if (!ret) {
> + struct seq_file *m = file->private_data;
> + m->private = tr;
> + } else {
> + trace_array_put(tr);
> + }
> + }
>
> if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ) {
> ret = seq_open(file, &tracing_err_log_seq_ops);
>
> base-commit: 1ef6663a587ba3e57dc5065a477db1c64481eedd
I believe this can be better fixed by:
diff --git a/kernel/trace/trace.c b/kernel/trace/trace.c
index 64a4dde073ef..999b7c73e324 100644
--- a/kernel/trace/trace.c
+++ b/kernel/trace/trace.c
@@ -8135,7 +8135,7 @@ static const struct file_operations tracing_err_log_fops = {
.open = tracing_err_log_open,
.write = tracing_err_log_write,
.read = seq_read,
- .llseek = seq_lseek,
+ .llseek = tracing_lseek,
.release = tracing_err_log_release,
};
as that tracing_lseek() is for this exact scenario.
Care to send a v2?
Thanks,
-- Steve
>> >From d6ef949d29b884dd77fe5e628dc71318de08868c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
>> From: Mateusz Stachyra <m.stachyra@samsung.com>
>> Date: Mon, 3 Jul 2023 17:48:40 +0200
>> Subject: [PATCH] trace: fix null pointer dereference in tracing_err_log_open()
>>
>> Fix an issue in function 'tracing_err_log_open'.
>> The function doesn't call 'seq_open' if file is opened only with
>> write permissions, which results in 'file->private_data' being left at null.
>> If we then use 'lseek' on that opened file, 'seq_lseek' dereferences
>> 'file->private_data' in 'mutex_lock(&m->lock)', resulting in a Kernel panic.
>> Writing to this node requires root privilages, therefore this bug
>> has very little security impact.
>>
>> Tracefs node: /sys/kernel/tracing/error_log
>>
>
>Nice catch, but I recommend a different solution.
>
>
>> Example Kernel panic:
>>
>> Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000038
>> Call trace:
>> mutex_lock+0x30/0x110
>> seq_lseek+0x34/0xb8
>> __arm64_sys_lseek+0x6c/0xb8
>> invoke_syscall+0x58/0x13c
>> el0_svc_common+0xc4/0x10c
>> do_el0_svc+0x24/0x98
>> el0_svc+0x24/0x88
>> el0t_64_sync_handler+0x84/0xe4
>> el0t_64_sync+0x1b4/0x1b8
>> Code: d503201f aa0803e0 aa1f03e1 aa0103e9 (c8e97d02)
>> ---[ end trace 561d1b49c12cf8a5 ]---
>> Kernel panic - not syncing: Oops: Fatal exception
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Mateusz Stachyra <m.stachyra@samsung.com>
>> ---
>> kernel/trace/trace.c | 10 +++++++++-
>> 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/kernel/trace/trace.c b/kernel/trace/trace.c
>> index 5d2c5678b..bfa8e2d01 100644
>> --- a/kernel/trace/trace.c
>> +++ b/kernel/trace/trace.c
>> @@ -8097,8 +8097,16 @@ static int tracing_err_log_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
>> return ret;
>>
>> /* If this file was opened for write, then erase contents */
>> - if ((file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) && (file->f_flags & O_TRUNC))
>> + if ((file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) && (file->f_flags & O_TRUNC)) {
>> clear_tracing_err_log(tr);
>> + ret = seq_open(file, &tracing_err_log_seq_ops);
>> + if (!ret) {
>> + struct seq_file *m = file->private_data;
>> + m->private = tr;
>> + } else {
>> + trace_array_put(tr);
>> + }
>> + }
>>
>> if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ) {
>> ret = seq_open(file, &tracing_err_log_seq_ops);
>>
>> base-commit: 1ef6663a587ba3e57dc5065a477db1c64481eedd
>
>I believe this can be better fixed by:
>
>diff --git a/kernel/trace/trace.c b/kernel/trace/trace.c
>index 64a4dde073ef..999b7c73e324 100644
>--- a/kernel/trace/trace.c
>+++ b/kernel/trace/trace.c
>@@ -8135,7 +8135,7 @@ static const struct file_operations tracing_err_log_fops = {
> .open = tracing_err_log_open,
> .write = tracing_err_log_write,
> .read = seq_read,
>- .llseek = seq_lseek,
>+ .llseek = tracing_lseek,
> .release = tracing_err_log_release,
> };
>
>as that tracing_lseek() is for this exact scenario.
>
>Care to send a v2?
>
>Thanks,
>
>-- Steve
Thanks for reply and for the suggestion.
I've submitted v2 at:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230704102706eucms1p30d7ecdcc287f46ad67679fc8491b2e0f@eucms1p3/
-- Mateusz
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