Adds PTRACE_O_SUSPEND_SYSCALL_USER_DISPATCH to ptrace options, and
modify Syscall User Dispatch to suspend interception when enabled.
This is modeled after the SUSPEND_SECCOMP feature, which suspends
SECCOMP interposition. Without doing this, software like CRIU will
inject system calls into a process and be intercepted by Syscall
User Dispatch, either causing a crash (due to blocked signals) or
the delivery of those signals to a ptracer (not the intended behavior).
Since Syscall User Dispatch is not a privileged feature, a check
for permissions is not required, however attempting to set this
option when CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE it not supported should be
disallowed, as its intended use is checkpoint/resume.
Signed-off-by: Gregory Price <gregory.price@memverge.com>
---
include/linux/ptrace.h | 2 ++
include/uapi/linux/ptrace.h | 6 +++++-
kernel/entry/syscall_user_dispatch.c | 5 +++++
kernel/ptrace.c | 5 +++++
4 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/ptrace.h b/include/linux/ptrace.h
index eaaef3ffec22..461ae5c99d57 100644
--- a/include/linux/ptrace.h
+++ b/include/linux/ptrace.h
@@ -45,6 +45,8 @@ extern int ptrace_access_vm(struct task_struct *tsk, unsigned long addr,
#define PT_EXITKILL (PTRACE_O_EXITKILL << PT_OPT_FLAG_SHIFT)
#define PT_SUSPEND_SECCOMP (PTRACE_O_SUSPEND_SECCOMP << PT_OPT_FLAG_SHIFT)
+#define PT_SUSPEND_SYSCALL_USER_DISPATCH \
+ (PTRACE_O_SUSPEND_SYSCALL_USER_DISPATCH << PT_OPT_FLAG_SHIFT)
extern long arch_ptrace(struct task_struct *child, long request,
unsigned long addr, unsigned long data);
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/ptrace.h b/include/uapi/linux/ptrace.h
index 195ae64a8c87..ba9e3f19a22c 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/ptrace.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/ptrace.h
@@ -146,9 +146,13 @@ struct ptrace_rseq_configuration {
/* eventless options */
#define PTRACE_O_EXITKILL (1 << 20)
#define PTRACE_O_SUSPEND_SECCOMP (1 << 21)
+#define PTRACE_O_SUSPEND_SYSCALL_USER_DISPATCH (1 << 22)
#define PTRACE_O_MASK (\
- 0x000000ff | PTRACE_O_EXITKILL | PTRACE_O_SUSPEND_SECCOMP)
+ 0x000000ff | \
+ PTRACE_O_EXITKILL | \
+ PTRACE_O_SUSPEND_SECCOMP | \
+ PTRACE_O_SUSPEND_SYSCALL_USER_DISPATCH)
#include <asm/ptrace.h>
diff --git a/kernel/entry/syscall_user_dispatch.c b/kernel/entry/syscall_user_dispatch.c
index 0b6379adff6b..7607f4598dd8 100644
--- a/kernel/entry/syscall_user_dispatch.c
+++ b/kernel/entry/syscall_user_dispatch.c
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
#include <linux/signal.h>
#include <linux/elf.h>
+#include <linux/ptrace.h>
#include <linux/sched/signal.h>
#include <linux/sched/task_stack.h>
@@ -36,6 +37,10 @@ bool syscall_user_dispatch(struct pt_regs *regs)
struct syscall_user_dispatch *sd = ¤t->syscall_dispatch;
char state;
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE) &&
+ unlikely(current->ptrace & PT_SUSPEND_SYSCALL_USER_DISPATCH))
+ return false;
+
if (likely(instruction_pointer(regs) - sd->offset < sd->len))
return false;
diff --git a/kernel/ptrace.c b/kernel/ptrace.c
index 54482193e1ed..a6ad815bd4be 100644
--- a/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -370,6 +370,11 @@ static int check_ptrace_options(unsigned long data)
if (data & ~(unsigned long)PTRACE_O_MASK)
return -EINVAL;
+ if (unlikely(data & PTRACE_O_SUSPEND_SYSCALL_USER_DISPATCH)) {
+ if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTART))
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
if (unlikely(data & PTRACE_O_SUSPEND_SECCOMP)) {
if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE) ||
!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECCOMP))
--
2.39.0
