drivers/hid/hid-steam.c | 10 ++++++++++ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
It is possible for a malicious device to forgo submitting a Feature
Report. The HID Steam driver presently makes no prevision for this
and de-references the 'struct hid_report' pointer obtained from the
HID devices without first checking its validity. Let's change that.
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>
Cc: Benjamin Tissoires <benjamin.tissoires@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-input@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: c164d6abf3841 ("HID: add driver for Valve Steam Controller")
Signed-off-by: Lee Jones <lee@kernel.org>
---
drivers/hid/hid-steam.c | 10 ++++++++++
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/hid/hid-steam.c b/drivers/hid/hid-steam.c
index a3b151b29bd71..fc616db4231bb 100644
--- a/drivers/hid/hid-steam.c
+++ b/drivers/hid/hid-steam.c
@@ -134,6 +134,11 @@ static int steam_recv_report(struct steam_device *steam,
int ret;
r = steam->hdev->report_enum[HID_FEATURE_REPORT].report_id_hash[0];
+ if (!r) {
+ hid_err(steam->hdev, "No HID_FEATURE_REPORT submitted - nothing to read\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
if (hid_report_len(r) < 64)
return -EINVAL;
@@ -165,6 +170,11 @@ static int steam_send_report(struct steam_device *steam,
int ret;
r = steam->hdev->report_enum[HID_FEATURE_REPORT].report_id_hash[0];
+ if (!r) {
+ hid_err(steam->hdev, "No HID_FEATURE_REPORT submitted - nothing to read\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
if (hid_report_len(r) < 64)
return -EINVAL;
--
2.37.1.455.g008518b4e5-goog
On Wed, 03 Aug 2022, Lee Jones wrote:
> It is possible for a malicious device to forgo submitting a Feature
> Report. The HID Steam driver presently makes no prevision for this
> and de-references the 'struct hid_report' pointer obtained from the
> HID devices without first checking its validity. Let's change that.
This patch has been floating around since the beginning of July.
It fixes a real issue which was found by creating a virtual
(software based) malicious device and registering it as a HID device.
There is nothing preventing a real attacker from creating a H/W
version of the device in order to instigate an out-of-bounds read,
potentially leading to a data leak.
Would someone be kind enough to review please?
> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>
> Cc: Benjamin Tissoires <benjamin.tissoires@redhat.com>
> Cc: linux-input@vger.kernel.org
> Fixes: c164d6abf3841 ("HID: add driver for Valve Steam Controller")
> Signed-off-by: Lee Jones <lee@kernel.org>
> ---
> drivers/hid/hid-steam.c | 10 ++++++++++
> 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/drivers/hid/hid-steam.c b/drivers/hid/hid-steam.c
> index a3b151b29bd71..fc616db4231bb 100644
> --- a/drivers/hid/hid-steam.c
> +++ b/drivers/hid/hid-steam.c
> @@ -134,6 +134,11 @@ static int steam_recv_report(struct steam_device *steam,
> int ret;
>
> r = steam->hdev->report_enum[HID_FEATURE_REPORT].report_id_hash[0];
> + if (!r) {
> + hid_err(steam->hdev, "No HID_FEATURE_REPORT submitted - nothing to read\n");
> + return -EINVAL;
> + }
> +
> if (hid_report_len(r) < 64)
> return -EINVAL;
>
> @@ -165,6 +170,11 @@ static int steam_send_report(struct steam_device *steam,
> int ret;
>
> r = steam->hdev->report_enum[HID_FEATURE_REPORT].report_id_hash[0];
> + if (!r) {
> + hid_err(steam->hdev, "No HID_FEATURE_REPORT submitted - nothing to read\n");
> + return -EINVAL;
> + }
> +
> if (hid_report_len(r) < 64)
> return -EINVAL;
>
--
Lee Jones [李琼斯]
Hi
Lee Jones <lee@kernel.org> wrote:
> On Wed, 03 Aug 2022, Lee Jones wrote:
>
> > It is possible for a malicious device to forgo submitting a Feature
> > Report. The HID Steam driver presently makes no prevision for this
> > and de-references the 'struct hid_report' pointer obtained from the
> > HID devices without first checking its validity. Let's change that.
>
> This patch has been floating around since the beginning of July.
>
> It fixes a real issue which was found by creating a virtual
> (software based) malicious device and registering it as a HID device.
>
> There is nothing preventing a real attacker from creating a H/W
> version of the device in order to instigate an out-of-bounds read,
> potentially leading to a data leak.
>
> Would someone be kind enough to review please?
AFACT this patch has been applied by Jiri on the 25th of August already.
Is a review still needed in this case?
Cheers,
Silvan
>
> > Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>
> > Cc: Benjamin Tissoires <benjamin.tissoires@redhat.com>
> > Cc: linux-input@vger.kernel.org
> > Fixes: c164d6abf3841 ("HID: add driver for Valve Steam Controller")
> > Signed-off-by: Lee Jones <lee@kernel.org>
> > ---
> > drivers/hid/hid-steam.c | 10 ++++++++++
> > 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
> >
> > diff --git a/drivers/hid/hid-steam.c b/drivers/hid/hid-steam.c
> > index a3b151b29bd71..fc616db4231bb 100644
> > --- a/drivers/hid/hid-steam.c
> > +++ b/drivers/hid/hid-steam.c
> > @@ -134,6 +134,11 @@ static int steam_recv_report(struct steam_device *steam,
> > int ret;
> >
> > r = steam->hdev->report_enum[HID_FEATURE_REPORT].report_id_hash[0];
> > + if (!r) {
> > + hid_err(steam->hdev, "No HID_FEATURE_REPORT submitted - nothing to read\n");
> > + return -EINVAL;
> > + }
> > +
> > if (hid_report_len(r) < 64)
> > return -EINVAL;
> >
> > @@ -165,6 +170,11 @@ static int steam_send_report(struct steam_device *steam,
> > int ret;
> >
> > r = steam->hdev->report_enum[HID_FEATURE_REPORT].report_id_hash[0];
> > + if (!r) {
> > + hid_err(steam->hdev, "No HID_FEATURE_REPORT submitted - nothing to read\n");
> > + return -EINVAL;
> > + }
> > +
> > if (hid_report_len(r) < 64)
> > return -EINVAL;
> >
On Mon, 12 Sep 2022, Silvan Jegen wrote: > Hi > > Lee Jones <lee@kernel.org> wrote: > > On Wed, 03 Aug 2022, Lee Jones wrote: > > > > > It is possible for a malicious device to forgo submitting a Feature > > > Report. The HID Steam driver presently makes no prevision for this > > > and de-references the 'struct hid_report' pointer obtained from the > > > HID devices without first checking its validity. Let's change that. > > > > This patch has been floating around since the beginning of July. > > > > It fixes a real issue which was found by creating a virtual > > (software based) malicious device and registering it as a HID device. > > > > There is nothing preventing a real attacker from creating a H/W > > version of the device in order to instigate an out-of-bounds read, > > potentially leading to a data leak. > > > > Would someone be kind enough to review please? > > AFACT this patch has been applied by Jiri on the 25th of August already. Ah, I missed his reply to the original patch. > Is a review still needed in this case? Certainly not. Thank you for your reply. -- Lee Jones [李琼斯]
© 2016 - 2026 Red Hat, Inc.