On Wed, Jan 18, 2023 at 03:10:53PM -0500, Gregory Price wrote: > Adds PTRACE_O_SUSPEND_SYSCALL_USER_DISPATCH to ptrace options, and > modify Syscall User Dispatch to suspend interception when enabled. > > This is modeled after the SUSPEND_SECCOMP feature, which suspends > SECCOMP interposition. Without doing this, software like CRIU will > inject system calls into a process and be intercepted by Syscall > User Dispatch, either causing a crash (due to blocked signals) or > the delivery of those signals to a ptracer (not the intended behavior). > > Since Syscall User Dispatch is not a privileged feature, a check > for permissions is not required, however attempting to set this > option when CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE it not supported should be > disallowed, as its intended use is checkpoint/resume. > > Signed-off-by: Gregory Price <gregory.price@memverge.com> One small nit -- see below, otherwise: Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> > --- > include/linux/ptrace.h | 2 ++ > include/uapi/linux/ptrace.h | 6 +++++- > kernel/entry/syscall_user_dispatch.c | 5 +++++ > kernel/ptrace.c | 5 +++++ > 4 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) > > diff --git a/include/linux/ptrace.h b/include/linux/ptrace.h > index eaaef3ffec22..461ae5c99d57 100644 > --- a/include/linux/ptrace.h > +++ b/include/linux/ptrace.h > @@ -45,6 +45,8 @@ extern int ptrace_access_vm(struct task_struct *tsk, unsigned long addr, > > #define PT_EXITKILL (PTRACE_O_EXITKILL << PT_OPT_FLAG_SHIFT) > #define PT_SUSPEND_SECCOMP (PTRACE_O_SUSPEND_SECCOMP << PT_OPT_FLAG_SHIFT) > +#define PT_SUSPEND_SYSCALL_USER_DISPATCH \ > + (PTRACE_O_SUSPEND_SYSCALL_USER_DISPATCH << PT_OPT_FLAG_SHIFT) > > extern long arch_ptrace(struct task_struct *child, long request, > unsigned long addr, unsigned long data); > diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/ptrace.h b/include/uapi/linux/ptrace.h > index 195ae64a8c87..ba9e3f19a22c 100644 > --- a/include/uapi/linux/ptrace.h > +++ b/include/uapi/linux/ptrace.h > @@ -146,9 +146,13 @@ struct ptrace_rseq_configuration { > /* eventless options */ > #define PTRACE_O_EXITKILL (1 << 20) > #define PTRACE_O_SUSPEND_SECCOMP (1 << 21) > +#define PTRACE_O_SUSPEND_SYSCALL_USER_DISPATCH (1 << 22) > > #define PTRACE_O_MASK (\ > - 0x000000ff | PTRACE_O_EXITKILL | PTRACE_O_SUSPEND_SECCOMP) > + 0x000000ff | \ > + PTRACE_O_EXITKILL | \ > + PTRACE_O_SUSPEND_SECCOMP | \ > + PTRACE_O_SUSPEND_SYSCALL_USER_DISPATCH) > > #include <asm/ptrace.h> > > diff --git a/kernel/entry/syscall_user_dispatch.c b/kernel/entry/syscall_user_dispatch.c > index 0b6379adff6b..7607f4598dd8 100644 > --- a/kernel/entry/syscall_user_dispatch.c > +++ b/kernel/entry/syscall_user_dispatch.c > @@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ > #include <linux/uaccess.h> > #include <linux/signal.h> > #include <linux/elf.h> > +#include <linux/ptrace.h> > > #include <linux/sched/signal.h> > #include <linux/sched/task_stack.h> > @@ -36,6 +37,10 @@ bool syscall_user_dispatch(struct pt_regs *regs) > struct syscall_user_dispatch *sd = ¤t->syscall_dispatch; > char state; > > + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE) && > + unlikely(current->ptrace & PT_SUSPEND_SYSCALL_USER_DISPATCH)) Align with the '(' pleaase. > + return false; > + > if (likely(instruction_pointer(regs) - sd->offset < sd->len)) > return false; > > diff --git a/kernel/ptrace.c b/kernel/ptrace.c > index 54482193e1ed..a6ad815bd4be 100644 > --- a/kernel/ptrace.c > +++ b/kernel/ptrace.c > @@ -370,6 +370,11 @@ static int check_ptrace_options(unsigned long data) > if (data & ~(unsigned long)PTRACE_O_MASK) > return -EINVAL; > > + if (unlikely(data & PTRACE_O_SUSPEND_SYSCALL_USER_DISPATCH)) { > + if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTART)) > + return -EINVAL; > + } > + > if (unlikely(data & PTRACE_O_SUSPEND_SECCOMP)) { > if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE) || > !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECCOMP)) > -- > 2.39.0 >
On 1/20/23 19:23, Peter Zijlstra wrote: > On Wed, Jan 18, 2023 at 03:10:53PM -0500, Gregory Price wrote: >> Adds PTRACE_O_SUSPEND_SYSCALL_USER_DISPATCH to ptrace options, and >> modify Syscall User Dispatch to suspend interception when enabled. >> >> This is modeled after the SUSPEND_SECCOMP feature, which suspends >> SECCOMP interposition. Without doing this, software like CRIU will >> inject system calls into a process and be intercepted by Syscall >> User Dispatch, either causing a crash (due to blocked signals) or >> the delivery of those signals to a ptracer (not the intended behavior). >> >> Since Syscall User Dispatch is not a privileged feature, a check >> for permissions is not required, however attempting to set this >> option when CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE it not supported should be >> disallowed, as its intended use is checkpoint/resume. >> >> Signed-off-by: Gregory Price <gregory.price@memverge.com> > > One small nit -- see below, otherwise: > > Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> > >> --- >> include/linux/ptrace.h | 2 ++ >> include/uapi/linux/ptrace.h | 6 +++++- >> kernel/entry/syscall_user_dispatch.c | 5 +++++ >> kernel/ptrace.c | 5 +++++ >> 4 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) >> >> diff --git a/include/linux/ptrace.h b/include/linux/ptrace.h >> index eaaef3ffec22..461ae5c99d57 100644 >> --- a/include/linux/ptrace.h >> +++ b/include/linux/ptrace.h >> @@ -45,6 +45,8 @@ extern int ptrace_access_vm(struct task_struct *tsk, unsigned long addr, >> >> #define PT_EXITKILL (PTRACE_O_EXITKILL << PT_OPT_FLAG_SHIFT) >> #define PT_SUSPEND_SECCOMP (PTRACE_O_SUSPEND_SECCOMP << PT_OPT_FLAG_SHIFT) >> +#define PT_SUSPEND_SYSCALL_USER_DISPATCH \ >> + (PTRACE_O_SUSPEND_SYSCALL_USER_DISPATCH << PT_OPT_FLAG_SHIFT) >> >> extern long arch_ptrace(struct task_struct *child, long request, >> unsigned long addr, unsigned long data); >> diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/ptrace.h b/include/uapi/linux/ptrace.h >> index 195ae64a8c87..ba9e3f19a22c 100644 >> --- a/include/uapi/linux/ptrace.h >> +++ b/include/uapi/linux/ptrace.h >> @@ -146,9 +146,13 @@ struct ptrace_rseq_configuration { >> /* eventless options */ >> #define PTRACE_O_EXITKILL (1 << 20) >> #define PTRACE_O_SUSPEND_SECCOMP (1 << 21) >> +#define PTRACE_O_SUSPEND_SYSCALL_USER_DISPATCH (1 << 22) >> >> #define PTRACE_O_MASK (\ >> - 0x000000ff | PTRACE_O_EXITKILL | PTRACE_O_SUSPEND_SECCOMP) >> + 0x000000ff | \ >> + PTRACE_O_EXITKILL | \ >> + PTRACE_O_SUSPEND_SECCOMP | \ >> + PTRACE_O_SUSPEND_SYSCALL_USER_DISPATCH) >> >> #include <asm/ptrace.h> >> >> diff --git a/kernel/entry/syscall_user_dispatch.c b/kernel/entry/syscall_user_dispatch.c >> index 0b6379adff6b..7607f4598dd8 100644 >> --- a/kernel/entry/syscall_user_dispatch.c >> +++ b/kernel/entry/syscall_user_dispatch.c >> @@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ >> #include <linux/uaccess.h> >> #include <linux/signal.h> >> #include <linux/elf.h> >> +#include <linux/ptrace.h> >> >> #include <linux/sched/signal.h> >> #include <linux/sched/task_stack.h> >> @@ -36,6 +37,10 @@ bool syscall_user_dispatch(struct pt_regs *regs) >> struct syscall_user_dispatch *sd = ¤t->syscall_dispatch; >> char state; >> >> + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE) && >> + unlikely(current->ptrace & PT_SUSPEND_SYSCALL_USER_DISPATCH)) > > Align with the '(' pleaase. > >> + return false; >> + >> if (likely(instruction_pointer(regs) - sd->offset < sd->len)) >> return false; >> >> diff --git a/kernel/ptrace.c b/kernel/ptrace.c >> index 54482193e1ed..a6ad815bd4be 100644 >> --- a/kernel/ptrace.c >> +++ b/kernel/ptrace.c >> @@ -370,6 +370,11 @@ static int check_ptrace_options(unsigned long data) >> if (data & ~(unsigned long)PTRACE_O_MASK) >> return -EINVAL; >> >> + if (unlikely(data & PTRACE_O_SUSPEND_SYSCALL_USER_DISPATCH)) { >> + if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTART)) Why not one if with a && ? >> + return -EINVAL; >> + } >> + >> if (unlikely(data & PTRACE_O_SUSPEND_SECCOMP)) { >> if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE) || >> !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECCOMP)) >> -- >> 2.39.0 >> -- Damien Le Moal Western Digital Research
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